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全球化、亚洲区域主义 与中国的和平发展

苏长和 主编

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杨玉良、朱之文、朴仁国

林尚立

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序 言

Preface

过去三十多年来,区域化是亚洲国际关系发展最活跃的力量之一。亚洲各个地区内部以及各个地区之间的政治、经济、社会、人文联系得到普遍的加强。在《东盟宪章》的指导下,东盟一体化有了更明确的政治经济发展方向;中日韩围绕东亚共同体的建设,以及中日韩与东盟之间对话平台的形成,为东亚和东南亚经济繁荣奠定了较为坚实的制度基础;上海合作组织的成立为中亚和平稳定提供了具体的安全 and 经济框架;近年来,南亚经济合作和地区一体化的发展也呈现积极的态势;随着俄罗斯远东及西伯利亚地区开发被提上日程,北亚和东北亚的经济合作会成为未来亚洲区域合作的新亮点。亚洲地域广袤,各地区国情差异较大,各地区根据自身特点和发展阶段,走适合本地区的区域发展道路,符合亚洲的区域化战略。

讨论亚洲的区域化发展浪潮,无论如何离不开中国的和平发展。中国的崛起与和平发展,是具有世界历史意义的一个伟大进程。某种意义上,亚洲各个地区的区域化发展,是与中国的和平发展不可分割的。当前,中国全方位、宽领域、深层次地参与到亚洲区域化进程的方方面面中,本身已成为亚洲区域化的推动甚至是带动力量。中国现在已经成为亚洲许多国家最大的贸易伙伴国和最大的投资来源国,中国的发展牵动着亚洲,亚洲的和平与稳定也深深影响着中国改革开放战略。过去三十多年的正面经验告诉我们,亚洲的区域化进程得益于中国的发展,中国和平发展也受益于亚洲各国的开放。两者和则双利,分则俱损。

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

当今世界处于大发展大变革大调整时期,世界政治经济文化格局正在发生自冷战结束以来最为深刻的变化。国际政治的一超格局不可扭转地出现松动,世界经济重心不可阻挡地出现向新兴国家转移的趋势,一大批新兴国家以及中等国家的崛起,将会对西方主导的国际政治格局产生历史性的冲击。伴随着政治经济重心的变化以及教育水平和识字率的提高,包括亚洲国家人民在内的各国人民的文化觉醒,对过去西方主导的人文交流格局也将产生重大的影响,人类文明对话的格局在向非西方国家倾斜,向亚洲国家倾斜。

与此同时,中国与世界的关系进入到历史性变化的新阶段,中国与世界处于卯榫相合的状态,中国的发展离不开世界,世界发展也离不开中国。在具有世界历史变化意义的今天,中国和亚洲都需要站在新的起点上,思考自身的命运与未来。

以史知今,鉴往知来。亚洲国家要抓住发展的机遇,既要时时不忘过去历史上反面经验给予自己的教训,也要有高度的文化自觉和主人翁意识,相信亚洲的智慧,进而有信心、有耐心走亚洲的和平发展道路。

亚洲大部分国家都有殖民地和半殖民地的痛苦记忆,在世界经济体系中长期处于边缘和末梢地位,今天亚洲地区的许多冲突和热点问题,其根由仍然与过去宗主国-殖民地的政治经济体系有着千丝万缕的联系。20 世纪上半叶,个别亚洲国家在经济发展以后,没有走和平发展道路,而是趋步于西方,实行军事扩展和经济殖民,从而给一些亚洲国家人民带来深重的灾难;在整个冷战时期,亚洲是冷战大国政治对抗的受害者;直至今天,外来势力仍然不同程度地干扰着、影响着亚洲国家的团结和合作。在和平与发展来之不易的今天,亚洲国家应该时刻牢记这些教训。

亚洲历来有信心,也有政治智慧解决亚洲问题,亚洲是为国际关系贡献过思想和理念的,它们是我们今天值得汲取的正面经验。亚洲自古以来就为世界提供了绚烂的政治经济思想,为人类政治文明作出了贡献。进入 20 世纪以来,亚洲的国际政治思想独树一帜,在国际政治思想史上占有一席之地。1954 年,中国、印度和缅甸政府共同倡导的和平共处五项原则,已经成为指导各国间关系的基本原则,是国际法的重要组成部分,今天,新旧干涉主义思潮和实践成为构建公正合理包容有序的国际政治秩序的最大威胁之一,维护和珍惜和平共处五项原则中的互不干涉内政原则,理应成为亚洲国家的共识。1955 年亚非会议上首

倡的万隆精神,是构筑新兴独立国家间团结的黏合剂,作为万隆精神的精髓,“求同存异,和平共处”的理念至今仍然历久弥新。20世纪60年代初,在美苏两大阵营激烈对抗的冷战时期,以尼赫鲁等人倡导的“独立、自主、不结盟”的不结盟思想,超越了西方强权政治中的结盟对抗理论,为新兴独立国家的外交发展开辟了一条新道路,不结盟运动在冷战时期具有重要的时代意义,其思想直到今天仍然没有过时。冷战结束以后,中国、俄罗斯以及中亚国家成立上海合作组织,主张“互信、互利、平等、协作”的上海精神,首次以新安全观为指导,开展地区政治经济安全合作。

进入新世纪以来,中国向世界郑重承诺走和平发展道路,中国不会走过去西方国家“国强必霸”的道路。历史证明,一个大国在其发展过程中一旦偏离正确的历史道路,就可能给本国人民以及他国人民带来巨大灾难。1956年,周恩来总理在会见巴基斯坦总理苏拉瓦底时说过,中国所以能实行和平共处外交,不选择霸权扩张外交,说到底是被我们的制度管死了。新中国成立六十多年特别是改革开放三十多年来,中国探索出一条中国特色社会主义道路,确立了中国特色社会主义制度,中国之所以敢于率先在国际上承诺走和平发展道路,根本原因正是我们的国内制度能够保障中国走和平发展道路。

今天,亚洲各国及其人民正在探索建立政治互信、经济互利、社会互助、文化互鉴的新型国家间关系。占世界人口60%的亚洲的现代化,将成为人类历史上最激动人心的现代化进程,这是一个真正实现更大多数人现代化的现代化,几无历史经验可借鉴,也无现成模式可参考,毕竟,过去的现代化模式几乎都是少数人的现代化模式。因此,“实现什么样的现代化,如何实现现代化”是摆在亚洲各国面前的历史课题,完成它需要更高的政治智慧,既取决于亚洲各国要从自己的国情出发,走自己特色的国家建设道路,更需要亚洲各国团结合作,探索适合本地区和平发展的国际体系建设道路。

2008年金融危机以来,发达地区的区域化动能有所衰竭,但新兴地区的区域化势头却丝毫不减。与此同时,国际体系变革进程加快,第二次世界大战以后形成的主要由西方国家主导的国际制度,越来越难以胜任地区和全球性问题的解决,这类制度普遍面临改制的压力,但是由于传统强国力量的抵制,改革成效不大。在这样的背景下,新兴国家和地区开始更加注重地区性制度建设,尤其是在区域化潮流下,亚洲各个部分的区域制度建设成就显著,为世界所瞩目,这些

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

制度为亚洲国家间合作提供了支撑,一些制度创新甚至还引起区域外国家的仿效和重视。

上海论坛本身就是在亚洲区域化与中国和平发展潮流下应运而生的,自2005年以来,上海论坛一直致力于从经济、社会、政治和国际关系等角度探讨亚洲道路。论坛至今已成功举办了七届,来自世界各地的一流学者为论坛贡献了自己的才智,仅政治与国际关系方面,论坛就收到优秀论文百多篇。我们聚焦“亚洲的区域化与中国的和平发展道路”主题,从中选出论文二十篇,这些论文既有关关注亚洲制度顶层设计问题的,也有探讨亚洲内部各种双边和多边关系对区域化影响的;既有研究外来因素在亚洲区域化进程中的作用,也有探讨一些国家内部政治发展与亚洲自身道路建设问题的,其中,大部分的论文均将中国作为重要的参照因素,以不同方式思考中国和平发展与亚洲区域化进程之间的关系。我们相信这些论文对帮助我们新的起点上真正立足亚洲来思考亚洲,具有建设性的意义。

苏长和

2012年4月于复旦园

目 录

Contents

全球化与亚洲区域治理

- 3 开创全球化时代亚洲合作的新局面 王家瑞
- 11 Globalization and Uneven Development
Giovanni Arrighi
- 35 The Making of a Regional International Society in East Asia: History
and Outlook
Barry Buzan
- 57 Restructuring International Relations in East Asia: The Role of ODA
Barbara Stallings
- 88 Does Asian Regionalism Have Legs?
Peter A. Petri

亚洲区域主义：各方的视角

- 111 The Spillover Effect of the ASEAN Plus Three Process on East Asian Security
Wu Xinbo

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

- 137 East Asian Cooperation and Asia's Governance An Indian Perspective
Srikanth Kondapalli
- 152 东盟在东亚合作中的领导地位研究 翟 光
- 171 East Asian Governance: The Critical Role of the China-Japan-United States
Triangular Relationship
Gerald Curtis
- 185 A Japanese Perspective on Asian Regional Cooperation Seen Through the
Lens of Sino-Japanese Relations
Kazuhiko Togo
- 206 Asian Regional Architecture — Thoughts on the Future U. S. Role
Jonathan M. Aloisi
- 225 East Asian Economic Integration: ASEAN Plus Three or ASEAN Plus Six?
Chia Siow Yue
- 243 ASEAN Economic Regionalism in Response to Globalization and the Rise
of China
Chia Siow Yue
- 253 The Rationale for East Asia Community Building: The Economic Dimension
of Regional and Global Governance Issues
Jesus P. Estanislao, Ph. D.

中国的和平发展与亚洲区域主义

- 273 A New Silk Road? China in the Global Marketplace
Gary Wihl
- 279 The 2008 - 2009 Global Economic Crisis and the China Phenomenon: The
Asian Development Model Revisited
Xiaoming Huang

294 Sino-Indian Relations: Quest for Strategic Partnership

Shen Dingli

312 China- Central Asia Cooperation and the Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Pan Guang

319 金融危机与中国模式

郑永年

332 另辟蹊径：重思东亚政治发展道路

张维为

全球化与亚洲区域治理

开创全球化时代亚洲合作的新局面

王家瑞*

一、经济全球化对亚洲是一个挑战,但更是一个机遇

20 世纪 70 年代以来,经济全球化浪潮铺天盖地,席卷全球,成为不可阻挡的历史潮流。它加速了全球范围内生产要素的自由流动和资源的优化配置,促进了贸易自由化、生产一体化和金融国际化的进一步发展,把世界经济推向一个新的历史阶段。

经济全球化不是简单的、单向度的,而是复杂的、多维的历史进程。它是一把双刃剑,给世界经济既带来了发展的机遇,也带来了许多深层次的挑战。在经济全球化浪潮面前,人类面对的是一幅更加美好也更加复杂的未来图景。

一方面,经济全球化是发达资本主义向全球范围的扩张,它从整体上加强了发达国家的优势。

经济全球化是以国际贸易和国际分工为条件、世界市场为基础、国际金融为核心的。发达国家利用在贸易、金融、科技等领域的主导权,主导制定国际经济规则,竞相扩张经济实力。而发展中国家作为世界经济规则的被动接受者,往往为适应这些规则,被迫对自身作出种种调整,付出了痛苦的代价。相当一部分国

* 王家瑞:中共中央对外联络部部长。本文源自 2005 年上海论坛。

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

家由于没有及时进行结构性调整,对经济全球化很不适应,发展滞后问题十分突出,有的甚至陷入危机。

经济全球化的加速发展,使国际规则的制定严重滞后于生产要素国际流动形式、渠道和手段的变化,现存的国际机构干预手段有限,对越来越多的投机性、垄断性的国际商业行为约束和监管不力,给发达国家跨国公司和国际炒家留下了为所欲为的巨大空间。特别是随着信息技术和网络经济的飞速发展,金融自由化、多元化、全球化的进程加快,各种衍生性金融产品造就了大量的投机风险,形成了独立于实物经济之外的虚拟经济。各种套利基金挟巨额的资本,四处游击,随时准备狙击各国的货币,使规模巨大的国际金融市场更加漂浮不定,汇市、汇率市场更加充满不确定性,国际金融秩序处于混乱和无序中,严重威胁着各国经济安全,尤其给参与经济全球化进程的后进发展中国家带来严重风险和挑战。

当经济全球化狂飙发展之时,许多发展中国家的地位却进一步削弱,日益滑向发展的边缘。过去30多年中,最不发达国家的数量从25个增加到49个,世界绝对贫困人口在5年中就增加了2亿;占全球人口五分之一的发达国家拥有全球生产总值的86%、全球出口市场的82%。1960年,全世界最富有的五分之一人口与最贫困的五分之一人口之间的收入差距是30:1,现在,这个比例已经扩大到74:1。随着经济全球化的不断发展,南北差距有继续扩大之势,南北矛盾更加突出。

而另一方面,经济全球化毕竟意味着世界经济的巨大发展和进步,在全球经济获益的过程中,发展中国家也能成为相对获益者。

经济全球化推动了世界经济结构调整和国际分工的纵深发展,提高了经济效率,促进了国际贸易,世界经济高速发展。发达国家之间通过跨国公司间的交叉投资和技术转移,实现了技术和资金密集型产业的升级,正在从工业经济向知识经济和信息社会迈进。同时,发达国家把劳动和资源密集型产业,包括高技术产业的劳动密集型生产环节向发展中国家转移。这种世界范围内的产业结构调整和生产分工的发展,使得世界各个国家和地区在参与国际经济合作中可以充分发挥各自在技术、劳动力等方面的优势,极大地降低了生产成本,提高了生产效率,发展中国家也能从中受益。

生产要素的跨国流动,为发展中国家引进资金和先进技术,借鉴发达国家的管理经验,实现跨越式发展提供了机遇。经济全球化意味着商品、资本、技术、劳

动力、信息等生产要素在世界范围的广泛流动,意味着先进生产技术、管理模式在世界范围的广泛传播。这有助于生产要素流向低成本的发展中国家,使其可以在国际市场上找到自己需要输出或引入的商品、资源、资金和技术,在更大范围内实现互通有无、优势互补,从而更快更好地发展本国经济,产生后发优势。

不可否认,发展中国家短期内无法摆脱在经济全球化格局中的整体被动地位,不仅无法成为全球化的最大获益者,反而成为全球化冲击和代价的主要承担者。但这不应成为发展中国家拒绝参与全球化的理由。参与经济全球化是有风险的,但拒绝参与则更是有害无益。统计表明,在发展中国家中,参与全球化的国家在经济增长方面明显快于没有参与全球化的国家。世界银行 2001 年发表的研究报告《全球化、增长与贫困》指出,在此前 20 年里,没有参与全球化的发展中国家正变得越来越落后,经济增长速度仅仅是参与全球化的发展中国家的四分之一。

二、亚洲在经济全球化过程中创造了辉煌,但也存在着深刻的教训

亚洲是一个发展中的大陆,发展中国家占绝大多数。从亚洲的情况看,许多国家的发展正是得益于对经济全球化的正确应对。过去几十年里,东亚、东南亚国家克服资源贫乏、人多地少、经济基础薄弱等困难,依靠出口导向型战略,大力发展对外贸易,积极引进外资和国外先进技术及管理经验,在一个相对不长的历史时期内,创造了震惊世界的经济奇迹。以“四小龙”为代表的亚洲国家和地区通过与世界经济接轨,不断调整与全球化不相适应的经济管理方式,深化经济改革,调整产业结构,促进了产业升级,已经跻身于新兴工业化国家行列。在人类历史上的任何时期和任何区域,都从未像当今的亚洲这样,取得如此惊人的经济增长。这些国家和地区的成功表明,亚洲各国在参与经济全球化的过程中,完全可以发挥主观能动性,通过正确的发展战略和经济政策,引导国家走上成功的发展之路。

然而,当亚洲经济高歌猛进之时,1997 年的亚洲金融危机却给亚洲国家当头一击。20 世纪 90 年代以来,东亚国家一度陶醉于经济的迅速增长,急于融入全球化,加快了金融自由化的步伐,放松了对国内外金融机构的监管。在金融自

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

由化的大旗下,外资大量涌入,证券市场、房地产市场虚假繁荣,虚拟经济、泡沫经济和游资经济恣意横行,国内经济的不稳定性和风险性大大增强,最终导致了亚洲金融危机的爆发。

金融危机不仅给亚洲经济带来了严重损失,而且给亚洲参与全球化的前景蒙上了巨大阴影。然而,金融危机无法改变世界经济全球化的根本趋势,也并不表明全球化将永远无益于亚洲的发展。亚洲已经被深深卷入世界经济全球化进程,这必然要求经济和金融体制的进一步开放,亚洲无法对全球化说“不”。但金融危机无疑提醒我们,亚洲国家在积极参与全球化的同时,需要防范全球化的消极影响,防止跌入“全球化的陷阱”。亚洲国家要想在经济全球化过程中获益,必须根据自身条件确定加入经济全球化的具体进程和时间。不能因噎废食,也不能操之过急。亚洲在不断提高经济运行机制国际化的同时,必须推动经济体制向着既有本地区特色、又能符合国际标准的方向发展。

亚洲金融危机同时表明,亚洲各国在协调经济政策、共同抵御危机方面十分欠缺。金融危机之所以像多米诺骨牌一样造成严重后果,其中一个重要原因在于,亚洲国家在危机发生之后没有很好地协调行动,而是竞相实行货币贬值,导致危机不断升级,并向周边国家迅速蔓延。金融危机说明,在经济全球化和区域化不断发展之时,亚洲国家只有通过各种形式团结起来,加强亚洲经济协调,形成完善规范的亚洲经济与金融发展安全体系,提升本地区的整体竞争力,才能具备抗衡全球化挑战的能力。唯有如此,亚洲国家才能共同应对经济全球化给亚洲带来的巨大风险,亚洲金融危机才不会重演,亚洲经济才能不被其他国家经济的起落所左右,亚洲才能与世界共繁荣。

三、亚洲在加强合作方面既存在优势,也存在劣势

环顾世界,欧洲、美洲、非洲在各自范围内的一体化运动如火如荼。欧洲联盟、美洲国家组织和非洲联盟等组织已经经历了数十年的发展历程,如今已经成为日益成熟的地区一体化组织,在地区乃至世界事务中具有越来越重要的影响。比较而言,亚洲在地区一体化方面起步较晚,没有在整个大陆开展合作的长期经验。然而,我们决不能因此对亚洲的合作前景抱悲观态度。正是因为亚洲起步较晚,我们更应看到亚洲开展大陆合作的潜力和优势。

亚洲拥有悠久灿烂的文化,黄河和长江流域、印度河和恒河流域、幼发拉底河和底格里斯河流域都是人类文明的重要发祥地。亚洲不但是当今世界所有主要宗教的摇篮,而且西亚的美索不达米亚文明、南亚的印度文明以及东亚的中华文明构成了世界上三种最古老的文明。亚洲各国人民彼此相近的历史遭遇和共谋发展的相同理念增强了区域合作的内在动力。

亚洲是世界上最大的洲,面积占全球陆地30%。亚洲拥有世界上最丰富的人力资源,地区总人口超过30亿,占世界总人口的60%。亚洲还拥有促进持续繁荣所需的极为丰富的自然资源——不仅包括能源储备,还包括从森林到渔业的各种各样的自然资源以及丰富多样的农产品。亚洲经济占世界经济总量的四分之一,就金融资源而言,亚洲的外汇储备总和占世界外汇总储备的一半以上。亚洲经济区内如实行良好协调,可以产生东西南北的纵横合作,取长补短,发展前景将十分广阔。

目前,亚洲的区域合作正蓬蓬勃勃地开展起来。20世纪90年代以来,各种形式的区域、次区域合作不断涌现,已逐渐形成了宽领域、多层次、广支点、官民并举的良好态势。亚太经合组织成为亚太地区具有广泛影响力的合作机制,东盟一体化不断深入发展,湄公河流域开发不断推进,南盟恢复活力并确定自贸建设目标,以“亚洲合作对话”为代表的泛亚合作崭露头角。尤其值得一提的是,“东盟10+3”将在今年发展成为东亚峰会,必将开创东亚合作的新局面,这在亚洲合作的历史上将具有里程碑的意义。此外,博鳌亚洲论坛、亚太安全合作理事会、亚太圆桌会议、东亚思想库网络等二轨机制也日趋活跃。区域合作深化了亚洲各国的经济依存和政治互信,提高了各国应对全球化挑战的能力。

亚洲正在朝着联合自强的方向大步前进,但是未来的道路并不平坦,我们还面临着种种障碍和问题。第一,亚洲多种文化和政治体制并存,各国经济在收入水平、经济结构、开放程度、所有制等方面存在相当大的差异。第二,亚洲各国产业结构互补性较差,出口产品较为单一,雷同,相互间的贸易和投资比例不高,企业合作的广度和深度不够,合理的区域性国际分工远未形成。第三,亚洲各国至今仍存在种种矛盾和问题,历史上的冲突和敌意仍未愈合,亚洲国家尚未形成明确的亚洲意识,还缺乏具有广泛基础的凝聚力。第四,亚洲合作面临较大的外部政治压力。亚洲一直是西方霸权势力争夺控制权的地区,东亚的经济奇迹更让西方经济霸权受到史无前例的挑战。在这种背景下,亚洲加强整个大陆的合作,

还面临种种压力。

四、加强合作,促进发展,实现共赢,是亚洲振兴和崛起的必由之路,也是亚洲各国的利益所在

亚洲的振兴和发展离不开世界,世界的发展和进步也离不开亚洲。在经济全球化日益发展的今天,我们亚洲更应在对世界开放中发展,在同世界交往与合作中进步。世界是丰富多彩的,亚洲的发展应该兼收并蓄,海纳百川,积极吸收人类一切优秀的文明成果,借鉴先进的发展经验。亚洲是具有全球意识的亚洲,它不仅致力于自身的繁荣,同样致力于全球的发展。

无论对亚洲还是对整个世界而言,经济全球化都不应是两极分化的全球化,而应是共同繁荣、更加均衡的全球化。财富越来越集中于少数国家,全球范围内贫富差距不断扩大,不利于整个世界的和平、稳定与长远发展。我们呼吁发达国家履行其责任和义务,进一步向发展中国家开放市场,提供资金和技术支持。为此,亚洲国家应该团结合作,为改革国际金融体系,完善国际贸易规则,建立公正合理的国际经济新秩序,贡献自己应有的力量。

在经济全球化浪潮面前,亚洲各国应该不断增强“亚洲意识”。过去的亚洲,曾被文化、语言、政治观念、宗教信仰和地理环境所割裂,而当代亚洲依靠政治、经济、文化的联系,特别是依靠发达的通信交往和人口流动,比以往任何时候都显得更像是一个紧密的整体。在亚洲内部日益相互依存的今天,我们比以往任何时候都更加强烈地意识到,我们共同生活在亚洲这个大陆,我们都是亚洲人。作为亚洲大家庭中的一分子,我们为亚洲创造的辉煌历史而感到自豪,同时我们也深深意识到,亚洲对于人类的未来肩负着重要的责任和使命。

新世纪的亚洲应该是不断加强整体合作的亚洲。金融危机表明,随着经济全球化的迅猛发展,亚洲有时变得更加脆弱。亚洲的政界、商界、学术界应该坐下来一起探讨亚洲合作的前景,克服种种障碍与困难,发挥亚洲的独特优势,创造亚洲合作的崭新未来。我们高兴地看到,亚洲的合作已有了良好开端。在平等互利的基础上,亚洲各国加强了国家间金融、贸易、投资和技术合作,逐步形成了优势互补、共同发展的局面。

亚洲应该是富强而繁荣的亚洲。亚洲合作应致力于增强亚洲的经济力量,让更多的亚洲国家摘掉“发展中”的帽子,使更多的亚洲人摆脱贫困的折磨。为此,我们要充分利用亚洲的人力资源和自然资源,以长远的眼光和足够的耐心,在金融、信息和能源等领域开展互利共赢的合作。当前,资源匮乏特别是能源匮乏,已经成为令亚洲和全世界担忧的问题。和其他任何地区一样,亚洲也受到石油价格上涨的影响。在亚洲加强合作的进程中,能源合作将是对亚洲国家智慧与决心的检验。在事关各国利益的挑战面前,亚洲应该以合作的心态,寻求平等互利的解决方案。

在我们充分发挥自己的潜能以促进亚洲共同繁荣的时候,我们的目光还必须超越经济增长。亚洲不仅要增强经济力量,而且要向全世界传播一种和平文化。亚洲应当以可持续发展为目标,而不仅仅是追求经济财富的最大化。随着全球化的发展,许多发达国家和全球性跨国公司出于保护本国环境和经济利益,将对环境和人体有害的企业转移到亚洲国家,或直接将有害的工业垃圾倾销到亚洲国家。亚洲国家应该加强合作,让发达国家为保护环境承担更多责任,同时也为促进生态环境健康发展作出自己的贡献。亚洲的发展应该以人为本,应该是经济与社会的协调发展,应是人与自然的和谐共处,应以提高亚洲各国人民的生活水平、生活质量为目的,减少贫困、疾病和各种天灾人祸对人们的困扰,确保每个国家、每个社会的和谐、安宁与发展,确保每个人都有受教育和平等就业的机会,都能享有充分的权利与尊严。亚洲各国应该超越意识形态分歧,加强政府、政党、议会、公民社会之间的多层次交流,就政治、经济、文化、安全等问题平等对话,求同存异,达成更多共识,建设一个更加稳定、安全的亚洲。

未来的亚洲应该是日益和谐的亚洲。在全球化时代,人类文明不断进步,世界民主不断发展。各国在文化传统、生活方式、社会制度和价值观念上的差异应该得到足够尊重,而不应成为交流与合作的障碍。我们相信,多元的文化遗产应该使亚洲充满活力与力量。亚洲的合作应该以自愿原则为基础,确保每个成员都有一种参与感和积极性。参与合作的每个成员都是平等的,没有一个成员受到强制或者孤立。在亚洲大陆加强合作的浩荡历史进程中,各国在共同合作中受益的同时,必将增加理解、信任与友谊,亚洲必将是一个更加具有凝聚力的和谐家园!

五、结束语

经济全球化的发展趋势不可逆转,但参与经济全球化决不应该是亚洲的被动选择。作为拥有世界最广阔土地和最多人口的发展中大陆,亚洲在全球化进程中肩负着特殊的责任和使命,亚洲应该具有自己的信仰和主张。随着全球化的加速发展,亚洲面临更大的机遇以及更艰巨的挑战,需要亚洲各国以集体的智慧和力量去成功应对,我们必须增强亚洲大陆合作的紧迫感。在整个亚洲日益相互依存的时代,我们应该团结在亚洲的旗帜下,为亚洲人的福祉进行更加紧密的合作,为全球的和平、发展、进步作出亚洲自己的贡献!

Globalization and Uneven Development

Giovanni Arrighi*

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of the very uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of globalization among regions and states. I begin by clarifying the different meanings in which the term globalization has been used, focusing specifically on the distinction between globalization as a historical process and globalization as a particular ideology associated with the neo-liberal turn of the early 1980s. After laying out the basic trends of the global political economy over a 40-year period, I point to the circumstances that have enabled India and especially China to take advantage of globalization and avoid the economic disasters that have affected other regions of the former Second and Third Worlds in the 1980s and 1990s. I shall conclude by pointing out possible ways in which these other regions may also benefit from, rather than bear a disproportionate share of the costs of globalization.

1. “Globalization” as Historical Process and as Ideology

The term globalization became fashionable in the late 1980s and early 1990s both as a description of a historical process of increasing world economic and

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societal integration — which we may call “structural globalization” — and as a prescription of policies allegedly dictated by that process, which we may call “ideological globalization” (cf. Chase-Dunn, 1999). As many commentators have pointed out, structural globalization has been going on with ups and downs for centuries. After the Second World War the process experienced a new major upswing that resulted in an unprecedented degree of global economic and societal integration. Moreover, as in previous upswings of the same kind, the great expansion of world trade and production of the 1950s and 1960s gave rise in the 1970s to a worldwide intensification of competitive pressures on businesses and governments.

At least initially, globalization in this sense did not serve the purposes and interests of Northern countries. The tendency towards an intensification of competition in the 1970s at first affected more negatively Northern countries — including and especially the United States — than Third World countries. Indeed, throughout the 1970s many Third (and Second) World countries benefitted from the higher prices for natural resources (oil in particular) and/or the abundant supply of credit and investment at highly favorable conditions generated by the intensification of competition among Northern countries. What eventually turned the tide to the advantage of Northern countries (or at least some of them) was not structural globalization as such but ideological globalization. As it materialized since *circa* 1980, ideological globalization consists of two closely related but distinct prescriptions: a domestic prescription, which advocated the liquidation of the legacy of the New Deal in the United States and of the welfare state in Western Europe; and an international prescription, which advocated the liquidation of the developmental state in the Third (and Second) Worlds (Arrighi, 2002).

Both prescriptions drew ideological inspiration from Margaret Thatcher's (in) famous slogan “There Is No Alternative” (TINA). Politically and economically, however, they became a global reality under the impact of US policies and actions. The domestic prescription was first put into practice at the end of the Carter administration, but it gained ideological and practical momentum only under Reagan. Under the banner of “supply-side economics,” the money supply was cut drastically, interest rates were raised sharply, taxes for the wealthy and corporate

capital were reduced, and capitalist enterprise was granted increasing freedom of action. The immediate result was a deep recession in the United States and in the world at large on the one side, and a US-led escalation of interstate competition for capital worldwide on the other. TINA was thereby turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whatever alternative to cut-throat competition for increasingly mobile capital might have existed before 1980, it became moot once the world's largest and wealthiest economy led the world down the road of ever more extravagant concessions to capital. This was especially the case for Third (and Second) World countries which, as a result of the change in US policies, came to experience a sharp contraction both in the demand for their natural resources and in the availability of credit and investment at favorable conditions.

It was in this context that the domestic prescription of ideological globalization came to be supplemented by the international prescription. This component refers to the sudden switch in the early 1980s of US thought and action from promotion of the "development project" launched in the late 1940s and early 1950s to promotion of the "globalization project" under the neo-liberal Washington Consensus of the 1980s and 1990s (McMichael, 2000). As a result of the switch, the US government — directly or through the IMF and the World Bank — withdrew its support from the "statist" and "inward-looking" strategies (such as import-substitution industrialization) that most theories of national development had advocated in the 1950s and 1960s, and began instead to promote capital-friendly and outward-looking strategies, most notably macro-stability, privatization, and the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements.¹

① As John Tye (1993) has argued, the turnabout amounted to a true "counterrevolution" in economic thought about development. As Hans Singer (1997) has pointed out the description of development thinking in the post-war era as statist and inward-looking is correct, but neither characterization had the derogatory implications they acquired in the 1980s. Indeed, even within the neo-liberal Washington Consensus, the initial anti-statist bias was superseded in the 1990s by an emphasis on "good governance" (see, in particular, World Bank 1989, 1992 and 1993). Nevertheless, the essence of the "good governance" advocated by the US government and the Bretton Woods institutions remained the promotion of macro-stability, privatization, and the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements.

As World Bank economist William Easterly has acknowledged, the “sea-change beginning around 1980 towards market-friendly economic policies” by governments of low- and middle-income countries was associated not with an improvement but with a sharp deterioration in their growth performance, the median rate of growth of the per capita income of these countries falling from 2.5% in 1960 – 1979 to 0% in 1980 – 1998. Easterly does not blame the new policies for this disappointing outcome. Since similar policies had previously been associated with good performance, he suggests two possible reasons for their failure to deliver on their promises after 1980. One is that “good” policies may be subject to decreasing returns. When they are pursued beyond a given threshold by a particular country, or are pursued simultaneously by a growing number of countries, they may cease to yield their “good” results. “While you may grow faster than your neighbor if your secondary [school] enrollment is higher, your own growth does not necessarily increase as your (and everyone else’s) secondary enrollment ratios rise.” In addition, he went on to suggest, the new policies may have not yielded the expected results because of a deterioration in the global economic environment. In his words, “worldwide factors like the increase in world interest rates, the increased debt burden of developing countries, the growth slowdown in the industrial world, and skill-biased technical change may have contributed to the developing countries’ stagnation” (Easterly, 2001 : 135 – 145, 151 – 155).

As we shall see in the next section of the paper, the idea that certain policies and actions may be subject to decreasing returns has a far greater bearing on developmental issues than Easterly seems to realize. For now, however, let us notice that the second reason he gives for the disappointing results of neo-liberal policies in low- and middle-income countries — that is, the deterioration of the global economic environment — was part and parcel of the neo-liberal turn. As noted above, the hike in world interest rates, the increased debt burden of low- and middle-income countries, and the growth slowdown in Northern countries, were all

provoked or made worse by the domestic (US) component of ideological globalization. The deterioration of the global economic environment, in other words, was no accident. Rather, it was an integral aspect of the dynamic of ideological globalization, partly an effect of the neo-liberal turn in the United States, and partly a cause of the adoption of neo-liberal policies by Third (and Second) World countries.

2. Industrial Convergence and the Persistence of the North-South Income Divide

Easterly's suggestion that "good" policies may be subject to decreasing returns implicitly challenges one of the most widely held beliefs in the theory and practice of national development. This is the belief that policies and actions yield similar developmental results regardless of how many countries undertake them. Easterly's illustration of policies that may contradict this belief (an increase in secondary school enrollment) is somewhat misleading, because a generalized increase in secondary school enrollment is in itself a desirable development even if it does not speed up economic growth — an issue to which I shall return in the conclusions of the paper. A far more appropriate and compelling illustration of the contradiction in question is the failure of North-South industrial convergence to bring about North-South income convergence.

From the very beginning of their development efforts, Third World governments have eagerly promoted the industrialization of their national economies as the generally prescribed means of catching up with the per capita income of First World countries. Manufacturing activities were thought to have higher productivity than both agricultural and service activities (see especially Clark, 1957; Baumol, 1967). Industrialization was therefore expected to bring about an acceleration in the rate of growth of Third World economies, while the widely anticipated "coming of post-industrial society" (Bell, 1973) was expected to bring about a deceleration in the rate of growth of First World economies. The general expectation, in other

words, was that industrial convergence would be accompanied by income convergence.^①

This expectation was so entrenched across theoretical (and ideological) divides as to turn industrialization into a synonym of development, and thus an end in itself. As Dean Tipps (1973: 208) noted, the ambivalence towards modern industrial society that characterized the writings of Marx, Weber and Durkheim became conspicuous *by its absence* in modernization and development thinking.^② Little attention was paid to the accumulating evidence that in reality industrial convergence was not bringing income convergence in its train. A comparison of tables 1 and 2 clearly demonstrates the discrepancy.

Leaving aside for now the extreme unevenness of the trends among the world's regions, Table 1 shows that the degree of industrialization of the Third World as a whole (measured by the proportion of GDP produced in manufacturing) first caught up with, and then overtook the degree of industrialization of the First World as a whole. While in 1960 the degree of industrialization of the Third World was 74.6% of that of the First World, in 1980 it was virtually the same (99.4%), and in 2000 it was 17.1% higher. At least by this measure, the continuing designation of the North as "industrial" and of the South as non-industrial (or less-industrial) has become wholly anachronistic.

① See, among others, Walt Rostow's canonical text (1960). Income convergence was also the expectation of neo-classical theories of growth (see especially Solow, 1956). These theories, however, did not deal explicitly with industrialization.

② This was as true of dependency and Marxist theories as of mainstream modernization theories. See especially Cardoso and Faletto (1979) for dependency theory and Warren (1980) for Marxist theories. In both texts industrialization and development are treated as equivalent terms. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ambivalence of classical social theory towards modern industrial society reemerged with a vengeance in the postmodernist critique of modernization and development theories (see especially Escobar, 1995 and the contributions to Sachs, 1992). This current of thought has been an important corrective to the a-critical acceptance across the ideological spectrum of development/industrialization as a generally beneficial pursuit. Nevertheless, in rejecting the alleged benefits of development and industrialization, postmodernist critics have tended to treat the two terms as equivalent, just like those whom they criticized.

Table 1 Region's % of GDP in Manufacturing as % of First World

Region	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa (w/SA)	53.0	63.0	71.1	88.1	77.8
South Africa	72.5	84.5	92.1	115.4	99.4
Sub-Saharan Africa (w/o SA)	31.9	34.1	44.4	56.2	50.5
Latin America	97.1	94.8	115.3	113.1	94.6
West Asia and North Africa	37.7	43.0	41.1	70.4	74.8
South Asia	47.9	51.2	71.2	81.6	84.3
East Asia (w/o China and Japan)	48.5	67.9	95.4	115.3	133.7
China	81.8	106.6	165.8	149.5	185.9
Third World (w/ China) *	74.6	78.3	99.4	108.1	117.1
Third World (w/o China) *	73.9	76.2	94.6	102.9	102.2
North America	95.9	87.5	88.0	84.4	90.4
Western Europe	101.5	101.3	97.0	96.8	100.4
Southern Europe	90.6	91.8	111.3	99.7	105.4
Australia and New Zealand	87.1	86.0	80.3	68.3	67.5
Japan	119.5	127.4	119.5	127.6	116.8
First World **	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Calculations based on World Bank (1984,2001,2004 for 2,000 figures)

*** Countries included in Third World:**

Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

West Asia & N. Africa: Algeria, Egypt Arab Rep., Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey
[No Oman in 2000]

South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

East Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand

China

**** Countries included in First World:**

North America: Canada, United States

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom [No Netherlands in 1970]

Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain

Australia & New Zealand [No New Zealand in 1960 and 1970]

Japan

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

Table 2 GNP per Capita as % of First World's GNP per Capita

Region	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa (w/SA)	5.2	4.4	3.6	2.5	2.0
South Africa	25.9	24.8	21.4	15.2	10.1
Sub-Saharan Africa (w/o SA)	2.9	2.1	1.7	1.2	1.1
Latin America	19.7	16.4	17.6	12.3	13.7
West Asia and North Africa	8.7	7.8	8.7	7.4	8.3
South Asia	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.6
East Asia (w/o China and Japan)	5.7	5.7	7.5	10.4	10.0
China	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.3	3.0
Third World *	4.5	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.6
Third World (w/o China) *	6.4	5.6	6.0	5.2	5.4
North America	123.5	104.8	100.4	98.0	121.1
Western Europe	110.9	104.4	104.4	100.2	85.8
Southern Europe	51.9	58.2	60.0	58.7	56.2
Australia and New Zealand	94.6	83.3	74.5	66.2	65.9
Japan	78.6	126.1	134.1	149.4	135.9
First World **	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Calculations based on World Bank (1984, 2001, 2004 for 2,000 figures)

* **Countries included in Third World:**

Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Rep of Congo, Congo Dem Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seneg South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (2001 used for 2003)

Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

West Asia & North Africa: Algeria, Arab Rep of Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (2002 used for 2003), Sudan, Syrian Arab Rep., Tunisia, Turkey

South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

East Asia: Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand

China

** **Countries included in First World:**

North America: Canada, United States

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Southern Europe: Greece, Ireland, Israel (2002 used for 2003), Italy, Portugal, Spain

Australia and New Zealand

Japan

In sharp contrast to the tendency of the South to catch up with and then overtake the North in degree of industrialization, table 2 shows that the income gap between the same two groups of countries has remained virtually the same, the gross national product (GNP) per capita of Third World countries as a proportion of that of First World countries being 4.5% in 1960, 4.3% in 1980, and 4.6% in 2000. In this respect there was no catching up. Against all expectations, 40 years of relatively successful industrialization left the South as poor relatively to the North as it was at the start.^①

This failure of industrialization to bring in its train income convergence suggests that the relationship between industrialization and economic growth is subject to a “composition” or “adding up” effect. As long as relatively few countries (or countries accounting for a small proportion of world population) had succeeded in industrializing, the economic benefits of industrialization were positive and significant. But when an increasing number of countries (or countries accounting for a growing proportion of world population) industrialized in an attempt to increase their national wealth, competition in the procurement of industrial inputs and disposal of industrial outputs in world markets intensified, and the economic benefits of industrialization were sharply reduced.

As argued in detail elsewhere (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986; Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2003: 16–23), this interpretation is consistent with Joseph Schumpeter's theory of competition under capitalism and Raymond Vernon's closely related theory

^① In calculating the manufacturing share of GDP we have weighted countries by their total GDP and in calculating GNP per capita we have weighted countries by their population. The particular indicator used for industrialization and the use of income data at actual exchange rates (FX-based data) rather than at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP based data) increases the contrast between industrial convergence and income non-convergence. Nevertheless, the contrast persists regardless of which particular indicator and data we use. Moreover, the aggregate combination of North-South industrial convergence without income convergence is not the spurious result of heterogeneous national experiences—that is, of countries that experienced a narrowing of both the industrialization and income gaps and countries that did not. Rather it is the result of the absence of any positive correlation between industrial and income performance (Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2003: 11–12, 15–16).

of the "product cycle." According to Schumpeter, the main determinant of the intensity of competition under capitalism is neither the number of units nominally competing with one another, nor "restrictions to entry" imposed or enforced by governments as economists generally assume. Rather, it is the process of "creative destruction" generated by major clusters of profit-oriented innovations, defined broadly to include the introduction, not just of new methods of production, but also of new commodities, new sources of supply, new trade routes and markets, and new forms of organization (Schumpeter, 1954: 83). These major clusters of innovations are the main direct and indirect source of gains and losses in the economy at large (Schumpeter, 1964: 80). They throw "to a small minority of winners" spectacular "prizes much greater than would have been necessary to call forth [their] particular effort." But they propel "the activity of that large majority of businessmen who receive in return very modest compensation or nothing or less than nothing, and yet do their utmost because they have the big prizes before their eyes and overrate their chances of doing equally well" (Schumpeter, 1954: 73 - 74).

A similar logic is at work in Vernon's product cycle model (1966; 1971: ch. 3). In this model, the diffusion of innovations is a spatially structured process that originates in the more "developed" (that is, wealthier) countries and gradually involves poorer, less "developed" countries. The spatial diffusion of innovations, however, goes hand in hand with their routinization — that is, with their ceasing to be innovations in the wider global context. As a result, by the time the "new" products and techniques are adopted by the poorer countries they tend to be subject to intense competition and no longer bring the high returns they did in the wealthier countries. Worse still, both product and process innovations originate under the conditions of high incomes, abundance of capital, and shortage of labor typical of wealthy countries. As they diffuse to poorer countries, they introduce patterns of consumption and techniques of production that increase further the shortage of capital and the overabundance of labor typical of poor countries.

The logic that underlies Vernon's product cycle model is operative not only at

the level of individual industries but also at the level of the *manufacturing sector as a whole*. That is to say, opportunities for economic advancement through industrialization, as they present themselves successively to one country after another, do not constitute equivalent opportunities for all countries. As countries accounting for a growing proportion of world population attempt to catch up with First World standards of wealth *through industrialization*, competitive pressures in the procurement of industrial inputs and disposal of industrial outputs in world markets intensify. In the process, Third World countries, like Schumpeter's "majority of businessmen," tend to underrate their chances of becoming the losers in the *intense competitive struggle engendered by their very success in industrializing*. As we shall see, there have been winners as well as losers among Third World countries, and even the countries that lost out in the competition drew some benefits from industrialization. Nevertheless, *on average*, 40 years of relatively successful industrialization has left Third World countries in the global hierarchy of wealth more or less where they were at the start.

3. Globalization and World Politics

The foregoing interpretation of the lack of income convergence in spite of industrial convergence may lead to two unwarranted conclusions. One is that the reproduction of the North-South income divide under conditions of generalized Southern industrialization has little to do with globalization, either structural or ideological. And the other is that Southern countries are powerless in their attempts to overcome the North-South divide.

The first conclusion is unwarranted because generalized Southern industrialization played a critical role in shaping the trajectory of structural globalization, and was in turn affected decisively by ideological globalization. Structural globalization is often identified with export-oriented industrialization (EOI) in contrast with import-substitution industrialization (ISI). In reality, there is a fundamental unity and complementarity between these two kinds of

industrialization. Suffice it to mention that the more successful Southern ISI is, the fewer the imports that can be easily and advantageously replaced by domestic production. The smaller the population, natural resources, and domestic market of the countries engaging in ISI, and the more capital- and energy-intensive their industrialization, the sooner and the more compellingly would that limit be reached. Sooner or later, however, all rapidly industrializing countries are bound to find it more advantageous to seek through exports the means of payments necessary to increase their imports, rather than substitute domestic production for an increasing number and variety of imports. The very success of Southern ISI in the 1950s and 1960s was thus creating the conditions for its supersession by one form or another of EOI, thereby strengthening the cross-border interdependence of economic activities that constitutes a major aspect of structural globalization.

The tendency of Southern ISI to be superseded by EOI unfolded in conjunction with the tendency towards “financialization” that in the 1970s began to characterize the US and other Northern economies. As Greta Krippner (2002) has shown for the United States, heightened international competition (especially in trade-intensive activities like manufacturing) induced corporations to divert a growing proportion of their incoming cash flows from investment in fixed capital and commodities to liquidity and accumulation through financial channels. In a sense, this diversion was a continuation of the logic of the product cycle by other means. The logic of the product cycle for the leading capitalist organizations of a given epoch is to ceaselessly shift resources from market niches that are becoming overcrowded (and therefore less profitable) to market niches that are less crowded (and therefore more profitable). When escalating competition reduces drastically the actual and potential availability of relatively empty and highly profitable niches in the commodity markets, the epoch’s leading capitalist organizations have one last refuge where to retreat and from where to shift competitive pressures onto others. This last refuge is the world’s money market—the market that, in Schumpeter’s words, “is always, as it were, the headquarters of the capitalist system, from which orders go out to its individual divisions” (1961: 126).

Throughout the 1970s, financialization did not actually help Northern capital in shifting competitive pressures onto Southern countries. On the contrary, it seemed to make capital so abundant as to be almost a free good. Thus, in the mid 1970s real long-term interest rates in the United States fell below zero. It was also at this time that, as previously noted, Northern capital flowed to Third (and Second) World countries at very favorable conditions. Initially, therefore, the financialization of Northern capital strengthened the tendency towards the relocation of industrial activities from North to South, as well as the tendency of Southern ISI to be superseded by EOI (Arrighi, 1994; ch. 4).

Had this situation persisted, Southern industrialization and structural globalization might have proceeded along a different trajectory than the one that materialized after the United States embraced the neo-liberal creed and the TINA doctrine. It is impossible to tell what this alternative trajectory would have been. But we do know which particular alternative trajectory the United States was reacting against when it embraced the neo-liberal creed and the TINA doctrine. This alternative trajectory was one of Third World empowerment and US dis-empowerment.

The empowerment of the Third World in the 1970s was first and foremost a political fact. Its main landmarks were the US defeat in Vietnam, Portuguese defeat in Africa, Israeli difficulties in the 1973 War, and the accession of the PRC in the Security Council of the United Nations. But the politics and the economics of the situation affected one another. Thus, the first and second oil shocks were integral to the political empowerment of the Third World. And so was the growth of North-South flows of capital, both private and public. Third World demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) sought to increase and at the same time institutionalize the ongoing redistribution of resources and power (cf. Krasner, 1985). Initially, First World countries seemed to yield to Third World pressures (see especially Brandt Commission 1980), even pledging 1% of their GNP in aid to Third World countries. While these pledges were being made, however, the neoliberal turn in the United States resulted in a sudden turnaround.

The main reason why the United States promoted such a turnaround is that Third World empowerment was accompanied by a sharp decline in US power and prestige. The decline reached its nadir in the late 1970s with the Iranian Revolution, the second oil shock, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a serious crisis of confidence in the US dollar. Control over the world's money seemed to be slipping from US hands, directly and indirectly disempowering the United States not just vis-à-vis the Third World but also vis-à-vis the USSR and Western Europe. It was in this context that the United States decided that the slide in its power and prestige could be reversed only by embracing the neo-liberal creed, both at home and abroad. In this respect, the neo-liberal turn in US thought and action was a counterrevolution, not just in development theory as Toye (1993) maintains, but in world politics as well.

The main reason why the neo-liberal counterrevolution succeeded in reversing the decline in US power beyond the rosiest expectations of its perpetrators is that it brought about a massive rerouting of global capital flows towards the United States and the US currency. To be sure, this massive rerouting transformed the United States from being the main source of world liquidity and foreign direct investment, as it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, into the world's main debtor nation and absorber of liquidity in the 1980s through the present.^① Increases in indebtedness of this order cannot be sustained indefinitely. For twenty years, however, an escalating foreign debt

① The extent of this rerouting can be gauged from the change in the current account of the US balance of payments. In the five year period 1965 - 1969 the account still had a surplus of \$12 billion, which constituted almost half (46%) of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1970 - 1974, the surplus contracted to \$4.1 billion and to 21% of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1975 - 1979, the surplus turned into a deficit of \$7.4 billion. After that the deficit escalated to previously unimaginable levels: \$146.5 billion in 1980 - 1984; \$660.6 billion in 1985 - 1989; falling back to \$324.4 billion in 1990 - 1994 before swelling to \$912.4 billion in 1995 - 1999 (calculated from International Monetary Fund, various years). By the end of 2004 the deficit in the US current account was approaching \$2 billion a day, that is, almost four times its average in the 1995 - 1999 period.

enabled the United States to achieve through financial means what it could not achieve through political and military means; defeat the USSR in the Cold War and contain the empowerment of the South.

For massive borrowing from abroad, mostly from Japan, was essential to the escalation under Reagan of the armament race well beyond what the USSR could afford economically. Combined with generous support to Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation, the escalation forced the USSR into a double confrontation, neither of which it could win and both of which it eventually lost; the one in Afghanistan, where its high-tech military apparatus found itself in the same difficulties that had led to the defeat of the United States in Vietnam; and the one in the armament race, where the United States could mobilize financial resources that were wholly beyond the Soviet reach.

At the same time, the massive redirection of capital flows to the United States turned the "flood" of capital that Southern countries had experienced in the 1970s into the sudden "drought" of the 1980s. First signaled by the Mexican default of 1982, this drought was probably the single most important factor in shifting competitive pressures from North to South and in provoking a major bifurcation in the fortunes of Southern regions in the 1980s and 1990s. As we shall see presently, the impact of the neo-liberal counterrevolution was especially catastrophic for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and for the former USSR in the 1990s. But in so far as the Third World as a whole is concerned, these catastrophes were partly counterbalanced in the 1980s, and more than counterbalanced in the 1990s, by the significant economic advance of East Asia (especially China) and the less significant advance of South Asia (see table 2). There is, of course, no way of knowing what would have happened to the North-South income divide in the absence of the neo-liberal counterrevolution. But the very unevenness of the Southern experience can provide some insights into what enabled some regions to do better than others and what might have been done to avoid or alleviate the African and Latin American catastrophes.

4. Globalization and Uneven Development

As table 2 shows, in so far as the *overall* North-South income divide is concerned the neo-liberal counterrevolution made little difference one way or another. It did nonetheless make a big difference for the individual regions of the South. Some regions (most notably East Asia) succeeded in taking advantage of the increase in US demand for cheap industrial products that ensued from US trade liberalization and the escalating US trade deficit. These regions tended to benefit from the redirection of capital flows towards the United States, because the improvement in their balance of payments lessened their need to compete with the United States in world financial markets, and indeed turned some of them (most notably China) into major lenders to the United States. Other regions (most notably Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America), in contrast, did not manage to compete successfully for a share of the North American demand. These regions tended to run into balance of payments difficulties that put them into the hopeless position of having to compete directly with the United States in world financial markets. Either way, the United States benefitted economically and politically, because US business and governmental agencies were best positioned to mobilize in the global competitive struggle the cheap commodities and credit that Southern "winners" eagerly supplied, as well as the assets that Southern "losers" willy nilly had to alienate at bargain prices. As a result, the United States reversed its economic decline vis-à-vis most world regions, while the gains and losses of Southern regions relative to the North balanced one another, thereby leaving the North-South income gap in 2000 roughly where it was in 1960 and 1980.

The question then arises as to whether it would have been possible (or might be possible in the future) to avoid Southern losses while retaining Southern gains so as to achieve a significant narrowing of the North-South income divide. The main institutional promoters of ideological globalization — most notably, the World Bank, the IMF, the US and UK Treasuries, backed by opinion-shaping media such

as *The Financial Times* and *The Economist* - have championed the view that the main reason why some Southern countries have done better than others since 1980 is that they followed more closely the prescriptions of ideological globalization.^① This view flies in the face of the fact that, comparatively speaking, the three world regions that have performed worst (Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and the former USSR in the 1990s) are also the regions that willy-nilly were subjected more extensively or intensively to the structural adjustment or shock therapy advocated by the promoters of ideological globalization. In light of this basic fact, James Galbraith wonders whether we should continue to consider the 1990s a "golden age of capitalism" rather than "something closer to a golden age of reformed socialism in two places (China and India) — alongside an age of disasters for those who followed the prescriptions favored by *The Economist*". "In truth," he goes on to claim, "countries that followed the IMF-World Bank prescriptions to the letter — Argentina, say, or Russia in the early 1990s — have seen catastrophes worse in every way than the Great Depression of the 1930s was for us" (Galbraith, 2004).

Many would question Galbraith's claim that China and especially India are practicing "reformed socialism" rather than some variant of capitalism. But however we may want to call what these countries have been practicing, it is hard to question Galbraith's claim that neither country did well since 1980 because it adhered to the prescriptions of ideological globalization more closely than the countries that did badly. If anything the opposite is true.

Both China and India steered free from Western banks in the 1970s, and spared themselves the debt crisis. "Both continue to maintain capital controls to this day, so that hot money cannot flow freely in and out. Both continue to have large state sectors in heavy industry to this day. Yes, China and India have done well, on the whole. But is this due to their reforms or to the regulations they continued to impose? No doubt, the right answer is: Partly to both." (Galbraith, 2004)

① For the latest critical survey of these claims, see Wade, 2004

I would reformulate and qualify this claim as follows. First, India and especially China fully participated in the process of structural globalization by opening up their economies and by putting greater emphasis on EOI than they had done before the mid 1980. By so doing they took advantage of the benefits of operating in a wider and comparatively wealthier economic space. Nevertheless, they did so on terms and at conditions that suited their own national interests, rather than the interests of Northern countries embodied in US-promoted ideological globalization. Among other things, this meant a slower and more selective process of deregulation and privatization than occurred in countries and regions subjected to the shock therapies and structural adjustments advocated by ideological globalization.

Second, India's and China's greater capacity to participate in structural globalization on terms that suited their own national interests was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that, as Galbraith suggests, through the 1970s both countries had become far less dependant on foreign capital than Latin America or Africa. Foreign capital never comes for free; and even when it comes at very favorable conditions, as it did in the 1970s, it may establish "addictions" that subsequently constrain the capacity to pursue the national interest. In 2003 China surpassed the United States as the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment. But China's increasing dependance on foreign capital has been more than counterbalanced by increasing US dependence on cheap Chinese commodities and credit, so that its capacity to dictate, rather than being dictated, the terms of much of this investment has not lessened.

Third, India's and China's greater capacity to participate in structural globalization on their own terms has not been solely due to the fact that they have remained far less dependent on foreign capital than Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America. Equally important is another peculiarity of India and China, namely, the fact that they are no mere national states but continent-sized states, each with a population considerably larger than that of Latin America or Africa. Moreover, both countries had a long history of highly diversified production and market

exchanges within their boundaries and with the surrounding regions — a history that has endowed them with a huge supply, not just of comparatively skilled and versatile labor, but also of micro (and not so micro) entrepreneurship. As a result of this legacy and of considerable infrastructural investment in domestic transport and communication, India and China have been far better positioned than economically and politically fragmented Latin America or Africa in combining the advantages of EOI and foreign investment with those of an informally protected and substantively self-reliant domestic economy.

Finally, and partly related to the above, China appears to have an additional advantage in industrialization, whether of the ISI or the EOI variety. Contrary to a widely-held belief, this advantage is not low wages — at least not low wages as such. Rather, as a recent cover story in *The New York Times* magazine entitled “The Chinese Century” has underscored, it is the widespread deployment of techniques of production that substitute as much as possible inexpensive educated labor for expensive machines and managers. The experience of Wanfeng automotive factory outside Shanghai illustrates the point.

Most tellingly — this goes a long way toward accounting for China's current status as an economic juggernaut — there is not a single robot in sight. Instead, there are hundreds of young men, newly arrived from China's expanding technical schools, manning the assembly lines with little more than large electric drills, wrenches and rubber mallets. Engines and body panels that would, in a Western, Korean or Japanese factory, move from station to station on automatic conveyors are hauled by hand and hand truck here. This is why Wanfeng can sell its hand-made luxury versions of the Jeep (to buyers in the Middle East, mostly) for \$8,000 to \$10,000. The company isn't spending money on multimillion-dollar machines to build cars; it is using highly skilled workers who cost at most a few hundred dollars a month — whose yearly pay, in other words, is less than the monthly pay of new hires in Detroit. (Fishman, 2004)

Moreover, Chinese businesses are substituting inexpensive educated labor, not just for expensive machinery, but for expensive managers as well. For a self-

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

managed labor force “keeps management costs down too.”

Despite the enormous numbers of workers in Chinese factories, the ranks of managers who supervise them are remarkably thin by Western standards. Depending on the work, you might see 15 managers for 5,000 workers, an indication of how incredibly well self-managed they are. (Fishman, 2004).

It is hard to tell how widespread the use of these machine-and-manager-saving techniques actually is. But if it is as widespread as Ted Fishman suggests, it constitutes an important antidote to the previously noted tendency of innovations originating in wealthy countries to absorb scarce capital instead of abundant labor in the poorer countries. In any event, the substitution of inexpensive educated labor for expensive machines and managers is not inimical to more mainstream, applied industrial development and innovation. On the contrary, last year:

China spent \$60 billion on research and development. The only countries that spent more were the U. S. and Japan, which spent \$282 billion and \$104 billion respectively. But again, China forces you to do the math: China's engineers and scientists usually make one-sixth and one-tenth what Americans do, which means that the wide gaps in financing do not necessarily result in equally wide gaps in manpower or results. The U. S. spent nearly five times what China did, but had less than two times as many researchers (1.3 million to 743,000). (Fishman, 2004)

In this respect too, therefore, a large supply of inexpensive educated labor is a crucial enabling condition for a Southern country to participate in processes of structural globalization on its own terms rather than on the terms dictated by the interests of Northern countries.

5. Conclusions

Three main conclusions follow from the foregoing analysis. First, although

globalization as an historical process of increasing world economic and societal integration has indeed originated in the global North, it may nonetheless serve Southern interests provided that Southern countries either have or can develop the capacity to dictate, rather than being dictated, the terms of the integration. Some Southern countries, most notably China, already have this capacity. But most Southern countries do not, and therefore cannot expect to do as well as China unless they develop comparable capabilities to dictate the terms of their integration in the global economy. This is especially the case for African and Latin American countries, for most of whom the costs of integration have far surpassed the benefits.

A second conclusion is that size matters. The huge populations of China and India have provided them with developmental options (such as the formation and preservation of a coherent national economy even when pursuing EOI) that are wholly beyond the horizon of most other Southern countries. The supersession of geopolitical fragmentation at the regional level, not just through treaties and agreements, but also through investments in transport and communications, may well be a necessary condition for African and Latin American countries to benefit rather than lose from greater integration in the global economy. In any event, the more Southern countries pursue mutual cooperation and integration within and across regions, the better the chances that they will gain rather than lose from structural globalization.

A third, and for present purposes last conclusion is that TINA is a Northern invention that has served primarily US interests. In reality, there are alternatives to the kind of cutthroat competition for capital advocated by the promoters of ideological globalization. One such alternative is for governments to compete, not in making ever more extravagant concessions to capital, but in providing the education, health, and quality of life that would make their citizens more productive. As Fishman suggests, a large supply of inexpensive educated labor has probably been the greatest of China's competitive advantages, not just in production, but in research and development as well. True, as Easterly suggests, beyond a certain point investment in education (or in any other reproductive

activity) may well not speed up economic growth. But the same is true of investment in concessions and incentives to capital, with one crucial difference. If a country "bets" on capital and loses, it is left with nothing. Indeed, if it has sacrificed the well-being of its population in the unfulfilled hope of attracting or retaining capital, it is left with less than nothing. But if it has put its "bets" on health and education, even if economic growth does not speed up, it is left with a more educated and healthier population, which is in itself an important developmental achievement. Greater South-South cooperation and the improvement rather than sacrifice of the well-being of the peoples of the South do constitute real alternatives to the cutthroat competition for the benefit of capital advocated by the TINA doctrine. The sooner and the more radically they are pursued by Southern countries, the greater the chances of a narrowing of the North-South divide.

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The Making of a Regional International Society in East Asia: History and Outlook

Barry Buzan *

1. Introduction

Despite great interest in the affairs of East Asia, not much has been written about its contemporary international society. There is a certain amount of related interest in “Confucian civilization” (Fairbank, 1968; Huntington, 1996; Kang, 2003, 2003 – 2004, 2005), but while the general history of the region is very well known, this has not yet been adequately told within the English school’s international society framework. This paper attempts to show how an English school approach generates a distinctive and useful picture of East Asia in a global context. It starts with a short conceptual overview of international society. It then looks very briefly at four phases of international society in East Asia that preceded the emergence of the current international society from the 1970s. The final section

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looks forward to the future unfolding of international society in East Asia; what it is that makes East Asia distinctive from Western/global international society, and how the regional and Western/global levels relate to each other?

By *international society* I mean acceptance of the deep rules of the game that states share with each other sufficiently to form a kind of social order. Hedley Bull (1977) labelled this “the anarchical society,” and its most visible manifestation is in the *primary institutions* that evolve to constitute both the players and the game of international relations, and to define what behaviour is and is not seen as legitimate (Buzan, 2004a; Clark, 2005). These organic institutions — such as sovereignty, non-intervention, territoriality, nationalism, war, balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great power management, the equality of peoples — are composed of principles, norms and rules that underpin deep and durable practices. They are distinct from the more familiar *secondary institutions* (such as regimes and intergovernmental organisations) that are recent, instrumental, mainly state-designed expressions of the underlying social structure of modern international relations. Primary institutions form the social structure of international society, which is dynamic and always evolving, albeit usually slowly and with a great deal of continuity (Holsti, 2004). Since the English school understanding of international society is dominated by liberal values, one has to keep in mind that liberal values are not universally dominant, and in some regions may not be dominant at all. Other sorts of values reflecting non-Western cultures are still in play worldwide, and will be reflected in the primary institutions at the regional level.

2. The Four Phases of International Society in East Asia Before the 1970s

The history of international society in East Asia before the contemporary period divides quite neatly into four phases:

- 1) The warring states period within China from 770 – 221 BC;

2) The classical Sino-centric regional suzerainty that ran from the unification of China after the Warring States period up to the late 19th century;

3) The encounter/reform phase, when Western penetration overthrew the classical society; and

4) The Cold War phase, running from the end of the Second World War up to the early 1970s.

I do not have the space here to consider these phases in any detail, but they can be roughly summarised as follows.

During the warring states period China was a self-contained international system along anarchic lines. Watson (1992: 85 - 93) and Zhang (2001) investigate the institutions of international society during the warring states period, seeing sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power and elements of international law (rituals), though Watson (1992: 88) also sees a tendency to bandwagon rather than balance. Hui (2005: 18) goes so far as to deny the existence of international society in warring states China because there were virtually no restraints on ruthless behaviour and the use of force. The main interest in this phase has been as a comparison with the anarchical society of later European history.

The tone for the second phase is set by Fairbank (1968: 1 - 6) with his idea of a Sino-centric "Chinese world order" in which there was a fairly seamless spectrum from the carefully structured Confucian hierarchy and system of legitimation within China to a similarly structured hierarchical order between China and its East Asian neighbours. After the warring states period, and with various waxings and wanings, this system endured for two millennia up to the late 19th century. China was effectively a unipole at the centre of a suzerain system, although as Gong (1984a: 130 - 136) emphasises, one needs to think of this not just in power terms, but also as a cultural, civilizational order. Zhang Yongjin (2001: 51 - 57) sees this more as a form of international society with the tribute system as its key institution, and Suzuki (2009: 34 - 46, 66 - 78) generally supports this view, emphasising its Confucian qualities of order, harmony and stability, the depth of belief that sustained it, and related institutions and practices of war, balance of

power and diplomacy. Zhang Feng (2009) questions the monolithic view of the tribute system as the key institution of this society, emphasising the considerable variation in practice contingent on shifts in the distribution of power, and seeing room also for war and the balance of power as institutions.

In these two phases there was effectively no interplay between the East Asian and Western international societies other than some indirect economic and cultural contact. There was no sustained direct military or political contact until the 16th century, and the West was not strong enough to make a significant military-political impact on East Asia until the 19th century. The main pattern was therefore the evolution of a distinctive local civilizational international society with fairly autonomous units relating within a mainly Sino-centric principal of suzerainty.

The third phase covers East Asia's encounter with Western/global International society from the late 19th century to 1945. The Chinese order was comprehensively overthrown by a combination of Western barbarians and their Japanese converts. When the European first began to turn up in Asia during the late 15th century, they were new players in the long-established Indian Ocean trading system, initially participating as no more than equals, and sometimes as inferiors (Little, 2004; Alexandrowicz, 1967, 1973; Benton, 2002; Pearson, 2003). They did not become dominant over the other major players in the Indian Ocean until the late 18th century, and not in East Asia until the mid-19th century. The weaker states in Southeast Asia were quite quickly and deeply penetrated by Europeans and their rivalries. But despite some inroads by European Christians and merchants, China and Japan placed effective restrictions on European rights of access to their economies and societies. China was able to maintain its own system up until 1840, and Japan until 1853, at which points both had to open themselves to Western penetration in the face of superior military force. Paine (2003: 5, 297) emphasises how it was not so much the Western defeats of China that brought down the Sino-centric international society, but China's defeat by Japan, a member of that society, but one systematically transforming itself along Western lines.

By the middle of the 19th century, both China and Japan were threatened not just by the West's superior military power, but also by the "standard of civilization" of Western international society, in which they were classified as culturally (and in some versions racially) inferior. As Suzuki (2005, 2009) argues, Western international society was two-faced, presenting a more orderly and equal character amongst its (Western) members, but treating outsiders unequally and coercively. Yet on top of these positional similarities lay a big difference. For China, the encounter with the West offered almost nothing but loss. Apart from being able to gain some new technologies to improve its military strength, Western international society offered China nothing other than reduction from being an empire to a state, and from constituting the core to being part of the periphery (Gong, 1984b; Paine, 2003: 352). For China to be merely equal to the Western powers was in itself a major fall in status. China's response was thus one of half-hearted and not very successful reforms aimed at restoring its ability to resist the West and maintain its own system (Gong, 1984a: 146 - 157). China wanted modernization without Westernization, yet because of tensions between the Han majority and the Manchu ruling dynasty even attempts at modernization were half-hearted (Suzuki, 2009: 89 - 113; Paine, 2003: 26 - 32).

For Japan, however, provided it could avoid being colonized, the encounter with the West offered many opportunities. In addition to Western technology, Japan had the opportunity to gain equality with the Western powers and with China, and to shed its inferior vassal status within the Sino-centric system. Indeed, give the two-tier character of Western international society, of which the Japanese were well aware, Japan had the opportunity to make good on its own claim to be the Middle Kingdom in East Asia and to assert its domination over the region (Suzuki, 2005, 2009: 1 - 33, 46 - 55). Within Western international society, Japan could seek great power status, detach itself from the region, and attempt to colonize it (reproducing in East Asia the power and norms differentiation and the "standard of civilization" that defined the West's attitude to the rest of the world in a core-periphery structure). Japan thus responds to the encounter by adopting a rapid and

extensive modernization programme aimed not just to enable it to match Western military strength, but also to get itself accepted by the West as a “civilized” power (Suganami, 1984; Gong, 1984b; Suzuki, 2009: 114–139). It did this with astonishing speed, undertaking both successful industrialization and major social reform. By the late 19th century this rising power was able to crush China militarily, just as Britain had done a few decades earlier, and begin to replace China as the core of an East Asian imperial system.

As relatively weak powers, both China and Japan sought to join Western international society on *status quo* terms. After its defeat in 1895, China spiralled into decades of fragmentation, civil war and foreign interventions, albeit achieving courtesy recognition as “civilized,” and as a great power, during the Second World War. Japan’s accession was in some ways quicker and less troubled. It was accepted as a legal equal by 1895, and as a great power by 1905. But while outstandingly successful in these ways, it was still not accepted as equal in cultural and racial terms, failing to achieve a commitment to racial equality at the Versailles negotiations in 1919 and suffering discriminatory legislation in the US (1924) against Japanese immigrants (Gong, 1984a: 198–200; Clark, 2007: 83–106). The story of international society in East Asia during the period from Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese war (1904–1905) to its defeat in the second such war (1931–1945), is about the rise and fall of a Japan-centred imperial system in place of the traditional Sino-centric suzerain one. Japan’s empire was more centralized and military than China’s. It was based not on the shared Confucian civilization with China as the cultural core, but on a transposed version of the Western differentiation between the “civilized” (modern) and “barbarian” (premodern), with Japan as the superior power. As Sakai (2008: 236) notes: “in East Asia, ‘international order’ and ‘imperial order’ seemed indivisible.” Japan sought to join the “civilized” inner circle of Western international society on equal terms, and therefore to reproduce in East Asia that society’s colonial policies towards “uncivilized” non-members. Yet even in its imperial excess, Japan had opened the door to the idea that white power could be broken by Asians, and it did

attract some regional allies on this basis.

The defeat of Japan in 1945 destroyed the Japanese imperial society in East Asia and ushered in a fourth phase in which regional international society in East Asia largely disappeared. A regional order dominated by a regional power was replaced with one dominated by outside powers. Post-war occupations morphed into a period of heavy penetration/overlay. There was much stationing of superpower armed forces within the region, and two major proxy wars, first in Korea, and then in and around Vietnam. East Asia, like Europe, was on the front line of a struggle for the soul of global level international society, and in a series of zero sum divides, the region was split, with some countries divided into two (Korea, Vietnam) and most others having little choice but to take sides between the Communist and Western camps.

Since the Cold War era was also the era of decolonization, it was during the period that East Asia completed the restructuring along Western political lines that had been begun earlier by the encounter/reform processes of Japan, China and Siam. With decolonization, all of the East Asian states accepted themselves as being states and therefore accepted the institutions of sovereignty, non-intervention, territoriality, diplomacy, and up to a point trade, that framed Western/global international society. Following on from the impact of Wilsonianism and the League in easing the "standard of civilization," the impact of Second World War transformed Western international society by ending both colonialism and the "standard of civilization" (Armstrong, 1993: 158-169; Zhang, 1998: 13-15).

Despite decolonization, the dominant story about international society in East Asia from the end of the Second World War up well into the 1970s is about the global level. Under the overlay of the US, Japan, and more arguably South Korea, effectively became more part of the West than of their region. Southeast Asia's decolonization process was massively penetrated by the Cold War, which divided the sub-region and subjected it to decades of war and intervention from both superpower blocs.

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

China was in its revolutionary phase under Mao Zedong. Within a few years after China had joined Western international society on equal terms, and been given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the communist victory in 1949 meant that China abandoned its previous policy of integrating with Western international society and took sides against the West in the Cold War. After briefly aligning with the Soviet project, China set out to become a third pole at the global level, alienated from both the US and the Soviet Union. As well as putting itself into opposition to Western international society, China was substantially cut out of its machinery, both because China's seat at the UN was given to the defeated Nationalist Party in Taiwan area, and because many governments gave the diplomatic recognition for China to the regime in Taipei. Yongjin Zhang sets out in detail China's encounter with Western international society post Second World War. He argues that after 1949 there was a two-decade period of "alienation" (not isolation) under Mao, in which US containment of China and China's rejection of the West played into each other. But even during this period, China developed extensive political and economic links, and even had extensive trade with Japan (1998: 27 - 31), and these paved the way for restoration of both diplomatic relations with the West, and its UN seat in 1971.

In the context of the Cold War, external powers divided and penetrated East Asia so deeply as virtually to eliminate the regional level of international society for over two decades. The splitting of East Asia into Cold War camps meant that there was a severe breakdown of even the most basic element of diplomatic recognition. Those on either side of the Cold War divide mainly recognized each other and not those on the other side, meaning that even China was recognized by few of its neighbours. Ideological differences deepened alienation within the region on the basis of communism vs. capitalism (democracy was less of an issue with most states on both sides being authoritarian). China began to go its own way after only a decade in the Soviet camp, and by the 1970s, that development began to open up space for the resurfacing of regional international society in East Asia.

3. The Fifth Phase: The Re-Emergence of Regional International Society in East Asia since the 1970s

The last decolonizations in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s, were a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for construction of a new international society in East Asia and a break with Sakai's (2008: 236) model that "in East Asia, 'international order' and 'imperial order' seemed indivisible." Three other developments were also necessary.

The first was China's split with the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1950s. After a tortuous decade, this move eventually paved the way for the ending of the US's diplomatic isolation of China in the early 1970s. In the context of their rivalries with the Soviet Union, both the US and China shifted to more geostrategic and less ideological positions (Zhang, 1998: 66 - 73). This shift began the end of China's diplomatic exclusion from international society by the US at both the global and regional levels. The People's Republic of China regained its seat at the UN in 1971 and in the same year began the process of diplomatic normalization that culminated in full diplomatic relations between China and the US in 1979. This in turn facilitated the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and most of its neighbours. China's re-engagement with international society was further facilitated by its "reform and opening up" policy after 1978, which meant that the country abandoned economic self-reliance, and embraced engagement with the world economy (Legro, 2007).

From the late 1970s, China put its own economic development as top priority, and deduced from that the need for stability in its international relations both regionally and globally (Zhang, 1998: 102 - 125, 194 - 243; Wu, 1998; Foot, 2001; Qin, 2003, 2004). Towards this end, there was an impressively quick shift from Mao's policy of revolutionary rise, deeply antagonistic to the Western-dominated *status quo*, to Deng's policy of peaceful rise within the *status quo*. Zhang sees China from the late 1970s as steadily adapting to international society,

and integrating with it, playing the diplomatic apprentice rather than the revolutionary in intergovernmental organisations from 1971 on, and mainly engaging economically (Zhang, 1998: 73–91). Not until the 1980s were China's domestic affairs settled enough to allow it to engage politically with international society on a non-revolutionist basis (Zhang, 1998: 91–125).

But China was chasing a moving target, and in danger of becoming alienated again as postmodern developments at the global level such as the so-called human rights issue and “good governance” created a new “standard of civilization,” putting pressure on its quite successful adoption of Westphalian standards and institutions (Foot, 2006). Just as in the first round of China's encounter with Western international society, China did not accept the need to Westernise itself completely, but sought to find a stable and workable blend of modernising reforms and “Chinese characteristics.” But while tensions remain between China and the West at the global level, at the regional level China has integrated more easily. It is now widely regarded as a “good citizen” by most of its Southeast Asian neighbours, and, after a hesitant start, since the mid-90s has integrated well into the regional intergovernmental organisations that have grown around ASEAN (Beeson, 2009: 104).

The second development playing into the formation of international society in East Asia was ASEAN in 1967. During the Cold War, ASEAN was a sub-regional international society of states aligned with the West. ASEAN was committed to both peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue, and up to a point to shared development. ASEAN's charter (the Bangkok Declaration) emphasized the institutions of sovereign equality, non-intervention, regional economic development, regional peace and stability, and international law. ASEAN was liberated by the ending of the Cold War. During the 1990s, it expanded its membership to include all of the Southeast Asian states, and became the nucleus for a variety of related organizations, notably the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone, ASEAN plus Three, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN's extension beyond Southeast Asia has played a key role in the

formation of an East Asian regional international society in at least two ways. First, it helped to socialize China into multilateral practices. Second, it extended into Northeast Asia both its distinctive diplomatic practice of multilateral and transnational “dialoguing,” and the general framework of primary institutions on which it was based. This was an unusual instance of an international society being led by its lesser powers because of historical and ideological issues preventing the bigger powers from taking that role.

The third development playing into the formation of international society in East Asia was the winding down of the Cold War. The implosion of the Soviet Union took its forces out of Southeast Asia altogether, and reduced its presence in Northeast Asia to that in Russia itself. The pullback of Soviet influence in East Asia mainly had a facilitating effect on the other developments trending towards the formation of a regional international society in East Asia. It helped the expansion of ASEAN, and by reducing the threats faced by China, made it easier for China to pursue reform and opening up.

The outcome of all this is a region that is considerably less postcolonial than many others in the third world. Although it still carries the scars and resentments of its encounter with the West’s “standard of civilization,” it is more strongly positioned than many other regions. The state structure is a much better fit with the region’s history and culture than is the case in much of Africa, the Middle East, South America and the rest of Asia, and has put down quite firm roots. East Asia is like Europe in having a main pattern of national identities that fits fairly well with the state structures. Many of the states in East Asia have been quite successful at pursuing economic development and are quite well engaged with the global economy. Most of their elites are less dependent on outside resources to stay in power. While problems of poor socio-political cohesion can certainly be found, these are generally less serious than in many other non-Western countries. Some serious international security problems remain, most obviously divided Korea, but for the most part regional relations are quite stable. Rhetoric about “Asian values” notwithstanding, there is no overarching culture covering East Asia, though

“Confucian culture” is strong in the classical Chinese sphere including Northeast Asia and Vietnam. Neither does the region have a uniform political structure. Although its political economy is mainly capitalist, it contains a mix of states: weak and strong, and democratic and one-party.

Thinking about this regional international society in terms of primary institutions, and what differentiates it from Western/global international society, it is clear that China and many of its neighbours share several important institutional values:

1) A rather traditional Westphalian view of sovereignty and sovereign equality which assigns it a high value and puts strong emphasis on non-intervention.

2) Related to this, and operating at both global and regional levels, anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism (and a preference for multipolarity at the global level).

3) A high priority to regime security, particularly in the non-democratic states.

4) A desire to preserve distinctive cultural values and development projects, and related to this in the non-democratic states, resistance to human rights and democracy. ①

5) A commitment to joint development through trade and investment, along with an economic (not social) liberal view that economic interdependence helps to promote peaceful interstate relations. This also makes East Asian states part of Western/global international society, but to the extent that these values have a specific focus on the regional level, as they also do in the EU, they support a distinctive regional international society as well.

6) More arguably, one might ask how far the idea of Confucian culture, and its inclination to hierarchy and bandwagoning, rather than to balance of power, takes one in thinking about East Asian international society (Kang, 2003, 2003

① 亚洲各国对民主和人权都有自己的理解。本文作者以自己的标准,简单地将世界分成民主国家与非民主国家,于学术研究来说并不严谨。请读者在此注意鉴别。——编者注

2004, 2005)? If East Asia is dressed up in Westphalian costume, but playing to a Confucian rather than a Westphalian script, this would also be a significant differentiation from global/Western international society.

On the face of it, this list seems sufficient to suggest that an East Asian regional international society distinctive from the Western/global one is already in existence. This is mainly based on a logic of coexistence with some cooperation elements mostly in relation to the regional economy. Unlike the EU it contains little or no desire for either convergence or integrating through intergovernmental organizations. Although it shares many Westphalian institutions with the Western/global international society (diplomacy, international law, nationalism, equality of humans), it has different interpretations of some (sovereignty and non-intervention), contests others (human rights, democracy), and has distinctive institutions of its own (regime security, perhaps bandwagoning). It is based on a more state capitalist^① mode of political economy than the West's, and it resists the social liberal idea of cultural homogenization along Western lines.

If a regional international society exists in East Asia, who are its members and what are its boundaries? Russia shares quite a few of its values, but does not identify itself as Asian and is best seen as a neighbouring outside power with interests in the border region. India similarly has neighbouring concerns, but shares fewer of the values and is also culturally distinct. The US still has a strong presence in East Asia, and through rhetorical devices such as "Asia-Pacific" tries to stage itself as part of the region (Buzan, 2004b: 104-106). But it is a penetrating outside power, more representative of Western/global international society rather than being part on the East Asian one, and not sharing many of the distinctive East Asian values. Australia and New Zealand have neighbouring concerns, but do not identify with the region and do not share many of its values. The most difficult

① “国家资本主义”是西方学者用以描述东亚政治经济发展的一个词。近年来，一些西方学者还广泛用它来分析中国发展模式，这是不确切的。中国走的是中国特色社会主义道路，请读者对这类话语注意鉴别。 编者注

question about boundaries and membership concerns Japan. Japan consciously took itself out of the region during the late 19th century, and to a considerable extent remained disengaged from it during the first half of the Cold War. Being democratic, it is an outlier to many “Asian values,” and has renounced war in a way that no other Asian country has done. Yet in its own way, Japan also supports strong sovereignty, state capitalism, cultural distinctiveness, and peace through economic interdependence. The original grounds for Japan’s “leaving” East Asia have largely eroded, not just because of the failure of Japan’s imperial project, but also because other societies in the region have modernized. South Korea and Singapore closed the development gap with Japan before the end of the Cold War, and China and much of Southeast Asia have been doing so since the 1990s. That said, however, there remains the problem of the history-poisoned relationship between Japan and China (Li, 1999; Drifte, 2000; Rozman, 2002; Yahuda, 2002; Reilly, 2004; Gries, 2005; Roy, 2005; Tamamoto, 2005; Dreyer, 2006; Foot, 2006; Wan, 2006; Mochizuki, 2007; Buzan, 2010b). This continues to push Japan offshore and into the arms of the US.

Japan’s part in the emerging East Asian international society therefore remains in question. Like Britain in relation to the EU, Japan is in some respects unquestionably part of its region, but in others it remains something of an outlier. It is difficult to think of East Asia without including Japan, but the inclusion of Japan opens up a political divide that itself hinges on how the region is defined. As Sohn (2008) notes, as Japan re-engages with the region it seeks to make the region more congenial to itself by defining it in wider terms, including other democracies such as Australia, New Zealand and India. This sets up a competition between a narrower, more China-friendly version of the region and a wider, more Japan-friendly one, and shows how significant elements of older divides are still in play.

This whole question of the scope and nature of contemporary regional international society in East Asia is one on which more research needs to be focused.

4. The Outlook for Regional International Society in East Asia

What legacies have been carried forward from the earlier phases in the development of East Asian international society to the current phase, and how is the relationship between the regional international society and the global/Western one likely to evolve? The legacies are significant.

There are three principle legacies from the encounter phase for the current one. First, and in common with many other non-Western regions, is a deep and abiding opposition to (Western) colonialism and (white) racism, and therefore a strong adherence to sovereignty and non-intervention. Second, and closely related, is the internalisation of nationalism and sovereignty as primary institutions serving both to stabilize the state and legitimise anti-colonialism. Third, and specific to East, and especially Northeast, Asia, is a strong resentment of Japan's imperial venture and fear of Japanese hegemony: the history problem that plagues relations between both states and peoples in East Asia.

The principal legacy of the Cold War phase is the deep and durable presence of the US in the region. Much more so than in Europe, the US military and political presence in East Asia, and particularly in Northeast Asia, survived the ending of the Cold War. During the Cold War (with the defeat of the US in Vietnam), and even more so during the 1990s, Southeast Asia was largely able to transcend the divisive legacies of decolonization and the Cold War. But in Northeast Asia the US presence underpinned the divisions of Korea, and provided an insulator between China and Japan that allowed both of them to keep their relationship unresolved. The sustained US presence in East Asia means that the rivalry between the US and China plays simultaneously at both the global and regional levels.

In the contemporary phase, the question is not one of legacies, but about looking forward to how the emergent regional international society in East Asia will relate to Western/global international society. Traditional English school theory,

reflecting its formative period during the Cold War, worried that the development of regional international societies would necessarily lead to conflict for dominance of international society at the global level. But as I have argued elsewhere (Buzan 2004a: 205–212) while such conflict is one possible outcome it is by no means the only one. Forms of second-order pluralist coexistence are equally plausible. There are three general scenarios for how the East Asian international society will relate to the Western/global one: rivalry/conflict, differentiation/coexistence or homogenization.

The differentiation/coexistence scenario presupposes that both “Asian values” and the conversion of East Asia to a Westphalian political form remain firmly in play. On this basis, East Asia wants to retain and cultivate its political, cultural and economic distinctiveness, but wants to do so within a generally Western-style political framing of sovereign states. In the context of a declining West and rising non-Western powers, such a development might be mirrored in other regions, leading to a layered international society evolving from the present postcolonial structure in which the West still has a privileged, but partly contested, hegemonic role, and non-Western regions are in varying degrees subordinate to Western power and values. As the Western vanguard declines relative to the rise of non-Western powers, the Western/global level of international society will weaken. Anti-hegemonism will add to this weakening, and reinforce a relative strengthening of regional international societies as non-Western cultures seek to reassert their own values and resist (at least some of) those coming from the Western core. The result would be a de-centred international society in which different regions, including the West, pursued their own cultural values and regional international orders. A global level international society would still exist, based partly on the successful diffusion and naturalisation of some Western values (territoriality, sovereignty, nationalism, market, perhaps environmental stewardship), and partly on the pragmatic necessities for all states and cultures of cultivating a degree of social order at the global level. But the global level would be relatively thin, representing a second-order pluralism among the regional international societies. The strength of

international society at the regional level would reflect the higher degree of both cultural unity and political similarity to be found there, while its weakness at the global level would reflect the lack thereof.

The homogenization scenario presupposes the triumph of the Western/global level of international society over the regional ones. This could be the result either of a successful Westernization project or one of cultural syncretism with the homogenizing effects of global capitalism being the main engine in either case (Buzan, 2010a). This would require that the imperatives for distinctiveness in East Asia (and elsewhere) be essentially superficial, transitory phenomena, amounting to a mere passing phase in the region's post-colonial history.

How plausible are these scenarios? The rivalry/conflict scenario is plausible inasmuch as East Asia might well become powerful enough to challenge a declining West. The question is whether it will have the ideological basis or the political will to mount such a challenge in the face of the very considerable costs of doing so. There is not only the increased risk of military confrontation, but also the problem of how to deal with the intensification of hegemonism and anti-hegemonism at the regional that would be a likely result. At the other end of the spectrum, homogenization seems the least plausible outcome. The West is weakening relative to a rising non-West, and the financial meltdown of 2008 – 2009 gives reason to think that the collapse of the Washington consensus will for some time lead to a more muted operation of global markets, and more regional differentiation from the global economy.

The differentiation/coexistence scenario seems the most plausible, though it too would face the problem of how to handle hegemonism and anti-hegemonism at the regional, and how to solve the history problem between China and Japan. Nevertheless, the imperatives to retain differentiation look strong and deep, though not really of a type to encourage rivalry/conflict at the global level. Unlike the global ideological rivalries of the 1930s and 40s, and the Cold War, when the fate of the global level of international society was being contested, contemporary Asian values and their equivalents elsewhere have a more defensive than offensive feel.

Non-Western cultures want the right exist, reproduce and evolve without being pressured to conform to Western liberal norms politically and culturally. This does not mean that they want to replace the West as an alternative global hegemony, though they would doubtless welcome a West that got used to the idea that its values were its own rather than being necessarily universal. In this context, enough has been absorbed from the West to provide pragmatic ideational foundations for a second-order pluralism at the global level in which thicker regional international societies coexist within a thinner global one. Within East Asia, this arrangement might even provide grounds for constructing a solution to the Sino-Japanese problem. As Williams (2004: 38, 17) notes:

Japan has offered more effective resistance to American hegemonic globalisation than any other non-White society ... When the end of White hegemony over the Pacific and Indian Oceans finally comes, historians will trace the origins of this racial fading to the military disasters inflicted on the United States by Imperial Japan between 1941 and 1942. The destruction of the World Trade Centre on 11 September was not a repeat of Pearl Harbour but a mere echo of it.

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全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

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Restructuring International Relations in East Asia: The Role of ODA

Barbara Stallings *

When we speak of restructuring international relations in East Asia, the main topic that comes to mind is regional integration and the relative influence of Japan, China, and Korea. Regional integration has been on the agenda in East Asia for nearly five decades. In formal organizational terms, the most important event was the formation of ASEAN in 1967 and its gradual evolution and expansion in the following years. In informal economic terms, the emergence of the “flying wild geese” model was the dominant force, dating from more or less this same time period. Both of these trends, however, have been restructured by the increasing presence of China in the region, and the Asian financial crisis stimulated important new developments.

This paper is mainly concerned with economic integration. Most of the discussion of this topic has centered on foreign trade and investment and specifically how different groups of countries were incorporated into East Asian production networks through trade and investment links. In recent years, monetary integration

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has also appeared on the agenda. One topic that has not been prominent in these discussions is the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In this paper, we will ask if ODA has played a significant role in unifying the nations of East Asia and, if so, what the mechanisms have been and how they relate to other economic processes.

To answer this general question, we will need to ask some more specific ones: Who are the main Asian donors? What share of their funds goes to East Asia? To what countries do these funds go? For what purposes are they used? How much of recipient countries' ODA comes from donors in the region? Have regional donors tried to use their funds to increase cohesion and to incorporate new nations? These questions will be addressed through an examination of quantitative data on ODA flows and a case study of Vietnam.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of the main trends in regional integration in East Asia. Then we analyze data on ODA, comparing the leading Asian donors with their counterparts from other regions. The next section looks at the Vietnamese experience with ODA and asks whether it has helped to incorporate that country into the East Asian region. Finally, we conclude with some general reflections on the role of ODA in regional integration.

1. Trends in East Asian Regionalism: A Literature Review

There is an enormous volume of literature on regionalism in East Asia, and we make no attempt to summarize it here.^① The aim is much more modest: to lay out a time line of the evolving mechanisms that have been emphasized in promoting East Asian regional integration in the last five decades and to extract some hypotheses on the role of ODA.

^① For recent overviews, see Chua (2010), Ravenhill (2008), Munakata (2006), Pempel (2005).

During the 1960s, two potentially complementary processes began to take shape in the region, but they generally operated in isolation from each other. One was what some academics now call “regionalization,” that is, the *de facto* integration of some of the economies of East Asia through economic activities, especially trade and investment. Although governments played a role behind the scenes, the main actors were private firms. The key paper that tried to make intellectual sense of the process was Akamatsu (1962), who introduced the concept of the “flying wild geese” model.¹ Based on theories of dynamic comparative advantage, the model postulated that East Asia would catch up with the west through the transfer of production technologies from leader to follower nations. In the 1960s, of course, the leader was Japan and the followers were the four East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs). Later, other generations of followers would be incorporated.

Also in the early 1960s, the Southeast Asian countries began to work on the creation of a sub-regional institution. In contrast to regionalization as embodied in the flying wild geese concept, the Southeast Asians were interested in “regionalism,” or politically constructed integration. The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) treaty was signed in 1967 and had as members Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Initially ASEAN was more concerned with political and security goals rather than with the economy. As Stubbs (2008: 456) reminds us, the five countries were preoccupied with conflicts among themselves as well as with the Vietnam War and the spread of communism in the region. Their *modus operandi* evolved in a way that still influences broader East Asian regional discussions: non-interference in the affairs of neighbors, peaceful settlement of disputes, and work by consensus.

After the 1985 Plaza Accord, which raised the value of the Japanese yen vis-à-vis the dollar and also impacted the other currencies of the region, Japan and the four NIEs began to invest heavily in Southeast Asia (Chia, 1993). Thus the flying

¹ For other important contributions on this topic, see Ozawa (2005), Yamazawa (1990).

wild geese model expanded into ASEAN as a second generation of economics, but the two types of regional integration continued to operate on separate tracks. It would not be until after the 1997 financial crisis that they would come together in a significant way when a broader regional institution would take up various economic challenges.

In the meantime, however, the increasing presence of China began to place new strains on both regionalization and regionalism in East Asia. Initially many thought that China — together with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos — would simply be a third generation within the flying wild geese formation. But soon it became clear that China's economic and political power would disrupt the regional economic model and have profound ramifications for political relations as well. China became a magnet for the foreign direct investment that had previously gone to ASEAN countries, and it began to compete with them in exports (Lardy, 1994, 2002). Moreover, its new economic power — together with its military might and international influence — meant that China also rose in political importance in the region. Increasingly, it began to compete with Japan for regional leadership (Bergsten et al., 2008).

The 1997 crisis was a watershed that changed both political and economic processes in East Asia (Park, 2006). First, it cemented China's economic position in the region, when its government did not devalue the RMB and thus became a source of stability for its neighbors. This position was further enhanced as Japan continued in the recession it had suffered since the end of the 1980s (Pempel, 1999, especially ch. 10; Noble and Ravenhill, 2000, especially ch. 7). Second, it convinced East Asian governments that they could not rely on the international financial system, with the IMF as lynchpin, to rescue them from future economic problems. Rather, they would have to develop their own mechanisms (Y. W. Lee, 2008). And third, as a consequence of the second, institution building came onto the agenda and ASEAN was broadened into ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, and Korea). ASEAN + 3 was especially important in the monetary sphere, which came to complement the trade and investment links, but it assumed more general

coordination and decision-making functions as well (Stubbs, 2002; Terada, 2003).^①

By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, then, the core of the East Asian region is constituted by 12 countries: Japan, China, and Korea at the top of the pyramid; the original five ASEAN countries in the middle; and other countries that had joined ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam) at the bottom.^② The group operates at political and economic levels. The main political forum is ASEAN+3. Economic processes continue to focus on trade and investment, but monetary relations are also important, including the Chang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Asian Bond Fund (ABF), and even discussion of a common currency.

Missing from this picture is ODA. ODA was important earlier in the postwar period for a number of countries in the region, but most of those resources came from the United States and Europe. The question in this paper is whether ODA from the region itself is making a contribution to regional integration today. In the rest of the paper, we will investigate three hypotheses with respect to regional integration in East Asia:

- 1) ODA in East Asia is important for incorporating new countries into regional networks.
- 2) ODA in East Asia is oriented to export to recipients an East Asian development model.
- 3) The regional role of East Asian ODA is partially offset by donors' other foreign policy priorities.

① ASEAN+3 has competition in ASEAN+6, which includes Australia, New Zealand, and India plus the others in ASEAN+3. The larger group is part of the leadership struggle between Japan and China, where the former wants to include the three democracies to partially dilute China's influence

② Brunei is also a member of ASEAN, but as a small, wealthy oil exporter, it plays a minor role in the region.

2. The Role of ODA in East Asia

With these hypotheses in mind, we begin by examining some statistical information on ODA flows by the four leading donors in the East Asia region. They include Japan, Korea, China, and the Asian Development Fund (AsDF), which is the concessional loan vehicle of the Asian Development Bank. Together the four account for 40–50 percent of the ODA in the region.

Japan was a founding member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and is one of the leading donors in the world. Indeed, for a number of years in the 1990s, it was the single largest donor, surpassing the United States. One reason is that Japan sought to substitute its lack of participation in international military activities by providing foreign aid; this was its contribution to international "burden sharing" (Islam, 2001). For some time, Japan was heavily criticized by other donors for its tied aid and the links between its ODA and contracts for Japanese firms, especially its trading companies. Eventually its ODA became legally untied, but there is still criticism that Japanese firms obtain a disproportionate share of project work. Another early criticism of Japanese aid was that it was not conditioned on democracy and human rights in recipient countries. That also began to change with the adoption of the ODA Charter in 2003.^①

Korea, by contrast, is the newest member of the DAC having acceded in early 2010 although it had had a formal aid apparatus for two decades. It was itself heavily dependent on foreign aid from the United States in the 1950s and 1960s after the Korean War. The country's subsequent development to its current status as one of the world's leading economies is one of the relatively few clear aid success stories. Not surprisingly, then, Korea sees its own experience as one of the assets it can provide to recipients. The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) is the embodiment of this

①. On Japanese foreign aid, see Katada et al. (2005), Lancaster (2006, ch. 4), Orr (1990), Yasutomo (1986).

approach. Korea was eager to join the DAC as evidence of its “arrival” on the global stage. It is trying hard to adjust its structures and policies to DAC standards — even though some of its own officials are dubious about the changes (interviews).^①

China is a larger ODA donor than Korea, but it is simultaneously a large recipient of ODA. The lack of official information on the quantity of its aid, its geographical distribution, or its purposes makes it difficult to evaluate or even describe it. China’s aid — although the government prefers the term “South-South Cooperation” — dates back to the 1950s. It generally operates separately from other aid donors, and its ODA is hard to disentangle from commercially-based transactions with developing countries. Overall its economic assistance (including ODA) is frequently directed toward securing access to natural resources. Another characteristic is its lack of economic or political conditionality — except allegiance to the One China policy and access to the resources it helps to finance. Often projects are carried out by Chinese personnel.^②

The Asian Development Fund is the fourth important provider of ODA from within the East Asian region. As part of the Asian Development Bank, a multilateral institution, it obviously has different characteristics than the three countries just discussed. The ADB has its own commercial loan window, while the AsDF provides grants and concessional loans. Internal documents describe the mission of the AsDF as helping the poorest countries in the Asian region begin to catch up with their more successful neighbors. The agency also supports regional integration activities to promote public goods and backward and forward linkages with the fast-growing Asian countries.^③

The relative size of the ODA contributions made by these four donors is shown

^① Little analysis of Korean foreign aid is available. For some information, see Kim (forthcoming), OECD (2008), Kwon, H. (2006), Kwon, Y. (2006).

^② On Chinese ODA, see Brautigam (2009), Lu (2009), Lum et al. (2009), Lum et al. (2008), Hubbard (2007), Lancaster (2007), Qi (2007).

^③ On the Asian Development Fund, and its parent, the Asian Development Bank, see ADB (2008, 2007a and b), Kappagoda (1995).

in Table 1. The table provides calculations based on various definitions of ODA commitments, gross disbursements, and net disbursements — for the year 2008. Several items are worth noting about this table. First, by all three measures, Japan is by far the largest donor. Its commitments are about ten times those of Korea or the AsDF; no information on commitments is available for China. Its gross disbursements are also much larger than its three counterparts. Second, there is a much larger gap between gross and net disbursements for Japan since it is an older donor and recipients are repaying prior loans. Third, Korea is increasing its ODA much faster than the others (with the possible exception of China). Its commitments are nearly three times the size of its gross disbursements for 2008. Fourth, the share of ODA going to East Asia is generally largest for Korea. The average of the East Asian share for the three measures shown in Table 1 is 34 percent for Korea, 30 percent for the AsDF, and only 18 percent for Japan. The latter is lowered substantially by the fact that its net disbursements are low in general, in comparison with its gross disbursements, and this is especially the case for East Asia. Several of Japan's largest East Asian borrowers (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) are repaying more than they receive.

Table 1 Main ODA Donors in East Asia: Total Bilateral Aid and East Asian Share, 2008

	Japan	Korea	China	AsDF
Status	DAC member since 1961	DAC member since 2010	Non-DAC member	Multilateral institution
Commitments	16 900	1 455	NA	1 745
East Asia share	23.7	34.3	NA	38.9
Gross disbursements	14 697	579	3 046	2 330
East Asia share	30.2	34.7	NA	24.5
Net disbursements	6 823	539	NA	1 654
East Asia share	0.3	33.0	NA	25.8

Sources: OECD/DAC Online Statistics (Creditor Reporting System) for Japan, Korea, and AsDF; Brautigam (2009: App. 6) for China in 2007.

East Asian recipients include Cambodia, China, Indonesia, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The geographical distribution of ODA from the four East Asian donors varies. Again we have no official information on China, but the best estimate is that around 45 percent of Chinese funds go to Sub-Saharan Africa (Brautigam, 2009: App. 6). With respect to the other three donors, we saw in Table 1 the varying shares of gross disbursements that go to East Asia: 30 percent from Japan, 35 percent from Korea, and 25 percent from the AsDF. Table 2 shows how each donor allocates the rest of its funds. Japan's allocation focuses on South and Central Asia (22 percent), the Middle East (14 percent), Africa (13 percent) with lesser amounts to Latin America and Eastern Europe. Korea provides a larger share to Africa and Latin America (19 and 12 percent, respectively), but a smaller share to other Asian countries (13 percent) and to the Middle East (5 percent). Since the AsDF only provides funds to Asian countries, the remainder of its resources goes to South and Central Asia (especially Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). These shares vary significantly from those for other donors, where the regional allocations are 38 percent to Africa, 11 percent to South and Central Asia, 11 percent to the Middle East, 8 percent to Latin America, 6 percent to East Asia, and 5 percent to Europe.

Table 2 The Rest Funds ODA Donors Allocate, 2008

Recipients	Japan		Korea		China		AsDF		other donors ^a	
	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%
All bilateral ODA	14 697	100	579	100	3 046	100	2 330	100	114 315	100
Africa	1 910	13	107	18.5	1 380	45.3	0	0	43 770	38.3
Asia (East)	4 429	30.1	201	34.7	NA	NA	571	24.5	7 065	6.2
Cambodia	115	0.8	35	6	NA	NA	141	6.1		
China	1 200	8.2	19	3.3	NA	NA	12	0.5		
Indonesia	1 324	9	23	4	NA	NA	60	2.6		
Korea, North	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	0	0		
Laos	68	0.5	12	2.1	NA	NA	62	2.7		
Malaysia	220	1.5	1	0.2	NA	NA	0	0		

To be continued

Recipients	Japan		Korea		China		AsDF		other donors*	
	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%
Mongolia	75	0.5	17	2.9	NA	NA	29	1.2		
Myanmar	42	0.3	7	1.2	NA	NA	0	0		
Philippines	471	3.2	26	4.5	NA	NA	4	0.2		
Thailand	119	0.8	2	0.3	NA	NA	1	0		
Vietnam	795	5.4	59	10.2	NA	NA	262	11.2		
Asia (South and Ce)	3 195	21.7	75	13	NA	NA	1 734	74.4	12 980	11.4
Europe	520	3.5	15	2.6	NA	NA	0	0	6 209	5.4
Latin America	769	5.2	70	12.1	NA	NA	0	0	8 825	7.7
Middle East	2 069	14.1	31	5.4	NA	NA	0	0	12 877	11.3
Oceania	167	1.1	3	0.5	NA	NA	25	1.1	1 350	1.2
Unspecified	1 638	11.1	76	13.1	NA	NA	0	0	21 238	18.6

Sources: OECD/DAC Online Statistics (Creditor Reporting system) for Japan, Korea, and AsDF; Brautigam (2009: App. 6) for China in 2007

* All donors, bilateral and multilateral, except Japan, Korea, and AsDF.

The disbursements within East Asia also differ in significant ways. Japan gives the largest amount of money to Indonesia and China, followed by Vietnam and the Philippines. Korea, by contrast, provides the largest amount to Vietnam and Cambodia, followed by the Philippines, China, and Indonesia. The AsDF has a distribution similar to that of Korea. By far the largest share goes to Vietnam, followed by Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. Almost no funds go to China or the Philippines, large recipients from the other two donors.

What do these geographical patterns tell us about ODA from the three donors? My interpretation is that they indicate that ODA plays a somewhat different function within the foreign policies of Japan, Korea, and China. As mentioned above, the Japanese government sees its ODA partially as a way to mollify the United States for its small defense budget and its reluctance to use the Self-Defense Forces abroad. This can be seen most clearly in the fact that Japan's largest recipient in 2008 was Iraq, which alone counted for 11 percent of gross disbursements of ODA

(18 percent of net disbursements). Afghanistan was the 11th largest recipient. These were not traditional recipients for Japan, but they are where U. S. interests are currently centered. Among East Asian countries in Japan's top ten recipients were included China, Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia — all middle income countries. Of the poorest East Asian countries, only Vietnam was among the top 15.

Korea appears to be following a pattern more typical of DAC recommendations, i. e. , aid to low-income countries for poverty reduction. As a new DAC member, it may be particularly concerned to burnish its reputation as a "good" donor. In its top 15 recipients are included Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines, Angola, Sri Lanka, India, China, Mongolia, Dominican Republic, Jordan, Laos, Turkey, Liberia, Senegal, and Honduras. Of these, five are classified as low-income countries by the World Bank; all of the poorest East Asian countries are included.

From the little we know, China represents a third pattern. Sub-Saharan Africa is the largest regional recipient of Chinese funds. As mentioned above, the most authoritative estimate (Brautigam, 2009: App. 6) suggests that Africa receives about 45 percent of China's ODA. Nearly all African countries that follow the One China policy receive some resources, but the largest recipients are reported to be Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia (Davies, 2007). Outside of Africa, China provides aid to its East Asian neighbors and has recently been moving into Latin America as well (Roett and Paz, 2008). Many, if not most, of these countries are important sources of natural resources for China. Aid in obtaining access to the resources is clearly an aim of ODA as well as of other Chinese resources.

As a multilateral institution, the AsDF is more tied to multilateral guidelines and, in particular, to those of the Asian Development Bank. All funds must be given to members, and poverty is a key criteria. The top 15 recipients of AsDF funds include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Georgia, Afghanistan, Laos, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Kirghiz Republic, Mongolia,

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

China, and Azerbaijan. Of these seven are low income recipients; the remaining eight are in the lower-middle income category.

Greater similarity among the East Asian donors is found with respect to the sectoral distribution of ODA funds in East Asia, as can be seen in Table 3. These contrast with other donors' allocation in the region. First, the three East Asian donors for which we have information provide a weighted average of 26 percent of gross disbursements for social sector activities in East Asia, compared to 53 percent for other donors. Second, an equally striking difference is seen with respect to economic infrastructure and production sectors. While other donors provide only 24 percent in these two categories, the three East Asian donors provide 50 percent. Our understanding is that most Chinese aid is also for economic infrastructure and productive activities. Third, the remaining categories are more difficult to characterize. They include multi-sector loans (including environmental loans), program assistance (budget relief), debt relief, humanitarian assistance, refugees, support for NGOs, and administrative costs. For non-Asian donors, these categories account for 23 percent; the main uses are debt relief and humanitarian purposes. For the Asian donors these categories represent a similar share. The strong support for economic infrastructure and production within the region provides a way to link ODA to home-country firms, whether the tendency is for aid to be openly tied (Korea) or formally untied (Japan). China is well known for having its own firms implement the projects it finances.

Table 3 Sectoral Allocation of ODA to East Asia by East Asian and Other Donors (gross disbursements), 2006^a

Sector	Japan		Korea		China		AsDF ^b		Other donors ^c	
	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%
Total	4 429	100.0	201	100.0	NA	NA	571	100.0	7 065	100.0
Social	1 159	26.2	69	34.3	NA	NA	131	22.9	3 759	53.2
Economic	1 721	38.9	89	44.2	NA	NA	286	50.1	1 148	16.2

To be continued

Sector	Japan		Korea		China		AsDF ^b		Other donors ^c	
	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%	\$mn	%
Production	467	10.5	20	10.0	NA	NA	0	0.0	563	8.0
Other	1 082	24.5	23	11.5	NA	NA	154	27.0	1 595	22.6

Sources: OECD/DAC online (Creditor Reporting System) for Japan, Korea, and AsDF; Braultgam (2009; App.6) for China in 2007

^aEast Asian recipients include Cambodia, China, Indonesia, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam

^bFigures represent sectoral distribution all Asian Development Bank members; average of 2006–2008.

^cAll donors, bilateral and multilateral, except Japan, Korea, and AsDF.

Finally, we need to examine data from the viewpoint of the recipients. Where does most of their ODA come from? On average, the ten East Asian recipient countries we have been following obtain 38.5 percent from the three East Asian donors (excluding China). This share is broadly similar with the following exceptions. Malaysia and the Philippines get a much larger than average share (80 and 52 percent, respectively) from East Asian donors. This is presumably since other donors consider that their per capita income is too high for ODA. Surprisingly, Laos gets a much smaller than average share from East Asian donors, only 26 percent. Myanmar, which has been somewhat ostracized for political reasons, receives most of its ODA from other bilateral donors and the multilaterals. Finally North Korea appears to get no funds from Asian donors, but this is misleading. South Korea provides over \$ 500 million per year, but these funds are counted as domestic transactions (OECD, 2008, interviews).

Table 4 Geographical Distribution of ODA by Recipient in East Asia (gross disbursements), 2008

Country	Total ODA \$mn	Total ODA from East Asia		Japan \$mn	Korea \$mn	AsDF \$mn
		\$mn	%			
East Asia	13 506	5 201	38.5	4 429	201	571
Cambodia	762	291	38.2	115	35	141

To be continued

Country	Total ODA	Total ODA from East Asia		Japan	Korea	AsDF
	\$mn	\$mn	%	\$mn	\$mn	\$mn
China	3 162	1 231	38.9	1 200	19	12
Indonesia	3 523	1 407	39.9	1 324	23	60
Korea, North	221	0	0	0	0	0
Laos	542	142	26.2	68	12	62
Malaysia	277	221	79.8	220	1	0
Mongolia	288	121	42.0	75	17	29
Myanmar	534	49	9.2	42	7	0
Philippines	959	501	52.2	471	26	4
Thailand	326	122	37.4	119	2	1
Vietnam	2 912	1 116	38.3	795	59	262

Source: OECD/DAC Online Statistics (Creditor Reporting System).

In summary, East Asian donors have a much higher concentration of their ODA in East Asia than do DAC countries as a whole. Nonetheless, varying shares of the former go to the region, and the intra-regional distribution differs. East Asian donors also show a strong preference for financing economic infrastructure over social services, budget support, and humanitarian aid. This again contrasts with DAC donors as a whole. On average, nearly 40 percent of the ODA of East Asian recipients comes from East Asian donors. These statistics provide the necessary but not sufficient conditions to support our hypotheses: that East Asian donors support regional integration through providing a large share of their ODA to East Asian countries and try to replicate their own development model in recipient countries through an emphasis on economic infrastructure and production facilities. Nonetheless, they must also attend to other international priorities — whether this is global political obligations (Japan), the research for natural resources (China), or establishing a “good” reputation among ODA peers (Korea). To get a better understanding on the processes and to further test the hypotheses, we turn to the Vietnam case study.

3. A Case Study of Vietnam

The purpose of the case study on Vietnam is to get a better idea of the processes — the goals and mechanisms — involved in ODA from the four main Asian donors to recipient countries in the East Asian region. This is a crucial step in evaluating the three hypotheses that the paper aims to test. Vietnam was chosen because it is the largest ODA recipient in East Asia, and it is easier than with other countries to find materials on donor intentions and activities. In the concluding section, we address the question of whether it is a representative case.

We begin with a brief look at the political-economic characteristics of Vietnam and its recent history. Then we turn to the subject of finance for development and the role that ODA plays within the broader financial flows to the country. This is followed by a study of the particular approaches of Japan, Korea, China, and the Asian Development Bank in Vietnam and the way the Vietnam government interacts with the various foreign actors involved in providing finance.

We can date modern Vietnamese history from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the resulting reunification of the northern and southern parts of the country. The fourth congress of the Communist Party in 1976 declared that Vietnam would be managed as a centrally planned economy under single party control. After the invasion of Cambodia (which alienated western powers and tightened links with the Soviet Union), and the failure of two five-year plans, a major transformation came about in economic policy. In 1986, “Doi Moi” — varyingly translated as renewal, renovation, or reconstruction — was instituted in Vietnam and brought the gradual marketization of economic relations although political centralization under the Communist Party continued.^①

Vietnam is a medium-sized country (85 million inhabitants in 2008) with a

^① On Doi Moi policies, see Ruedel and Comer (1998); on the process of Doi Moi, see Rama (2008)

fairly high adult literacy rate (92 percent, according to the latest UNESCO figures). In the early 1990s, it was one of the poorest countries in the world. While World Bank statistics show that low income countries averaged \$ 268 per capita in 1990, Vietnam's GNI was only \$ 120. Since then, however, growth has accelerated and the country has enjoyed one of the world's highest GDP growth rates. Average annual growth between 1990 and 2008 was 7.4 percent. Other than the early 1990s, the only times that growth has fallen below 7 percent were in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and during the current crisis (see Figure 1).^① Other aspects of the strong performance in the last two decades include high rates of investment and export growth, rapid reduction of poverty and, until 2007, a low rate of inflation.




Figure 1 Vietnam's GDP Growth Rate, 1990 - 2009

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online (for 1990 - 2008); IMF (2009 - projection for 2009).

Clearly the change of economic model can be considered a major success. One component of the new model was foreign finance, which flowed rapidly into the

① The decline in 2008, and projected lower growth rate for 2009, was only partially due to the international context. Vietnam also suffered from the overheating of its economy and consequent macroeconomic problems; see Riedel (2009)

country. Vietnam received many types of foreign financial flows, with the composition changing over time. ODA began to arrive in large volume in the early 1990s, and FDI picked up in the same period. Later these two types of flows were supplemented by remittances. Table 5 shows net ODA and FDI from 1996; remittance data are only available from 2001. In the cases of both ODA and FDI, commitment of funds has substantially exceeded the amounts actually invested. Estimates by the Ministry of Planning and Investment for 2005, for example, suggest that only about half of the commitments are fulfilled in the same year — although of course further amounts may arrive in succeeding years.^① To arrive at the net figures shown in Table 5, repayments and capital withdrawals must be subtracted, but until now these have not been large in the case of Vietnam. Other types of flows — which were quite unstable and thus did not make a significant contribution to development — included bank loans and equity investment in the local stock market.^②

Table 5 Financial Flows to Vietnam, 1996–2008 (millions of dollars and as share of GDP)

Year	Net ODA	Net FDI	Remittances	Flows/GDP (1)	Flows/GDP (2)
1996	936	2 395	NA	13.5	NA
1997	998	2 220	NA	12.0	NA
1998	1 177	1 671	NA	10.5	NA
1999	1 429	1 421	NA	9.9	NA
2000	1 681	1 298	NA	9.6	NA
2001	1 423	1 300	2 000	8.3	14.5
2002	1 280	1 400	2 714	7.6	15.4
2003	1 772	1 450	2 700	8.3	15.2
2004	1 846	1 610	3 200	7.6	14.7
2005	1 913	1 889	4 000	7.2	14.8

① Data on the ODA disbursement ratio comes from Hang (2007); for FDI, information is from Ahn and Thang (2007).

② Bank loans were generally negative on a net basis; equity investment spiked in 2007 and then turned negative.

To be continued

Year	Net ODA	Net FDI	Remittances	Flows/GDP (1)	Flows/GDP (2)
2006	1 845	2 315	4 800	7.0	15.0
2007	2 511	6 516	5 500	13.1	21.2
2008	2 552	9 279	7 200	13.1	21.0

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online.

(1) Net ODA plus net FDI as share of GDP

(2) Net ODA plus net FDI plus remittances as share of GDP

As can be seen from the last two columns in Table 5, net ODA and FDI alone reached very high proportions of GDP in the mid-1990s. Even at the lowest point in 2006, they accounted for 7 percent of gross domestic product. The acceleration in 2007–2008 is seen by many experts as a major source of the overheating of the economy. When remittances are added in, the share is extraordinary, varying between a low of 15 percent and a high of 21 percent. It should be noted that these inflows do not imply a current account deficit of this order of magnitude, since remittances and part of the ODA flows are components of the current rather than the capital account. Nonetheless, such large inflows can create inflationary pressures as indeed happened in 2007.

With these data on the size of flows as background, we turn to ask who was providing these resources. In particular, we are interested in the role of East Asian donors and investors. Beginning with ODA, the first panel of Table 6 shows commitments from the ten largest donors in 2008. The single largest donor in terms of commitments was the International Development Association (IDA), the concessional arm of the World Bank (29.3 percent). The next three in rank order were Japan (28.5 percent), the Asian Development Fund (12.8 percent), and Korea (6.6 percent). Together the three Asian donors committed 48 percent of the total. The next five in the ranking were European donors, followed by the United States; the western group together accounted for 29 percent of commitments.

Table 6 Largest ODA Donors to Vietnam, 2008 (percent)

Panel A. Commitments		Panel B. Gross Disbursements	
Donor	Share	Donor	Share
IDA	29.3	Japan	27.9
Japan	28.5	IDA	25.2
AsDF	12.8	AsDF	9.2
Korea	6.6	France	7.0
United Kingdom	5.2	United Kingdom	4.5
Germany	4.0	Germany	4.2
France	2.7	Australia	2.8
Denmark	2.5	Denmark	2.4
European Union	2.5	European Union	2.4
United States	2.3	United States	2.3
Total	96.4	Total	87.9

Source: OECD/DAC Online Statistics (Creditor Reporting System).

The second panel of the table shows gross disbursements of ODA in 2008. The ordering is similar. Japan is the largest donor by this measure, followed by the IDA, the Asian Development Fund, and five European donors. This time, however, Australia is in seventh place, and the United States is again the tenth largest donor. Korea comes in as eleventh largest donor. The difference, as we saw earlier, owes to the rapid increase in Korean ODA such that its commitments rank it much higher than its disbursements. The Asian total of gross disbursements was 39 percent.

The data we have available on country origin of net FDI flows are for the cumulative total of the 1988 - 2006 period. They show that the Asian share was even higher than for ODA. Table 7 indicates that the top five home countries or districts for FDI to Vietnam were all from Asia. In rank order, they are China's Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Japan, and China's Hong Kong SAR. Taken together, they provided 57 percent of Vietnam's FDI. The second tier includes the British Virgin Islands, the Netherlands, France, the United States, and Malaysia. Both the

British Virgin Islands and (to a lesser extent) Hong Kong are not the “real” origin of the investments; rather they are locations that investors use for tax purposes or to disguise their true origin. We could also think of Hong Kong as an indicator of investment from China.

Table 7 Largest Foreign Investors (FDI) in Vietnam, 1988–2006

Country or District	No. of Projects	Share	Registered Capital	Share
China's Taiwan	1 550	22.8	3 577	13.5
Japan	735	10.8	3 277	12.4
Korea	1 263	18.5	3 229	12.2
Singapore	452	6.6	2 982	11.3
China's Hong Kong	375	5.5	1 953	7.4
Netherlands	74	1.1	1 373	5.2
France	178	2.6	1 340	5.1
United States	306	4.5	1 151	4.3
British Virgin Islands	275	4.0	1 134	4.3
Malaysia	200	2.9	763	2.9
Total	5 408	79.3	20 779	78.6

Source: Han (2007: 11).

*Millions of dollars

A final important set of data involves the sectoral distribution of ODA and FDI. Here we see a more extreme version of the patterns found in the previous section of the paper. As seen in Table 8, the western donors, both bilateral and multilateral, put a strong emphasis on social sector funds. Excluding Asian donors, 45 percent of total ODA to Vietnam goes to the social sector. Economic infrastructure and production together account for 35 percent, and other sectors (including environmental projects, humanitarian assistance, debt relief, and budget support) represent 20 percent. For the three Asian donors, by contrast, the weighted average of social sector donations is 20 percent, economic infrastructure and production are 72 percent, and other sectors are 8 percent.

This difference is highly significant and, we will argue later, is a good indicator that a different development model is being promoted in Vietnam by the Asian donors.

Table 8 Sectoral Distribution of ODA to Vietnam, 2006 (percent)

Sector	Japan	Korea	AsDF	Other Donors ^a
Social	16.6	30.4	26.0	44.8
Economic	65.0	64.7	74.0	24.9
Production	6.9	1.7	0.0	10.4
Other	11.6	3.2	0.0	20.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: OECD/DAC Online Statistics (Creditor Reporting System).

^aAll donors, bilateral and multilateral, except Japan, Korea, and AsDF

Vietnam has many ODA donors, and a lively debate has been going on about the best use of ODA funds. The chief protagonists are the World Bank and the “like-minded donor group” (Australia, Canada, and eight European donors) versus the East Asian donors. This does not imply that there is no cooperation between the two groups. A cooperative venture, for example, is the “six bank group” that includes the Japanese and Korean Eximbanks, together with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, France’s Agence Française de Développement, and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Moreover Japan is participating with the World Bank and the western group in providing budget support to the Vietnamese government. Nonetheless significant differences do remain (interviews).

The Asian approach to ODA draws heavily on its own very successful economic history. All three Asian bilateral donors — Japan, Korea, and China — have exceptional trajectories of growth and development in the postwar period despite the different timing involved. The ADB is heavily influenced by these same Asian members and thus embodies similar views. Not surprisingly, these Asian donors want to recommend the policies that proved beneficial for them. This is

especially the case for recipient countries in the same region, which they are eager to incorporate into regional economic networks. The construction of economic infrastructure and production facilities are part of this effort. The view is that poverty reduction will follow from high growth and industrialization, a sequence that is considered preferable to concentrating on poverty reduction *per se* as the western donors are prone to do.

Japan has taken the lead in Vietnam as the largest bilateral donor and the largest Asian contributor to the ADB. Vietnam is Japan's sixth largest ODA recipient, representing 5 percent of Japanese ODA (OECD/DAC online). One of the leading policy intellectuals in Japan has tried to explain the Japanese approach. She defines East Asian development as driven by trade and investment, as a collective phenomenon, as catching up (rather than poverty reduction), and as participation in regional and global production networks. Stressing the need for policies designed to fit individual country needs, she says that Japan's efforts are directed toward concrete goals with particular emphasis on increasing industrial capacity and building on countries' comparative advantages. This approach is reflected in the Vietnam priorities of Japan's newly merged aid agencies (now called Japan International Development Agency or JICA). Of the approximately \$1 billion of JICA's annual commitments, 35 percent was designated for the social sector and 60 percent for economic infrastructure and production facilities. The remaining 5 percent was for other activities (OECD/DAC on line).^① While project formulation used to be done by Japanese companies, JICA is now in charge but tries to coordinate with the private sector (interviews).

Korea is increasingly interested in Vietnam as seen by the rapid growth in its ODA commitments. Vietnam is currently Korea's largest ODA recipient and receives 7 percent of its total ODA (OECD/DAC online). Korea's private sector is

^① JICA officials in Hanoi provided a somewhat different breakdown. According to their estimates, some 40 percent is for transport, 40 percent for energy generation, and 20 percent for other activities (including waste management, telecommunications, and some social sector projects).

a major source of FDI, and there is a close relationship between ODA and private sector finance. In comparison with Japan, Korea is much more open about its aim of transmitting lessons from its own development experience. Korean officials in Hanoi say that the Vietnamese government sees their country as a model and has requested that Korea provide information on its experience to the World Bank Consultative Group (interviews). As mentioned earlier, an important part of Korea's ODA apparatus is the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), which focuses on transmitting the Korean model. The first KSP project was in Vietnam in 2004; it focused on finance for export promotion (T. H. Lee, 2008). With respect to 2008 ODA commitments, 57 percent was for economic infrastructure and production, while 43 percent was for social sectors. Within the latter category, most of the money was designated for construction of education and health facilities (OCED/DAC online and interviews).

China's relations with Vietnam are colored by a difficult history. Like Chinese aid in general, no systematic quantitative data are available on aid to Vietnam. A recent project comparing Japanese and Chinese aid to Mekong River Basin countries, carried out by the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) in Japan and including both Chinese and Vietnamese researchers, provides some scattered information on the topic (Kagami, 2009). In general, funds began to flow in the late 1990s and focused on upgrading Vietnamese factories that had been financed by China in the 1970s. Later projects seem to have centered on electricity generation, transport, and telecommunications. In these and other projects, however, it is virtually impossible to determine the interface between grants, concessional and non-concessional loans, trade credits, and foreign direct investment, but all sources of finance focus on production facilities and economic infrastructure. Two Vietnamese researchers in the IDE project (Van and Sam, 2009) also indicate that — as has been discussed extensively with respect to Africa — Chinese activities in Vietnam have often been geared to stimulate Chinese exports and access to natural resources.

Finally the Asian Development Bank and its soft loan window, the Asian

Development Fund, have also been active in Vietnam. Vietnam is the third largest recipient of AsDF funds (11 percent of the total); it also receives commercial rate loans from the bank. The ADB is dominated by its regional members who collectively have 67.6 percent of voting rights. The largest shareholders are jointly Japan and the United States, but the bank's president is traditionally a Japanese national. China has the fourth largest voting share and Korea the eighth largest.^① While it does not follow obviously from the bank's power structure, the ADB's loan and grant pattern in the Vietnamese case is very similar to the other three Asian donors we have just discussed. Economic infrastructure represented 74 percent of commitments in 2008 and social infrastructure only 26 percent. In addition to its lending activities, the ADB explicitly promotes regional integration. A recent publication (ADB, 2008) outlines five priority activities: integrating production, integrating financial markets, managing macroeconomic interdependence, making growth inclusive and sustainable, and creating an architecture for cooperation. Vietnam is central to this vision of a more integrated Asia.

While these four donors have significant influence in Vietnam, it should not be assumed that they are "imposing" a development model from the outside. The Vietnamese government has a clear vision of its goals as reflected in the five-year plans. It also convenes meetings to coordinate donors and is known as a tough negotiator that frequently proposes projects to the donors. Of course it is hard to get a clear understanding of donor-recipient relations. In this case, it is even more difficult since there appears to be a substantial overlap between the preferences of the Asian donors and Vietnamese officials. Both emphasize economic development, perhaps at the cost of short-term social goals. Governance, as defined by the World Bank and western donors, is a lower priority for donors and recipient alike (interviews).

^① Other shareholders in the top ten are Pakistan (#3), India (#5), Australia (#6), Indonesia (#7), Canada (#9), and Germany (#10).

Conclusions

The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of ODA in fostering regional integration in East Asia. More specifically, it tests three hypotheses; ODA is important in incorporating new countries into regional networks; ODA is used to export the East Asian development model to new countries; but ODA donors have other priorities that may partially offset regional goals.

1. These hypotheses have been supported by the evidence presented in the paper. With respect to the quantitative section, we found the following:

1) East Asian ODA goes preferentially to East Asian recipients. A weighted average of the gross disbursements of the three East Asian donors for which we have information indicates that 30 percent goes to East Asian recipients, while other donors provide only 6 percent to East Asia. For commitments, the East Asian share is nearly 40 percent.

2) The sectoral distribution of East Asian ODA is also substantially different from that of other donors. The former emphasizes production and economic infrastructure over social sectors. A weighted average of the three East Asian donors' gross disbursements of ODA shows that 20 percent goes to social sectors, 72 percent for economic sectors, and 8 percent to others. For the rest of the donors, those numbers are 45 percent, 35 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.

3) The sectoral distribution reflects the East Asian development pattern, which emphasizes economic growth with the idea that social development will follow. More generally, there is interest in exporting the Asian development model to neighboring countries. Korea is the most explicit about this aim.

4) But not all ODA goes to East Asia; the majority goes to other regions. This responds to other goals and responsibilities in the world. Japan is a world power that must meet expectations with respect to many regions and many priorities. Korea is just getting started as a member of the donors' club, and it wants to show that it meets international norms and standards. The Asian Development Fund and

its parent, the Asian Development Bank, specifically target their resources to Asian members and so are freer to reflect Asian priorities. Nonetheless, they have important non-Asian members who represent other development priorities. In the case of China, about which we have very little information, the search for natural resources has given its aid an especially large role in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. The Vietnam case reflects these general patterns and displays them in more specific terms.

1) There is a very explicit emphasis on economic growth and industrialization in Vietnam among East Asian DAC members; the goal is catch-up with the rest of the region. China's activities also reflect these priorities according to the scanty information we have on China and Vietnam.

2) The situation in Vietnam suggests some degree of conflict over ODA approaches between East Asia and the "like-minded group" of European donors and the World Bank. The former stresses economic development in the short to medium term, while the latter is more concerned about immediate poverty reduction.

3) Vietnam provides clear evidence of the intertwining of public and private finance. ODA agencies from Japan and Korea are concerned to complement and support the private sector in their home countries. Moreover ODA, FDI, and export credits are all seen as part of a package that together can lead to development. This was the experience of the wealthier countries of East Asia, and they assume it will be effective for their poorer neighbors too.

3. This research has provided some interesting conclusions about three East Asian donors (Japan, Korea, and the Asian Development Fund) with some weak supporting evidence about China. But many interesting questions remain to be investigated. Five issues are particularly important.

1) We need to put this study into a historical framework. To what extent do current processes reflect attempts to incorporate the original ASEAN members into regional networks?

2) Is Vietnam "representative" of other East Asian countries that are still on the margin of East Asia's central core? It is a large country with several advantages,

such as natural resources, a stable government, and good relations with the west. Other East Asian countries — Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Timor-Leste — do not share this set of characteristics. Is Vietnam the last frontier, or will the Asian donors pursue the others with equal vigor at a later time?

3) How do Australia and New Zealand fit into this picture? They want to be part of East Asia, and their aid patterns are also weighted toward East Asian recipients (although with greater emphasis on Oceania). This question, of course, is intimately linked to the political relations embodied in the ASEAN + 3 versus ASEAN + 6 discussions.

4) How does the East Asian attempt to incorporate less developed members into the region compare with similar attempts in Europe? The structural funds and cohesion funds that the EU has developed to incorporate new members seem to have similar — although more explicit — aims. Are there any lessons that can be learned in either direction?

5) We urgently need more systematic information on the Chinese role in East Asia. Much research in recent years has been devoted to China in Africa; we need to expend equal efforts to find out how China operates with respect to its more immediate neighbors.

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Does Asian Regionalism Have Legs?

Peter A. Petri*

Market connections among Asian economies are strong and deepening, but Asian regionalism — collective government action in support of joint goals or economic integration — has been slow to develop. Previous efforts to jump-start Asian regionalism — such as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's proposal of an East Asian Economic Group in 1990 — have typically turned into false starts. This paper argues, however, that the prognosis today is much better; Asian integration now “has legs,” in the sense that a new regional environment has emerged in the last decade that is more conducive to regionalism than the environment has been at any time in the past. In this context, Asian governments have stepped up cooperation through bilateral agreements, sub-regional initiatives such as the commitment to build an ASEAN Economic Community, and many regional forums. What accounts for the change in the region's attitudes toward integration? Where is it likely to lead? What sequence of policies could help to

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strengthen regional institutions? ^①

The paper draws on the results of a major new analysis of Asian integration the ADB's *Emerging Asian Regionalism* (2008) study ^②— to explore the recent rise of Asian regionalism and how it is shaping Asian economic development and the global economy. Asia's new regionalism is rooted in fundamental changes in the region's economic structure. These changes make it likely that regionalism will strengthen significantly from now on, albeit gradually, and will make positive contributions to Asian development as well as the world economy.

1. Structural roots of contemporary Asian regionalism

Until recently, the centrifugal forces of Asian regional integration were more than offset by centripetal forces that led Asian economies to develop relations outside the region rather than inside it. Most Asian economies had initially similar resource endowments — especially low-wage labor — and hence were more competitive than complementary in output and export patterns. Because of their history of political conflict, Asian countries also looked to relations with extra-regional powers to underwrite regional security. Moreover, the great diversity of Asian countries — in income levels, scale, political structure, language, culture and so on — made cooperation difficult, and contributed to the perception that there was little to be gained from it. These factors were reinforced by outward-oriented

① This paper is based on the findings of the Asian Development Bank's *Emerging Asian Regionalism* (2008) study, in which the author participated as Principal Consultant. Other members of the senior research team included Masahiro Kawai, Jong-Wha Lee, Srin Madhur and Giovanni Capannelli. Many other researchers made major contributions, as noted in the study's introduction and acknowledgements. While some sections of this paper overlap with the study and draw on the results of this extensive team effort, the views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of other team members or the Asian Development Bank.

② The study covers the economies of "integrating Asia," consisting of ASEAN; China's mainland, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province; India; Japan; Korea. Since these economies account for 97% of the output of all of Asia (as defined by the Asian Development Bank), they are simply referred to as "Asia" in this paper.

policies that achieved remarkable success in linking Asian economies to the US and other global markets.

Such deep-rooted, fundamental forces change slowly. But they do change. In market size, production structure, and political interests, Asia is experiencing growing regional gravitational pulls, and its governments are responding through cooperative links in many forums. To be sure, there is a fundamental difference between this process and European integration; in Asia, integration remains market-led, with cautious response from governments, while in Europe integration has been government-led and reinforced, in some cases, with vigorous response by markets. This difference will affect the speed and shape of the process of integration in Asia. But one should also not make too much of this difference; there is an inherent logic to an integrated economy that will ultimately require market and policy frameworks in Asia that perform economic functions similar to those now emerging in Europe.

The first cause of deepening interdependence in Asia is the region's growing importance to itself, reflecting nothing more, or less, than its growing importance in the world economy. In the last 20 years, Asia's economy has grown $1\frac{1}{2}$ percent per annum faster than those of North America and Europe — in other words, growth alone has made Asian markets one third more important, relatively, than they were twenty years ago. And since Asian growth has been strongly outward-oriented, the growth of intraregional trade, as a share of world trade, has been even faster.

A second cause is Asia's innovative role as a global center for organizing manufacturing production through multi-country networks. This development, spurred by advances in information technology, has allowed production chains to be separated into smaller steps, with each step performed in a separate, low-cost location. Asia has emerged as an optimal venue for exploiting this organizational technology because of its excellent infrastructure for trade, and because of its experience in linking producers in the region and outside with each other. The location of integrated multi-country production systems has stimulated trade and

other connections among Asian economies. Asia's scale and the technology of production networks have reinforced each other: manufacturers view Asia as a good place to locate networks not just because of their efficiency, but also because of their expectations for the growth of complementary networks and regional markets.

A third cause is the convergence of Asia's economic interests in the global context. Asia is now perhaps the most committed of all major world regions to the principles of open global trade. Asia also has a growing menu of converging (if not fully aligned) interests on other global economic issues, such as the management of foreign exchange rate reserves, the regulation of sovereign wealth funds, and responses to global warming. This convergence of interests emerged especially clearly in the financial crisis of 1997 – 1998, when Asian economies had to rely on global institutions for financial rescues and, in retrospect, received less than optimal support. The crisis led them to rethink the role of Asian economies in global institutions, and triggered a spurt of activity in developing new, regional institutions of cooperation. Because the global economic environment has been relatively benign since the crisis, these institutions have not yet been tested, but they nevertheless provide foundations for deeper cooperation in the future.

2. Deepening interdependence

Regional interdependence is complex — it cuts across many spheres of activity — but it is possible to quantify its broad dimensions. Its most common measure — the share of a region's total trade conducted within it — has risen in Asia from about a fifth in the aftermath of World War II to a third or so in the 1980s, and to over half in recent years. Asia is now broadly as interdependent in trade as the EU and North America are (Figure 1). Indeed, Asia now trades more with itself than either the EU or North America did at the outset of their integration efforts.

The intensity of intra-regional trade a measure of the region's *bias* for




Figure 1. Intraregional Trade Shares

The intra-regional trade share is defined as: $[(X_i + M_i) / (X_i + M_i)]$ where X is exports and M is imports, the subscript i refers to region i , and the subscript $.$ refers to all regions (the world). Data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics* database

trading with regional partners^①— also shows increases (Figure 2). This indicator rises if the share of a region's exports to itself outpaces the share of the region's markets in the world economy. The regional intensity of trade was high in the aftermath of World War II; while Asian economies were too small to trade much, they traded disproportionately with each other. At that time, the intensity of Asia's intra-regional trade stood around $4\frac{1}{2}$; that is, Asia traded more than four times as much with regional partners than with similar-sized external partners. From this high level — reflecting Asia's relative isolation from world trade — Asia's intra-regional bias went into steep decline, continuing well into the 1990s. The explanation is a positive one: Asian countries successfully penetrated export markets around the world and also gained the means to buy from suppliers worldwide. It

① The index is calculated by dividing the share of intraregional trade in its overall trade by the share of its trade in global trade.

was not until the last decade or so that the intensity of Asia's intra-regional trade has begun to rise, for some of the reasons noted earlier.




Figure 2. Intra-regional Trade Intensities

The intra-regional trade intensity is defined as: $[(X_i + M_i) / (X + M)] / [(X_i + M_i) / (X + M)]$ where the subscript i refers to region i , and the subscript $.$ to all regions (the world). Data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics* database.

A still-broader measure of interdependence needs to include other important channels such as direct investment, financial flows, macroeconomic links, and personal contacts. We therefore collected data on six indicators of Asian economic integration, providing further insight into the progress of Asian integration by country and channel.

The key measures of interdependence included: (a) *trade policy cooperation*, measured as the density of free trade agreements among potential pairs of Asian economies; (b) *foreign direct investment*, measured as the share of intra-regional investment of all foreign investment; (c) *equity market co-movements*, measured as correlations of quarterly equity returns; (d) *output co-movements*, measured as correlation of quarterly GDP growth rates; (e) *trade*, measured as the intraregional

trade share; and (f) *tourism*, measured as the intra-regional share of the region's tourist inflows and outflows. As all summary measures, these need to be interpreted cautiously. They only proxy for complex processes, and of course statistical correlations — used as indicators of various co-movements — could reflect common reactions to global forces, rather than regional relationships.

The results, averaged across Asia, show that interdependence has increased in all six channels from a period before the crisis to the present (see Figure 3). This is by no means an inevitable result; indeed it is somewhat surprising, since globalization, rather than regionalization, is usually regarded as the predominant trend of our time. Most rapidly developing economies — especially large or highly specialized ones — require, and usually develop, strong global connections. Declining trade barriers, transport and communication costs, and the harmonization of world business practices could be also expected to tilt the balance toward distant global rather than nearby regional ties. Yet this does not appear to be the case; in Asia at least, regional integration appears to have progressed rapidly in recent years. ^①




Figure 3. Indicators of Asian Integration

Source: Asian Development Bank, *Emerging Asian Regionalism* (2008)

^① Regional integration is not confined to Asia. Although technological change is supposedly making the world “flatter,” around the world regional trade flows are increasing more rapidly than extra-regional ones.

Which channels have changed the most? The data provided in Figure 3 cannot answer this question, since the individual indicators are measured in different units. We therefore normalized the indicators. In effect, we transformed each indicator into a new, relative indicator, by recalculating it as the difference between the indicator and its average (across all economies and all time periods) divided by its standard deviation.¹ We then calculated the average change in the normalized indicators between the pre- and post-crisis periods (see Figure 4). This change, which is positive for all indicators, turns out to be most significant for GDP correlations and for trade-policy cooperation, and least so for intraregional FDI and tourist flows (perhaps because they were already high before the crisis).




Figure 4. Change in Integration, by Channel

Source: Asian Development Bank

Which countries are leading the integration process? We next combined the six indicators into an aggregate index (a simple average of the normalized indicators) to see how closely each economy is linked to the region. Since the aggregate index is also a relative measure — a summary of how the six individual indicators differ

¹ A value of 2 for this index would mean that the economy's indicator differs from the regional average by twice as much as the typical difference among economies.

from their regional averages — it can take on positive and negative values (see Figure 5). Evidently, Malaysia and Thailand have the strongest overall connections to the region, but other ASEAN members are not far behind (on average, their indicators are one-half standard deviation above regional averages). The index is lower for the largest economies (the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea), due to their stronger connections with global markets. And it is lowest for India — understandably, since the Asia grouping consists mainly of East Asian economies. However, all economies show substantial positive changes in integration over time.




Figure 5. Change in Integration, by Economy

HKG = Hong Kong, China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; PRC = Chinese Mainland; SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei, China; THA = Thailand; VIE = Viet Nam.

Source: Asian Development Bank.

The China's role in Asian integration is particularly interesting and complex. Given its relatively recent emergence as a major trading power, China's relations with the rest of Asia are not yet as intensely developed as the region's more established partnerships. Indeed, China is still strengthening its economic ties to other parts of the world, and the intensity of its regional trade links is, for the time being, declining relative to its international connections. Nevertheless, the PRC has

contributed to regional integration in several ways. It has become the leading hub for coordinating production networks that involve components manufactured throughout East Asia (Athukorala, 2007), and its trade with the region now accounts for half of all trade within Asia, up from 29% in 1996.^① Moreover, China and India are also shaping regional integration by exerting pressure on smaller economies, for example those of ASEAN, to combine their markets in order to achieve competitive scale.

In sum, all indicators of regional interdependence suggest a positive, multidimensional trend in regional integration, in all channels of interdependence and for all Asian economies analyzed. The points are further supported by detailed evidence in *Emerging Asian Regionalism* on the trade, financial, macroeconomic and social aspects of regional interdependence. And they are supported also by the positive perceptions of interdependence of those responding to a survey of the region's opinion leaders, as summarized in the study. To some extent, these developments are an inevitable consequence of the integration of Asia into the world economy, and of the larger role Asia itself plays in world markets, but as we have seen, they also reflect an intensification of regional relationships that cannot be explained by growth alone. Not just growth, but also technology and policy are increasingly generating opportunities for integration on the regional plane, within the broader general context of globalization.

There are also reasons to expect regional integration to gain momentum. Dense regional trade networks increase the return on investments in transport, communications and the soft skills — business networks, cultural skills — that support regional economic activity. These investments, in turn, will tend to make it easier to do business in a regional setting. Although trade theory has little to say about the geographical pattern of regional trade flows (beyond identifying transport costs as a determinant), such flows tend to be empirically stable, suggesting that the pattern of trade is based on significant fixed investments.

① IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*.

And there are reasons to expect the drivers of interdependence to remain active. Forecasts of Asia's economic growth suggest that region will continue to outpace world growth, roughly by the same $1\frac{1}{2}$ percentage points as in the last twenty years. By 2020, *Emerging Asian Regionalism* estimates that Asia's share of world output will increase from 28% to 35%, with China representing the largest part of this gain. This will provide further impetus for integration from both the demand side (as Asian markets expand and become more prosperous) and the supply side (as Asian know-how and the scope of Asian products expand). Integration should proceed especially rapidly in finance, where Asian development now lags the world and where development usually generates more than proportional growth.

3. How policies are responding

Asia's deepening connections are beginning to be reinforced by policy. Until recently, formal economic cooperation among Asian governments lagged behind market-driven integration. This is consistent with the region's cautious policy-making style, but it has also reflected Asian trade patterns; in the past, the region's most important economic partners have been outside Asia. As the patterns of the region's economic relations are changing, so are its policy priorities.

The early Asian regional organizations established after World War II were motivated by security issues and typically included partners outside the region (including the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Mekong River Commission, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Asian Development Bank). The longest-standing wholly regional grouping is the ASEAN, which has increasingly shifted its attention to economic goals, and has become a crucial element of the region's emerging policy architecture.

More recently, a rich network of organizations primarily focused on economic issues have also begun to emerge. These include sub-regional forums that address mainly trade, transport and energy issues with a strong geographic focus (such as

the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation). They also include ASEAN's ambitious effort to transform its economies into a "single market." And they include region-wide forums that address financial, macroeconomic and regulatory issues (such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit) and still broader, trans-continental groupings (such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asia-Europe Meeting). In other words, the region's cooperative mechanisms are evolving on multiple tracks, with each track possessing distinctive "comparative advantages."

In addition to dialogue through regional forums, Asia is also witnessing a wave of bilateral and smaller plurilateral cooperation initiatives (see Figure 6). As of December 2007, 44 agreements had been signed involving one or more Asian economies (nearly all since the crisis), and 90 more were under study or negotiation. These agreements vary widely in objectives, partners and trade




Figure 6 Free Trade Agreements in Asia

Source: Asian Development Bank database

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

coverage — some are limited in scope, while others go well beyond the WTO in sectors and issues addressed. The proliferation of such agreements could lead to an inconsistent “noodle bowl” of narrow agreements. But this trend also reflects fundamental, widespread interest in cooperation and under the guidance of visionary regional leadership — it could provide foundations for a consolidated, region-wide free-trade system.

The case for regional cooperation rests on three rationales for government intervention: the need to manage international spillovers and externalities, the need to provide international public goods, and the need to solve international coordination problems. *Emerging Asian Regionalism* examined the potential relevance of these criteria in four areas of regional links: production, financial markets, macroeconomics, and social and environmental issues. In each, it identified problems that require attention as well as options for collective response by the region's governments.

(1) In **production**, Asia has a major stake in maintaining and improving access to global and regional markets. Regional cooperation can sustain the dynamism of Asian trade by creating vast regional markets, and by building a seamless production base that makes the region's production networks even more competitive. In addition, by joining its forces in global forums, Asia can also help to maintain open global markets and access for Asian own, rapidly expanding economies. The study recommends that Asia:

A. Support the global trading system and help lead the world to a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.

B. Pursue regional cooperation as widely and deeply as possible and consolidate its FTAs into a region-wide trade and investment framework.

C. Create regional guidelines for sub-regional trade policies and agreements to ensure the consistency of sub-regional agreements with regional interests and priorities such as agricultural development.

D. Enhance regional connectivity by creating world-class transport, communications, and energy infrastructure to connect all economies — including

especially their poorer regions — to Asia's economic centers.

(2) In **financial markets**, Asia's priorities focus on the continued development of the scope, depth and safety of its financial systems. With further development of regional markets, a greater part of Asian savings will be intermediated by regional financial centers and markets rather than distant ones. Strengthening the region's financial markets will require liberalization as well as improved regulation and supervision. The study recommends that Asia:

A. Improve financial market surveillance through a new, high-level "Asian Financial Stability Dialogue" that gathers all authorities responsible for financial markets.

B. Promote consistent standards and mutual recognition by identifying best-practice policies on prudential norms and financial supervision, as well as minimum standards for mutual recognition.

C. Strengthen financial markets through initiatives such as the Asian Bond Market Initiative and with new regional infrastructure for credit enhancements, payments and settlements.

D. Open capital accounts and cross-border financial services flows through measured and prudent liberalization.

(3) In **macroeconomics**, Asia needs to develop stronger mechanisms to assess and manage macroeconomic spillovers among its economies. This will become especially important if Asia indeed "decouples" from the world economy, driven by increasingly independent regional engines of growth. In this context, policy makers will need new, more sophisticated tools to monitor regional economic spillovers and to set policies that can dampen regional fluctuations and exchange rate volatility. The study recommends that Asia:

A. Strengthen macroeconomic consultation and surveillance by establishing an "Asian Secretariat for Economic Cooperation" with qualified, permanent staff.

B. Enhance Asia's short-term financing facility by making the bilateral swaps under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) multilateral, and by easing the rules on CMI activation.

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

C. Cooperate in exchange-rate and macroeconomic-policy management by reaching understandings on the conduct of policy, and by undertaking *ad hoc* coordinated actions when necessary.

(4) In **social and environmental policy**, Asia's challenge is to ensure that the benefits of progress are sustainable and widely shared. Asian economic growth is arguably the most powerful engine ever devised for social progress, but the region faces many problems, including significant pockets of poverty, income disparities, patchy social safety nets, rapidly ageing populations, and widespread environmental degradation. The study recommends that Asia:

A. Connect the poor to the thriving regional economy by eliminating regulatory and other barriers in labor markets; by promoting trade flows with a strong impact on poverty; and by investing in infrastructure to link poor populations to economic centers.

B. Develop cost-effective social protection systems with new technologies and policy instruments that make social insurance increasingly cost-effective.

C. Facilitate and manage labor migration with policies that control its social side-effects and ensure that migrants enjoy basic rights and dignity.

D. Protect regional health and safety with world-class systems to monitor, prevent, and (if necessary) contain epidemics, and to respond to natural disasters.

E. Make development sustainable by mobilizing Asian and non-Asian resources and technologies to stop the degradation of the environment, including cross-border environmental problems.

4. Maintaining the momentum of cooperation

The case for greater regional cooperation is compelling. Yet marshaling collective efforts across the vast, diverse Asian region is a huge challenge. The examples of the EU and, to a lesser extent, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) highlight some of the possibilities and difficulties. But Asia's economics, politics, and history are different from those of Europe and North

America. Some forms of interdependence — in trade, for instance — are deeper in Asia today than they were in Europe in the early stages of European regionalism. But others — such as monetary policy — involve largely independent national decisions. While Asia can draw on other regions' experience, Asian regionalism will ultimately follow a distinctive blueprint, building on Asian economic priorities and based on an Asian vision for a regional community. That vision is just beginning to take shape, amid spirited debate.

Will Asia's powerful countries yield authority to regional institutions? Doing so will be challenging; they have many common priorities, but also differing ones. At times, the differences are amplified by history and politics. The price of cooperation is the loss of some national sovereignty and the narrowing of policy options available for pursuing purely national objectives. It is difficult for large, successful economies to make such compromises, so cooperation is likely to evolve only gradually.

For all of these historical and political reasons, the region is "institution light" compared to Europe or the Americas. Yet there is increasing recognition in Asia that greater institutional capabilities are needed — for example, ASEAN has committed to increasing the capacity of its secretariat as part of implementing its new blueprint for creating an ASEAN Economic Community. *Emerging Asian Regionalism* in turn identified a need for an "Asian Financial Stability Dialogue" and an "Asian Secretariat for Economic Cooperation" (the latter to support a wide range of cooperative efforts). But even with such new institutions, intergovernmental consultation and decision making are likely to remain central features of the Asian regional cooperation.

Asia's regional policy agenda is also likely to retain its flexible, multitrack, multispeed architecture. This allows for the gradual intensification of cooperation — engagement in limited areas or groups first, followed by a deepening and widening scope of cooperation. The diversity of the region's forums is consistent with, and necessary for, achieving multiple policy objectives. Developing infrastructure to connect nearby communities, for example, requires limited, focused sub-regional

cooperation, such as CAREC provides. At the same time, ensuring that markets in Asia, Europe, North America, and other parts of the world remain open to each other requires dialogue in APEC, ASEM, and of course global institutions. Some institutional consolidation may help to streamline this process, yet competition among forums can also help; it opens multiple options for addressing a problem and stimulates efficiency.

The structure of regional cooperation in Asia is fluid, and it is premature to speculate where the strongest locus of institutions will emerge. Nevertheless, ASEAN + 3 appears to be an especially useful coordinating forum, and is also identified by the region's opinion leaders as the most promising venue for region-wide cooperation. This grouping is organized around ASEAN, which has the most experience with cooperation and operates the most developed regional institutions. It also incorporates the region's three large economies (the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea), and is generally closely integrated. But the institutions coordinated by ASEAN + 3 need not be limited to supporting its strict membership. For example, functions that require wider participation — such as the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue proposed in this study — could also build on the membership of the larger East Asian Summit forum (which also includes Australia, India and New Zealand).

A key challenge of Asia's policy architecture will be to develop strong complementary relationships among different forums which have unique histories and capabilities for addressing different aspects of cooperation. For example, ASEAN is an important proving ground for more advanced forms of regional cooperation, and is also likely to become an increasingly effective hub for cooperation as it pursues deeper integration itself. At the same time, the Greater Mekong Subregion framework — a subregional group — provides an ideal laboratory for infrastructure development and new initiatives for fighting poverty. In the meantime, the EAS may prove to be the most effective forum for dealing with climate change and other environmental challenges, and APEC could be the most effective forum for trade facilitation. APEC and ASEM could also play useful roles

in addressing “behind the border” regulatory policies and in ensuring that the region’s expanding global role is effectively managed.

Thus a flexible, multi-track architecture has economic and political advantages. But it also has risks, including possible inconsistencies among initiatives, and slower progress than might be possible with a top-down approach. At the highest levels of government, the importance of regional cooperation is well accepted — Asian leaders have repeatedly and eloquently confirmed their commitment to work together.^① But they will need effective mechanisms to translate this intent into results. Asia’s regional institutions need to be strengthened, and their efforts need to be complemented with the work of knowledge-generating institutions outside the official sphere. Ideas matter, and the region’s think tanks and universities have the best structure for addressing long-term issues and for providing objective advice.

The support of civil society will be ultimately the most important. A survey for *Emerging Asian Regionalism* found that Asian opinion leaders welcome international cooperation. All nationalities and groups seem to share this perspective, including business executives; professionals; journalists; experts in universities, laboratories, and research institutes; and political and economic analysts. They welcome an Asian identity, and increasingly interact with regional colleagues in professional, educational, and official networks. Their collaboration and friendships can inform regional strategies and provide foundations for future cooperation.

The challenge, in the near term, is to develop a strategy that strengthens Asian cooperation in a pragmatic, step-by-step fashion. The *Emerging Asian Regionalism* study provides a menu of such possibilities. With the help of these steps, Asia could develop:

- (1) integrated market free of restrictions on regional flows of goods, services,

① The reports of the East Asia Vision Group (2001) and the East Asia Study Group (2002), commissioned by the leaders, offered an excellent summary of potential regional cooperation efforts and provided guidance for this study.

and capital;

(2) deep and liquid financial markets open to cross-border financial flows and services, with high standards of oversight and strong protection to national and foreign investors;

(3) effective frameworks to coordinate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, taking into account global challenges and differing national circumstances;

(4) collective efforts to address vital social issues, such as poverty, exclusion, income insecurity, migration, ageing, health, and environmental threats;

(5) a consistent voice to project the concerns of Asian economies in global policy forums and enhance responsible global governance; and

(6) vital institutions, adequately and highly professionally staffed, to provide first-rate analytical and logistical support for these efforts.

These are challenging goals, each requiring innovation, leadership, and support from major economies. But Asia is poised to take these steps. Its integrations is proceeding rapidly and smoothly, and its economies are sound and enjoy good relations with each other and with other global centers. Appropriately, Asian regional cooperation is becoming more necessary, and Asian regionalism is becoming more accepted. There is growing appreciation also of its ability to contribute to both Asian and global welfare. These factors now favor the emergence of an operational, constructive Asian regionalism, and the gradual development of a strong, outward-looking Asian economic community. Asian regionalism now appears to have legs, and it is likely to play an increasingly important role in the region's continued progress and in its relations with the world economy.

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亚洲区域主义： 各方的视角

The Spillover Effect of the ASEAN Plus Three Process on East Asian Security

Wu Xinbo*

Does economic regionalism enhance security regionalism in East Asia? While Miles Kahler expresses more skepticism in his chapter in the volume, I tend to be more optimistic, and in this chapter, I adopt an approach that varies somewhat from that of Kahler's. First, instead of focusing on the deficiencies in the development of East Asian economic institutions relative to other regions, the paper accepts these institutions as a given and puts them in perspective. In other words, East Asian economic institutions are a new and encouraging development in the region's history; although relatively primitive at this stage, they will evolve and become more mature along with the trends of regional economic cooperation and integration. Second, while considering the security implications, the paper adopts a broader definition of security and both non-traditional and traditional security are taken into account. Third, in probing the impact of economic regionalism on security regionalism, this paper will pay more attention to its effects, while I will

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also try and explain why more has not been accomplished. Finally, a cross-paradigmatic approach, rather than a single paradigm, will be utilized to examine the effects of economic institutions on regional security.

Compared to Western Europe where economic regionalism first emerged in the 1950s, economic regionalism did not appear in East Asia until more recently. It was in the late 1970s and 1980s that regional integration began to appear as a result of the emergence of production networks built by Japan and other newly industrialized economies in the region as well as the adoption-oriented development strategies by China and other developing countries in East Asia. The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of a series of proposals for regional initiatives, such as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), both put forward by then-Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. As is well known, these proposals were unsuccessful largely because of opposition from the United States. It was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 that finally ushered in East Asian economic regionalism. In December 1997, at the peak of the crisis, leaders from the nine ASEAN members and three Northeast Asian countries — China, Japan and South Korea — gathered for the first time to discuss opportunities for cooperation among themselves, kicking off a process which later became known as the “ASEAN Plus Three (hereafter referred as APT)” framework after Cambodia joined ASEAN in 1998. In November 1999, the third APT summit meeting released a joint statement outlining the orientation, principles, and areas for East Asian cooperation, marking a substantive step forward in the APT process. Specially, the APT process includes cooperation at three different levels: ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus One (cooperation between ASEAN and one of the three Northeast Asian countries), and Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea).^① While the

^① In November 1999, leaders from China, Japan and South Korea held a breakfast meeting while attending the APT summit, kicking off the cooperation among the three countries within the framework of APT. As cooperation among the three countries accumulated more momentum, they decided to hold their summit outside of the framework of APT, signaling their greater devotion to trilateral cooperation. In December 2008, leaders from the three countries held in Japan their first summit outside of the framework of APT.

APT process is still young – it is still in the early stage of its second decade of existence – it is nonetheless the primary venue of East Asian cooperation and stands as the main symbol of East Asian regionalism. The paper will thus take the APT process as an empirical example to demonstrate how economic regionalism has affected security in East Asia.

Unlike Western Europe where regionalism was driven by politico-security concerns stemming from the two world wars and from the outset was intended to address traditional security concerns, in East Asia, the so-called “new regionalism” was mainly motivated by economic considerations; initially, security cooperation was not a significant part of the agenda. Yet, cooperation in East Asia gradually extended into the realm of security, particularly with regards to non-traditional security issues. Here “non-traditional security” refers to “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, smuggling of persons, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime” (Green and Gill, 2009: 306). Compared with traditional security, non-traditional security bears three major features: it focuses primarily on non-military challenges; a majority of the challenges are transnational in nature with regard to their origins, conception, and effects; and while it incorporates the state as a primary referent object of security, it also moves beyond the state by including other referent objects like human collectivities (Emmers, Caballero-Anthony, and Acharya, 2006: XIV). With the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security threats have become more salient in East Asia. They have received even more attention following the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Given East Asian economic regionalism’s short history as well as the lack of a security mandate in its initial stage, it is no surprise that the regional economic cooperation process has thus far produced much less of an impact than the European Union. It is worth noting, however, that East Asian economic regionalism did spill over into both the traditional and non-traditional security domains. The question,

therefore, is how this spillover effect occurred, and what respective factors facilitated or hindered this phenomenon.

Finally, it is necessary to adopt a cross-paradigmatic approach to examine the linkage between economic and security cooperation in East Asia so as to better understand the effects of regional economic institutions. Social and cultural differences between the West and East Asia (or Asia, more broadly) give diverging meanings to institutions. Generally speaking, modern Western societies are legally-oriented and based on rules and contracts, while East Asian societies remain largely socially-oriented with an emphasis placed on connections and implicit understandings. Thus, the values that they place on institutions and their concepts of cooperation are also quite different. In the West, the purpose of institutions is to provide legally binding venues for actors to come to agreements with one another, while in East Asia, their primary function is to enable actors to socialize with each other and to build connections. In the West, neoliberalism defines cooperation as "the result of a process of policy coordination," which involves mutual adjustment for a common agenda (Keohane, 1984: 52). In East Asia, however, cooperation has both political and sociological implications, and is best understood through the perspective of social constructivism. It refers not only to the outcomes of coordination, but also to the process of coordination itself, including such transnational interactions as meetings, dialogues, initiatives, and declarations that help bring about a stable pattern of behavior that is mutually beneficial. Therefore, when it comes to examining the origin of institutions, neoliberal paradigms, which argue that institutions increase opportunities for cooperation, provide a useful framework. When it comes to assessing the effects of institutions, however, even though "[b]oth neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism suggest that institutions can shape preferences and ideas" (Solingen, 2008: 266), social constructivist frameworks provide greater insight into the East Asian social-cultural context and better explain the functions of regional institutions than neoliberal institutionalism.

1. The Spillover Effect on Non-Traditional Security Cooperation

Security cooperation was not intrinsic in the APT process by design, but rather, was a byproduct of it as a result of key events. Just as the Asian Financial Crisis served as a catalyst for East Asian cooperation, the eruption of a series of non-traditional security crises in the early 21st century triggered the spillover of cooperation from the economic to the security realm. Elsewhere in this volume, Benjamin J. Cohen explores the role of crisis as a catalyst for new initiatives and argues that the Asian Financial Crisis provided an impetus for East Asian financial cooperation. The following empirical study will detail the role of crisis in causing East Asian cooperation to extend from the economic to the non-traditional security

section:

In November 1999, the third ASEAN + 3 summit meeting released a joint statement in which country leaders not only promised to strengthen efforts at accelerating economic cooperation, but also agreed to continue dialogue, coordination, and cooperation in the political-security arena so as to increase mutual understanding and trust, and also to strengthen cooperation in addressing common transnational concerns. Those purposes conform to the neoliberal notion that institutions enhance information about mutual preferences and behavior as well as increase the opportunities for cooperation. The willingness to cooperate in the political-security arena, however, did not translate into immediate outcomes.

It was September 11 that highlighted the urgency of regional cooperation in dealing with non-traditional security challenges. In November 2001, at the fifth ASEAN + 3 summit meeting, former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji suggested that while the ASEAN + 3 process should place particular emphasis on economic cooperation, it should also gradually include dialogue and cooperation on political-security issues, beginning with non-traditional security issues. In July 2002, China

proposed an APT Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and this idea was endorsed by the APT foreign ministers. In November 2002, the sixth APT summit meeting approved a final report submitted by the East Asia Study Group, a body established by the APT Singapore summit in November 2000. The group explored the means by which cooperation in East Asia could be broadened and expanded and also prepared concrete measures and action plans for closer cooperation in various areas. Among their recommendations was the need to “strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on non-traditional security issues, including, in particular, mechanisms to stem the tide of piracy, drug trafficking, and cyber crime.” The report (APT Summit, 2002: 37) argued that “the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 have increased people’s awareness of the severity, pervasiveness, and the international linkage of terrorism and new kinds of threats to security. As transnational crime becomes more organized and threatening, it becomes more and more urgent for the governments of East Asian countries to establish mechanisms for coordination and cooperation on the new security challenges that we are facing in today’s global arena.”

As a result of these efforts, the first APT Senior Officials Consultation on Transnational Crime (SOMTC + 3 Consultations) was held in June 2003 in Hanoi, and subsequently became an annual gathering for senior law enforcement officials from thirteen East Asian countries to exchange views on combating transnational crime in the region. In January 2004, the first “10 + 3” Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC + 3) was held in Bangkok, which endorsed the concept plan of cooperating in eight areas: terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, arms smuggling, sea piracy, international economic crime, and cyber crime. Subsequently, an APT Work Plan to Combat Transnational Crime was developed and endorsed by the APT countries for implementation. In addition to the annual SOMTC + 3 Consultations, AMMTC + 3 became a biennial gathering for ministers of public security, interior, and internal security to consult with one another on combating transnational crime in East Asia.

The decision by the APT countries to begin collaborating on health-related issues was also event-driven, namely, the outbreak of SARS in China in the spring of 2003. Since then, two regional mechanisms have been established: the APT Senior Officials Meeting on Health and the APT Health Ministers Meeting. These meetings are intended to help promote the collaborative responses to various health-related challenges, especially those concerning aging populations, emerging infectious diseases, and the impact of globalization and trade liberalization on health. Specifically, the APT countries have set up two frameworks on health cooperation, one on emerging infectious diseases, and the other on traditional and complementary medicine.

Within these frameworks, the APT countries have proposed concrete plans for actions. For instance, in October 2008, the third APT Health Ministers Meeting endorsed the "Year 2 Action Plan of the APT Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) Program," which aims to enhance regional preparedness and capacity through integrated approaches to prevention, surveillance and timely response to emerging infectious diseases, as well as to facilitate partnerships among existing networks and experts in the region on public and animal health. The new web-based "Information Center on Emerging Infectious Diseases in the ASEAN Plus Three Countries" was established in 2008 with the objectives of improving cooperation through "communication" and "unified strategy." In order to better prevent and control particular diseases, several meetings were also held, including the joint meeting on quarantine management for entering or leaving a country, on reviving the tourism industry during the outbreak of SARS, and the Beijing conference on fighting against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria through cooperation in East Asia (Zhu and Tang, 2009: 162). Moreover, with the outbreak of Influenza A (H1N1) in the spring of 2009, the APT Health Ministers Meeting held a special session in May and agreed on regional collaboration measures, such as sharing data and information on epidemic situations.

The 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, which inflicted heavy casualties on Southeast Asia, served to further regional cooperation efforts on non-traditional

security threats and prompted the APT countries to work together on disaster relief. At the Ninth APT summit held in December 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed that APT cooperation should emphasize sudden public health incidents and serious natural disasters. In 2007, the first ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting (ACDM +3) was held to explore possible areas of cooperation among the ACDM and the Plus Three countries, such as capacity building through training programs and information sharing. This became an annual gathering of senior officials from the thirteen East Asian countries to discuss cooperation in the management of natural disasters. In addition, other initiatives have also been adopted to promote regional cooperation in disaster relief. At the Tenth APT summit held in January 2007, China offered to host an APT military workshop on international disaster relief, and by 2010, three rounds of ASEAN Plus Three Workshop on Disaster Relief by Armed Forces had been held in China. At the workshop, officers from East Asia focused on the discussion of practical measures for disaster relief cooperation among the APT nations, such as coordinating mechanisms and standard operating procedures (Xinhua Agency, 2008).

Though not originally part of the agenda, non-traditional security cooperation, such as information-sharing, capacity-building, and coordination, turned out to be remarkable achievements of the first decade of the East Asian collaborative process. Encouraged by these accomplishments, APT countries pledged to conduct even more extensive security cooperation in its Cooperation Work Plan for the second decade (2007–2017), with a blueprint adopted by APT leaders at the Tenth APT summit in 2007. According to the Work Plan, APT countries will further cooperate on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), anti-terrorism, maritime security, anti-drugs, traffic in persons, cyber crime, public health, and disaster management and relief (FMPRC, 2007). Building on the experience of the first decade, APT cooperation on non-traditional security is likely to accomplish even more during its second decade of development.

As demonstrated by the experiences of East Asian cooperation on non-traditional security, the path from economic cooperation to security cooperation lies in nurturing the habits of cooperation, cultivating consciousness and an interest in extending cooperation into political and security realms, and providing institutional platforms for security cooperation. Economic regionalism is a learning process in the sense that it nurtures the habit of cooperation among regional members. As countries become accustomed to the idea and practice of cooperation, they then seek to expand their area of cooperation either to create a better environment for further economic cooperation or to gain benefits in other areas such as politics or security, resulting in a spillover effect. In the case of the APT process, the spillover effect took place conceptually at the Third summit meeting which released a joint statement in which country leaders agreed to continue to dialogue, coordinate, and cooperate on political-security issues so as to increase mutual understanding and trust, and to strengthen cooperation in addressing common concerns in the area of transnational issues.

However, in practice the spillover effect occurred only after "September 11th" terrorist attack which gave rise to the needs for cooperation in non-traditional security area. As the needs of security cooperation arise, existing economic cooperation mechanisms can facilitate such a process by providing venues. In the post-Cold War era, efforts have been made to establish new regional security mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to promote security cooperation. However, the role of ARF in regional security cooperation has been limited due to its design as a forum. On the other hand, as regional economic cooperation evolves, the APT framework stands as a conveniently established platform for conducting security cooperation among its members; this reduces the cost of creating new mechanisms and institutions. It was no surprise that when events such as September 11th, the SARS outbreak, and the tsunami disaster alerted regional members to the need for cooperation in dealing with those challenges, they turned to the APT framework as a natural venue for regional coordination and cooperation.

2. Shaping Identity and Norms

Compared with non-traditional security, traditional security in East Asia appears to benefit less directly from improvements in economic regionalism. It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that economic regionalism does not have any effect on a country's behavior in the realm of traditional security. The East Asian cooperation process is known for its regular and frequent meetings at various levels (summit, senior official, working), yet socialization occurs amid these institutionalized interactions of policymakers and elites. From the constructivist perspective, social interactions can not only shape identities and norms but also affect the way a country defines and seeks its national interests (Acharya, 2001 : 3 - 4). For the APT countries, this process has given rise to a regional consciousness and has contributed to the willingness of countries to cooperate on regional security affairs. It has also helped develop common security norms among regional members in part by shaping their security behavior.

In the case of East Asia, economic cooperation introduced the concept of regionalism within the consciousness of participating countries while also supporting community-building efforts. This particular development was discussed at the Fifth APT summit held in November 2001. Just one month earlier, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), which was created in October 1999 by the APT Summit to provide a vision for East Asian cooperation, proposed the formation of an East Asian community, turning East Asia from a region of nations into a *bona fide* regional community. The goals of building an East Asian community as envisioned by the EAVG include preventing conflict and promoting peace among the nations of East Asia, achieving closer economic cooperation, advancing human security, bolstering common prosperity by enhancing cooperation in the development of education and human resources, and fostering the identity of an East Asian community (ASEAN, 2001). The vision of forming an East Asian community was endorsed by the East Asia Study Group and was positively received by the Sixth

APT Summit held in November 2002. Subsequently, the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, released in November 2007, reaffirmed the long-term goal of building an East Asian community. The goal of community-building in East Asia not only prompted broader and deeper regional cooperation, but also created a sense of shared identity among regional members.

On the other hand, as countries pursue substantive economic cooperation, they begin to develop and observe common rules and norms not only within the economic realm, but also in the political-security realm, which shapes their behaviors and reduces the risk of conflict. This has been manifest in the APT's first joint statement, which highlighted their commitment to handling their mutual relations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and the universally recognized principles of international law (ASEAN, 1999). Collectively, this set of core norms includes mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of member countries, as well as the agreement that the use of force to solve the disputes among them should be prohibited.

It is worth noting that with the emergence of East Asian cooperation, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia became the basis for common norms guiding relations among regional members. The treaty, established in 1976 when ASEAN was founded, embraces such fundamental principles as the "settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means" and the "renunciation of the threat or use of force" (ASEAN, 1976). China signed the TAC in October 2003, becoming the first non-ASEAN country to accept the treaty. ASEAN welcomed this significant step by stating that "China's accession to the TAC has contributed to the stature of the TAC as the code of conduct for inter-state relations in the region" (ASEAN, 2009a). After China's accession to the TAC, Japan, worried that it might lag behind Beijing in its relations with ASEAN, also signed the TAC in July 2004. ASEAN applauded Tokyo's decision by noting that "Japan's accession to the TAC added importance to the Treaty as a code of conduct

governing relations among countries in the region and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region" (ASEAN, 2009b). Although South Korea stands as the only APT country that has yet to sign the treaty, there is little reason to believe that Seoul holds major reservations against the document. Indeed, for the first time in history, the countries of East Asia agreed to observe a set of common norms in their relations with one another, and this will have a profound impact on their external behavior.

To determine whether economic cooperation among states helps to create new norms that constrain their behavior on security-related matters, it is worth considering the actions of the countries that are party to the South China disputes. Sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea have long been a major obstacle in China-ASEAN relations.^① As economic cooperation between China and ASEAN deepens in both bilateral and APT contexts, the two sides have made efforts to prevent the territorial disputes from interrupting and damaging their overall ties. In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" (DOC), pledging to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, and through friendly consultations and negotiations. Meanwhile, they also agreed to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in the region. Pending the peaceful settlement of the disputes, they promised to make an effort to build trust and confidence among the concerned parties, such as holding dialogues between their defense and military officials, and notifying other concerned parties of any impending military exercises. They would also explore or undertake cooperative activities, such as marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, navigation safety and communication exercises, search and rescue operations, and counter-transnational crime operations (ASEAN, 2002). And, as a follow-up,

^① Parties involved in the disputes include China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines

ASEAN and China established a joint working group in December 2004, a mechanism tasked with formulating recommendations on guidelines and the action plan for the implementation of the DOC as well as specific cooperative activities in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2004).

The effects of the aforementioned norms on the behaviors of the disputants in the South China Sea are clear. In 1974 and 1988 respectively, military conflicts occurred around the Xisha (Paracel) Islands between China and South Vietnam (and later Vietnam). In recent years, disputes over fishing rights and oil and natural gas exploration in the disputed areas in the South China Sea have cropped up sporadically, with countries involved adopting various steps to solidify their sovereignty claims in the region. However, except for a handful of minor incidents, no serious military clashes have broken out since the first agreements regarding South China Sea conduct were signed. Additionally, the DOC has led to concrete efforts of cooperation among its signatories. In September 2004, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) agreed to conduct seismic soundings in the South China Sea, with Vietnam joining in March 2005, renaming the cooperation project the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU).

Since March 2009, in response to the rising number of fishing disputes in the South China Sea, China has intensified its deployment of patrol boats on administration missions to the region, including both the Xisha Islands and Nansha (Spratly) Islands, in an attempt to assert China's sovereignty claim and protect its maritime interests. The fact that Beijing deployed fishery patrol boats rather than navy ships reflects Beijing's desire to avoid military conflicts and to rely on peaceful means to resolve the disputes. To reassure other parties to the South China Sea disputes of China's peaceful intentions, one senior Chinese military official emphasized at an important forum on regional security in 2009 that "China has always advocated a peaceful solution to the disputes over marine rights and interests" (Ma Xiaotian, 2009).

When military conflicts occurred between China and its Southeast Asian

neighbors, such as with South Vietnam (1974) and Vietnam (1988), they were overt enemies in the Cold War context. Today, China and the ASEAN disputants are close partners in regional political and economic affairs. Moreover, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea serve as common norms constraining the behaviors of states dealing with the disputes. In July 2009, the 16th ASEAN Regional Forum issued the Chairman's Statement suggesting that "[t]he Ministers reaffirmed the continuing importance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of 2002 (DOC) as a milestone document between the Member States of ASEAN and China, embodying their collective commitment to ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes in the area" (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2009). The Statement also expressed hope that the ASEAN countries and China would expeditiously conclude the Guidelines on the Implementation of the DOC. As further evidence of the effects of behavior-constraining norms, the ASEAN countries and China are considering the adoption of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, a legally binding document that would augment the DOC, which is merely a non-binding declaration. Such norms-building efforts, to be sure, should not be expected to resolve the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, although they can still constrain the behaviors of the parties involved. Each state will likely continue to assert its claims of sovereignty and pursue its maritime interests in the disputed areas through economic, administrative, and security measures, though avoiding the use of force to advance their goals. As a result, disputes and tensions may arise from time to time, but serious military conflicts are unlikely.

3. Altering Regional Security Dynamics

East Asian economic regionalism also contributes to the security of the region by modifying and altering regional security dynamics, which refers to a series of key factors affecting regional security, such as level of mutual trust among nations,

state of interactions of respective national interests (i.e., convergence or divergence), security links and regional security arrangements, etc. When the Cold War ended in early 1990s, the East Asian security landscape was highly complex. First, there was the preeminence of traditional security challenges. Due to the region's often bellicose history as well as the ideological divide stemming from the Cold War, strong animosity and distrust existed among the states in the region, which held diverging and conflicting security interests. Moreover, widespread territorial disputes among neighboring states resulted in strained relations. These problems were compounded by China's reemergence in the mid-1990s that gave rise to concerns regarding a shift in the regional balance of power. Second, the United States played the role of "regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor" in East Asia (The United States Department of Defense, 1990: 5). Washington achieved this position during the Cold War through its forward military presence, "hub-and-spoke" alliance system, and provision of economic aid to the countries in the region. As a result, regional members sought to enhance their security by strengthening ties with Washington rather than endeavoring to improve security relations with each other. It was not uncommon for East Asian countries to have stronger security connections with the United States than with their neighbors. Third, there was an absence of regional security cooperation mechanisms that were capable of addressing common security challenges. Even though ASEAN was founded in 1976 to cope with the perceived threat of communist expansion in Southeast Asia, there were not any serious efforts within this organization to develop the norms and institutions required for security cooperation. Thus, although the end of Cold War helped improve the security environment in East Asia, the region lacked the foundations required for the institutionalization of peace.

The development of economic regionalism has altered East Asian security dynamics in the following ways. First, institutionalized economic cooperation has helped to build trust and reduce suspicion among regional members, thus improving the regional security atmosphere. The first joint statement on cooperation in East Asia, released in 1999, stated that the APT countries would "deepen and

consolidate collective efforts with a view to advancing mutual understanding, trust, good neighborliness, and friendly relations, peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia and the world" (ASEAN, 1999). This suggests that the APT process is not just aimed at economic cooperation, but also geared toward political and security goals. Indeed, before the launching of the APT process, regularized meetings exclusively for East Asian leaders did not exist; the ARF was a venue for the meeting of foreign ministers not only from East Asia, but also from North America and Europe, while the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was a gathering for leaders from both Asia and Europe. As the APT framework continues to regularly bring together East Asian leaders as well as senior and working-level officials, these frequent interactions help familiarize these individuals with one another. Such relationships "advanc[e] mutual understanding, trust, good neighborliness, and friendly relations," as envisioned by the first East Asian statement of cooperation. Moreover, socialization among policymakers in the region helps to constrain their options when dealing with either preexisting or newly emerging disputes while also increasing the likelihood in which they adopt conciliatory approaches.

Moreover, economic regionalism also helps to form common security interests. As Ming Wan put it, "Countries change their views and redefine national interests owing to interdependence and transnational connections" (Wan, 2003; 290). Indeed, as the East Asian process of cooperation progressed, it introduced positive elements in relations among its members. Ten years after the process was initiated, APT leaders noted with satisfaction "that the ASEAN Plus Three process had brought about mutual benefits and closer linkages among the ASEAN Plus Three countries" (ASEAN, 2007). Beneficial economic interactions cause countries to view each other more as useful partners than as malicious rivals, with their relations seen more positively. Moreover, as the economic welfare of each country improves due to economic cooperation, economic factors become an increasingly important component of national security. With regional members placing economic growth and cooperation at the top of their national agendas, there emerges a common interest among them in securing and maintaining a stable environment in which

economic gains are possible. This shared interest grows with the deepening of economic cooperation, resulting in pacific effects on the security policies of all member states.

Economic regionalism, in addition to creating economic interdependence and cooperation among member countries, also facilitates their cooperation and exchanges in traditional political-security fields. Wan suggests that economic interdependence and cooperation “facilitate countries’ efforts to cooperate and reduce tensions in security matters by offering economic incentives and creating vested interests in continuous cooperation” (2003: 290 – 291). Furthermore, as economic regionalism causes countries to attach increasing importance to the economic benefits gained through expanded cooperation, cooperation becomes the preferred approach in relations with their regional partners, helping to moderate the security environment in the region. As evidence of just such a phenomenon at work, the APT process has helped promote military/defense exchanges among regional members. The first joint East Asian cooperation statement declared that member states “agreed to continuing dialogue, coordination, and cooperation to increase mutual understanding and trust towards forging lasting peace and stability in East Asia” (ASEAN, 1999). The East Asian Study Group recommended in its final report to “nurture confidence-building among countries, especially exchanges, consultations, and other cooperative activities among military and defense officials,” and to “establish and implement effective measures to prevent and avoid conflict, and manage tensions” (APT Summit, 2002: 14 – 15).

The APT Cooperation Work Plan (2007 – 2017) also pledged that in order to enhance mutual understanding and mutual trust, APT countries aim to gradually increase their exchanges and cooperation among defense officials and to increase visits to each others’ military academies. As a result, multilateral and bilateral military and defense exchanges among APT countries have increased in frequency. For instance, since 2004, the ARF security policy conference has been held annually, involving senior defense officials from all the thirteen APT countries as well as other ARF members to discuss the regional security situation as well as

opportunities for defense and security cooperation. Although participants in the gatherings of defense officials also come from non-APT countries, the conference was initiated and has been hosted by the APT countries as an effort to strengthen dialogue among themselves.

The APT countries view the ARF as a convenient platform through which to promote political and security cooperation in East Asia and have agreed to strengthen it (APT Summit, 2002: 15). Moreover, in March 2010, the first "China-ASEAN Defense and Security Dialogue" was held in Beijing. Focusing on the subject of "regional security mechanism and defense policy," defense officials and scholars from China and ASEAN explored the condition and the development of a regional defense mechanism, China-ASEAN defense and security cooperation, and the national defense policies of China and the ASEAN member states. The dialogue aims to enhance the mutual trust between China and ASEAN member states and to deepen China-ASEAN defense and security cooperation (Chinese Ministry of Defense, 2010). Meanwhile, bilateral security dialogues, defense consultations, and military exchanges among China, Japan and South Korea also have increased in recent years. In 2008, a military hotline was established between China and South Korea in an attempt to avoid incidents in the East China Sea. In 2007 and 2008, the first-ever port calls took place between the China's People's Liberation Army Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force. The visiting Japanese ship also conducted a joint telecommunication exercise with the Chinese navy. Overall, interactions among East Asian countries in the realm of traditional security reflect the features of a cooperative security approach, aimed at promoting engagement and reassurance rather than resolving common security threats (Kay, 2006: 64).

The impact of economic regionalism on security is reflected not only at the national, but also at the international level. As noted by Muthiah Alagappa, "Concurrent with the emergence of Asia as a core economic region and the development of regional norms and organization, the security system in Asia has become more distinct and autonomous" (Alagappa, 2008: 45). Due to

improvements in mutual trust, the emergence of shared security interests, and increases in positive and cooperative security interactions, countries are more likely to increasingly draw on the development of security relations among regional members than on ties with extra-regional powers in their calculations of national security. As a result, interactions among regional members have taken on a weightier role in their security calculations, leading to an East Asia that is becoming increasingly self-reliant on matters of security. This trend is gradually reducing the degree to which regional members rely on the United States as a provider of security and reducing the role of the United States as the “regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor” in East Asia. In the long term, this trend will also give rise to a new security architecture in East Asia in which relations among regional members themselves will play a more central role in regional security arrangements. Both existing economic cooperation mechanisms and newly created institutions for security cooperation will constitute the main means by which East Asian affairs are managed under this new regional architecture.

Is economic regionalism, aimed at building the envisioned East Asian Community, establishing the basis for a security community? Does it suggest that a regional security community is likely to emerge? As economic cooperation further enhances regional economic interdependence and contributes to institutional and normative frameworks of cooperation, East Asia as a region is becoming more distinct and autonomous (Alagappa, 2008: 42). Such developments help cultivate regional consciousness, foster a regional identity, and draw more attention to intra-regional security relations. In addition, to varying degrees security cooperation is already unfolding in both nontraditional and traditional areas. While nontraditional security cooperation contributes to the management of common security challenges, traditional security cooperation enhances reassurance and engagement. As deepening economic cooperation and integration drive the region towards an East Asian Community, security cooperation simultaneously moves forward on these two uneven wheels, increasing the possibility of transforming the region into a pluralistic security community. A constructivist and path-dependent approach suggests that the

development of a security community has three stages: nascent, ascendant and mature. The nascent stage is usually triggered by, among other factors, common threat perceptions, expectations of mutual trade benefits, and some degree of shared identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 50 – 61). In the case of East Asia, all three factors exist: there exists a common threat perception among regional members regarding nontraditional security challenges; ASEAN Plus Three cooperation embodies their expectations of mutual trade benefits; and the East Asian Community stands as a shared identity. The remaining challenges are the complicated relations among regional members on traditional security issues and the loose sense of regional identity. Thus, it is uncertain whether East Asia already possesses the “push or pull factors” necessary for the nascent stage of developing a security community. That stage requires the following: a dynamic and positive relationship among regional members, the emergence of social institutions and organization, an improvement in mutual trust, and the existence of a core state or coalition of states as a facilitator and stabilizer (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 53). Over the last decade in East Asia, these conditions have been manifest in greater intra-regional cooperation on nontraditional security matters, increases in inter-state exchanges on traditional security, more bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for cooperation and exchanges, improved (although unevenly) trust among regional members, and ASEAN's role as a facilitator of regional economic, political, and security cooperation. With these positive indicators already evident, it is not unreasonable to suggest that East Asia may be in the midst of the nascent stage of developing a pluralistic security community.

4. Concluding Observations

The recent history of the ASEAN +3 summarized above largely conform to the logics of both neoliberalism and social constructivism. Economic regionalism has contributed to security regionalism by promoting and facilitating regional security cooperation, shaping identity and norms, enhancing socialization, improving

mutual understanding and trust, and expanding security links among regional members. It is also apparent that in the case of East Asian security, the most tangible spillover effect of economic regionalism has been in the realm of non-traditional security, while cooperation on traditional security remains underdeveloped and less substantive. Given the short history of East Asian economic regionalism, it is understandable that its spillover effect in regional security has not yet fully materialized, and this is just like a half-full-and-half-empty glass, while skeptics saw the lack of progress from it, a more positive view saw achievements.

The flourishing of non-traditional security cooperation in East Asia as a byproduct of economic regionalism is an understandable phenomenon. On the one hand, the acceleration of globalization in the 21st century has rendered the non-traditional security challenges of the region more salient and their transnational nature requires multilateral cooperation. Since non-traditional security challenges confront all of the regional members, they have a common interest in jointly dealing with these challenges, providing the political impetus for cooperation. And, the APT process provides an existing platform for cooperation, thus avoiding the need of creating entirely new mechanisms. Moreover, non-traditional cooperation largely involves less sensitive issues, such as policy coordination and the sharing of data, information and expertise, while leaving more delicate matters, such as sovereignty and military security, untouched. In this sense, the relatively lower threshold for cooperation in the realm of nontraditional security, compared to that of traditional security, increases its likelihood.

In contrast, political and security relations in East Asia, characterized by a lack of mutual trust, have limited the spillover effects of economic regionalism on traditional security, impeding the possibilities for political-military cooperation. Nationalism and collective historical memories remain potent influences in East Asia, and from time to time, nationalist sentiment and disputes over historical issues strain political relations in the region. For instance, the annual summit meeting of China, Japan and South Korea, which was started in 1999 as a

byproduct of the APT process was cancelled in 2005 as a result of then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's decision to once again visit the Yasukuni Shrine where Japanese class-A war criminals of World War II are enshrined. Moreover, divergent security interests also undermine incentives for cooperation on matters of traditional security. Enduring disagreements about the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea disputes all undermine the political willingness of regional states to cooperate on military and strategic matters. Furthermore, the fact that security cooperation touches upon matters of state sovereignty complicates efforts for cooperation. The preeminent role of the United States in regional security also impedes the development of intra-regional security relations. For East Asian countries, the United States stands as either a security guarantor, a security broker, or a major security concern. To the extent the road to security starts from Washington, East Asian countries still attach greater importance to their security relations with the United States than to coordinating security policies among themselves.

It is also worth repeating that social and cultural lenses are required to understand regional cooperation in East Asia. The concept of security cooperation is used loosely in this chapter. In the West, cooperation is usually measured against material results achieved — i. e. , how cooperation leads to mutual gains or building institutions. In East Asia, however, cooperation is understood in terms not just of tangible achievements but also the conduct of interstate social interactions. In his study of how ASEAN developed into a security community, Amitav Acharya noted that “[w]ithout a constructive understanding, it would be difficult to explain the emergence of ASEAN” (Acharya, 1998: 45). His research explored how “ASEAN regionalism developed as a highly deliberate process of elite socialization involving the creation of norms, principles, and symbols aimed at the management of diversity and the development of substantive regional cooperation” (Acharya, 1998: 207). Amitav stressed that “elite socialization,” as a social constructivist variable, was crucial to the understanding of the evolution of ASEAN. According to him, among the four factors that have played an important role in the

development of a collective identity in ASEAN, one was the practice of multilateralism. Its contribution to community-building "lies not in providing a formal institutional mechanism for conflict resolution, but rather in encouraging the socialization of elites which facilitates problem-solving" (Acharya, 1998: 208). Alexander Wendt, inspired by Kantian culture suggests the importance of "thinking systematically about the nature and consequences of friendship in international politics." He argues that "friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of anyone is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid)" (Wendt, 1999: 298 -299).

It is in this sense that the effects of institutions on security in East Asia should be gauged. This is a region with large differences among its members not only in material power, but also in history, culture, and ideology; on the other hand, East Asia has a general preference for socialization and connections. It is, therefore, all the more important and necessary to encourage interstate social interactions especially those that facilitate elite socialization. Social interactions can increase mutual understanding and mutual trust, expand connections, and develop friendship and affinity among states. While they may not automatically lead to a resolution of disputes, continued interaction can certainly help mitigate tension and avoid war, spread common norms as well as increase the willingness for cooperation. Taking for example Wendt's two rules of friendship as a role structure in international politics, although the rule of mutual aid is unlikely to be observed among East Asian states in the foreseeable future, given its complicated political-strategic dynamics, the rule of non-violence has already been widely accepted with the introduction of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the APT process. Disputes will surely continue to exist and remain difficult to solve. But the deliberate use of force to settle them may be less likely as a result of more frequent social interactions aimed at enhancing economic and security cooperation. Even though East Asian cooperation appears to be more means-oriented than result-oriented and institutions

have not yet delivered many tangible results in terms of traditional security cooperation, these institutions have fostered a significant improvement in the tone of regional discussions about security.

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全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

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East Asian Cooperation and Asia's Governance—An Indian Perspective

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1. East Asian Cooperation

East Asia has become one of the most prominent regions of the world in the recent period. It has several specific features as one of the most densely populated areas, home to 3 of the 11 largest economies of the world; 6 of the 20 major economies of the world in the G-20 framework, known for its economic and technological prowess; the first place to have witnessed nuclear holocaust; host to some of the most critical “flash points” of the globe with acute differences over competing territorial and sovereign claims^①, escalating defence budgets and arms

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① These include Japan-Russia and Korea's disputes over islands, etc. Resolution or otherwise of these territorial disputes has a significant bearing on regional security and economic development.

procurements patterns^①, existence of cold war influences despite the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s^② and the like. Yet, the International Monetary Fund termed the region as exhibiting economic “miracle” in the early 1990s for its growth story and much to be emulated.

Due to the size and influence of these countries, the significance of the security issues or the on-going economic and technological transformation in the region is not confined only to the East Asian region but actually has pan-Asian or even global impact. Hence cooperative efforts — at the bilateral or multilateral levels — in the region have a significant bearing on the regional and global situation. ^③

Starting from the 1970s normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and in 1992 between China and South Korea, cooperation between these countries expanded substantially despite some of the security challenges facing them. As a result, Japan, South Korea, China and the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are engaged in mutually beneficial market integration efforts including foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, gradual removal or even elimination of hurdles to free flow of trade in goods and services, higher savings, capital formation, long-term investments in basic education and health care, growth in small and medium enterprises, thriving of the export-oriented

① While Japan used to be the largest defence spender in Asia (at about \$45 billion a year on an average due to the Constitutional restrictions), this position is secured by China in the last three years with its current official estimate at \$91.4 billion in 2011. The region as a whole witnessed higher defence allocations (with India allocating \$34 billion in 2011 and Malaysia and Vietnam placing orders for advanced military equipment) indicating to the emerging security dilemmas for several countries due to strategic uncertainty. North Korea declared itself nuclear in October 2006 despite the four party-turned six party talks on the peninsula

② These include the US-led alliances with Japan and South Korea.

③ See Kishore Mahbubani, “From Confucius to Kennedy: Principles of East Asian Governance” accessed at < [http://www.mahbubani.net/articles/EA_Visions 11. pdf](http://www.mahbubani.net/articles/EA_Visions%2011.pdf) > For the diversity of the region and security issues and concerns, see Yu Xintian, “China and Northeast Asian regional security cooperation” *Asia-Pacific Review* Vol 12, no. 2 (2005) pp 30–38.

special economic zones, etc.¹ These efforts proved to be useful to stave off from turbulences globally and regionally such as during the 1997 and 2008 financial crises.

For instance, Japan, South Korea contributed to one of the highest FDI flows in the region in the last two decades. Of these China and the ASEAN countries are major beneficiaries with estimated cumulative investment of about \$800 billion in China alone.² While China on an average received more than \$50 billion a year in the recent period (reaching to more than \$72 billion recently), ASEAN is as well in the lead by attracting more than \$40 billion in FDI. Outward flow of FDI from the region is also significant in the last few years, with China having \$2.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, taking the lead in investing \$49 billion in 2010 abroad. Cumulatively, by 2015, China is expected to invest \$350 billion abroad — mostly in resources (minerals and energy) in Africa and South America and in financial resources in Europe. On the other hand, Japanese, Korean investments in Asia and beyond are useful for their emphasis on the manufacturing industries and infrastructure facilities in the recipient countries.

Also, intra-regional trade in East Asia is one of the highest in the world — nearly 55 percent, as compared to about 65 percent for the European Union (EU) and 45 percent for North America.³ As a result, bilateral trade figures between

¹ See Peng Dajin, "The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region" *Pacific Affairs* vol. 73 no. 1 (2000) pp 171 - 191; Joseph F. Francois, and Ganeshan Wignaraja, "Economic Implications of Asian Integration" *Global Economy Journal*; Vol. 8, Issue 3 (2008); and Joseph F. Francois, Pradumna B. Rana and Ganeshan Wignaraja, ed. *Pan-Asian Integration: Linking East and South Asia* (Palgrave-MacMillan Press, 2009).

² For an overall assessment see, Peter J. Buckley, *Foreign Direct Investment, China and the World Economy* (London, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010)

³ While East Asian intra-regional trade constituted 43.1 percent in 1990, that of South Asia was 2.7 percent; for 1995, these figures were 51.9 and 3.9 percent; for 2000, 52.2 and 4 percent and in 2007 53.9 and 5.2 percent respectively. See Francois, et. al. eds. 2009 p. 9. For the historical period, see A. J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (ed.) *Intra-Asian Trade and the World Market* (London: Routledge, 2006) and Durgesh Rai, "Asian economic integration and cooperation: Challenges and way forward" July 1, 2010 accessed at <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/01/asian-economic-integration-and-cooperation-challenges-and-way-forward/>>.

Japan and China, Japan and South Korea, China and South Korea or their trade with ASEAN had substantially increased.

Again, taking advantage of the low labour costs, availability of raw materials and energy supplies in the under-developed regions, fragmented production of manufactured goods took place by shifting from advanced countries through joint venture companies and export processing zones.^① As a result, over a period of time, while some countries went up the value chain (such as China), more sophisticated production and distribution networks geared towards the US and Europe evolved in the region.^② This phenomenon meant practical, pragmatic and extensive stakes built across the region between capital, labour, management and business circles. This is also facilitated by the massive investments in the infrastructure projects across East and Southeast Asia and the recent revival of the idea of trans-Asian railway and highway projects.

2. Asian Governance

While Asia had bounced back in posting higher economic growth rates and a large number of countries in the region have cooperated on such issues, on the other hand the region exhibits diverse political systems, levels of state formation and interactions, with competing sovereignty claims and the presence of non-traditional security challenges. While Europe had exhibited similar dynamics in 19th through 20th centuries, with drastic consequences in the first and second world wars, Asia could project a different trajectory if such competing visions could be tamed into a

^① See Wendy Dobson and Chia Siow Yue Ed. **Multinationals and East Asian Integration** (Ottawa, IDRC and ISEAS, 1997) accessed at <<http://www.idrc.ca/openbooks/806-6/>>.

^② For a useful study, Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), **Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism** (London: Praeger, 1984).

mutually beneficial, widely accepted norm-based governance system.^①

To address issues of governance at the Asian regional levels, several initiatives have been undertaken so far. As home to 43 countries, Asia is diversified in political, economic and social aspects and this had complicated efforts at either defining regional order or working on the nitty-gritty aspects of governance in the region.

Coinciding with the de-colonisation process, a number of efforts were made by the independent countries in Asia to address issues of national integration, economic development and integration. One of such ideas was reflected in the deliberations at the first Asian Relations Conference organised by India in 1946. Representatives from most Asian countries have attended this conference. Later, the five Colombo countries organised 27-member Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1954 in which China was invited. However, with the onset of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union, such ideas floundered till recently.

The second major attempt at Asian governance related mechanisms could be traced to the 1990s with the transformation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) into a broad-based organisation with emerging countries in Asia becoming its members, viz., China, Japan, South Korea, India and others. This period also coincided with the inauguration and the transformation of the Shanghai Five into Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the initiation of Six Party talks on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

① For differences in the Asian and European contexts see Shu Tianjun, "Europe's Lessons for East Asian Integration" May 4, 2009 accessed at <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1345>>; Tomoko Okagaki, "Europe as a model of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific?" May 6, 2009 accessed at <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/06/relativising-europe-as-a-model-of-regionalism-for-the-asia-pacific/>>; Giovanni Capannelli, "Asian regionalism: How does it compare to Europe's" April 21, 2009 accessed at <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/21/asian-regionalism-how-does-it-compare-to-europes/>> and Robert Boyer, "Asian Integration: What can be learnt from the European Union?" February 6, 2003 accessed at <<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/03020601.html>>.

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

There are others such as those in economic and trade issues like the G - 20^①, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asia-Europe Meeting, Russia-China-India trilateral meetings^②, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa meetings^③, Tumen River Delta grouping with Korea, Mongolia and Japan, Bo Ao Forum, the Mekong River commission projects, etc.

At the multilateral interactions, while China was the earliest entrant in ASEAN processes, it has also initiated other multilateral institutions. China's multilateral efforts in Southeast Asia are notable, although these are packaged in exclusive terms. China has proposed a free trade area (FTA) agreement in 2001 with the ASEAN countries which came into force in January 2010 (for the new ASEAN

① The G - 20 countries formed from G - 7 + 1, include the highly industrialized nations and the emerging countries. Formed after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the G - 20 from 1999 had become an international organization specifically by gathering the finance ministers and Central Bank Governors of these countries and representing nearly 90 percent of global product and 80 percent of global trade. In the last decade, the G - 20 expanded its agenda from advocating growth policies, curbing tax evasion and financial cooperation to also countering money laundering and financing of terrorism given the post 9 - 11 imperatives. The multi-trillion dollar stimulus packages announced by the G - 20 recently to cope up with the global financial crisis had generated the much needed financial stability for the globe. From the East Asian perspective see Hadi Soesastro, "EAST Asia, the G - 20 and Global economic governance" March 8, 2009 accessed at < <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/03/08/east-asia-the-g20-and-global-economic-governance/> > and Soogil Young, "The case for an East Asian Caucus on global governance: A Korean Perspective" April 12, 2009 accessed at < <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/12/the-case-for-an-east-asian-caucus-on-global-economic-governance-a-korean-perspective/> > .

② In December 1998, the then Russian Prime Minister Prmakov visited New Delhi where he expressed interest in forming a "strategic triangle" with India and China. Eleven meetings took place so far between the three. Apart from enhancing political understanding in the international arena among the three countries and supporting each other on minimalist agenda on respective territorial integrity and sovereignty aspects, tangible benefits for the three countries subscribing to the strategic triangle include enhancement in economic, regional/sub-regional and trade cooperation, though at a bilateral level; infrastructure development projects like energy pipelines, roads/railways; etc.

③ Coined by Jim O'Neill at the Goldman Sachs, the BRICS (with South Africa joining the grouping in 2011) posted high economic growth rates and are expected to be the largest economies by 2050, with China surpassing the United States by 2017. Three meetings of the grouping took place so far. They had called for removal of protectionist measures in trade, reform of the United Nations, respect for the UN Charter, etc.

members such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 2012). While India was unveiling the BIMSTEC process in December 1997, China made efforts to build up Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar regional cooperation under the Kunming Initiative of 1999.^① Since then several meetings took place annually in all the four capitals with declarations about promoting tourism, infrastructure development projects, etc., although this grouping still remains largely at the track - 2 levels, with mainly Indian reluctance to upgrade the initiative. Also, India and other ASEAN countries initiated Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in November 2000, while China has its own version of Mekong cooperation projects with relevant ASEAN countries.^②

Several ideas and institutions preceded the creation of the EAS on December 14, 2005 at Kuala Lumpur. Briefly, several countries in Southeast Asia have put forward a number of multilateral initiatives in economic and security areas in the last two decades.^③ The earliest one from the region came in the form of the Malaysian concept in 1991 on East Asian Economic Caucus. Subsequently the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process was instituted in 1996. However, in the aftermath of the debilitating financial crisis that hit the region in 1997, Chiang Mai Initiative called for a single Asian currency. Further, at the same place, the ASEAN + 3 countries decided in May 2000 to set up regional monetary exchange to counter speculation, although the grouping was sensitive that this initiative should not challenge the International Monetary Fund processes.^④ Later, in 2002 an East Asian Study Group was formed by the ASEAN + 3 (the latter included Japan, South Korea and

① See on the significance of the Kunming Initiative, Chen Jidong, "Zhong Yin Mian Meng qucheng jingji hezuo chutan" [Preliminary explorations of China-India-Myanmar-Bangladesh regional economic cooperation] *Nanya Yanjiu Qikan* [South Asia Quarterly] April 1999 pp.24 - 27.

② Chandan Irom, "Whatever Happened to India's Look East Policy? The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation" January 19, 2002 at < <http://www.manipuronline.com/Features/January2002/mekongganga19.htm> > .

③ See for an overview, Richard Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?" *Asian Survey* vol.42 no.3 (May-June 2002) pp.440 - 455.

④ Extensive treatment of this subject is at Pan Zhongyong, "Crisis and Transformation: New Regionalism and East Asia's Regional Cooperation" *Guoji Wenti Luntan* [International Review] (Shanghai) vol. 34 (Spring 2004).

China), leading to the formation of the EAS after the 3rd ASEAN + 3 ministerial meeting in July 2005 in Laos. In late 2003, at the 9th ASEAN summit meeting, the grouping decided to broad base its agenda by ushering in an ASEAN community by 2020, including security, economic and cultural aspects.^① With the recent renewal of the pan-Asian Railways and Highways projects and signing of FTA between China and ASEAN, ASEAN + 3 or India and ASEAN, these initiatives could be further broad based in future. Some, such as Yu Xintian, had argued that a distinct identity in the region is taking shape due to the mutual interdependencies.^②

3. East Asian Summit

Apart from the above, East Asian Summit (EAS) process came into being in 2005^③. The first meeting of the EAS took place on December 14, 2005 at Kuala

① While the ARF process is identified to be the basic framework of the East Asian Security Community (EASC), its principles are to be based on four, viz., respecting the diversity of the region; following democracy in international relations; peaceful settlement of disputes; and agreement between regional security and a country's security and survival. Further, four major countries were identified, viz., United States, China, Japan and Russia — among whom a strategic dialogue mechanism would be set up to diffuse crisis, if any Indian role in the EASC was not, however, mentioned at this time. In the security management sphere, the EASC is expected to boost confidence building measures, set up a management regime to diffuse military incidents, mechanism for conflict resolution, disaster relief, combating non-traditional security issues such as crime, energy, etc. This is based on Liu Jiangyong and Yan Xuetong, "Some Tentative Strategic Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community" *Wajiao Shuwu* [Foreign Affairs Journal] (Beijing) No 17, March 2004. None of these, however, have been realised so far.

② See Yu Xintian, "Dongya ren tonggan de taidong cong wenhua de shijiao" [The Emergence of East Asian identity: A Cultural Perspective], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (Beijing) Issue 286 no. 6 2004 pp. 20–25. She argued that the current level of integration in the region is inadequate and there is a need for harmonizing cultural identities in the region.

③ Ji Ling had argued that the EAS should be set apart from the ASEAN + 3. Ji argued that is a reflection of the competition between China and Japan for influence on regional affairs. While the European experience is based on political and economic integration through legislative means, Ji argued that norm-based approach is crucial for the East Asian region. See "Norm-based Governance and Implications for East Asia" **Occasional Paper No. 19** (2008) Centre for Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong.

Lumpur, the second one at Cebu on January 15, 2007 (postponed from December 2006 due to a typhoon) and the third meeting at Singapore on November 21, 2007. The fourth and fifth meetings were held at Hua Hin in Thailand and Hanoi in Vietnam subsequently, with the 6th to be held in Indonesia in 2011.^①

The first meeting indicated that the ASEAN is expected to continue to be in the lead, with the first declaration arguing for an open, inclusive, transparent and outward looking forum. The EAS member countries constitute nearly half of the global population and about one-fifth of global trade. A majority of the 16 member countries are posting significant economic growth rates. Although differences in size, population profiles, economic and technological levels and cultural differences persist, the EAS has indicated that it would focus on pressing economic and security concerns. While intense lobbying by several countries was reported in the five meetings so far on several issues such as membership, formulation of agenda, etc., these meetings indicated that finance, energy, education and non-traditional security issues like countering bird flu and natural disasters would be prioritised. Indeed, concrete proposals include setting up of a fund of nearly \$100 million to look into such initiatives; setting up of an economic research institute and plans to initiate East Asian FTA.

Differences persist in membership, leading role, issues, finances, etc. between these states in EAS. The United States and Russia were excluded, while the European Union appeared to be interested in joining the grouping as an observer.^② In 2011, the US and Russia are to attend the EAS as full members after the 2010 summit admitted them.^③ While Australia considered the EAS as secondary

① At the fourth meeting, it was decided to revive Nalanda University.

② Evan Feigenbaum had argued that in the light of the rise of China and other major developments in Asia in the last two decades, the United States tends to be marginalised in the region unless and until it takes corrective measures of re-engagement. See "Could America fade in Asia?" Business Standard April 4, 2011 at < <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/evan-feigenbaum-could-america-fade-in-asia/430785/> > .

③ According to Ezra Vogel, the current set up in EAS could optimise its performance in the region. See "Regionalism in Asia: Why we should stick with existing structures" March 30, 2010 accessed at < <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/30/regionalism-in-asia-why-we-should-stick-with-existing-structures/> > .

to the APEC process, Japan, and India wanted EAS to be the lynchpin in the region's initiatives.^① Several members of the ASEAN, China and South Korea expressed negative responses to the idea of a pan-Asian FTA. In the financial sphere, the Chiang Mai Initiative of December 1997 supported efforts towards a common Asian currency unit. However, there has been no major enthusiasm or moves from China or other countries in this regard. A regional cooperative monetary exchange system was proposed by the ASEAN + 3 gathering at Chiang Mai in May 2000 to overcome speculation in currencies. The loans to be raised for the purpose from the Japan Central Bank are not to exceed more than 10 percent (so that the International Monetary Fund need not approve below this percentage). Likewise, the idea of Asian Monetary Fund is yet to take off. No major progress in implementing these proposals in the region is reported.

4. Indian Role

India's entry into the East Asian region, although not new as it had historical contacts, is an indication of an outgrowth from the South Asian region, in which it was confined during the Cold War period.^② As one of the fastest growing economies recently^③, India has several contributions to offer to the region, including its large domestic consumption, younger population profile, skilled working population, IT software, management system, private sector, stock

① Kevin Rudd, the then Australian Prime Minister, in May 2009 called for building Asia Pacific Community.

② For the lessons to be learnt by the South Asian countries from the East Asian experience, see Ramesh Chandra and Rajiv Kumar, "South Asian Integration Prospects and Lessons from East Asia" **ICRIER Working Paper No.202** New Delhi, January 2008.

③ According to the International Monetary Fund estimate, India grew at 10.4 percent in 2010, while China at 10.3, Brazil 7.5, Mexico 5.5 and Russia at 4 percent. See P. Raghavan, "Finally, India beats China in growth sweepstakes" **The Indian Express** April 13, 2011 accessed at <<http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/775468/>>.

exchanges, inclusive multilateral experience, maritime security cover^①, etc. Indian "Look East" policy in 1991 which was solidified with several multilateral initiatives such as joining the ASEAN (in 1995) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (in 1996) and signing the free trade area (FTA) agreement recently.^② Indian role in the region further increased with its joining of the East Asian Summit in late 2005 and the multilateral naval exercises conducted in the region.^③ India also signed several trade, finance, industry cooperation agreements with the East Asian region, apart from the FTA with the ASEAN. These include Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in February 2011 with Japan^④, a similar agreement with Singapore (2005), South Korea (2010) and exploration of such possibilities with Malaysia and Thailand (2004).^⑤

① For instance, India offered at the Shangri-la Dialogue at Singapore in mid-2006 to help protect the piracy-prone Straits of Malacca's, etc. A year before, Indian swift role in the Tsunami relief in December 2004 — January 2005 when it helped evacuate several thousand victims in Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka was received well in Southeast Asian region.

② See Christophe Jaffrelot, "India's look east policy: an Asianist strategy in perspective" *India Review* vol 2, No. 2 (April 2003) pp 35 – 68; M K. Venu, "Look east policy & multilateralism" *The Economic Times* January 23, 2007 at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Look_east_policy_multilateralism/articleshow/1386800.cms> ; "India's Look East Policy: Analytical perspectives from the political, economic and military lenses" at <http://www.whatisindia.com/editorials/wis200501019_indias_look_east_policy.html> ; According to Rong Xiangdong, India's "Look East" policy provides opportunities and challenges to China. Such Indian entry into Southeast Asia is fraught with challenges and prospects for China in economic, foreign policy and security arenas. However, Rong argued that China should follow a "rational and tolerant" policy without being "paranoid" about the inherent "dangers" in engaging India. Expanding economic interactions with India in the region was prescribed as a long-term policy of China. See "Yindu 'dongxiang' Dongnanya dui Zhongguo de yingxiang" [India's "Look East" towards Southeast Asia and its impact on China] M. A thesis submitted to Foreign Affairs Institute June 2004 42p

③ Zhao Gancheng, "India: Look East Policy and Role in Asian Security Architecture" Position Paper at the SIIS-Brookings Conference on Regionalism in Asia, Shanghai, December 11 – 12, 2006 accessed at <<http://www.sis.org.cn/forumenglish/brookings/gancheng4.pdf>> This is also available at *Indian Ocean Digest* 42(21) July-December 2006.

④ See Takenori Horimoto, "The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Relations?" *Asia Pacific Bulletin* April 15, 2011.

⑤ See "Yindu dakai FTA damen Taiwan jibukeshi" *The China Times* editorial April 12, 2011 accessed at <<http://news.chinatimes.com/forum/11051402/112011041200225.html>> .

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated at the first EAS meeting that "Asia is India's destiny".^① Further, at the 2nd EAS meeting, India has expressed the view that a pan-Asian FTA could solve several economic and financial problems of the region than confining to one specific sub-region. This suggestion evoked positive response from Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. However, for China (and South Korea) FTA with ASEAN is of utmost significance.^② Again, while China wanted to push through an East Asian Community with ASEAN + 3 in the driver's seat, India (and Japan) appeared to support the EAS as a whole.^③ Nevertheless, India and China in November 2006, during President Hu Jintao's visit to Delhi had agreed to work together in the Asian region. Paragraph 43 of the joint declaration underlined the prospects for bilateral cooperation in Asia. It stated:

Recognising that regional integration is an important feature of the

① Singh cited by Nandita Mallik, "East Asia Summit ends with high optimism" December 14, 2005 at < <http://us.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/14asean2.htm?q=bp&file=.htm> > [accessed on January 23, 2007].

② Jae Cheol Kim, "Politics of Regionalism in East Asia — The Case of the East Asia Summit" Asian Perspective vol. 34, no. 3 pp. 113 - 36 accessed at < <http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-d.pdf> >.

③ See Mohan Malik, "The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord" *YaleGlobal* December 20, 2005 at < <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6645> > [accessed on January 23, 2007]; Barry Desker, "Why the East Asian summit matters" December 14, 2005 at < <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pac0555b.pdf> > accessed on May 1, 2006 and Chietgi Bajpae, "India rediscovers East Asia" *Asia Times* October 31, 2007 at < http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ31Df01.html > However, Yang Renfei argued that there is a possibility of China cooperating with India in the fields of intelligence and technology to mitigate the challenges posed in the Straits. See Yang Renfei, "Malujia haudao wentide zui xin fazhan ji dui Nanhai wentu de qushi" [Latest developments of the Malacca Straits issue and its inspiration for the South China issue] *Dongnanya Zongheng* [Around Southeast Asia] September 2004 pp. 38 - 42 and 54. On the other hand, Zhai Kun of China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, underlines limitations of either China, Japan, Singapore or India in the EAS. See "How the move for 'harmonious East Asi' goes forward?" *People's Daily* January 16, 2007 accessed on January 23, 2007 at < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/16/eng20070116_341720.html >.

emerging international economic order, the two sides agree to expand their coordination within regional organisations and explore a new architecture for closer regional cooperation in Asia. They positively view each other's participation in Asian inter-regional, regional and sub-regional cooperation process, including in the progress towards the East Asian Community. In this context, the two sides agree to cooperate closely in the East Asia Summit.^①

This is expected to boost cooperation between the two in the EAS in the coming years. During Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Delhi in December 2010, both countries outlined cooperation in Afghanistan reconstruction as well as in countering piracy in the Indian Ocean Region, region through which more than 80 percent of China's estimated 200 million tonnes of oil passes through the contiguous Malacca Straits in 2010.

5. Conclusions

East Asia had exhibited a higher sense of purpose in market-led integration for the mutual benefit of the constituent states in the region. Across the board and over a period of time, major efforts at economic integration in the region are gradually paying rich dividends to the countries involved. Integration levels of East Asia high and next to only NAFTA and EU. The "East Asian Miracle" indeed, as coined in the early 1990s to explain this phenomenon is being emulated in other parts or several countries have expressed interest in joining the process. All these indicated moving away from sectarian views and securing cooperation among the member states over a period of time. However, in the process, the region is also exposed to several challenges — traditional and non-traditional security challenges — in

^① See "Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China" November 21, 2006 at < <http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2006/11/21jd01.htm> > accessed on February 20, 2007.

addition to the debilitating 1997 and 2008 financial crisis that affected currencies, stock-exchanges, real-estate sector and broadly economic development in the region. Europe witnessed faster economic growth after industrial revolution, no viable security institution or initiative could address competing rivalries in the region. This was to cost Europe its predominant position by the 20th century in the costly two world wars. Asia could learn lessons from this European experience, although the context is different.

For sustainable and long-term development of the region, several new initiatives and institutions were established in the region. It dawned on many a country in the region that the governance-related issues need to be tackled as no single and effective architecture in the region is present. To that extent, despite some progress in the EAS process, the region exhibits low level of institutionalism.

Apart from focus on structurally changing the economic aspects at the national level, constituent members deliberated on broader challenges facing the region. At the outset, several basic decisions were taken which include the realisation that for enhancing economic cooperation, peace and stability in the region should prevail. There also appears to be a consensus that pending territorial dispute resolution, pressing issues such as energy, climate change, pandemics, disaster relief, human trafficking, terrorism and piracy needs to be addressed collectively. However, in the longrun, protection of the “global commons” — maritime, cyber space, green environment, free trade, free navigation, cooperation on resources, etc. — need to be kept in mind.

At the decision-making level, it appeared that there is greater support to an open, inclusive membership for the willing countries and decisions taken in consensus and resolve issues by peaceful means. There is also a growing realization that track 2, civil society and corporate groups’ interests need to be accommodated for the process to be broad-based and effective.

At the larger and long-term view, for peace to ensue in Asia, relations between economically and militarily strong countries such as Japan, China, India and other powers in the region have to be coordinated for any meaningful and

effective governance system.^① As Jusuf Wanandi had argued,

the new emerging powers, meaning those in East Asia, should also prepare themselves well. That means not only sharing stakeholdership but also responsibility. They have to prepare and adjust their own value systems to be compatible with what have become global values, namely the rule of law, good governance, democracy, human rights, and social justice. They should accept that democracy and social justice are values and principles that are valid not only nationally, but also globally. Implementation may be influenced by history, stages of development, and values, but the basic criteria should be the same for every country and society.^②

Currently, coordination between the emerging countries is meagre while their readiness to assume responsibility for challenges facing the region also leaves much to be desired. This explains the part successes and challenges facing Asia in the coming decades.

① Hitoshi Tanaka, "The Crisis of Global Governance and the Rise of East Asia" *East Asian Insights* vol 3 no. 4 (September 2008) pp 1 - 8 accessed at < <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAL/3-4.pdf> >.

② Jusuf Wanandi, "East Asian Regionalism and Global Governance" in Jusuf Wanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto ed. *East Asia at a Crossroads* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2008) pp. 19 - 37 (p. 28) accessed at < http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/crossroads/chp2_wanandi.pdf >.

东盟在东亚合作中的领导地位研究

翟 巍*

东亚合作机制自1997年底创建至今已超过13年。学界和政策界开始反思此历程的一些根本性问题,比如是否坚持搞东亚合作,是否坚持东盟在东亚合作中的主导作用,是否将美国引入东亚峰会等等。而东盟在东亚合作中的地位和作用问题,历来是争论的焦点。质疑者会问,“小马能拉大车吗”?对这一问题的回答,将在很大程度上决定东亚合作的命运。

笔者认为,东盟之所以能保持领导地位,主要原因在于,东盟在本地区特定时空条件下所形成的“东盟加”结构中,获得了制定和运用规则(或软权力)的中心性地位。所谓“东盟加”结构,即以东盟为中心,以数组东盟+1为支架,以其主导的10+3、10+6及东盟地区论坛(ARF)为平台的地区关系运行机制。在此结构下,一方面,东盟通过推动东亚合作和实施大国平衡战略,获得前所未有的巨大战略收益,地位和作用明显提升,维持本地区和平与发展的能力得以加强。在此情况下,东盟不愿意放弃已经获得的历史性主导权,想要“小马”变“宝马”。另一方面,东亚地区秩序也出现前所未有的质变,地区合作潮流从东南亚扩散延伸至东亚、泛亚,反过来还刺激了亚太地区合作。这说明“小马”在结构复杂的互动之下,把“大车”拉得还不错。因此,东亚地区整体有必要维持这种对大家

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都还不错的局面。

但另一方面,地区大国尤其是美国、日本和澳大利亚,普遍怀疑东盟这四“小马”的能力和意愿,怀疑“东盟加”这种地区结构是否能与美国和中国为中心的地区结构相提并论,尤其是在东盟自身痼疾丛生而导致一体化遇挫,及大国协调渐起的情况下,严重质疑“小马”还能把大车拉多久,拉多远,甚至怀疑其会把大车拉散架。因此,东盟自身存在的弱点使其中心性地位并不稳固,因而其领导地位也有致命的脆弱性。不少官员和学者提出,随着中国实力和能力的提升,中国应取代东盟的主导地位,或者应该把10+3倒过来,成为3+10,确立东亚合作以中国为主导的大车带小马的形式。

笔者认为,在今后一个时期,东盟主导东亚合作仍是最不坏的选择。这是由“东盟加”结构的存在决定的。只要“东盟加”结构不散架,东盟继续拉东亚合作的条件就存在。尤其是,中国在崛起过程中实际上发挥了“东盟加”结构的主要促成者和维持者的作用,这有利于降低中国崛起的地区性风险和阻力。实际上,中国领导人和外长一贯坚持东盟在东亚合作中的领导地位。比如,杨洁篪外长在2010年两会期间答记者问时重申此立场。因此,无论从理论上,还是从政策上,在今后一个时期,中国将一直支持东盟在东亚合作中的领导地位,帮助东盟推进东亚合作,变东盟“小马”为地区“宝马”,这是符合历史和逻辑的现实选择。

本文中的东亚泛指东南亚、东北亚、美国、印度、澳、新等实际参与了东亚地区合作的国家所涵盖的地区。这个范围超越了一般意义上的地理东亚或政治东亚。笔者认为,东亚的范围一直处于历史变动中。本文的涵盖符合东亚体系演化的内在现实发展逻辑。对此,乔万尼等人早就把东亚作为一个“世界区域”。长期以来,这些因素的综合使得东亚成为一个具有明显多样性特征的世界区域。^① 学界倾向于认同卡尔·多伊奇对世界区域的概括:由许多邻近国家组成的,按照不同的空间和时间维度,在广泛领域中都存在显著依存关系的国家群体。皮特·卡赞斯坦指出,“这种观点提供了一种能够把握动态变迁的方法,既揭示了本体论者所关注的内部结构特点,同时又避免把世界描绘成一个外形不

^① “导言:从地区和世界历史的角度来理解东亚的复兴”,〔美〕乔万尼·阿里吉、〔日〕滨下武志、〔美〕马克·塞尔登主编,《东亚的复兴:以500年、150年和50年为视角》,社会科学文献出版社2006年版,第6页。

断变化但内核却固定如“流动着的集合体”^①

一、东盟在“东盟加”结构中领导地位的形成

(一)“东盟加”结构的原点：东盟的进化

当我们讨论东南亚在全球所处中心地位时,可以追溯至16世纪。“自16世纪起,东南亚就成为东北亚和亚洲内陆经由好望角和美洲与南亚和欧洲进行区域间贸易的首要的也是最关键的枢纽。这就意味着,按照当时的标准,经过该地区的海运不论就物品数量还是种类来说都已经相当可观了……与东南亚同时保持最重要依存关系的地区,不是一两个,而是有近(南亚和东北亚)也有远(欧洲与美洲)。”500年后,东南亚以东盟组织的形式,再次成为“全球交往的连接点”。^②这就是大历史展现给我们的相似性。

二战结束后,东南亚国家纷纷独立,但都面临追求国家安全与自身实力不足这一难题。解决这一矛盾的途径有二:一条道路是走现代化道路,增强自身抵御力。但当时的东南亚领导人认识到,作为中小国家,无论怎么发展,都难以在实力上接近周边大国。因此,还有一条是在现代化的基础上联合自强,建立地区性合作组织,增强地区抵御力,在组织内部解决纠纷,以集体力量与大国打交道。1967年8月,印尼、新加坡、马来西亚、菲律宾、泰国五国建立东盟。

东盟在发展过程中进一步认识到,东盟不可能成为第二个欧盟,东盟整体的硬实力仍无法与周边大国比,必须利用周边大国环绕的地缘特点,通过向大国提供交流平台,与大国建立制度性对接,增强彼此之间的相互依赖,将东盟塑造成大国间的枢纽。冷战期间,东盟与主要国家和国际组织建立了对话伙伴关系。冷战结束后,东盟在将组织扩大到整个东南亚范围的同时,参与并改造亚太经合组织进程(APEC,1989),建立了东盟地区论坛(1994,ARF)、亚欧峰会(ASEM,

① “导言:从地区和世界历史的角度来理解东亚的复兴”,〔美〕乔万尼·阿里吉、〔日〕滨下武志、〔美〕马克·塞尔登主编,《东亚的复兴:以500年、150年和50年为视角》,社会科学文献出版社2006年版,第8页。

② “导言:从地区和世界历史的角度来理解东亚的复兴”,〔美〕乔万尼·阿里吉、〔日〕滨下武志、〔美〕马克·塞尔登主编,《东亚的复兴:以500年、150年和50年为视角》,社会科学文献出版社2006年版,第9—10页。

1996)等以东盟为核心的地区和跨地区交流平台。1997年亚洲金融危机后,东盟又创立10+3东亚地区合作平台,并在该框架内形成三个10+1峰会机制,分别为东盟+中国、东盟+日本、东盟+韩国。但直到20世纪末,由于东盟还处于金融危机肆虐后的低谷,三个10+1机制还缺乏实质性的制度性合作内容。

(二)“东盟加”结构的核心支柱:东盟-中国合作的确立

二战结束之后到1967年东盟成立之前,在东亚两极对抗格局下,中国与东南亚的一些社会主义阵营国家如越南、老挝,不结盟国家缅甸、柬埔寨等关系密切,而东盟的成立具有明显的“遏制共产主义”的性质。随着东亚地区体系结构的变化,中国与东盟的合作逐渐展开:20世纪70年代,东亚体系结构由两极对立转变为中美苏大三角互动,中美关系改善,中苏关系恶化,中国与亲西方的泰国、马来西亚和菲律宾建立外交关系,对抗性质减弱。尤其是80年代末90年代初,中国与东盟国家在柬埔寨问题上密切合作,消除了中南半岛上的冷战遗迹。

整个90年代,中国和东盟在东亚体系结构变迁中的作用日渐突出,双方的合作关系也快速发展。1991年,冷战结束,中国与东南亚所有国家建交、复交或恢复正常关系;时任中国外长的钱其琛出席第24届东盟外长会议开幕式,与东盟国家外长们举行首次非正式会议。^①1994年,中国加入东盟主导建立的东盟地区论坛(ARF)。尽管1995年出现“美济礁事件”,但在1996年,东盟还是将中国提升为“全面对话伙伴国”。1997年亚洲金融危机成为中国-东盟对话关系中的重要转折点。中国克服困难,坚持人民币不贬值,并向受危机影响的东盟国家提供援助。东盟开始认识并确信:日益增强的中国经济对东南亚至关重要,中国愿意在关键时刻向东盟伸出援助之手。1997年12月,东盟倡导举行东盟与中日韩领导人(10+3)会议和中国与东盟领导人非正式会晤。自此,中国与东盟领导人建立了年度峰会机制,并发表联合宣言,宣布建立面向21世纪的睦邻互信伙伴关系。从1998年到2000年,中国与东盟10国分别签署了双边关系框架文件或发表了合作计划。

进入21世纪,中国与东盟的整体性合作又上新台阶。从2001年到2003年底的短短三年内,双方合作关系实现全面突破发展:(1)确立双方新世纪初五

^① 《中国-东盟名人小组报告》,世界知识出版社2006年版,第24页。

大重点合作领域,开启中国-东盟自贸区谈判进程(CAFTA, 2001);(2)中国与东盟签署《南海各方行为宣言》(DOC, 2003);(3)中国加入《东南亚友好合作条约》(TAC, 2003);(4)确立面向和平与繁荣的战略伙伴关系(2003);(5)中国支持东盟主导的以10+3为主渠道的东亚合作。以上各项均为中国与东盟整体间的制度性合作,涉及战略、政治、经济、安全等多个领域,构成中国-东盟战略伙伴关系的主要框架和支柱。

双方领导人均认为中国与东盟关系进入历史最好时期。这一时期,本地区的主导外交哲学为“共赢观”,以国家和地区的共同发展、共同繁荣和共同安全为主要目标,追求共赢。2004年以后,中国与东盟着力于推进战略伙伴关系,相继举办中国-东盟博览会(CAEXPO, 2004)、中国-东盟建立对话伙伴关系15周年纪念峰会(2006)、设立中国驻东盟大使(2008)、中国在全球金融危机肆虐的背景下向东盟提供100亿美元基础建设基金和150亿美元信贷(2009)等措施。以上措施均是对2003年前建立的制度性合作框架的完善和扩展。期间,南海问题虽有所升温,但在可控范围。

由上可见,中国与东盟的合作关系大致经历了四个阶段:第一阶段,是从东盟1967年成立到1991年以前,性质是从对抗怀疑走向对话合作。当时占统治地位的外交哲学是“生存观”,以追求国家安全与生存为主要目标,零和思维占优。第二阶段是从1991年到1996年,建立全面对话框架。第三阶段是从1997年到2003年,建立制度性合作框架和战略,确立战略伙伴关系。第四阶段是2003年至今,推进战略伙伴关系。主导后三个阶段的外交哲学是“共赢观”。尤其值得注意的是第三阶段,中国“抢”在其他大国之前,与东盟率先确立较为完整的制度性合作框架。^①这一时期,双方在内外环境均发生重大变化的形势下,能确定共同利益和共赢目标,合作比较成功。

(三)“东盟加”结构的大致形成:以东盟为核心的多组10+1合作机制

中国的先发举措成就了“东盟加”结构。主要表现为三个关系紧密的进程:

^① 关于中国与东盟关系发展的阶段划分,本文主要参照了官方的《中国-东盟名人小组报告》(2006),并根据最近三年的动态发展进行了完善。

1. 2000 年底,鉴于东盟国家普遍担心中国入世后将给东盟带来巨大的经济挑战,朱镕基在中国-东盟峰会上提出与东盟建立自贸区,向东盟开放市场,让中国的资金进入东盟。这一举措惊动世界,标志着中国参与东亚地区合作的政策从积极参与转向主动塑造。东盟借此获得巨大收益,既提高了地区地位,又获得启动新一轮大国平衡的有力杠杆。之后,在东盟的穿针引线之下,日本、韩国、印度等纷纷步中国-东盟自贸区的后尘,开启与东盟整体谈判建立自贸区的进程,出现你追我赶的竞争性合作局面。到 2010 年前后,东盟与多个大国的自贸区谈判完成或接近完成,“东盟加”结构在经济领域获得拓展和深化。

2. 中国首先于 2003 年加入《东南亚友好合作条约》(TAC),与东盟建立战略伙伴关系,引发其他大国纷纷加入该条约,并提升与东盟的战略关系。2009 年 7 月,美国最后一个加入 TAC,标志着“东盟加”在安全领域的拓展和深化。

3. 2005 年底,鉴于中国在东南亚影响力上升速度很快,主导东亚合作进程的态势明显,东盟、日本、美国等考虑将澳、新、印拉入东亚峰会(EAS),造成 10+3 和 EAS 并行的局面,以此制约中国影响力。此举导致东亚合作进入“迷惘的瓶颈期”,但有利于东盟将外部势力拉入,丰富和完善其“东盟加”结构。根据系统的自组织原理,机制化的组织一旦形成,就会不断寻找自我强化机制,使之维持下去。另外,在亚太地区缺乏大国协调机制的背景下,尤其是中日竞争局面的持续,只要东盟保持基本发展,不致停滞不前或崩溃,“东盟加”仍有很大成长空间。

由此可见,一方面,中国-东盟的合作关系不仅实质性地推进了东亚合作进程,也是成就“东盟加”结构的最大动力,并受该结构的制约。另一方面,东盟从“破碎的地区”走向地区的整合,从弱势无为走向有所作为,从权力边缘走向权力中心,从多样性耗散到聚集性权力,的确是变弱为强。

不仅如此,中国-东盟合作还成为 10+3 合作的主要推动力,周边大国等纷纷效仿中国,竞相与东盟谈判自贸区,签署东南亚友好合作条约,建立战略伙伴关系。美国由于担心被排除在东亚合作之外,也与东盟发展全面合作关系,乐见澳大利亚、新西兰和印度三国加入东亚峰会(EAS, 2005),并在亚太经合组织(APEC)框架下提出亚太自贸区构想(FTAAP, 2006),于 2009 年 7 月最后一个加入《东南亚友好合作条约》(TAC),中国-东盟合作关系中的共赢思想,已延伸扩散至东亚地区。

二、东盟在“东盟加”结构中领导性地位的内在逻辑

中国与东盟建立的整体性制度合作关系,使东亚地区在21世纪初掀起了一股巨大的合作浪潮。东盟借此吸引日、韩、印、澳、新、俄、美等建立相似的整体性制度对接,形成以东盟为核心,以多个10+1为支架,以东盟地区论坛(ARF)、10+3、东亚峰会、亚欧会议(ASEM)等为主要平台的“东盟加”机制,形成东亚地区的一个新结构。东盟为什么能在复杂的东亚系统内建成“东盟加”结构?其他大国为什么会跟进?如何跟进?东亚秩序将在“东盟加”结构下走向何方?也就是说,东盟的领导地位的结构因素是什么?

(一)“东盟加”结构孕育于东亚的复杂适应系统

“东盟加”结构使东亚体系更趋复杂。“东盟加”只是推动东亚新秩序构建的一个正在成长中的结构。东亚曾出现过几个主导性的体系结构,古代以中国为中心的朝贡体系结构,近代西方殖民时期的霸权结构,日本短暂的霸权结构,美苏争霸的两极结构,以及美国双边军事同盟为支架的轴辐(hub-spoke)结构。当前,就覆盖范围来看,除了以东盟为核心的“东盟加”结构外,东亚地区还有以美国霸权为核心的轴辐(hub-spoke)结构,以日本技术和资本为核心的亚洲雁行模式结构,以中国市场为中心的“和谐东亚”结构等。^①只有“东盟加”是由非大国主导,并得到各方普遍认可和适应的结构。它自身如何演进、维持,发挥功能,如何与其他同时存在的结构进行竞争、合作与协调,是个极其复杂的问题。

本文尝试借用复杂科学中的“复杂适应系统”(CAS),剖析“东盟加”结构的内在规定性。^②所谓复杂适应系统,是指由大量的按一定规则或模式进行非线性相互作用的行为主体所组成的动态系统。行为主体通过“学习”产生适应性生

① 除了上述几个比较成型的结构外。一些学者还在讨论构建一些新的地区结构,如美中G-2结构、美-日-中协调结构、亚洲大国协调结构,以及时任澳大利亚总理陆克文倡议的类似欧盟的亚太共同体(APC,2007)等,不一而足。

② 本文关于复杂适应系统概念的说明,参见〔美〕约翰·霍兰著:《隐秩序:适应性造就复杂性》,上海科技出版社2000年版;苗东升著:《系统科学大学讲稿》,中国人民大学出版社2007年版;〔美〕米歇尔·沃尔德罗普著:《复杂:诞生于秩序与混沌边缘的科学》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。

存和发展策略,导致 CAS 进行创造性演化。

适应性造就复杂性。在复杂适应系统中,“适应性”是一个核心概念。CAS 将生物学中适应性术语的范围扩大,把学习与相关过程也包括进来。尽管不同的 CAS 过程具有不同的时间尺度,但适应的概念可以应用于所有的 CAS 主体。所谓适应,就是个体与环境之间的主动的、反复的交互作用。

任何系统包括 CAS 都是由大量元素组成的。主体概念加上适应性概念成为“适应性主体”或“行为主体”,把 CAS 组成单元的个体的主动性提高到了复杂性产生的机制和复杂系统进化的基本动因的重要位置。在 CAS 中,任何特定的适应性行动者所处的环境,其主要部分都是由其他适应者组成的,每个行动者在适应方面的努力就是要适应其他适应性行动者,为同它们相适应而行动、学习、改进自身。同一环境中的不同行动者相互提供资源,相互产生适应性压力,既相互支持和合作,又相互制约和竞争,在合作与竞争中相互适应。

另外,环境中还可能存在作为入侵者的其他适应性行动者,如免疫系统的抗原,作为适应性行动者的抗体是在同抗原的对抗中学习和自我改进的。不论是合作者、共生者、竞争者或入侵者,它们的总和构成 CAS 行为、特性、策略。每个适应性行动者努力去适应其他适应性行动者,这个特征是 CAS 生成复杂动态模式的主要根源。^①

(二)“东盟加”结构具有使整体趋向适应性共赢的功能

“东盟加”结构是东亚体系的一个结构,东亚体系本身就是一个巨大的复杂适应系统。根据复杂适应系统的若干原理,本文推导出“东盟加”结构优化东亚秩序的若干功能。

第一,共向(核心)聚集。“物以类聚,人以群分”。适应性行动者的一个重要表现,就是具有自我集聚的本性,不安于孤身独处。只要同一个大环境中分散着众多适应性行动者,它们就有自动聚集起来去向。聚集是一种相互作用,大量行动者在这种相互作用中逐渐找到稳定的关联方式,形成具有一定结构的聚

^① 复杂适应系统(CAS)具有聚集、非线性、流、多样性等四大特性,以及标识、内部机制、积木等三大机制。

集体(系统),能够采取集体行动。^①在“东盟加”结构中,东盟对各方尤其是对大国都不构成威胁,并创造了沟通的渠道和平台,因而各方力量均向东盟聚集:东盟各国向东盟一体化的方向聚集;大国博弈也向东盟提供的连接管道和平台聚集。这就形成东盟的核心性和中心性,造就东盟的枢纽位置。这是东盟能充当东亚合作的“驾驶员”,构造“东盟加”结构的主要原因。因此,东盟在2007年成立40周年时提出“活力亚洲的心脏”的口号。东盟作为权力聚集和生产的中心,能得到持续收益。^②“一个国家处于关键地位,就能够获得与其经济和军事资源不相称的收益。……一个国家处于关键地位,大概就能够为了广泛的利益以及它自己的好处而影响其他国家的行为。”^③

第二,对称复制。所谓对称,是指以东盟为核心的各组“东盟加”是对称的,比如东盟+中国、东盟+日本、东盟+美国,在形式上是对称的。所谓复制,指一个政策措施可以在各组“东盟加”关系中连续复制。比如FTA谈判就从中国-东盟复制到日本-东盟、韩国-东盟、印度-东盟,以及澳新-东盟等,甚至欧盟和美国也曾提出与东盟谈判FTA的构想。在各大国中,谁先启动一种有效增进与东盟合作的新政策,谁就能在此政策领域获得相对先发优势。随着该政策被复制到其他各组“东盟加”关系,该国先发优势也就不断减退,但是各大国在东南亚的利益也趋于平衡。“仿效也可以重建均衡……,从而使创新者只能享有短暂的优势。”^④对称复制的循环演进,使各组“东盟加”趋向帕累托最优。中国在2003年前一度占据整体先发优势,日本在推出EPA战略后,尤其是在2005年推出东亚峰会后,势头赶上中国。美国则在2008年后后来者居上,率先推出美国驻东盟大使,获得一次先发优势,中日等相继效仿。各组“东盟加”在你追我赶的动态平衡中,优化了东亚地区秩序。“更为重要的是,类似的进程能够推动进化。”^⑤

① 苗东升著:《系统科学大学讲稿》,中国人民大学出版社2007年版,第385页。

② 在东盟内部,那些地缘战略地位特别重要(如越南),实力最强(如印尼),应变能力最强(如新加坡)的国家,对于东盟发挥“东盟加”,作用最突出,获利也最大。

③ [美]罗伯特·杰维斯著:《系统效应:政治与社会生活中的复杂性》,上海世纪出版集团2008年版。

④ [美]罗伯特·杰维斯著:《系统效应:政治与社会生活中的复杂性》,上海世纪出版集团2008年版。

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第三,适应学习。复杂适应系统理论的重要性在于,适应性行动者会学习,能够积累经验,通过了解外部环境的变化来调整、改进自己,以适应环境。在“东盟加”结构中,复制之所以能产生,主要是因为各方都能根据适应性学习,调整政策。中国率先加入 TAC,其他各方迅速认识到:第一,中国与东盟将不以武力解决南海问题,双方达成战略互信。第二,如果本国也加入 TAC,也可与东盟增进战略互信,于是跟随。当然,各大国的适应能力和适应快慢是有区别的。比如,中国最先明确了可以由东盟主导东亚合作的道理,因而就能比较顺利地推动东亚合作。日本不理解也不愿意让东盟引领东亚合作,所以一直停留在与中国竞争主导权的层面,与东盟发展关系的速度一度落后于中国。美国对东盟主导的东亚合作进程一向持“善意忽视”态度,直到“东盟加”结构显示出较强的生命力时,美国才意识到要采取行动。通过学习机制,使大国间形成相互学习对方先进经验、彼此适应的习惯,这比什么都重要。急剧下降的学习曲线(learning curve),表明每次学习所需的时间就越少,成本越低,效率也就越高。

第四,差异发展。差异是系统发展的根本动力,差异造成复杂性、多样性、竞争性。由于各大国的实力、地位不同,与东盟各成员国的远近亲疏不同,对东盟整体的战略目标、意图、倾向、重视程度不一,政策执行力不同,因而,复制的结果也不同。而且,有些政策很难复制。比如日本可以为支持东亚峰会的研究机构 ERIA 提供 100 亿日元的研究资金,中国限于财力就很难做到。差异为东盟实施大国平衡提供了条件。比如,中国与东盟多个成员存有南海纠纷,而美国与东盟多个成员拥有军事同盟或准同盟关系。差异也为各大国寻找与东盟建立不可替代的关系创造了条件。比如,东盟不可能放弃中国的大市场,也不可能放弃日本的技术、援助,更不可能放弃美国在本地区的存在。

第五,层次转化。所有 CAS 都有多级层次结构,下一层次的小聚集体成为构筑上一层次聚集体的建筑砖块。能够修正和重组自己的转化的建筑砖块,能够形成更高层次的聚集体,是 CAS 根本的适应性机制。^①东盟各成员以及各大国是东亚系统的组成要素。它们由内而外主要构成如下层次:第一层为东盟;第二层为多组“东盟加”;第三层是东亚系统。层次转化有如下特点:(1)每个层次都有不同于其他层次的整体性特点。东盟的特点是合作性较强,“东盟加”的

① 苗东升著:《系统科学大学讲稿》,中国人民大学出版社 2007 年版,第 385 页

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

特点是差异发展,东亚系统则是共同进化。(2)各层次之间的相互联系和转化非常复杂。有三种最基本的路径。一是从内到外。东盟的强弱将直接影响其操纵各组“东盟加”的能力,各组“东盟加”的发展态势又会影响大国关系和东亚秩序。一个相对强势的东盟更有利于引导东亚合作,反之则会出现“小马拉大车”、“东盟无用论”等批评言论。二是从外到内。大国关系的变动也会影响到各组“东盟加”和东盟。比如,对东盟来说,美中和中日关系保持适度紧张对东盟最有力,否则要么“被共同管理”,要么“被迫选边站”。三是从中间向两端发展。东亚合作一方面靠东盟来协调,具有增强东盟作用的功能;另一方面又可能促进中日韩的合作,从而使东盟面临被边缘化的风险。事实上,层次转化绝不会这么简单,由于各种因素同时起作用,层次之间的转化也变得非常复杂。

最后,整体协调。作为一个系统,整体与部分、部分与部分之间的关系至关重要。在东亚体系中,“东盟加”结构要得以维持,还必须与其他结构协调共生。比如,美国认为,10+3的发展将把美国排斥在东亚之外。因此,东亚合作各方强调,东亚地区主义是开放的地区主义,不排斥美国,支持APEC进程。美国则支持10+3扩展为东亚峰会,并推进APEC进程。而作为一种折中,美国很有可能以某种方式建立与东亚峰会(EAS)的互动关系。这样,“东盟加”结构与美国的霸权结构进行协调,这是部分与部分之间的协调,有利于东亚整体的合作气氛。另外,从整体来看,东亚的复杂性和多样性将会允许不同的结构同时共存。因此,无论是美国的霸权体系,还是以东盟为核心的“东盟加”结构体系,都有生存的空间,不可避免地会进行竞争、协作,达致一种适应性妥协。

总之,“东盟加”结构有可能将东亚秩序导向一种适应性共赢的局面,使整个地区形成共同进化。(1)东盟要维持其在“东盟加”中的核心地位,加强共同聚集功能,除了加强一体化建设外,别无选择;(2)“东盟加”的对称复制功能将各方导入一种相对的利益动态平衡,比较符合本地区极有可能形成的多极力量结构;(3)“东盟加”的差异发展功能,将会保持各组“东盟加”的竞争与合作态势;(4)“东盟加”造就的适应学习能力,导致各组“东盟加”在竞争中学会照顾各方利益,趋向于帕累托最优;(5)“东盟加”的层次转化功能,将最大限度地带动各方的利益协调,结构兼容;(6)东亚体系的复杂性和多样性要求“东盟加”必须与其他地区结构共存共生,引导东亚秩序进入“适应性共赢”的共同进化轨道。

三、东盟在“东盟加”结构中领导地位的收益

东盟由于处于核心地位,所以收益最大。我们想当然地认为大国定乾坤,小国无外交。但这种认识往往会蒙蔽我们对小国追求权力的观察。小国在何种情况下才能获得与大国平等共舞的权力呢?当小国能创造一种大国所缺乏的新型权力资源,并能持久保障和运用这种资源时,权力就可能到手了。东盟苦心经营东亚合作和大国平衡的努力,正是其获得权力的历史。东盟在遭遇1997年金融危机的打击后,一度陷入低潮,但进入新世纪以后,随着东盟国家经济的复苏,东盟的地区地位和作用不断提升,在自身一体化、东亚地区合作进程、大国平衡战略方面都令世人刮目相看。具体表现在以下几个方面。

1. 东盟正在改变我们对权力拥有者的传统认识。当我们还固守东南亚是大国争夺势力范围的竞技场这一老概念时,东盟的大国平衡战略已运转开来。美国甚至开始为中国在东南亚影响力的上升而吃惊,结果是不断给东盟国家以更多的胡萝卜。大国若想参加到东盟所编织的地区合作网络,防止在竞争中被边缘化,就必须达到东盟所设定的条件,比如得加入《东南亚友好合作条约》(TAC)。美国不愿加入,也就无缘成为东亚峰会(EAS)的成员。俄罗斯虽然加入了TAC,但东盟以“双方经贸关系仍未达到非常紧密的程度”为由,拒绝俄罗斯加入峰会。因此,东盟在与大国的集体游戏中获得一定的裁决权力。

2. 东盟正在改变我们对国家追求财富的传统认识。一般的经济合作理论认为,在大小国家谈判建立双边自贸协定的过程中,往往是大国着力推行,小国被动开放市场。大国通过与多个小国建立自贸区而成为获益较多的轮轴国家,小国成为得益较少的轮辐国家。比如美国力图将北美自贸区推向整个美洲的意图,就是要实现其在美洲的制度霸权。当多数亚洲国家还固守这些国家追求财富的老观念时,东盟早就抛开中日关系这对矛盾,在建立之初就开始了地区经济一体化进程,创造出将中日韩整合包容在一起的东亚合作框架。中日韩承认和支持东盟的主导权。这样,东盟在制度设计上就成为获益更多的轮轴国家,大国反而成为轮辐国家。因此,东盟在追求地区和国家财富时获得主导权。

3. 东盟正在改变我们对国家寻求安全的传统认识。冷战期间,不是东盟成员的印支半岛战事不断,而东盟老成员国之间虽多次剑拔弩张但力避战事。冷

战之后,东盟的不断扩大最终把和平扩展到整个东南亚。东盟国家认为,传统安全的威胁主要来自朝鲜半岛、台湾海峡和南中国海。这是东盟国家实施大国平衡的最大动力来源。于是东盟建立东盟地区论坛为亚太等地区 20 多个国家提供了安全对话平台。这也是东盟希望亚太大国“加入”以和平方式解决彼此冲突”为宗旨的 TAC 的最主要原因。过去,都是大国强按小国签署和平条约,现在则是大国主动加入 TAC 以给予小国安全保障。

另外,东盟还体现出对人类安全共同体这一先进理念的先知先觉。在跨国非传统安全的威胁面前,他们更容易受伤害,更有感于国家能力的不足,更迫切于地区合作和国际援助,更担心国家主权被侵蚀。因此,东盟国家正努力寻找国家、地区和国际之间的平衡点。2003 年,东盟领导人决定在 2020 年前将东盟建设成为东盟安全共同体。因此,东盟在寻求安全时获得一定的主动权。

4. 东盟正在改变我们对国际规范的认识。如果要评选国际关系史上最美妙的理念,冷战时期的“和平共处”,全球化时代的“共赢”,也许都能拔得头筹。东盟成员国已经实现“和平共处”,眼下他们正努力实践区域内外“共赢”。在本地地区,东盟国家不可能不让大国赢,这是国际政治的最大现实,也是东盟对外战略设计的题中应有之意。而东盟国家的宗旨是实现地区赢,即小国们要在大国环绕之间求独立、生存、发展、壮大,这是地区政治的最大现实。从这个角度讲,以讲求回避矛盾、寻求共识为主旨的“东盟方式”,既能对内缓慢培养地区意识,也能对外谨慎周旋于大国之间。东盟在建立地区规范时也创造了大国愿意遵守的国际规范。东盟成长为东亚合作的“权力中心”,发挥舍我其谁的主导作用。此番情形在东亚国际关系史中并无先例。国际政治最大的现实是:不会轻易放弃已经获得的权力。

在此结构中,东亚整体也获得前所未有的收益。历史上,东亚曾形成以中国为核心的“朝贡秩序”,后因中国国力衰落而难以为继;日本在明治维新后试图营建“东亚共荣圈”,建立“殖民秩序”,但以失败而告终;二战后,美苏争霸形成东亚地区的“冷战秩序”。冷战结束后,在全球化背景下,国际和东亚地区秩序深刻转型,美国霸权、地区大国崛起,东亚地区合作等,均成为塑造地区秩序的重要力量。和平时期的国际秩序建设具有长期、缓慢、复杂和专业的特点,大国间的合作和竞争往往集中在制度、组织、规范、规则等方面。而地区合作能起到规范地区秩序、调整大国关系的重要作用。因而,地区合作也能推进和改善地区秩

序。经过多年发展,东盟主导的东亚合作进程成为诸多塑造东亚地区秩序的重要力量之一,东亚合作有助于亚洲崛起

1. 东亚合作开启了东亚新的历史进程 1997年东亚金融危机后,东亚合作浪潮迭起,形成了多领域、多层次、多支点的官民并举的合作态势,标志着东亚地区开始步入全球化下的地区合作新时代。多年来,东亚形成了以东盟为核心,以中、日、韩为支撑的10+3合作机制,并衍生出多组10+1合作轴。东亚峰会启动了更广泛的地区战略对话机制,以经济合作为主的多领域合作全面展开。迄今,东亚已开辟了18个重点合作领域,建立了50多个对话机制,实施了近百余项合作项目;同时,区内双边、多边自由贸易安排不断成型,相互投资显著增长;地区扶贫、减灾、环保等合作启动,社会文化交流频繁,政治安全合作渐次发展。特别是以清迈倡议和亚洲债券市场建设为代表的地区金融合作取得实质性进展。10+3合作改善了东亚地区的发展环境,提升了地区整体实力,为各国带来了实际利益,成为地区合作的主渠道和支柱。

2. 东亚合作使东亚日益成为一个内涵丰富的地区 二战后,东亚仅是个松散的地理概念,远未形成完整的政治、经济、社会、文化等地区属性。东亚合作使东亚具备了一个相对完整的地区所应有的要素和特征。东亚地区合作的兴起、发展和深化,确立了东亚致力于经济发展、社会进步和民族振兴的地区目标,使东亚在世界舞台上崭露头角。目前,在地理上,东南亚和东北亚共同构成了“东亚地区”的概念。在政治上,10+3机制确立了东亚共同体的长远目标和共同利益,形成了地区认同意识。在经济上,东亚人口超过20亿,经济总量快速扩大,区内贸易、投资依存度上升。以10+3为主渠道、东亚峰会为补充,东亚形成了多层次、多渠道的经济合作框架。在文化上,中华文明、印度文明和伊斯兰文明相互交融,多种文化和谐共处,形成了亚洲文明。在国际上,东亚合作产生了巨大的吸引力,澳、新、印积极加入,欧美也加紧与东亚建立实质性联系。东亚合作已从地理概念转变为富有实际内涵的地缘政治概念。

3. 开创了构建多样性和差异性并存的地区主义新方向。东亚合作积累了有别于欧盟的地区合作经验,明确以“经济合作”、促进持续发展与合作共赢为大方向,确立了“开放性”、“舒适度”、“创造共同利益”的基本理念,坚持“东盟主导”、“互利共赢”、“循序渐进”的基本原则,推行“多层次、多渠道”的合作方式。“东亚地区主义”具有时代生命力:第一,适应了东亚地区经济依存与安全

对立并存的二元结构特征,选择了从经济合作走向政治合作的渐进道路;第二,适应东亚地区的多样性与差异性特点,积极推进多种合作机制相互重叠,在重叠最密集的地区形成共同体的“层叠模式”;第三,正视现实,积极合作,构建认同,体现了多种理论思想并用的新特征;第四,将民族主义与全球主义结合,通过地区合作与地区治理方式,维护各自的国家利益和地区共同利益;第五,以地区合作为舞台,积极协调中日美印等多方利益关系,为建立公正合理的地区秩序提供了机遇。因此,东亚地区主义既不同于欧盟的超国家模式,也不同于美国的霸权模式,是建立在共有利益和共同利益基础上的东亚模式。

4. 东亚合作模式克服了美国主导地区秩序的霸权属性。二战后,美国通过在亚洲构筑双边同盟体系行使霸权,东亚在安全结构上形成了长期对立的格局。冷战后,随着东亚崛起,地区意识萌生,东亚国家自主决定地区秩序的意识上升。尤其是日、韩、澳等美国的盟国开始要求自主性与独立性,寻求建立“自立与共生”并存的地区秩序。同时,随着地区经济依存度的不断加深,非传统威胁因素上升,非传统安全诉求增强,美国主导的地区治理模式面临挑战。进入21世纪,东亚能源紧缺、环境恶化、贫富差距拉大,疾病、灾荒、走私、贩毒乃至恐怖活动等非传统安全威胁上升,其安全影响远远超出一国范围,也不以民族、制度甚至意识形态为限,单独的国家力量、传统的军事手段,特别是美国主导的双边军事同盟无法应对,客观上要求以地区合作方式应对非传统威胁。因此,平等、互惠、合作的东亚模式挑战美国主导的地区霸权秩序是一种必然选择,它有助于促进美国调整地区治理方式,与东亚共建公正、合理的地区秩序。

5. 初步具备协调东亚可持续发展的功能。亚洲整体的复兴或东亚崛起需要可持续的共同发展。东亚合作的兴起在某种程度上具备了协调东亚可持续发展的功能:第一,协调和处理发展不平衡问题。发展是东亚各国最重要的任务,也是本地区秩序演变的关键因素。二战以来,东亚的发展缺乏协调,加剧了资源和市场的竞争,造成国家间与地区间发展不平衡、生态环境急剧恶化、地区冲突以及各种安全困境。第二,解决东亚经济的结构性矛盾。东亚的产业结构带有依赖外来投资和出口导向的特点,且区内市场规模不一,大小市场间存在严重的结构性矛盾。而外部市场贸易保护主义抬头,市场约束趋严,贸易竞争秩序混乱,成为制约东亚经济可持续增长的重要的结构性原因。因此,通过建立地区自贸区,有效协调区内贸易,可以使东亚国家联合起来,形成优势互补,有力地促进

地区经济融合及地区经济一体化的发展。第三,有利于形成官民结合的双轨合作机制。金融危机前,东亚已形成以市场为主导的民间商业网络和产业链10+3合作机制启动后,东亚开始形成以政府为主导的制度合作,实现了由“市场诱导型合作”向“政府主导型合作”的转变,形成了“双驱动”合作模式。第四,10+3机制有利于形成“开放、学习、包容和强调集体主义”的新亚洲价值观。经济共同体需要以地区普遍价值观为灵魂。美、日等提出的“民主、人权、法制”价值观,给东亚合作蒙上了“推行民主”的阴影,必将导致东亚合作的分裂,不利于东亚地区的稳定与秩序构建。

由此来看,东亚合作使东亚地区正式踏上一体化的正轨,以合作代替对抗,明确了发展方向,降低了东亚地区转型过程的不确定性。相对于APEC、亚洲合作对话(ACD)、博鳌亚洲论坛,东亚合作取得的成就无疑更大。APEC号称有美国这样的超级推动力,日本一直试图推动日本版的地区合作,ACD是亚洲地区唯一的官方合作机制,博鳌亚洲论坛是中国主办的亚洲论坛,但都没有东亚合作取得的实际性成果大。换言之,大马如美中日等也难以拉动亚太或者东亚这些大车。因此,如果东盟不分裂,亚太地区格局不出现大的变化,亚太基本矛盾不变,小马自有拉其大车的历史意义。

四、东盟在“东盟加”结构中领导性地位遭遇的挑战及其未来

“东盟加”结构是在东亚特定时空下形成的,相对于其他几个并立的地区性结构,比如以美国为中心的地区结构,以及正在形成中的以中国为中心的地区结构,处于相对弱势的地位。一旦本地区的大国协调机制建立起来,东盟的领导地位或许将会下降。东盟维持领导地位的难度也会越来越大。目前,其领导地位的脆弱性主要表现在以下几个方面。

1. 东盟主导力减弱。东盟发展状态直接影响其主导东亚合作的态势。当东盟处于较强态势时,地区作用发挥也较明显,反之亦然。冷战结束后,东盟大致有两波起伏。第一波大致从冷战结束至2001年左右,东盟在经历差不多5年的大发展后,于1997年金融危机前达到顶峰,然后遭金融危机打击经历了三四年时间的衰退,再经过三四年的时间逐渐恢复。东盟在地区和国际中的作用也

随之起伏,作用大时被称为继欧盟之后第二个最成功的地区合作组织,作用小时被称为“夕阳组织”。第二波的升势孕育于东盟复苏阶段。进入21世纪后,东盟各国均实现快速增长。10+3合作成为东亚合作的主渠道,并于2005年底召开东亚峰会,标志着东盟作用达到一个新顶峰,一度被学者称为“东亚权力的新中心”。其后,随着缅甸问题再度升温,泰国陷入长期政治动荡,以及全球金融危机的影响,东盟再次陷入发展困境。东盟的地区作用、进取心和主导力均有所下降,被称为“小马拉大车”。

2. 新地区协调机制的兴起。东盟于1994年创立东盟地区论坛(ARF)、1997年以来创立10+3,2005年创立东亚峰会,基本特征都是以东盟为核心,对话伙伴主要是地区大国,进行安全对话和经济合作。东盟主导模式的相对成功,建立在三个条件之上:一是比起其他东亚国家,东盟具有搞地区合作的经验;二是东亚和亚太地区尚未形成大国协调机制,需要借重东盟搭建的地区性公共平台;三是东亚和亚太地区也没有其他更具吸引力、更符合亚洲特色的机制。但进入21世纪后,随着六方会谈这一大国协调机制的兴起,APEC在“9·11事件”后开始重视安全合作,以及随着香格里拉对话会(亚洲安全大会)的创建,东盟感觉其在推进地区合作中“舍我其谁”的独特作用遭遇挑战。美国、澳大利亚等西方国家,以及一些与美国比较亲近的东盟成员,均批评东盟搭建的各种机制效率低下,美国国务卿赖斯因此两次缺席东盟地区论坛外长会议。中日韩峰会于2008年底单独召开,澳大利亚总理陆克文又以东盟效率低下为由提出建立“亚太共同体”,并进而提出建立包括中、美、日、俄、印、韩、澳以及印尼在内的大国协调机制,均直接挑战东盟在地区合作中的地位。东盟愈发感到其作用下降,危机感上升。

3. 大国在地区合作问题上的主导权竞争加剧。亚洲金融危机后,东盟在大国默许下主导了东亚合作进程。中国因势利导,成为东亚乃至亚洲合作的最主要推动力。美国和日本等担心中国将取得地区合作的主导权,因而,在东亚合作中有关“中国版的门罗主义”、“经济共同体需要以地区普遍价值观为灵魂”等言论不绝于耳。随着东亚峰会的出现,东亚合作分别由中日倡导,客观上形成竞争态势。日本充当经济领头羊的“雁行结构”被打破,“亚洲已进入真正的竞争时代”。因此,中日共识是东亚合作取得实质发展的关键。然而两国在模式选择、地缘涵盖、战略重点等一些根本性问题上的认知相距甚远。日本的东亚地区主

义战略取向是制衡中国,争夺地区主导权。中日这两个地区合作发动机的力道相反,东亚合作很难进一步深入和拓展,主要体现为中国更重视 10+3,而日本力推东亚峰会。东盟担心中日政治关系恶化导致地区恶性竞争,影响东亚合作。另外,美国也不甘心被排除在东亚合作之外,布什于 2006 年在亚太经合组织提出“亚太自贸区构想”,试图以此来覆盖 10+3 或在东亚峰会基础上建立的自贸区。

尽管东亚合作存在不少问题,东盟陷入阶段性的弱势状态,但只要东亚国家有继续推进东亚合作的意愿,尤其是在中国的支持下,东盟就能继续发挥主导作用。

1. 东盟发挥主导作用是历史的选择。地区合作模式的主导权历来是地区合作进程中的争夺焦点。从欧洲和北美的经验看,地区一体化进程多由大国(如美国)或大国联合(法德)主导。但鉴于东亚存在复杂的历史、文化关系,以及美国对东亚的战略影响,中日两大国分别主导,或联合主导东亚地区合作模式的条件尚不具备。目前来看,亚太结构并没有发生根本性变化。而且从前文可以看出,现有东亚合作模式总的来讲是符合东亚的时代特征的。东亚复杂的关系和矛盾导致东亚大国均无法主导东亚合作,只有“不是任何大国的潜在竞争对手”的东盟,才能成为各大国共同接受的主导者,为东亚合作设计方向、左右进程、协调关系。正如一位越南学者所言,只要本地区存在中日竞争,东盟就能发挥主导作用。

2. 东盟锁定自身一体化目标。东盟目前总体处于低谷,但当前这一波低谷没有上一波严重。而且,随着老东盟国家印尼的复兴,新东盟国家越南的崛起,有可能给东盟未来发展带来新气象。危机感是东盟一体化进程的原始动力。东盟充分意识到,一个强东盟是其实施地区合作和大国平衡的关键。为保持这一战略优势,东盟在不断加快、加强、加深自身一体化进程。另外,东盟也认识到,一体化进程的质量直接关系到其在东亚合作中的主导地位。为此,东盟 10 国领导人决定在 2015 年提前五年将东盟建设成为一个共同体,包括经济共同体、安全共同体、社会与文化共同体。同时,东盟还在酝酿对现有合作机制进行调整和改革,以适应地区合作新形势的发展。

3. 中国支持东盟的领导性地位。首先,“东盟加”是构建未来东亚秩序的一种成长型的结构,有利于本地区走向适应性共赢。在亚洲大国协调未建立起来

之前,在中日、中美、中印等大国关系真正理顺之前,“东盟加”结构优化地区秩序的作用不可替代。其次,“东盟加”有利于本地区多极格局的形成。在“东盟加”结构中,各方都受到制约。任何大国想主导该结构,都会导致其他大国的联合抵制。因此,在此结构中,跟随和引导战略是最好的选择。第三,中国对东盟一体化进程的支持不仅是出于道义,也是对“东盟加”结构“核心聚集”功能的强化。一方面,中国与东盟的制度化合作越深入,就越有利于东盟吸引其他大国的投入。另一方面,中国与东盟关系越密切,中国受到的约束也就越大。因此,“中国未来威胁论”至少在理论上是不成立的,未来仍是“中国机遇论”。中国和东盟在实践中证明“适应性共赢”思想是可行的,双方应该在多边合作平台上共同倡导和实践该思想。以东盟为支点,以中国-东盟关系为支轴,支持东盟在东亚合作中的领导地位,就有可能推动东亚地区走向适应性共赢。

4. 东亚地区有可能通过“东盟加”结构,走向适应性共赢。其基本逻辑是:第一步,亚洲金融危机后,中国率先与东盟达成以“共赢”为目标的整体性制度合作;第二步,东盟借助中国-东盟合作关系,迅速推动东亚合作(10+3),并与周边其他大国构筑起以东盟为核心的多个10+1整体性制度合作框架,再加上东盟主导建立的东盟地区论坛(ARF)、东亚峰会(EAS)等多个平台,进而在东亚复杂系统中创造出一种新的结构形态——“东盟加”(相对于美国在本地区的hub-spoke结构)。第三步,“东盟加”结构具有“核心聚集”、“对称复制”、“差异发展”、“适应学习”、“层次转化”等功能,虽然存在各组“东盟加”的“局部竞争”,但能形成“整体优化”,并与东亚地区显存的其他结构协调共存。在“东盟加”结构中,各方彼此适应,相互学习,你追我赶,达至动态利益平衡,使东亚各方总体上呈现一种各方均能接受的状态,即“适应性共赢”。

总之,东亚合作仍然需要东盟这匹小马,东盟也在加劲努力,拉好东亚合作这辆大车。这是东亚的现实。

East Asian Governance: The Critical Role of the China-Japan-United States Triangular Relationship

Gerald Curtis *

Compared with South Asia, the Middle East, and other parts of the world plagued by political instability, violence, pervasive poverty, death, and destruction, East Asia offers a stark contrast as a region that is the dynamic center of the world economy and that is at peace, or at least not at war. This reality is rendered all the more remarkable by the fact that this is an area where the interests of three great powers — China, Japan, and the United States — intersect. There are dangers of course. Perhaps even more worrisome is the continuing fragility of the global financial system in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, posing as it does the ever-present danger of renewed economic turmoil, increased protectionism, and the weakening of a relatively free trade regime that makes it possible for China, Japan, Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia to pursue successful export-led growth policies.

China, Japan, the United States, and other countries in East Asia face the

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same essential strategic question of how to keep the region at peace and sustain the economic vitality that not only is raising the living standards of people in East Asia but in the globalized system in which we live is contributing to improving the lives of people around the world. Successfully responding to this strategic challenge is no easy task, to be sure, but it is far preferable to the alternative faced in other parts of the world where there is still a need to figure out how to bring about political stability, economic growth, and the termination of war.

It is not surprising that the attention of policymakers, and of media opinion makers, should be drawn more to crisis situations than to the less headline-grabbing issues of how to manage relations among the great and the lesser powers of East Asia — not surprising, but worrisome nonetheless. East Asia is too important to be treated with a kind of benign neglect, approached with the easy assumption that since the region is at peace and is economically vibrant, what has worked in the past to keep it that way can be relied upon to do the same well into the future.

This is especially true for relations among the United States, China, and Japan. The consequences for the region and for the world of China's remarkably rapid transformation are at this point impossible to gauge. China's rise to great power status by definition upsets the *status quo*. That does not make conflict inevitable, but whether there is conflict or cooperation will depend on how policymakers respond to the history-changing reality of China's emergence, or rather reemergence, as one of the world's most powerful countries.

In terms of domestic politics, economics, and social structure, both Japan and the United States are undergoing transformations more far reaching than anything either of them has experienced for decades. Though still the world's singular military superpower, the United States' unilateral moment has passed. The distribution of national power — a combination of economic strength, military capability, political will, and diplomatic skill — among the United States, China, and Japan is shifting. And it is doing so in a regional and global environment that itself is changing in dramatic ways. A new and complex multilateral international system is in the process of formation, but its structure is as yet inchoate; the old

world order is gone and a new one has not yet been created.

1. The Context and the Challenge

The United States, China, and Japan are each in a transformative period in their history with respect to their domestic affairs, foreign policy orientations, and relations with each other. Each is trying to define anew its role in the world, and they are doing so at a time when the world order itself is being transformed.

Recovery from the global financial crisis will not return us to the world in which the United States reigned supreme, either economically or politically. There is no going back to a system in which prosperity was sustained by easy money, excess consumption, and huge budget and trade deficits. American personal saving rates ranged close to 10 percent in the postwar years up to the mid-1970s, but they subsequently moved toward zero and finally, in 2008, into negative territory. The saving was done by China, Japan, and oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, which recycled that money back to the United States for Americans to borrow so that they could buy more products made by China and Japan and more oil from the Middle East.

This global system has now crashed. Americans have already begun to save more. That trend doubtless will continue and will bring personal spending more into line with personal income, with profound effects on both the American and the world economy.

Countries such as China, Japan, and others that have depended on exports to the United States as the driving force in their export-led growth strategies will have to make major adjustments in light of decreasing American demand for their products. This inevitably will mean greater emphasis on intra-Asian trade and investment for all Asian countries. Japanese, Korean, and ASEAN trade with China already exceeds that with the United States, and the gap is bound to grow wider.

Many of the exports from other Asian countries to China, it needs to be

pointed out, consist of components for products that are assembled in China for export to the United States and to other countries. The US market will remain critically important for all Asian economies, but its relative importance will continue to decline, especially as the Asian middle class grows larger and consumes a larger share of the products produced by Asia's cross-border production networks.

The United States, for its part, will have to adopt policies that reassure foreign holders of American treasury bonds — particularly China and Japan, the largest holders of those bonds — that the value of their holdings is secure.

Leverage, of course, is not all on one side. China's huge holdings of US Treasury bills creates something of an economic equivalent to the theory of mutually assured destruction that is applied to the balance of nuclear terror: China could impose devastating damage on the US economy by disposing of these assets but not without creating substantial distress to its own economy. Japan is in a similar situation, though its heavy dependence on the United States for its security makes it more unlikely than in China's case that it would take actions that the United States would perceive as hostile. Nonetheless, the reality that the United States depends on foreign financing of its government deficit changes the dynamic between the United States and the countries whose willingness to buy that debt is crucial to America's economic wellbeing.

Change in East Asia obviously encompasses much more than just trade and finance. Environmental degradation, pandemics, competition for energy resources, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons capability, the threat of nuclear proliferation, China's growing military capabilities, and Japan's groping for a new foreign policy vision all go into the dynamic mix that is transforming East Asia. That has led some analysts to argue that the region needs a new security "architecture."

The architecture imagery, however, seems far too grandiose for what is needed and what is feasible in East Asia. For the United States, the key feature of the postwar East Asian architecture has been a hub-and-spokes arrangement of bilateral security alliances. There is no reason to believe that this will not or should not

continue to be the case for many years to come. There has been a proliferation of regional organizations and there is much talk about the emergence of an East Asia community, but it is questionable whether all this innovation on the multilateral front amounts to something that can usefully be considered to be a new architecture.

It is important to be realistic about what regional institutions can achieve. The Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia that were created to try to get the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons, for example, have been notable mainly for their failure to achieve their objective. It is hard to fathom what a five-party format — the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia — would seek to achieve or indeed what this talk shop would actually talk about.

The so-called East Asia community is a “community” characterized by deep distrust among its key members — China and Japan in particular — by political systems that range from democratic to autocratic, by large disparities in levels of economic development, and by religious and cultural diversity. The United States should welcome the development of regional institutions that can help bridge these differences, as President Obama has done.

It also should take a relatively relaxed attitude toward the emergence of an East Asia community. Unlike the EU, community in East Asia is developing as a multilayered set of regional institutions. There are the Six-Party Talks, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, APEC, and several functionally specific organizations. For the United States, the need is not for more architecture. The challenge is to pay attention to the region, deal with it in a flexible and imaginative manner, and participate actively in multilateral institutions where it is appropriate to do so. But more than anything else, the United States needs to manage its bilateral relations with China and Japan skillfully and get the triangular relationship with China and Japan straight.

2. China's Rise, America's Response

Ever since Richard Nixon initiated the process of normalizing relations with the

People's Republic of China in 1972, there has been basic continuity in America's China policy. Whether Republican or Democrat, every American president from Nixon to Obama has taken the position — some only after initially promising to reverse the supposedly soft China policy of the previous administration — that it is in the vital national interest of the United States to deepen economic and political ties with China and to encourage it to become fully enmeshed in the international system. Each administration has also emphasized the importance of maintaining strong alliances, especially with Japan, to enable the United States to retain military and political preeminence in East Asia. A major purpose of that preeminence is to prevent China from securing a hegemonic position in the region.

But while the basic strategy, often referred to as entailing a combination of engagement and hedging, has not changed for nearly four decades, China itself has been transformed. It has made a truly great leap forward, becoming virtually overnight a major force in the economy of the East Asian region and that of the world and one of the leading players on the international political stage. China's GDP was US \$390 billion in 1990; it had risen to about US \$5 trillion by 2010. Because its phenomenal growth has been driven by exports, China has rather suddenly become a leading trading partner for the United States, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and the European Union. The United States is China's largest export market, and Japan is second.

History is replete with examples of interstate conflicts spawned by the competition between rising new powers seeking to expand their influence and established powers endeavoring to hold on to their power position. However, it is not inevitable that China's rise should have such a destabilizing impact. China does not seek to impose its ideology on other countries, as did the Soviet Union. It does not deny the legitimacy of existing international institutions but rather wants to be an active participant in them. And Chinese leaders appear far more skeptical than many foreign observers that China will become a superpower in the sense that the United States is anytime in the near future.

China's acquisition of great power status will to some degree come at the

expense of American power. American policymakers should have no illusion about this reality. Even more important, the United States does not have the power to decide whether or not China is going to acquire great power status.

As a great power, China will have great power ambitions. There is no hedging strategy that can prevent that from happening. The United States needs to guard against a false sense of confidence that it has the power to decide whether or not China will become a great power. It also should avoid exaggerating China's strengths. In terms of living standards, technological development, and many other indicators, China is not among the front-ranking countries. The idea that a Sino-American "G2" can be a key element in resolving regional and global problems grossly exaggerates China's power. And the view that the United States should temper its criticism of policies that it finds inimical to American interests and values out of a desire not to incur China's wrath is similarly misguided. In dealing with an increasingly powerful China, the United States needs to pursue a policy mix that seeks avenues for cooperation with China across a whole gamut of issue areas and that at the same time strives to maintain a balance against Chinese power — not to punish it for misbehavior but because a stable international order requires balance among the powerful.

3. Getting the Triangle Straight

The urgent tends to drive important but less urgent issues to the bottom of the president's inbox, where they sit until some event compels his attention and forces a policy response. Those at the center of East Asia policymaking in the Obama administration need to push back against this tendency. The Obama administration needs to engage closely with China and Japan, both of which are in the midst of a period of dynamic change. It needs a well-thought-through strategy for dealing with China and Japan, bilaterally and trilaterally, if the president is to avoid finding himself constantly caught up in a game of catch-up, reacting tactically to events after they occur rather than thinking strategically about how to further American

interests in a region that is the center of the global economy and that is undergoing far-reaching political, social, and economic change.

Neither the Obama administration nor preceding governments have given enough attention to developing trilateral relations with China and Japan. The pattern has been to focus on bilateral ties and to give short shrift to a trilateral dialogue and little attention to the development of trilateral programs. There is a need for a new approach.

For one thing, bilateral relations have a way of refusing to stay bilateral. In the interconnected world in which we live, those relationships are more akin to a game of billiards than they are to the more familiar chessboard of international politics. Billiards is a two-person game in which when one hits a ball it hits another, setting that ball in motion and moving other balls on the table. It is an apt metaphor for international politics, where what may be intended as a solely two-party interaction, whether between the United States and China, the United States and Japan, or some other combination, takes on the characteristics of a multi-party game. As the United States deepens its relations with China, it has to reassure Japan that this does not amount to a downgrading of the US-Japan relationship, that America's relations with China and with Japan are a positive-sum and not a zero-sum game.

There are limits to what a trilateral dialogue can achieve. Many of the most important issues in US relations with China and Japan are bilateral in nature. And many of those that are not bilateral involve the interests of other countries as well. Institutionalizing a China-Japan-US "G3" is no more desirable than a US-China "G2." The South Koreans would be concerned about being left out and anxious about how trilateral consultations might impinge on their own interests. Nor is it necessarily the case that China and Japan would welcome trilateral consultations that might result in the United States taking a position that tilts toward one of the other two parties. In addition, the United States would need to be careful not to let such consultations draw it into taking sides on controversial issues that it would rather avoid being drawn into, such as the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the

Diaoyu Islands.

There is an important role, nonetheless, for a trilateral dialogue among China, Japan, and the United States. These are, after all, the three most powerful countries in East Asia, with many common interests that could be furthered by coordinating their policies. Japan's pollution control technology, for example, is among the world's best. A joint China-Japan-US program to combat water and air pollution in China, for example, could make an important contribution to dealing with an issue that not only affects the health of the Chinese population but also has an adverse impact on nearby countries as well.

There is also considerable merit in convening a regularized trilateral dialogue on hard security issues. Strengthening the US-Japan alliance, which should be a goal of the Obama administration, should be pursued in a manner that does not provoke Chinese suspicions that the US objective is to enlist Japan in a containment strategy against China.

Trilateralism should be only one of several approaches used to foster dialogue among the United States and countries in East Asia. But it should be one of them. It is especially important that the United States and Japan, whose alliance is the core element in the East Asian international order, engage in a much deeper and broader dialogue on a range of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral issues. The importance of skillfully managing relations with a rising China is well understood by Washington. Regrettably, the equally important need to pay greater attention to skillfully managing relations with a changing Japan is not as well understood.

4. The Future of US-Japan Security Relations

The year 2010 was the 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty, one that updated and improved upon the original treaty concluded in 1951. Over the ensuing years the United States and Japan forged not only a potent military alliance but a relationship of extraordinary depth and breadth in all dimensions — economic, political, and cultural — and at all levels from the

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

grassroots to the leaders of our governments.

Recently, however, the US-Japan dialogue on security issues has been dominated by controversy over what to do with the US Marine Futenma airbase in Ginowan City, Okinawa. The Futenma relocation issue is no closer to resolution today than it has ever been in the 15 years since the United States and Japan agreed to close the Futenma base and build a new facility in a less populated area on Okinawa's northeast coast. The longer this issue festers, the more it undermines mutual trust and diverts attention away from other important issues and away from a dialogue about how to evolve the security alliance.

The stated agreed upon goal of Tokyo and Washington is to close the Futenma base and build a new base at Henoko on the coast at the northeast corner of Okinawa. There is little chance that such an objective can be realized anytime soon. There is too much opposition to it among the Okinawans. The political cost of forcing Okinawa to accept the building of a base at Henoko would be too high both for the government in Tokyo and for the United States. It would be reckless to make a decision to move forward with implementing the US-Japan relocation agreement regardless of widespread Okinawan opposition to it because that would only intensify anti-base sentiment in Okinawa and put the entire US military presence on the island at risk.

There is in Okinawa, as everywhere else in Japan, widespread support for the security alliance with the United States, especially now that there is heightened concern about the threat North Korea poses and uneasiness about China's growing military power and political ambitions. But these concerns do not translate into support for the Henoko relocation plan. The security environment in East Asia offers an opportunity to the United States and Japan to strengthen their security cooperation, but it does not make the relocation of the Futenma base to Henoko politically feasible.

American policymakers and security specialists for the most part would agree with the proposition repeatedly put forward by Japanese political leaders that the relationship should be a more equal one. But to some Japanese leaders what this

seems to mean is that the United States should continue to honor its commitments to Japan's defense while imposing less of a burden on Japanese communities to host US forces whose presence is necessary to fulfill that commitment and accept that Japan will be more ready to say no to American policies that it finds problematic and that it will not do much more to carry a larger burden to provide for its own defense or to contribute to regional stability. That is not a recipe for a more equal relationship but for discord in US-Japan security relations.

To make the relationship more equal requires tough decisions by both sides. The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation is anchored by a grand bargain. That bargain was for Japan to make land available for US military bases that would facilitate the projection of American power beyond Japan and to cover much of the cost involved in maintaining those bases. In return, the United States made a commitment to protect Japan's security and made no reciprocal demands on Japan. It is "mutual" on the basis of asymmetrical obligations.

This grand bargain is under considerable strain and needs new definition. It has in fact been periodically updated and fine-tuned, most notably in 1996 when President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued a joint declaration on security that led to closer cooperation between US forces in Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces. That led to the adoption of new guidelines for defense cooperation that provided for an important role for Japan in providing rear area support for US forces involved in military actions in the areas surrounding Japan. Japan has expanded the roles and missions of the Self Defense Forces in the years since then, especially with regard to participation in peacekeeping activities.

There has been a fundamental and historic change in the recent politics of Japan's foreign and defense policy. In the postwar years, security policy was the driving political cleavage distinguishing the ruling party from the political opposition. That is no longer true. Amidst all the criticism of the DPJ government, many people fail to appreciate fully enough how important the change of government has been in reducing the political salience of fundamental differences over security policy. The National Defense Program Guidelines that were adopted at

the end of 2010 by the DPJ government could just as easily have been adopted if the LDP were in power. There are serious differences in security thinking between the LDP and the DPJ and within each of those parties. But for the most part these are in the nature of center right versus center left differences over policy and are not at all like the polarized ideological divisions that characterized relations between the LDP and the political opposition for so many decades in the postwar period. That means that the political environment that prevails now makes a debate over the specifics of security policy more feasible than in the past. But that debate cannot proceed if political leaders are not clear about the policy changes that they think are necessary and if they do not have the communication skills and the political courage needed to convey those views to the public in a persuasive and convincing manner.

It used to be the conventional wisdom that one of the purposes of the US-Japan security alliance and of the presence of US military forces in Japan was to act as a kind of "cork in the bottle," preventing the reemergence of Japanese militarism and the strengthening of the Japanese military to a point where it might be perceived as a threat by neighboring countries. Those concerns are no longer prevalent, in the United States at least.

The United States needs new thinking about security relations with Japan. Americans are fond of referring to Japan as the "cornerstone" of US policy in East Asia. But a cornerstone implies something solid and strong and inanimate; it sits at the foundation of the alliance and is there to be built upon. But the Japanese cornerstone is shifting. Generational change among Japan's political leaders and far-reaching social and economic changes are impacting the way Japanese think about security and the way they think about the United States. Support for continuation of the security alliance with the United States should not be taken to mean that Japanese also support continuing to do things the same way they have been done in the past. The United States needs to get out in front of these changes. It should support the eventual elimination of stand-alone military bases in Japan for American forces in favor of maintaining the American military presence in Japan on bases of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Such a sharing arrangement is the best way to

ensure the political viability of an American military presence in Japan.

Japan's dispute with China over the issue of sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands is one of three territorial disputes Japan has with its neighbors. It is embroiled in a controversy with Korea over claims to Takeshima, which to Koreans are the Dokdo Islands (and which used to be known in English as the Liancourt Rocks), and with Russia over several islands north of Hokkaido at the southern end of the Kuril Island chain. South Korea exercises administrative control of Dokdo and Russia treats the "northern territories," as they are known to Japanese, as an integral part of its territory. As if to drive that point home, Russian President Medvedev visited Kunishiri, one of the disputed islands, in November 2010.

None of these territorial disputes is going to be settled anytime soon. Stoking the fires of nationalism, whether by Chinese, Russian, or Japanese leaders, may serve domestic political purposes but it dangerously complicates the conduct of foreign relations.

5. Keeping Things in Perspective

The US-Japan relationship is more than a military alliance and discussions about how to develop it should not focus on military issues alone. Americans for one thing have a lot to learn from Japan about how to have its citizens to live healthier and longer lives. Issues involving health, energy conservation and pollution control, mass transportation systems, and many others should be on the US-Japan agenda. There should be more bilateral discussion of economic issues and trade policy, including the desirability of opening negotiations for a US-Japan free trade agreement, corporate governance, entrepreneurship, approaches to developmental assistance, and how best to reform international economic institutions.

The US-China relationship is characterized by both competition and cooperation. They have common interests in maintaining a stable global and regional economic order, protecting the environment, and maintaining a peaceful

environment in East Asia. They have competing interests over access to energy and other resources and their efforts either to maintain their power or to grow their power will invariably produce tensions.

Japan's relationship with China parallels the Sino-US relationship, but is more complicated in several respects. Japan is located close to China and its economy is becoming increasingly dependent on trade with and investment in China and on Chinese tourism and investment in Japan. The two countries have disputes over territory and historical memories of wartime conflict. As Japan feels increasingly vulnerable to growing Chinese power, it will lean more and more heavily on its alliance with the United States for security, but will be anxious about declining American power and the credibility of the commitment to protect Japan.

In this complex and fluid political environment the building of regional dialogues and institutions takes on enhanced importance. East Asia is not going to follow the path of the European Union, at least not for many years to come. Regionalism in East Asia will be multi-layered and multi-dimensional and driven by functional concerns. Even the definition of East Asia will vary depending on the issues that would benefit from regional cooperation. There is no need and no advantage to trying to define East Asia in inflexible terms or pressing for a kind of regional integration that does not reflect the diversity — in levels of economic development, in political systems, and in values — of East Asia. Most importantly, there is a need to resist conceptualizing relations among countries in this region as a zero sum game in which gains for one invariably come at the expense of another. East Asia is dynamic and increasingly the growth center of the global economy. With common sense and determination it should be possible to make relations among China, Japan, the US, and the countries of Southeast Asia a positive sum game that enhances the well being and security of all.

A Japanese Perspective on Asian Regional Cooperation Seen Through the Lens of Sino-Japanese Relations

Kazuhiko Togo*

1. Introduction

In analyzing the international situation in North East Asia in the past five years, the best news that I would like to underline is the normalization of Japan-China relations. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro was one of Japan's prime ministers who took strong leadership in many important areas such as implementing political reforms and strengthening Japan's defense-security policy and the Japan-US alliance. But in the area of Asian policy, in particular his China policy, the two countries reached the lowest point of political relations since the establishment of relations in 1972. The year 2005 may be marked as its nadir. At a time when Japan and China had many critical issues to talk about the leaders of the two countries became incapacitated in holding summit talks not only in their respective capitals but also in international fora

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such as APEC or APT. It was regrettable and ironic because Koizumi's view on history was as apologist as Prime Minister Murayama. In 2005 at Bandung in front of Afro-Asian leaders who commemorated the 1955 Bandung Conference Koizumi made a speech which literally repeated what Murayama had said on August 15, 1995 in his most decisive speech of apology. But the single issue of Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni left the leaders of the two countries irreversibly apart.

Thus, when Abe Shinzo became Prime Minister in September 2006, there emerged genuine fear that the relationship might deteriorate to an unmanageable level because Abe was known to have fundamentally more nationalist views on historical issues. But to the surprise of many, Abe's policy toward China became much more measured and balanced than what anybody had anticipated. His resort to ambiguity "not to confirm nor to deny whether he visited Yasukuni or not"; his confirmation of the 1993 Kono Statement on comfort women and the 1995 Murayama Statement on apology as cabinet policy; his policy direction to expand political and economic relations with China as two wheels, all played a decisive role in "melting the ice." Fundamentally, in the Fukuda and Aso's cabinets the policy direction to seek normal political dialogue with China remained firm. The Chinese government reciprocated Japan's change of approach. Prime Minister Wen Jinbao's speech at the Japanese parliament in April 2007 was marked by two key statements of appreciation of the Chinese government and people toward Japan's apology and toward Japan's support and assistance of China's Reform and Opening policy and modernization efforts. In the communiqué adopted at President Hu Jintao's visit in May 2009, "The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than sixty years since World War."^① Japan's willingness to help the victims caused by the May 2008 earthquake was reported in a favorable light. Agreement on the exploitation of an oil field in the East China Sea

^① < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html> > (access April 30, 2009).

in June 2008 was another concrete fruit of normalization between the two countries.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a stunning victory in the House of Representatives elections in August 2009. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party since 1955 with a short interruption in 1993 – 1994, lost its power, and it is generally perceived that a real system change may be occurring in Japan. The primary focus for change is in the realm of domestic reforms, but no small change in foreign policy may be taking place. In relations to China, Yukio Hatoyama, the new Prime Minister signaled an enhancement of East Asia Community, and powerful party general secretary, Ichiro Ozawa is known by his long term ties with the Chinese leadership. But the DPJ still lacks concrete content in their China policy.

Japan and China now face each other at important cross roads. From Japan's perspective the coming five to ten years has become critically important to squarely face the phenomenon of a "rising China." Japan needs to deal with this so that peace and prosperity in East Asia will be ensured and Japan's national interest maximized. A strategic streamlining of its foreign policy is required.^①The financial crisis originating from the U. S. weighs heavily globally and the North Korean nuclear crisis weighs deeply regionally. These issues merit analysis in their own right. But this paper concentrates on Sino-Japanese relations and their implications for regional cooperation.

2. A Japanese Perspective on a Rising China

(1) China's Economic Rise, Its Problems and Current Policy to Overcome Them

Few would deny the startling economic rise of China. Just to quote from an

① This paper is written as a continuation of a conference working paper which the author wrote for a workshop held by the Australian National University March 10 – 12, 2009 in Canberra on "The Australia-Japan Security Relationship and New Regional Security Architectures: Opportunities and Obstacles". The paper presented by the author was entitled "A Japanese Perspective on Regional Security in Northeast Asia" and some overlap is found with the analysis incorporated into this paper.

official Japanese MOFA website; a) the average GDP growth 1979 - 2007 was 9.8% and for five years since 2003 it recorded a growth of more than 10%; b) the engine of growth is fixed asset investment from domestic finance and foreign direct investment; c) the 2007 GDP reached \$3.4 trillion, which was fourth after the U. S. , Japan and Germany. ^① Few doubted that China would soon surpass Germany and Japan in its GDP, taking into account the speed of its development. Another analysis indicates that the Chinese government put forward an objective of quadrupling its GDP in 20 years since the policy of Reform and Opening started from 1980 to 2000. According to an IMF figure per capita GDP accounted for \$250 in 1980 and it reached roughly \$1,000 in 2000, so one can conclude that the initial objective was met. The Chinese government has set a new objective of quadrupling its GDP in 20 years from 2000 to 2020. To meet this objective there is a need to achieve a yearly GDP growth of 7.2%. ^②

But at the same time few observe that China's economic development is being achieved without difficulties. The same MOFA website which highlighted China's economic growth pointed out in detail to such problems as the discrepancy between the city and country side; too rapid development; lack of a social safety network; energy and environmental troubles; corruption; an aging society; and ethnic minority issues. ^③ The current Chinese government under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao seems to be well aware of these problems. The debates and conclusions drawn at the 16th Party Congress held in 2002 and the 17th Party Congress held in 2007 seem to indicate clearly that recognition. The concluding part of Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 confirmed that the three historic missions of China were: the realization of modernization, the

① < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/pdfs/kankei.pdf#01> > , p. 4 (access April 27, 2009).

② Anami Koreshege, "Saikinno Chugokujijyo", *Gakushikaiho No. 872* (2008 - V), p. 6.

③ See note 4 above. Anami Koreshege, former ambassador of Japan to China, also makes a penetrating observation about the "light and darkness" of Chinese society. "Saikinno Chugokujijyo", pp. 4 - 15).

unification of the homeland, and the maintenance of world peace and cooperative development.^① In the area of the realization of modernization, the 17th Party Congress enumerated clearly the difficulties and challenges which Chinese society is facing now:^②

A. The cost which had to be paid in resources and environment to realize economic development was too high;

B. There is an imbalance between the city and the countryside, among regions, between economic and social development;

C. Stable development of agriculture and sustainable income of farmers are becoming increasingly difficult;

D. Issues which touch upon direct interests of the people such as employment, social security, income distribution, education, medical treatment, housing, production safety, judicial fairness, and social security were noted; the lives of low-income were found to be in difficulty;

E. It is essential to strengthen political thought and morale;

F. Party leadership needs to be strengthened;

G. Some basic party organizations have been unduly weakened;

H. The behavior of a few party members was formalistic, bureaucratic, extravagant, and corrupt.

The notion of “scientific development” is playing a key role to guide measures to overcome these difficulties and meet these challenges. In proceeding, the “improvement of welfare” and “socialist democracy” became the key supporting drives.^③ Policy directions do not guarantee success. But at the same time, without the existence of sound policy directions, difficulties and problems cannot be resolved. There is also no credible arguments that show that Hu Jintao — Wen Jibao efforts are doomed to fail. Despite much hardship, present day Chinese policy

① Onishi Yasuo ed., *Chugoku Chowa Shakaihen Mosaku*, IDE - JETRO, 2008, p. 11.

② Onishi Yasuo ed., *Chugoku Chowa Shakaihen Mosaku*, p. viii.

③ Onishi Yasuo ed., *Chugoku Chowa Shakaihen Mosaku*, p. 10.

should have reasonable grounds to succeed rather than China falling into chaos in the near future.

After the eruption of the global financial crisis the Chinese economy has been severely affected as well. GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 declined to 6.8% and 10 million coastal workers have reportedly lost their job and had to go back to their rural origin before the Chinese New Year. 700,000, i. e. 12% of the university graduates in 2008, still are unable to find a job.^① But the government is claiming that the four trillion yuan package proclaimed in November 2008 would elevate the growth rate by 1% and that, as Wen Jiabao stated at Davos in 2009, “there are hopeful sign of recovery such as increasing bank lending or rises in the price of manufactured goods.”^② At the G20 held in London on April 1 and 2 2009, President Hu Jintao revealed that China was going to make \$40 billion of additional contributions to back up the IMF funding. This will make it third in contributions after Japan and the EU, which were providing \$100 billion to cope with the recent financial crisis.^③

(2) Foreign Policy Objectives and Sino-US Relations

In order to achieve these domestic objectives, “maintenance of world peace and cooperative development” are suitable foreign policy objectives. Realization of a “harmonious world” and a foreign policy of “peaceful development” were emphasized at the 17th Party Congress.^④ The notion of “harmonious world” was first discussed at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the 16th Central Committee and got its full exposure in April 2005 at the Bandung Asia-African Summit Meeting when Hu Jintao called for “the creation of a harmonious world together.”^⑤ Drastic

① *Asahi Shinbun*, January 23, 2009.

② < <http://www.asahi.com/special/08017/TKY200901290282.html> > (access April 2, 2009).

③ *Sankei Shinbun*, April 4, 2009.

④ Onishi Yasuo ed., *Chugoku Chowa Shakaihenno Mosaku*, p. 10.

⑤ Masuda Masayuki “Chugokuno Wakaiseikai Gaikou” in Onishi Yasuo ed., *Chugoku Chowa Shakaihenno Mosaku*, pp. 40 – 41.

improvement of China's relations with Japan is partly the result of Japanese policy makers' wise decisions, but at the same time it may well be that it is the result of China's efforts not to provoke Japan. China's US policy may also be considered in the same light. From the time when Deng Xiaoping established China's foreign policy direction, the U. S. was given special attention. In the fundamental conceptualization of foreign policy, the Chinese leadership divided the world into four categories;

- One area; neighboring regional countries
- One line; advanced countries
- One side; developing countries
- One point; the United States

The United States had a special strategic position and it was Deng's 20 character directive which set the policy toward the U. S. The directive consists of five four character expressions.

- Observe calmly
- Stand firmly
- React with caution
- Hide the spirit
- Accomplish productive results

This 20 character directive is characteristic in its tone of restraint. "Hide the spirit" is typical in underlining China's strategic thinking for the imperative of accumulating its power so that this power would make maximum impact in the future.^① In reality, China's policy toward the U. S. has been characterized by restraint, although in the later part of the 1990's the adoption of the Japan-U. S. Defense Guideline and NATO's bombardment of Kosovo including the bombing of the Chinese embassy resulted in a tense situation. But apart from this period, Sino-U. S. relations were under typical restraint and it may be possible to assess

① Aoyama Rumi, "Reisengo Chugokuno Taibeminshikito Beichuukankei", Kokubun Ryosei ed., *Chugokuseijito Higashujia* (Tokyo, Keio University Publishing House, 2004), p. 241, 244.

that the first four months under President Obama are characterized by this restraint as well.

At the time Barak Obama was elected president of the U. S. , Northeast Asia was not at the forefront of his policy priorities. This was so, because in relative terms, East Asia involved fewer problems in comparison to other areas. There were the issues of economic crisis, withdrawal of U. S. troops from Iraq, and restructuring the Afghan-Pakistani war front. But Hillary Clinton's trip to East Asia from February 16 to 22 signaled that this region was not outside the U. S. priority areas. Naturally the importance of rising China in Asia was an integral part of balanced analysis. After her trip to Japan, Indonesia and Korea, where she successfully communicated the importance which the United States attaches to each bilateral relationship, Mrs. Clinton and the Chinese leadership heralded the advent of a "new era of Sino-American relations" and agreed to start strategic dialogue in the area of politics and security, in addition to the area of economics.^① These points were confirmed in London on April 1, 2009 when the first summit meeting between President Hu and President Obama took place. Obama stated in that meeting that "U. S.-China relations are the most important bilateral trade relations."^② President Obama's trip to East Asia in November and his four days trip to China from Shanghai to Beijing was a display of cooperative approach between the two countries, probably more in atmospherics than substance. The Year 2010 began however with rising tension particularly by Obama's decision of arms sale to China's Taiwan region. China and the U. S. are in learning process for coexistence but at the time of writing of this paper there is no evidence that China has moved out from the period of "Hide the spirit".

(3) Rise of China's Military Power

"The Chinese government's official report in March 2008 announced a 17.6%

① *Sankei Shinbun*, February 22, 2009.

② *Asahi Shinbun*, April 27, 2009.

rise in the military budget from the last year, continuing the double-digit growth in this budget over the last two decades. The nominal defense expenditure (417 billion yuan, 6.743 trillion yen) exceeded Japan's defense expenditure (4.742 trillion yen). Details of the Chinese military budget have not been published and the Military Balance and other sources indicate that it does not include such items as the purchase of weapons from abroad, expenses related to the People's Armed Police, and R&D expenditures. Hence further transparency is expected. Modernization of the navy and air force is rapidly taking place through the introduction of Russian fighters, destroyers and submarines. Nuclear missile power is also increasing through modernization of ICBMs and SRBMs." This analysis by the Japanese MOFA, usually cautious in highlighting other countries' military development, is alarming to Japanese.^① Both the China friendly *Asahi Shinbun* and the China critical *Sankei Shinbun* carry frequent reports that two national carriers and one Soviet-made aircraft carrier will be deployed by 2016.^② In April 2009, Foreign Minister Nakasone made a speech on nuclear disarmament "Conditions toward zero: 11 benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament". Nor does the country disclose any information on nuclear arsenals." He added that "it is vital for the promotion of global nuclear disarmament that these [China and other nuclear] countries take nuclear disarmament measures, including the reduction of nuclear weapons, while enhancing transparency over their arsenals. In addition, it is necessary for these countries to freeze the development of nuclear weapons and other delivery vehicles that would undermine the momentum toward nuclear disarmament while the United States and Russia are making nuclear disarmament efforts."^③

① < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/pdfs/kankei.pdf#01> >, p. 6 (access April 27, 2009).

② *Sankei Shinbun*, January 12, 2009; *Asahi Shinbun*, December 30, 2008.

③ < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/stat0904.html> > (access April 29, 2009).

3. Japan's Response and Initiatives

(1) New Policy Initiatives Toward China

In the current situation when the history issue has stopped functioning as the stumbling block of the relationship, and when the two countries are in a position to see the issues which both of them face with greater clarity, I propose four directions which Japan may take in dealing with the rising China.

First, while one may observe that the history issue has ceased to function as a serious barrier, it is evident that it has not disappeared from the domestic politics of each country. In particular, the Japanese side might have a golden opportunity to face the historical memory issue straightforwardly in a situation where the issue no longer is perceived as in the diplomatic forefront between Japan and China. When the issue appears to be the object of diplomatic pressure from China, in the contemporary situation where nationalism plays an inescapable part in domestic politics, any decision toward ultimate reconciliation becomes very hard to take. But the historical memory issues are not only international, touching the hearts of those who suffered in China and Korea, but also profoundly domestic, splitting the minds of Japanese intellectuals and opinion leaders, constantly raising the issue of "what did the war mean for Japan and for the rest of the world?" Calmness, which today governs the Sino-Japanese relationship, presents a golden opportunity for Japan to find its own answers to unresolved issues.

The single issue of historical memory which most tears Sino-Japanese relations apart has been the Yasukuni shrine. Prime Minister Koizumi ruined Sino-Japanese high-level dialogue because of his yearly visits to Yasukuni. Since then, Prime Minister Abe declared a "no confirmation no denial" approach, Prime Minister Fukuda declared he would not visit Yasukuni, and Prime Minister Aso basically stayed mute on this controversial issue. Hataoyama had declared even before the August election that he would not visit Yasukuni if elected as prime minister and that the DPJ would support a non-religious neutral memoriam. But the issue remains

domestically sensitive in Japan and could become an explosive point of rivalry between the conservatives and liberals. I have offered as early as June 2006 a proposal on Yasukuni reform and published it in English and Japanese.^① But in order to ensure conditions for that, there are two areas where reform is necessary; first, the Japanese people should come to its own evaluation of war responsibility and draw an optimal conclusion on enshrining class A war criminals; second, the current war museum Yushukan should be dissociated from Yasukuni and a new national museum to commemorate pre-WWII history should be established. That national museum should have three perspectives; how the war was seen then, what were its consequences as a perpetrator, and what kind of suffering Japan had to go through as a defeated invader.

While I argue that it is Japan which first of all needs to seize this opportunity, the Chinese side may also have room for reflection. Negative reaction even among steady China supporters against Jiang Zemin's "preaching approach to history" in his 1998 visit to Japan, and some support for Koizumi's Yasukuni visits even among those who consider Japan's past deeds in China regrettable may be sources for consideration. In this context Lu Chuan's recent film on the Nanjing massacre, the Chinese people's reaction that the film was too kind to the Japanese and the Chinese government support of Lu Chuan may perhaps be a sign of a new direction.^②

Second, attention needs to be addressed to Taiwan. The Japanese government's official position is that it firmly maintains the position expressed in the 1972 Japan-China Communiqué.^③ As for Japan's official position it is difficult to

① Kazuhiko Togo, "A Moratorium On Yasukuni Visits", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 2006, pp. 5-15. Japanese articles include those in *Gekkan Gendai*, *Ronza*, *Sekai*, *Shukan Kinyobi*, and *Asahi Shinbun*.

② < <http://www.thenational.ae/80/article/20090506/FOREIGN/705059847> > (access May 16, 2009).

③ Clause 3 of the 1972 Joint Communiqué reads: "The Government of the PRC reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the PRC, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."

imagine anything more, or less, than the confirmation of that Communiqué, and this is precisely what was confirmed by the Joint Statement issued at the time of Hu Jintao's visit to Japan in 2008.^① Cross-strait relations are less tense after Ma Ying-jeou was elected as president of the Taiwan area in March 2008. Cross-strait economic relations and exchanges have developed rapidly. Hu Jintao's presented six-point proposal on 31 December 2008 to govern Cross-Strait relations. The Chinese government reacted by strong verbal criticism against arms sale to Taiwan by the Obama administration in February 2010. Still, general rapprochement between China's Taiwan and mainland is moving ahead steadily.

Third, new consideration is needed on how to handle concrete issues which divide the two states but are also at the basis of successful cooperation for them; trade and investment, including such issues as dumpings, energy cooperation in the East China Sea, Japan's anxiety at expanding military forces and desire for greater transparency, possible Chinese anxiety at greater Japanese assertiveness on defense and security matters. Probably there is only one promising approach for the two countries to adopt: uninterrupted exchanges, dialogue and negotiations. Ultimately, what can be achieved through diplomacy will be greatly conditioned on the relative power (economic, political and military) and strategic orientation of each country including its value formation. But the role of individuals in maximizing awareness of overlapping mutual interests counts. How leaders, top officials, business circles, media representatives and a wide range of people in general interact and perceive each other ultimately plays a decisive role in developing state-to-state relations. It is important that the peoples of the two countries, particularly their leaders, take this constructivist approach rather than a determinist approach based on power considerations. Regular visits, at a minimum on a yearly basis, of the top leaders to each other's capital and frequent and timely

① Clause 5 of the Joint Statement of 2008 reads: "Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC."

meetings on the fringe of international fora are essential to keep up these exchanges and negotiations.

One area where a creative approach may be useful is the negotiations over East China Sea energy development. An agreement in principle was achieved in June 2008, but no concrete modality to allow actual cooperative development has yet to be achieved. What is the real structure for the Japanese companies to enjoy the fruits of exploration on the western side of the equidistance line? What is a mutually acceptable mechanism for the two sides to enter into a cooperative scheme on the development of the oil field on the western side, where the legal positions of the two sides completely differ?

Last but not least, we should consider a Grand Bargain between Japan and China. This idea was proposed by Tanaka Hitoshi in his writing on December 2008, pointing to three areas of far-reaching cooperation: ①

- The first issue — representation in international institutions — is inextricably linked to China's global role . . .
- The second part of the grand bargain must be deeper bilateral cooperation in dealing with environmental challenges . . .
- The third aspect of the grand bargain — consolidation of a regional architecture — will be integral to ensuring long-term peace and prosperity in East Asia.

Funabashi Yoichi in his article in *Asahi Shinbun* identified areas where such cooperation could take place, but lamented the lack of Japanese political leadership to grasp that opportunity. He suggested that cooperation to tackle the global financial crisis may be cited as an era of further “Grand Bargaining” between Japan and China. ②

- A new strategy to put Asia into Japan's own recovery is required. Japan-China cooperation lies at the center of that strategy . . . We need to incarnate

① <<http://www.jeje.or.jp/insights/3-6.html>> (access April 20 2009).

② *Asahi Shinbun*, April 27, 2009, p. 3.

spirit into the “strategic mutually beneficial relations” finance, monetary, environment, energy, trade and investment cooperation. Prime Minister Aso’s initiative to doubling Asian economy through the support of Asian domestic demand is a refreshing idea but this cannot be achieved without Japan-China cooperation.

All four points mentioned above are pertinent to the Japan-China Grand Bargain. In fact in Prime Minister Aso’s visit to Beijing on April 29 – 30, 2009, the Japanese MOFA precisely emphasized positive cooperation very much in line with these grand bargain ideas. MOFA highlighted three achievements from the visit; 1) dialogue and cooperation in the business and economic sphere; 2) cooperation on environment, energy and climate change; 3) enhancement of people-to-people exchanges. In the first area of cooperation, MOFA underlined the importance of the two countries’ cooperation so that Asia can effectively respond to the current financial crisis, namely, making the Chiang Mai Initiative a multilateral structure or increasing funding of the ADB. In the second area of cooperation, MOFA announced the adoption of a “Japan-China environment and energy conservation cooperation plan”.^① In this paper, I would like to dwell upon the cooperation between Japan and China for the establishment of a viable regional framework, but before doing so I need to direct my attention to the importance of U. S. policy for Japan.

(2) Policy Initiatives Toward the U. S. and Japan’s Defense Security Policy

The role of the U. S. in the post-WWII era has been enormous. The country with which Japan fought a deadly war for four years became a solid alliance partner with which Japan came to share fundamental values of democracy and market economy. The lesson which Japan learned as the result of the defeat of the Pacific

^① < http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_aso/china_09/seika.html > (access May 1, 2009)

War was that Japan would not fight a war again with the U. S. and that it would adopt a fundamental policy of pacifism. The Yoshida doctrine struck a formidable balance between minimal self defense, alliance with the U. S. and concentration on economic development. But this resulted in passive pacifism void of sense of responsibility in regional and global security matters, which sometimes became a cause of friction with the U. S. , which became irritated by Japan's selfish search for one country pacifism to enjoy the fruits of economic development. At a time of China's rise and global recession there is a fundamental need for Japan to set its policy toward the U. S. right.

Hatoyama underlined the importance of the alliance but have adopted certain self-assertive policy. On the critical issue of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Hatoyama decided to withdraw the Maritime Self Defense Force troops from the Indian Ocean as of January 2010 and decided that Japan should offer additional assistance of \$5 billion to Afghanistan over five years. On the issue of relocating an American base in the Futenma U. S. base in Okinawa Island to Camp Schwab near Henoko on the northern part of that Island, as agreed by the previous LDP and Bush administrations, Hatoyama decided to postpone the decision by May 2010. Hatoyama's U. S. policy and its impact toward Japan-China relations at the beginning of 2010 remain uncertain.

4. In Search of a Viable Regional Cooperative Framework

After the end of the Cold War, significant multilateral organizations, all comprising major countries of North East Asia in the context of multilateral security dialogue emerged; APEC (1989), ARF (1994), APT (1997), 6PT (2003), and EAS (2005). There were various reasons why these five organizations took shape. Some of them developed out of political necessity and confusion rather than future oriented coordinated vision. But they are there, and it is not realistic and possible just to brush them aside. To understand why these organizations are there will become the starting point of what to do next.

None of the five organizations were proposed with a view to replace the hub and spoke security structure. All these organizations had their own areas of cooperation such as economy and exchanges (APEC), confidence building measures or CBMs (ARF), economy, exchanges and non-traditional security (APT and EAS). In the course of their development, some organizations expanded the sphere of their activities. For instance, both APEC and ARF are stretching their activities to non-traditional security cooperation. Geographically, there is a shift from the Pacific, to the Asia-Pacific, to East Asia, and then to the whole of Asia. From the end of the 1970's and during the 1980's regional cooperation started with PECC, a second track Pacific Cooperation organization. APEC and ARF started as Asia-Pacific organizations, and APT became an East Asian organization, the Six Party Talks a Northeast Asian organization. Finally EAS appeared as an all Asian organization. I would like to examine first the possible role of the 6PT, how other cooperative organizations functioned or did not function, and the role of trilateral to fill in the gaps in regional cooperation.

First, the most appropriate sub-regional framework to build on hard core security cooperation in Northeast Asia is undoubtedly the Six-Party Talks. Among the five regional organizations created after the end of the Cold War, this is the only organization which can directly address the hard core security issue in Northeast Asia. The North-Korean nuclear issue is still the most destabilizing regional factor. The 6PT is constructed precisely to resolve this issue and comprises all relevant and necessary actors. It has already established a framework for future oriented security cooperation through the construction of the five working groups, including the fifth "Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism" in February 2007. This working group chaired by Russia has so far not achieved any tangible result. The difficulty of developing this framework into a sub-regional security organization is that it is very much contingent on the success of dismantling North Korean nuclear weapon. How successful the Obama-Clinton-Bosworth team would be in this operation in handling the present day North Korean brinkmanship is not yet clear, but without this success, wider coverage of security issues may be difficult.

Second, in terms of wider regional cooperation (1) ASEAN Plus Three (APT) which was created in 1997 as the result of the Asian financial crisis should probably be analyzed first. Seen from a Japanese perspective, this organization is at the center of East Asian cooperation. APT fits in best with the notion of an East Asian Community (EAC). (2) Looking east from the EAC to the Pacific Ocean, there are two organizations, one primarily in charge of economic cooperation and exchanges, APEC, and another primarily in charge of CBMs, ARF. Both now cover security issues of a non-traditional character. (3) Looking west from the EAC to cover the whole of Asia, notably to include India, there is the EAS. This organization covers Australia and New Zealand as well.

The interrelationships between these four organizations are complicated, duplicating, confusing and perhaps, unfortunate. The year when the EAS was established was 2005, when relations between Japan on the one hand and China and Korea on the other hit a nadir, as stated. The impression disseminated through the press that Japan was taking the lead in support of an inclusive EAS whereas China was trying to lead the traditional framework of APT was, at least partly, the result of the Japan-China bitter rivalry. "Functionality" and "pragmatism," which are said to be the criteria to discern the sphere of activities so as to avoid duplication and ensure maximum efficiency, make sense. But how, in reality, they would help to demarcate the sphere of activities very much depends on the individuals who run these organizations. Obama hinted in his Tokyo speech in November 2009, U. S. intention to join the EAS. This would certainly streamline the present day confused structure of regional cooperation.^①

Third, filling in the confusion and vacuum as described above in the regional cooperative framework, a series of trilateral cooperative schemes are emerging.

①: "And the United States looks forward to engaging with the East Asia Summit more formally as it plays a role in addressing the challenges of our time." < <http://www.asahi.com/international/update/1114/TKY200911140197.html> > (access February 8, 2010).

Three cooperative schemes need to be mentioned with a view to strengthening Japan-China cooperation for: the present, the immediate future, and the long-term future.

(1) Present: Japan-China-Korea

The Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Cooperation exists, but in an embryonic form. It started at the fringe of APT in 1999 by Prime Minister Obuchi's initiative in Manila. With one exception in 2005 when bilateral relations between Japan and China and Japan and Korea were at their nadir, respectively because of the Yasukuni and Takeshima/Dokto issue, the meeting was held regularly on a yearly basis. The first meeting outside the framework of APT was held at Fukuoka in December 2008. In the Joint Statement, "openness, transparency, mutual trust, common interest and respect for our diverse cultures" were underlined as guiding principles.^① A concrete Action Plan for Promoting Trilateral Cooperation was adopted,^② and a Joint Statement on International Finance and Economy was adopted.^③

From Japan's point of view, cooperation with China and Korea has its roots in the very beginning of its history. In the process of modernization after the Meiji Restoration, they had become an object from which Japan distanced itself, then an object for Japan to manifest its superiority. After this attempt failed completely in 1945 "reentering Asia" became a vital pillar of Japanese foreign policy. Trilateral cooperation is the most direct and symbolic cooperative framework to let Japan "re-enter" Asia. Given the "rise of China" phenomenon, improving relations with its weighty neighbor through a multilateral framework would also have great

① < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/partner.html> > (access April 2, 2009).

② < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/action.html> > (access April 2, 2009)

③ < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/economy.html> > (access April 2, 2009).

significance from a Realist point of view. South Korea, with its shared geopolitical interests and democratic values, is increasingly becoming a natural partner for Japan as well. ①

It goes without saying that this trilateral cooperation should not have any exclusive character. The primary area of cooperation is exchanges and improving mutual understanding. The cooperation is still in an embryonic stage. In enhancing this trilateral cooperation, it is essential that the U. S. and other regional partners be properly informed and consulted.

(2) Immediate future: Japan-China-U. S.

Given the importance which these three countries have in Northeast Asia, this trilateral cooperation is potentially a promising one. The Grand Bargain as discussed above well fits into the subjects to be tackled by this trilateral summit. At the track II level, the Japan Institute of International Affairs took the initiative to hold a Japan-China-U. S. dialogue on a yearly basis since 1999. Morton Abramowitz quite recently proposed that a U. S. -China-Japan summit be held to discuss measures to overcome the global recession and to stabilize the situation in East Asia^② but nothing at the track I level has taken place so far.

(3) Long-time future: Japan-China-India

Dialogue has not even started other than as an idea from a former ambassador of Japan to India. ③

From the point of view of Japanese foreign policy, parallel trilateral

① I have outlined my personal view on the importance for Japan to enhance cooperation in East Asia in Kazuhiko Togo, "Japan and the Security Structures of Multilateralism" in Kent Calder and Francis Fukuyama ed., *East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability*, pp. 168-197. My view was re-introduced by Francis Fukuyama in his article in the same book as "the option 5: Encourage existing trends toward Asian multilateralism as a means of integrating Japan into Asia." pp. 251.

② *Asahi Shinbun*, February 14, 2009.

③ Ambassador Enoki Yasukuni's statement to the author (October 10, 2008).

cooperation plays an essential role in enhancing regional cooperation, all having established bases of some cooperation already: Japan-U. S. -Korea, Japan-U. S. - Australia; and Japan-U. S. -Russia. But I have not included these trilaterals under the scope of the analytical framework of this paper.

5. Conclusion

After Koizumi's departure from power in 2006, the DPJ victory at the House of Counselors' election in July 2007, Abe's resignation in September 2007 and Fukuda's resignation in September 2008 created an impression of instability of power. Prime Minister Aso's popularity at home was at a low level. But probably three factors contributed to the maintenance of Aso's power for a year.

First, successive measures taken to overcome the economic downturn are probably having some impact to keep his popularity from further declining. The size of these measures is phenomenal. A total of 75 trillion yen in stimulus packages were introduced as the result of three supplementary budgets adopted in October 2008, January 2009 and March 2009. This included 12 trillion yen of direct budgetary expenditures and 63 trillion yen of financial measures.^① On April 10, 2009 Aso took another major decision to combat the economic crisis with 57 trillion yen of additional stimulus including 15 trillion yen of direct budgetary expenditures. Extraordinary measures to prevent a further downturn of the economy, investment for future economic development, and realization of a social safety network were emphasized as the three pillars of the new policy.^②

Second, the foreign policy agenda probably helped to maintain Aso's popularity. Hilary Clinton's opening visit to Japan and Aso being received as the first foreign leader by Obama on February 24 pleased the Japanese sense of pride. Aso's successive appearance at the G20, visit to Sakhalin where he met with

① < <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/keizai/index2.html> > (access April 29, 2009).

② < <http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2009/0410gaiyou.pdf> > (access April 29, 2009).

President Medvedyev in February and visit to Beijing in April kept the prime minister's schedule busy, not damaging his reputation.

Third, the arrest of the first official secretary of Ozawa Ichiro and Ozawa's subsequent resignation from the DPJ's presidency on May 11, 2009 damaged the challenge coming from the opposition at the time of writing of this article. It is yet to be seen to what extent Hatoyama's election to the Party President would heal the wound of Ozawa's retirement.

All these changes did not help LDP to remain in power. As stated at the beginning of this paper, as the result of the House of Representatives election in August 2009 the DPJ came into power with Yukio Hatoyama as prime minister. For Hatoyama to take a more proactive and assertive role in facing China's rise and taking a greater leadership role in the region, there is a need to implement the following three policy directions. With these steps alone Japan would be able to find its footing and come up with creative ideas and a cooperative scheme with outside powers meeting the standard of globalization:

- Viable economic and social policy which would allow Japan to overcome the current crisis particularly with the introduction of a social safety net dealing with the socially discarded poor, the medical system, the pension system and education.
- New dynamic vision toward the future, which on the one hand would allow the highest technological development and innovation to lead industry and society; and on the other hand would maximize the Japanese people's imagination for the creation of a life style, harmonious with its traditions and its environment and open and transparent to the outside world.
- A responsible defense and security policy commensurate Japan's economic and political power so that it could play a positive and assertive role in matters of security and stability in the region and globally.

Asian Regional Architecture — Thoughts on the Future U. S. Role

Jonathan M. Aloisi*

The last thirty years of Asia's history has been characterized by peace, economic development and increasingly constructive interactions among nations. The region's ability to react to unanticipated challenges of a global, regional and bilateral nature is greatly enhanced by these positive developments. China's economic and strategic integration with the major players in the region, reflecting a convergence of interests among these players, is an important element underpinning these advances. In this paper, I will comment on the future of U. S. involvement in Asia's regional infrastructure. Over my 25-year career as a U. S. diplomat specializing in Asian affairs, I have both analyzed and contributed in small ways to these developments as they occurred. I begin this paper with a review of the history of regional architecture as I experienced it, setting the stage for a discussion of U. S. plans and intentions, based extensively on my reading of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January speech on this subject. I will also briefly give my assessment of Beijing's views, and comment on those of others, to round out the

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discussion before making predictions of U. S. “next steps.”^①

1. A Practitioners’ View of History

In retrospect, the collapse of the Soviet Union had less impact on the development of multilateral relations in Asia than some might have guessed at the time. In particular, the U. S. security approach built primarily on bilateral relationships has remained basically unchanged for almost 20 years. In addition, the lack of multilateral security mechanisms remains a distinctive difference between Asia and Europe. During the Cold War, the United States had tried to foster effective multilateral security alliances, most notably the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but these attempts did not yield unified bodies for collective defense. SEATO collapsed in 1977 without having furthered U. S. efforts in the Vietnam War, which remained a “coalition of the willing.” Then, as now, it is America’s network of bilateral alliances, plus its intensive bilateral engagement with other nations in the region, which form the foundation on which Washington bases its Asia security strategy.

In the first decades of the Cold War, Beijing and Moscow cooperated to aid North Korea, and then to support the North Vietnamese, in wars against the United States. Their “alliance,” however, was invalidated when deep rifts between the Soviet Union and China formed in the late 1950’s. Indeed, the rapprochement between Chairman Mao and President Nixon got underway while the Vietnam War was still raging and was firmly based on a shared strategy of limiting Moscow’s strategic ambitions. After China’s short war with Vietnam in 1979 and the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s Opening and Reform program, China initiated an intensive campaign of improving relations with nations on its periphery. In addition, Beijing

① I retired from the U. S. Department of State in 2008. I do not represent the U. S. Government and nothing in this paper should be construed as reflecting U. S. Government policy. All ideas and assessments expressed are my own.

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

continued it's important, though limited, cooperation with the United States against their common Soviet rival. China's good neighbor campaign was designed to both give China "space" in which to peacefully develop and also to set the stage for China to compete more effectively with others for influence in the region.

As Asia entered the 1990's, questions about the rationale for a U. S. leadership role in Asia in the absence of a rival Soviet Union inevitably arose. Inspired by concerns about U.S. dominance, European moves toward unity divorced from American leadership, perceived cultural differences, and difficulties in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad began enthusiastically trying to build support for an Asian multilateral entity which challenged U.S. influence and U.S.-influenced models of globalization. Mahathir termed his initiative the "East Asia Economic Caucus" (EAEC) and began actively seeking international support for the proposal.

Japan, not China, was the main focus of Mahathir's lobbying. While the region recognized China's growing influence and potential, China found itself in a reactive position in 1990 in the wake of domestic developments, uncertainties about the future of its economic reforms, as well as the geopolitical fallout of the collapse of East European communist government and then the Soviet Union. In part for these reasons, Beijing was not interested at that time in playing an active public role in the debate over the EAEC. Some in Japan and other Asian nations found Mahathir's arguments convincing and shared concerns that, while Western Europe worked toward common trade policies, Asian nations had no vehicle for further economic liberalization and thus faced having limited influence in debates over the international economic system.

The United States, which was explicitly excluded from the EAEC as posited by Malaysia, strongly objected to the exclusive nature of the EAEC and took the lead in opposing the concept. Canberra, which was perhaps even more concerned about being excluded than Washington, had already hosted the first meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. Nations represented included Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of

Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. Participants agreed to hold follow-on annual meetings and to continue to invite other attendees.

An "either-or" debate over whether nations should support EAEC or APEC soon developed which spurred both sides' lobbying efforts. The U. S. case was furthered in Japan and elsewhere during this period by what many saw as Mahathir's inflammatory anti-Western rhetoric. The rivalry between Singapore and Malaysia, and South Korea's reluctance to accept Japan as Asia's "leader," also helped consolidate support for the APEC alternative. As part of this process, the United States took bringing China into APEC as a key step in ensuring the success of APEC against the EAEC concept. Frankly, this was welcomed by some in Washington as it gave the United States a "safe" subject on which to engage Beijing on an economic subject of significant importance during a period in which U. S. -China bilateral relations were limited in political areas. Beijing's openness to this approach was strengthened by a parallel interest in engaging Washington, I believe.

The mutually positive approach toward these discussions yielded the decision in 1991 to welcome China, including China's Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province, into APEC. In deference to China's concerns regarding the status of China's Taiwan and Hong Kong in APEC, APEC members no longer represented sovereign states, but rather "member economies." In a move designed to add further momentum to the consolidation of APEC as a trans-regional multilateral body, then-President Bill Clinton offered to host the first APEC Leaders Meeting in 1993. This initiated what has been an annual series of well-attended summits which now include the leaders of Russia and all major East Asian economies.

No discussion of Asian architecture would be complete without a recounting of the important role played so far by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While its inception in the 1960's was motivated by a complicated set of factors, including fears about the spread of communism and a desire to remain aloof of Cold War superpower politics, by the early 1990's the organization was experimenting with engagement through formal "dialogue partner" relationships

with neighbors and major world players. The annual “Post-Ministerial Conference” (PMC) had become a valued networking forum for many of the Asia-Pacific region’s foreign ministers. Indeed, in the early 1990’s this meeting served as a key channel for formal and informal discussions at the ministerial level of the region as a whole, as well as sub-regional and bilateral exchanges. It was no surprise, therefore, when in 1993 leaders meeting in the ASEAN PMC context agreed to form Asia’s first inclusive, region-wide, governmental group devoted to the discussion of political and security issues. This, of course, is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

By using ASEAN as the vehicle for the ARF initiative, member states avoided complications which would have been generated by membership in a security focused organization promoted primarily by one or more key players, such as the United States. This was due to ASEAN’s recognized traditions of non-confrontation and consensus. ASEAN ministers jointly pledged in 1994 to help guide the group toward steps building confidence among states through constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues. I think all of us working in the region at the time considered ARF to be a significant step, but one limited almost by definition to a slow evolution. Over time, the number of ARF members has grown to include even North Korea. The United States, among others, worked to generate a sort of cautious momentum, which over the years has led to an incremental broadening of the ARF mandate. Washington clearly viewed ARF as a useful sounding board for views on moving toward multilateral structures designed both to reduce tensions and to foster common norms toward dealing with security issues.

Indeed, the United States saw the formation of ARF, which was occurring just as APEC had successfully achieved “summit” status, as a channel through which it, and other nations in the region, could interact with China on non-economic issues. In a speech delivered in 1998, then-Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth looked back on the first term of the Clinton Administration (1993 – 1997) as a time when the United States sought a governmental forum to complement several

academic and Track Two channels^① such as the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which involved Chinese experts as participants. Roth noted the unease in the region resulting from the end of the Cold War and the departure of the U. S. military from the Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines as contribution to a general desire for new ways of approaching security issues.^②

ARF's limitations were understood by all and founding members were cautious in positing a formal role for the ARF beyond discussion of the most widely acceptable matters. Despite a stir caused when then-Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen decided to raise the South China Sea issue at the ARF, it did not routinely function as a forum to openly and effectively address the key issues of the day. For example, the violence in Indonesia, which led to the creation of East Timor in 1999, was not mentioned in the Chairman's statement at that year's ministerial meeting.^③ Rather, members focused more on step-by-step development of "process," including discussion groups and the establishment of sub-groups looking at non-controversial issues such as disaster relief and peacekeeping. ARF members did decide to endorse Track Two initiatives and broaden the dialogue to include defense officials, but these were widely viewed as limited, incremental steps. While it is correct to say that the ARF remained faint on Asian nations' radar screens and in Washington, it was never forgotten. Its inclusive nature, to include memberships for the European Union and India, helped underscore its "talk shop,"

① "Track Two" discussions are those led by academics, but with the "informal" involvement of current and former government officials. They are designed to promote dialogue, especially among nations which find holding formal exchanges difficult.

② The text of then-Assistant Secretary Roth's speech, titled as: "Multilateral Approaches to Regional Security, Speech at the Stimson Center Asian Security Seminar Series, 21 July 1998" is available on the NTI website: <http://www.nti.org/db/China/engdocs/roth0798.htm>. Accessed April 30, 2010.

③ ASEAN Regional Forum statements are available through the official ASEAN website. Chairman's statements, including the 1999 version, can be found at: <http://www.aseansec.org/11997.htm>. Accessed April 30, 2010.

non-substantive, function.

The late 1990's saw increased activity, particularly with the formation of the Shanghai Five, which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As one can surmise by its title, China took a leading role in driving the establishment and institutionalization of this security-related organization. At the time, the United States viewed this process with some suspicion. Washington understood Beijing's wish to increase its capability to prevent separatists from attacking China, either violently or rhetorically, from havens across its borders. Washington recognized, however, that Beijing's drive to establish the SCO also reflected a shift in China's early-1990's defensive policy of cautious diplomacy.

Despite the fact that the SCO's mission did fairly quickly expand beyond countering separatism to include broader issues of security and economic integration, I believe the U. S. assessment then, as now, continues to be that the SCO does not pose a current threat to U. S. interests in Asia. One reason is a judgment that Chinese and Russian interests do not align in ways that would drive the SCO toward confrontation with the United States. This is not to say that the SCO's institutionalization is not significant. It clearly is. ① The limited appeal to other nations of China's version of an anti-separatist/extremist/terrorist agenda, however, will probably serve to limit its role in shaping Asian multilateral architecture over the coming ten years. ②

Of more significance was the decision by China, South Korea and Japan to initiate the "ASEAN plus Three" process, a series of top-level exchanges which began in 1997 with a limited agenda. Since its first summit, officials of the ASEAN plus Three nations have sent their leaders an increasingly ambitious program each

① A full official accounting of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is available in documents and speeches on its official website, available at: <http://www.sectsc.org/>. Accessed April 30, 2010.

② Given more space, I would also comment on the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) as an interesting initiative, but with limited potential to drive Asian institutionalization.

year, which has yielded an institution with momentum and now even a budget. The list of issues under explicit discussion and the number of “bodies” at various levels now exceed 50, rivaling APEC in bureaucracy. Annual summits ensure that top-level attention remains focused on this broadening agenda.^①

A significant issue of discussion for the ASEAN plus Three since its first years has been the development of an “East Asian Community.” The ASEAN plus Three established a study group to examine this question. On this group’s recommendation, the “East Asia Summit” (EAS) was first convened in 2005. By design, this meeting occurs in conjunction with the annual ASEAN and ASEAN plus Three summits. Unlike the ASEAN plus Three, initial EAS member states included India, Australia, and New Zealand, making it a venue for discussions among sixteen nations, three of which are not “East Asian.” Unlike the self-limited ASEAN plus Three, the EAS has already demonstrated it is scalable, and Russia may become a new member in the near future.

In terms of Asia’s future architecture, the existence of both the ASEAN plus Three and the EAS raises some interesting questions. ASEAN plus Three is, in membership, is Mahathir’s “East Asia Economic Caucus.” The East Asia Summit group, built on the recommendation of the ASEAN plus Three, however, already includes India, Australia and New Zealand and is clearly open to further expansion. With this trend in place, the EAS forum could conceivably respond positively to an approach from the United States. This raises very real questions on the definition of an “East Asian” community. Has the early-1990’s debate over EAEC and APEC models been rejoined? Is the EAS forum set on a path toward embracing the membership of APEC? Will an institutionalized EAS play the role in security affairs which APEC plays in the economic realm?

A significant development in multilateral discussions in Asia of a different type

^① The official ASEAN website includes both background information and documents of the ASEAN plus Three. See in particular: http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1. Accessed April 30, 2010.

has been the “Six-Party Talks” process involving North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the United States and China. Unlike the other organizations mentioned above, in 2003 the Six-Party Talks was created, largely through efforts by China and the United States, as a forum to address a single serious issue. China has hosted the working sessions, but there is no formal secretariat and no explicit expectation that the Six-Party Talks will ever be charged to take on a broader agenda. The reason for the focus of governments on the importance of the Six-Party Talks is the pragmatic significance of the issue at stake. While nations attending the ASEAN Regional Forum had “noted” problems on the Korean Peninsula, the ARF hadn’t served as a venue for targeted efforts to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The ad hoc Six-Party Talks process, however, has that potential.

2. Hillary Clinton’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

In this section of this paper, I will give my views on how the United States is responding to the current situation with regard to its engagement in shaping Asia’s multilateral infrastructure. What is Washington saying it wants with regard to the evolution of Asian security infrastructure? In this, we need only take as reference the policy statements of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on precisely this topic. I’m sure some of you have read, or even closely studied, Secretary Clinton’s January speech entitled “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities.”^① The speech has not garnered much attention in the region as far as I can tell, perhaps for the reason that outlining “principles” is less newsworthy than announcing explicit plans or initiatives. Secretary Clinton^② also gave the speech only hours before deciding to cancel her further travel to the region to rush back to

① Clinton, Hillary “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities.” January 12, 2010. Official U. S. Department of State website; <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm>. Accessed April 30, 2010.

② I place the title “Secretary” before Clinton in every case to ensure there is no confusion with former President Clinton.

Washington in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. This denied her the opportunity to underscore her message in later press events in the region.

To lead with my conclusions about the speech, I believe the United States understands it has lost significant short-term leverage over the shape of Asian security infrastructure. In Washington's current estimation, this is in part due to Bush Administration policies, but a more important factor is the rise of China. Of course, America's distraction with domestic economic troubles exacerbates the decline in U.S. influence. At the same time, I do not see the Obama Administration as interpreting assessments of a decline in U.S. influence as a cause for consternation or defensive posturing. Rather, U.S. policy-level officials view them as facts to be absorbed and factored into a coherent U.S. approach. Secretary Clinton does not reveal a "roadmap" in her speech, but she seeks to influence current debates in ways which help ensure that these debates focus on options which support U.S. national interests.

So what did Secretary Clinton say? She began by asserting that the United States has played and will play an important role in Asia's past and future success. This is a consistent U.S. theme. She then noted Obama Administration initiatives already underway to bolster the current U.S. position in Asia, including her early 2009 trip, the Obama Administration's focus on the G-20 as key world organization (thus involving key Asian players excluded in the G-8), Obama attendance at the first U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and the U.S. signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. To sum up the goals of current American diplomacy, Secretary Clinton stated;

"We are working to deepen our historical ties, build new partnerships, and work with existing multilateral organizations to pursue shared interests, and to reach beyond governments to engage directly with people in every corner of this vast region."

Now, this statement could have been made by U.S. officials at any point in the last

ten years. Secretary Clinton adds, however, that the “new landscape” requires the development of “an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces frictions of competition.” From this formulation we can understand that the United States anticipates there will be significant evolution in current multilateral structures, which is something that was not as evident in the statements of the previous administration. In fact, the U. S. acceptance of the fact that Asia is moving toward new arrangements, and that this process is already well underway, may have been one reason why Secretary Clinton decided to make this speech at this time. Secretary Clinton then explained that the United States has five principles underpinning the Obama Administration’s approach to the development of this new infrastructure.

The first principle can be summarized as: “reliance on strong bilateral alliances, formation of new bilateral partnerships.” Secretary Clinton assured listeners that the United States is deeply interested in maintaining its “special relationships” with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. Clinton does not discuss the U. S. rationale for maintaining military alliances in today’s post-Cold War Asia, and does not mention the effective downgrading of our ties with Thailand and the Philippines. With regard to the “new bilateral partnerships,” Secretary Clinton lists India and China, in that order. This reflects, I believe, The Obama Administration’s focus on building effective partnerships with both key nations in order to effectively address issues of common concern such as the global economic crisis, proliferation and climate change. Secretary Clinton also adds mention of Vietnam as a “new partner,” which I find interesting. I can confirm as a former Deputy Chief of Mission in Hanoi that Washington is indeed impressed by Vietnam’s increase in sub-regional influence and some of its reform choices, but the United States also clearly understands that history and geography limit the extent to which Vietnam can ever be a “special partner” of the United States. I assess Secretary Clinton’s first principle as reflecting the strong political consensus in the United States on the importance of bilateral diplomacy in maintaining American influence. To not lead her address with this “area of

strength” would raise eyebrows in Washington and perhaps generate concerns in our allied nations with regard to U. S. resolve.

Secretary Clinton’s second principle shifts the focus to multilateral institutions. She states that:

“Regional institutions and efforts should work to advance our clear and increasingly shared objectives. These include enhancing security and stability, expanding economic opportunity and growth, and fostering democracy and human rights. To promote regional security, we must address nuclear proliferation, territorial disputes, and military competition — persistent threats of the 21st century. ”

She also includes language on joint approaches to expand economic opportunity.

Secretary Clinton’s key point in principle two is the emphasis on “clear and increasingly shared objectives. ” One can see this as unsurprising, as it parallel’s the stated goals accepted as the basis of the ASEAN Regional Forum discussions, and even United Nations principles, but it confirms that the stated U. S. vision in further developing an Asian security infrastructure is inclusive, with the goal of fostering consensus and setting norms, and not a vehicle for maximizing U. S. influence in the region. Readers will note that by using the word “regional” rather than “multilateral” as the adjective modifying “institutions,” and through her addition of the word “efforts,” Secretary Clinton is actually in part reinforcing U. S. reliance on a multitude of approaches, including its bilateral and trilateral ties.

Of course, the explicit reference to “fostering democracy and human rights” would appear to imply that, from the U. S. perspective, China and other nations with leaderships adhering to different political and human rights value systems than the United States might not be invited to collaborate. One way to resolve this apparent dilemma would be to state that there are different interpretations of “democracy and human rights” and that these can co-exist. Indeed, this is of

course China's explicit approach when commenting on its adherence to international agreements which proclaim these ends. In her speech, Secretary Clinton does not signal any change in the U. S. position, which permits the United States to collaborate with China on the basis of "shared values," especially on transnational issues listed in the quote above. Other comments in her speech on the importance of deepening ties with China seem to confirm this.

According to the way Americans see this issue, it is not correct to state that there is no interest in promoting U. S. values and the American brand of democracy and human rights. Readers will note that, elsewhere in her speech, Secretary Clinton applauds ASEAN's decision to establish a new Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, noting her hope that the commission enhances "respect for fundamental freedoms and human dignity throughout the region." For the purposes of current U.S. diplomatic strategy, however, the Obama Administration has clearly decided to seek to reduce tensions with China by not allowing this long-term goal to translate into short-term demands for institutional changes in China's system of governance as a condition for collaboration in other areas.

Secretary Clinton's third principle is that: "our institutions must be effective and be focused on delivering results." She goes on to praise the U. S. engagement with regional players, especially India, to provide emergency humanitarian relief in the wake of the 2004 Tsunami. She asserts that these collaborative efforts: "helped to forge enduring political, military, and civilian relationships that have enhanced our ability to respond collectively to natural disasters." Of course, there has been some movement in the ASEAN Regional Forum to create formal mechanisms for multilateral capacity building in disaster relief since the Tsunami. In fact, Secretary Clinton chooses this part of her speech to state that the United States "is eager to strengthen the ASEAN Regional Forum."

My assessment of this third principle is that President Obama genuinely wishes to see changes in security infrastructure result in a strengthened capacity to jointly respond to contingencies. Secretary Clinton's emphasis on disaster relief is designed

to underscore what America "brings to the table" in terms of capacity to help Asia cope with future challenges. Some might be surprised that she would highlight this in a way that implies we would build joint capacity, as the U. S. military now has an unmatched advantage in providing "command, control, and communications" support, as well as transport and logistics, and is also well-trained in humanitarian operations. In the view of some, the U. S. might best seek to retain this edge as an element of soft power rather than dilute it by helping build joint capacity. I believe that Washington wishes to build joint capabilities for three reasons: (a) the potential scope of trans-national disasters could easily overtax even the U. S. resources; (b) Washington expects significant benefits in "confidence building," including with China, as a result of capacity building, preparedness and joint training work; and, (c) Washington understands that China is years, not decades, away from fielding a significant expeditionary humanitarian capability. Indeed, China is reportedly working now on what will be largest hospital ship in the world. It would be best to engage China now through multilateral channels to collaborate in the use of these capabilities, rather than to compete or to cooperate only in an ad hoc manner.

Secretary Clinton's fourth principle is that Asian nations; "must seek to maintain and enhance flexibility in pursuing the results we seek," especially when "large multilateral organizations" prove incapable of action. Here she points to the Six-Party Talks as an example of an ad hoc grouping through which nations cooperate toward a specific goal. Secretary Clinton also includes under this principle U. S. trilateral dialogues as important forms of regional and sub-regional cooperation. America's existing trilateral dialogues are separately with Tokyo and Canberra and with Tokyo and Seoul. While Secretary Clinton explicitly suggests that the United States would like to consider new trilateral dialogues with Tokyo and New Delhi and with Tokyo and Beijing, the suggestion that existing dialogues could be structured as "action taking" coalitions of the willing, while realistic, will confirm for some that the United States is intent on possibly moving further toward more formal multilateral "alliance" relationships, building on its current bilateral

mutual defense treaties with Asian nations.

It is also under her fourth principle that Secretary Clinton brings into the discussion those new constructs we have seen form over the past fifteen years which were not primarily U. S. initiatives. She states that the United States has “seen” the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN-plus Three, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. She further comments that she hopes “we will be able to participate actively in many of those.” This is a somewhat strange statement, especially since the United States is a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and “active participation” in the ASEAN plus Three would seem unrealistic unless that forum were to be fundamentally restructured. My belief is that the drafters of Secretary Clinton’s speech wished to find a way to acknowledge the ASEAN plus Three and SCO in a positive manner which does not rule out a possible future U. S. observer role.

Secretary Clinton’s fifth principle is the need to decide which will be the “defining” regional institutions. She asserts that these “defining institutions” will necessarily include all the key stakeholders, but does not define this concept. We can assume, however, that the United States is a “key stakeholder.” Secretary Clinton mentions APEC and the East Asia Summit as “old” and “new” contenders for “defining institution” status, and then predicts the defining institutions will include a mix of the well-established and the new. The speech ends with a rendition of several U. S. themes, including that the United States will remain an indispensable element in the region’s success and that civil society involvement is also important.

3. Views on U. S. Hopes and Desires for the Future

Shifting gears, let us now discuss views of how the U. S. might influence the evolution in Asia’s multilateral infrastructure and its desires in that regard. First, I believe that Secretary Clinton’s speech confirms that the number one U. S. priority remains ensuring the continued relevance and centrality of APEC in the mix of

future "defining institutions." This centrality is not assured. With the development of an institutionalized East Asia Summit process, for example, especially one which does not include the United States, APEC's role as the premier forum for discussions of economic liberalization could be challenged and undermined. I believe that Washington, if it could control the process, would like to see APEC's role broadened beyond economic issues to make it perhaps "the" defining institution.

I believe that Washington, unsure of how developments will trend over the coming years, is positioning itself to flexibly respond to various possibilities. Given uncertainties, which include potential shifts in views and positions of the people and political leadership in Japan and the possibility of China, Washington understands that offering an explicit U. S. roadmap for the future at this point could prove counterproductive. With APEC out of the running as "the" defining institution, I believe the United States is considering both the ASEAN Regional Forum and the EAS as promising candidates to be a "partner" defining institution to APEC in security affairs.

For this reason, U. S. interest in further institutionalizing the ARF will continue, as will efforts to develop actual capabilities in the current focus areas. "Defining institution" status would necessarily involve an increase in the level of political involvement in ARF, however, and this could prove difficult as other nations might see the East Asia Summit as the most promising new top-level forum. If the momentum toward an institutionalized EAS grows, I anticipate that the United States will seek a formal role. In this context, I find Secretary Clinton's explicit reference to the EAS as a possible "defining institution" as significant. While not locking the United States into a particular position, I take this as a signal that the United States will not "fight to the death" against moves to further strengthen the EAS in the same way it successfully lobbied against the East Asia Economic Caucus as proposed by Mahathir in the early 1990's.

In one possible future scenario, the United States could seek full membership in the EAS, then support concurrent meetings of EAS and APEC along the well-

established ASEAN model (for example, the concurrent ASEAN Ministerial/Post-Ministerial/ARF meetings and now concurrent ASEAN Summits and ASEAN plus Three meetings). This would allow APEC to continue to serve as a force in trans-region economic liberalization, while the EAS develops as the top-level forum for meetings to address security issues.

In no scenario, however, do I see the United States unilaterally downgrading its bilateral military alliance relationships. While broader regional institutions might address “consensus” security issues starting with disaster response and crisis prevention, there is no prospect for a broad-based Asian security institution which can be assured to quickly cooperate in serious military contingencies such as a war on the Korean Peninsula. In such cases, the United States would act unilaterally or through its alliance relationships.

4. Comment on the Views of China

Let me briefly present my views on China's views toward regional architecture. Like the United States, I see Beijing as reluctant at present to sketch a concrete vision of its desires for its future of Asia's multilateral infrastructure. In my assessment, this is a conscious decision. I do not believe, however, that this caution is based on the defensive diplomatic approach set by Deng Xiaoping's in 1990 to “avoid the lead” in the face of shifting geo-political circumstances in the wake of the collapse of Soviet and East European communism. Today, I believe Beijing's motivations have changed. Deng Xiaoping's strategy helped provide China the “space” it needed to resist perceived external challenges, maintain internal stability and build the nation's comprehensive strength. All observers agree that China's influence and capability to influence regional and global politics is now much enhanced. I believe that Beijing's current disinclination to be seen as actively driving Asian institutional development is based on the understanding that current trends favor further significant enhancements of China's influence. At the same time, Beijing understands that China's success and impact on the balance of

influence in the region have generated concerns about Beijing's future intentions. Through quiet diplomacy, and allowing others to assume key roles in a step-by-step evolution, Beijing denies those harboring these concerns the luxury of questioning specific Chinese initiatives. It is a solid and intelligent approach for a rising power to take.

5. Conclusion and Predictions

As an outside observer, I am impressed by the clear and strong realism underpinning the Obama administration's approach to Asia, which contrasts to the unilateralist tendencies of officials in the previous U. S. Administration. The team of Jeff Bader at the NSC and Kurt Campbell as Assistant Secretary of State, I believe, has helped Secretary Clinton shape U. S. interactions with China, in particular, through a strategy of respectful engagement. They are taking their lead from President Obama, who has said he wishes to focus major world relationships on key issues and "results." We can see this, in retrospect, through Secretary Clinton's approach to her first visit to China very early in the new Administration.

With regard to Asia's future architecture, Secretary Clinton states that the United States remains intent on pursuing parallel and explicitly stated strategies of maintaining bilateral alliances, seeking ad hoc bilateral and multilateral approaches to emerging challenges, maintaining APEC's influence over regional economic matters, and cooperating with others in developing regional multilateral structures. Washington also remains open in principle to economic liberalization initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The U. S. approach will remain multi-faceted and will unapologetically retain both bilateral and multilateral elements. U. S. leaders would of course prefer to see the United States better positioned to influence developments, but are not focused on "win lose" contests for ideological leadership or for U. S. "ownership" of Asian institutions. Rather, they will focus on maximizing regional capacity to address defined challenges while maintaining a strong unilateral capability to act in extreme circumstances.

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

Over the past 65 years, we Americans, I admit, have developed a propensity to speak out and present our views rather than patiently stand back and watch events unfold. With this in mind, I predict that at some point during his tenure President Obama will announce U. S. willingness to either materially upgrade the ASEAN Regional Forum or join the East Asia Summit process, while reiterating strong U. S. support for APEC. The U. S. intent will be to work toward the establishment of parallel “defining institutions,” with APEC leading economic liberalization and the second institution working toward developing joint capabilities in other areas. Let’s await the statements of Secretary Clinton during her summer trip to Asia, and especially of President Obama in the fall, for indications on which way the United States will lean.

East Asian Economic Integration : ASEAN Plus Three or ASEAN Plus Six?

Chia Siow Yue*

1. Introduction

The growing momentum for an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) has led to two main proposals — the ASEAN +3 comprising the ASEAN –10 plus Japan, China and South Korea and the ASEAN +6 comprising the ASEAN +3 economies as well as Australia, New Zealand and India.

The building blocs toward an East Asia FTA are found in the following:

(1) Growing regionalisation as manifested in the trade, investment, financial flows and growing people interactions among East Asian economies. This led to the breaking down of national barriers and the thawing of the Cold War. The growing economic interdependence was manifested in the “flying geese” model of economic development that began with Japan, followed sequentially by the Asian Newly

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Industrialised Economies, the ASEAN economies and China. The negative aspects of growing economic interdependence were manifested in the rapid contagion of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 – 1998.

(2) Growing regionalism as manifested in the proliferation of FTAs among the economies in East Asia as well as with other parts of the world. East Asia is a late-comer in regionalism, following on the regionalism in North America (NAFTA), Western Europe (EU), Latin America and Africa.

2. Key Features of Existing FTAs in East Asia

Table 1 Shows the list of regional plurilateral and bilateral FTAs that have been concluded, are under negotiation, or are being proposed in East Asia. These FTAs have the following features.

Plurilateral/bilateral	Concluded	Negotiating	Proposed
East-Asia wide			2
ASEAN and ASEAN plus	3	3	1
Other plurilaterals	3	6	5
Bilaterals	32	35	10

(1) Diversity of geographical partners: The FTAs are among ASEAN economies, between ASEAN and northeast Asian economies, and between East Asia and rest of the world. Geographical proximity traditionally facilitate trade flows among neighbouring economies, but with the revolution in transportation and telecommunications, geographic distance is no longer the trade barrier it used to be and availability of efficient logistics also lower the cost of trade. Cross-regional FTAs are motivated by a variety of reasons, such as — to enhance or consolidate political relationships (for example, with U. S.), to gain preferential entry into other FTA markets (for example, Korea-Mexico into NAFTA), to secure access to major markets (for example, ASEAN-Japan, Singapore-U. S.) or to secure access to natural resources (for example, Japan-ASEAN, Korea-ASEAN).

(2) Diverse economic partners: Economic complementarity between north-south economies (for example, Japan-ASEAN) facilitates inter-industry trade such as between high tech manufactures and primary commodities, such as in the Japan-ASEAN partnership.

A. The south partners are expected to benefit from FDI and technology transfers while the north partners benefit from easier access to natural resources. On the other hand, south-south partnerships among economies with similar production structures, such as those in ASEAN, have to build on intra-industry trade based on new division of labor in manufacturing and services.

B. In East Asia, both the north-south and south-south partnerships have facilitated the development of efficient production networks and supply chains. South-south FTAs such as AFTA and ASEAN-China are notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause for developing economies, while north-south FTAs such as Japan-ASEAN have to be notified under the more stringent GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.

(3) Scope and coverage: All the plurilateral and bilateral agreements in East Asia have a core free trade area component rather than a customs union or common market.

A. The FTAs require only lowering and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers among partner economies, with no obligation to adopt a common external tariff or free flow of capital and labour. Diversity in economic levels and trade regimes make a customs union and common market difficult to negotiate.

B. However, most agreements signed and implemented extend beyond the FTA core are economic partnership agreements (EPA in Japanese-type agreements) or comprehensive economic partnerships (CEP in other ASEAN + 1 agreements). They are "FTA-plus" as the scope extends beyond the traditional FTAs and are also "WTO-plus" as the scope extends beyond what is covered in the WTO. They cover traditional liberalization of merchandise trade and services trade, as well as trade facilitation (including customs procedures, harmonization of standards), investment protection and liberalization (beyond TRIMS), intellectual property

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

protection (beyond TRIPS), government procurement (beyond GPA), movement of natural persons (beyond GATS mode 4) and competition policy. They also include technical assistance and development cooperation and labour and environment standards and cooperation. These agreements allow for potentially deeper integration and greater efficiency gains. However, critics have also dubbed some of these FTAs as "WTO-minus" because they exclude some key sensitive sectors and agricultural products.

C. On market access for goods, in some FTAs, 100% of bilateral trade and tariff lines are included for immediate liberalization (such as Singapore-New Zealand and Singapore-Australia). In others, the percentage coverage goods is less, and tariff elimination is phased out over a period, usually 10 years, and the exclusion lists differ in length. On market access for services, some agreements adopt either the more restrictive positive list approach of the GATS in the WTO or the more liberal negative list approach of NAFTA.

D. Trade facilitation covers improved customs procedures, standards and conformance measures dealing with the technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. It is advisable to adopt international standards and practices, as these facilitation measures benefit not only trade with the FTA partners but also trade with the rest of the world. Measures aimed at protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) and foreign investment, and ensuring fair competition between imports and domestic produced goods also benefit not only FTA partners but also other trade and investment partners.

E. Economic cooperation covers dialogue on macroeconomic, financial and monetary measures, capacity building through development of human resources, physical infrastructure, institutions and legal frameworks, small and medium enterprises, science and technology, etc. It entails technical and financial assistance. These help capacity building and improve competitiveness of the less developed FTA partners.

(4) Multiple and overlapping FTAs: The proliferation of multiple and overlapping FTAs in East Asia has given rise to what economists call the "spaghetti

bowl" problem. The various FTAs differ in rules of origin, product standards and conformance requirements, inclusion and exclusion lists and time schedules of liberalisation. These inconsistencies give rise to confused complexity that raise business transaction costs and reduce the potential economies of scale and FTA utilisation.

(5) ASEAN as front runner and hub in East Asia; ASEAN was formed in 1967, adopted the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 followed by the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). In 2007 ASEAN agreed to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to be completed by 2015 and with the following components — free trade in goods, free trade in services, free movement of investment, and freer movement of skilled labour. ASEAN has also signed or are negotiating FTAs, EPAs and CEPs with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India (all members of ASEAN +3 and ASEAN +6).

3. The Driving Forces and Benefits of a Region-wide East Asia FTA

(1) The Driving Forces

European integration has its origin in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 that evolved and expanded in subsequent decades with the current 27-member European Union. In the Americas there is NAFTA and MERCOSUR but a failed effort to form the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

East Asia is a late-comer to the FTA phenomenon. A number of studies have been commissioned to examine the rationale and feasibility and feasibility of a region-wide FTA. Push and pull factors include:

A. Post-Cold War warming of relations; The end of the Cold War led to improved political and economic relations between communist and non-communist states in East Asia, particularly between the ASEAN6 (comprising founding members Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand as well as Brunei) and Vietnam, and between China and the rest of East Asia. It led to the expansion

of ASEAN to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar and the signing of the ASEAN-China FTA.

B. Response to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis: The Crisis serves as the trigger in East Asian regionalism. The regional contagion demonstrated the close economic and financial interdependence among economies in East Asia. This, and the disappointment with the actions and responses of the International Monetary Fund and some major OECD countries led to the ASEAN + 3 monetary and financial cooperation initiative to help secure regional financial stability and resilience. The idea of an East Asia FTA germinated. A 1990 proposal by then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir for an East Asian Caucus had failed to take off.

C. Response to the growing regional economic interdependence: The East Asian economies have been rapidly developing since the 1960s according to the flying geese model. Economic interdependence is deepening through multiple channels — macroeconomics and finance, trade and investment flows, labour and tourist flows, and social and cultural interactions. Intra-regional trade and investment flows have woven a web of regional production networks. Institutionalization through a region-wide FTA will strengthen this hitherto market-driven economic integration.

D. Response to the challenges of globalisation and regionalism in developed countries: Smaller East Asian economies are concerned about their abilities to remain globally competitive, particularly with the emergence of continental economic blocs in Europe and the Americas. Instead of clamouring for protection from the challenges of globalisation and regionalism in the Americas and Europe, East Asia began to explore the regionalism option. FTAs can promote domestic deregulation and structural reforms, achieve economies of scale and scope, promote regional production networks and reduce business and trade transaction costs.

E. Response to the disappointing progress in the WTO and in APEC: The GATT/WTO process has become increasingly difficult due to a growing and diverse membership and a deepening agenda. The Doha Development Round was finally launched in December 2001 but its successful conclusion is fraught with difficulties.

APEC was originally established to promote open regionalism through voluntary unilateral and concerted liberalization of trade and investment but realization of the Bogor goals of free trade for developed countries by 2010 and for developing countries by 2020 has become increasingly unlikely.

F. Economic rise of China and the “domino effect”: China has been undertaking domestic reforms and opening its economy to international trade and investment since 1978, culminating in its admission into the WTO in December 2001. The smaller economies of East Asia are concerned over their ability to compete with China in the global marketplace for goods, services and investments. In particular, it has spurred ASEAN integration and cooperation to be competitive as well as spurred the ASEAN grouping to enter into various ASEAN + 1 agreements. When China proposed an ASEAN-China FTA, it triggered a domino reaction from Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia-New Zealand, U. S. and the EU. Conclusion of the Korea-U S. FTA and the launching of the Korea-EU FTA negotiations are also pressuring Japan to undertake similar initiatives

(2) The Anticipated Benefits

A. Improved economic efficiency and dynamism; An FTA confers static and dynamic benefits on its members, although its discriminatory feature leads to trade and investment diversion costs for non-members.

a. Removal of trade distortions lead to static efficiency benefits from improved resource allocation, trade creation and economic growth and welfare. Dynamic benefits include the scale effect arising from an enlarged integrated market and resultant fall in unit production cost, as well as the competition-enhancing effect from introduction of new products and new technologies. Increased competition also promotes domestic reform.

A region-wide FTA will enable the region and individual member countries to better meet the challenges of globalisation and emergence of continental economic blocs in the Americas and Europe. A large and integrated East Asia would lead to further economies of scale and fuller development of efficient production networks.

b. A region-wide FTA could embrace the smaller and less developed East Asian economies which would otherwise become marginalized as they lack the attractions of sizeable markets and negotiating resources.

c. CGE modelling results show that a larger FTA can create more benefits for its members than a smaller or multiple and overlapping sub-regional and bilateral arrangements. The latter gives rise to a “spaghetti bowl.” The benefits of a region-wide FTA are also larger when they extend beyond goods and services liberalisation to include trade facilitation, foreign direct investment and economic cooperation.

B. Delivering on regional public goods: The experiences of the EU and ASEAN have shown that closer economic cooperation and integration produce several regional public goods.

a. Reduce political and military conflicts and tensions among member states. More interactions at the political, economic, social and cultural levels among all segments of society will help in the long process of confidence building and community building in East Asia. A region-wide FTA would help create shared benefits and mutual trust, and contribute to regional peace, stability and economic progress.

b. Cooperative and coordinated regional action will help resolve the regional problems of climate change, environmental deterioration, pandemic diseases, natural disasters, and security concerns.

C. Active global participation and leadership: Hitherto, East Asia has weak influence and leadership in various international fora and organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO. A “united” East Asia with its growing economic and financial resources will have a greater world role — helping to tackle global public concerns and serving as global engine of growth.

4. Opportunities and Challenges of Realizing an East Asia Economic Partnership Agreement

(1) Common Vision and Regional Leadership

Deep economic integration requires a political vision and sense of community

as existed in Europe (Schuman of Germany and Monet of France) and in NAFTA (US played a dominant role). In East Asia, the perception of an East Asian community and common vision is only gradually emerging since the 1990s.

A. There must be widespread perception and understanding that the political and economic gains of economic integration and cooperation outweigh the costs from sacrificing some national sovereignty for the creation of common institutions and common rules and policies.

B. Currently, Southeast Asia is more integrated than northeast Asia because ASEAN has been in existence since 1967. In northeast Asia there is still considerable mistrust and conflict between Japan-China, Japan-South Korea, and South Korea-North Korea.

With issues of territorial disputes, national security, and ethnic, language, religion, social mores and cultures, more community building efforts are required to strengthen and deepen mutual understanding and to increase awareness of potential benefits of a region-wide FTA. Frequent meetings, dialogues and exchanges are required at all levels of society.

C. FTA institution building needs strong political leadership. China and Japan would be obvious powers to take the lead in an East Asia group. ASEAN is a grouping of middle and small economies that could serve as the compromise choice and with the agreement of the bigger regional powers. China, Japan and South Korea are already linked to ASEAN through the ASEAN +1 FTAs, and have close economic links and warming political relations with the ASEAN region.

(2) Diversity in Market Openness

The East Asian economies are at different stages of market opening.

A. FN applied tariffs; Low average MFN applied tariffs (no more than 3.5%) characterise Singapore, Brunei, Australia and New Zealand; moderate average tariff levels (more than 3.5% but under 10%) characterise Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Laos, Myanmar, China, and Japan; and high average tariff levels (10% or more) characterise Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, South Korea

and India. It should be noted that these simple average tariff levels mask wide diversities across sectors and tariff peaks on specific products. In addition, the countries show wide variation in the range and restrictiveness of non-tariff barriers.

B. Agricultural protection: Agriculture is more heavily protected than non-agriculture in both developed and developing economies. High agricultural average tariffs characterise Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and India. Agricultural product groups vary in their protection across countries. High average tariffs imposed for protective as well as revenue purposes characterise the beverages and tobacco product group in many countries.

(3) Extra-regional Orientation

Some East Asian economies have strong external political, security, economic and technology links with the U. S. and EU. Although intra-regional trade is increasing very fast, it is dominated by intermediate parts and components and resource-based commodities. The economies remain heavily dependent on the U. S. and EU markets for their final manufactured products, although dependence on these markets has been on the decline. Similarity in export products and competition for export markets make some countries wary of full trade liberalization. The East Asia FTA would have to be outward looking and engage the American and European blocs positively.

(4) Large Economic Diversities and Need to Narrow the Development Gap

A. The East Asian economies vary in population size between the extremes of 1.3 billion for China and 300,000 for Brunei, and in gross national income (GNI) size between the extremes of U. S. \$5.0 trillion for Japan and less than U. S. \$2 billion for Cambodia and Laos.

B. Development levels as proxied by GNI per capita ranges from U. S. \$39 thousand for Japan to under U. S. \$1,000 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, although the gap is less when measured in PPP-adjusted terms. Total

external trade exceeded U. S. \$1,000 billion for China and Japan but was only U. S. \$1 billion for Laos.

C. East Asian economies also differ in their trade/GDP ratios, from over 300% for Singapore, over 100% for Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, to 25% for Japan and 36% for Laos. FDI inflows ranged from U. S. \$55 billion for China to U. S. \$17 million for Laos.

In view of the very large economic diversities, consensus building on the scope and speed of achieving a region-wide FTA is difficult as the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalisation are unevenly distributed among economies. Conceptually, economic diversities offer complementarities and prospects of specialisation according to comparative advantage and economies of scale in regional production. However, governments would be pressured by domestic interest groups to protect less competitive sectors and delay the necessary process of economic restructuring. The challenge is how to craft a regional FTA to provide flexibility and assistance to the less developed members while at the same time pursuing a "high quality" FTA result.

Special and differential treatment (SDT) is any measure or mechanism that accommodates the constraints faced by less developed countries. The ASEAN and ASEAN + 1 agreements have provisions for longer compliance periods on market access opening, formulae for temporary opting out of specific schemes, and technical assistance and capacity building. A region-wide FTA for East Asia should contain the following elements focused on the less developed economies:

A. More time and flexibility for implementation and adjustment.

B. Development, technical and financial assistance. These would aim at building both soft infrastructure (legal, judicial and governance systems and institutions, human resources development) and specific-trade related infrastructure (logistics development, customs modernisation, support for capacity building on trade, information transparency, and outreach on business utilisation of FTAs and public understanding of the potential benefits of FTAs). Assistance with hard infrastructure (transportation and telecommunications networks and facilities) is

also needed to enable these economies to be more competitive and be more attractive to FDI.

(5) “Spaghetti Bowl” Effect

Rules of origin (ROO) are incorporated into FTAs to prevent “*trade deflection*” that is, the transshipment of products from nonpartners through a low-tariff FTA partner, in the absence of common external tariffs. A customs union would resolve the ROO problem, but economies in ASEAN and East Asia are not ready for the harmonisation of tariff regimes and non-tariff barriers required.

Restrictive ROOs distort trade, investment, and production patterns.

A. Compliance with ROO requirements could involve significant transaction and business costs and reduce the utilisation of FTA trade preferences. Complex ROOs increase the costs of compliance and disputes. Such costs tend to fall more heavily on small farmers, SMEs and less developed member countries.

B. FTA countries use restrictive and complex ROOs to protect sensitive sectors such as agricultural products and textile products. With fragmentation of production processes across borders becoming increasingly common in manufacturing, a ROO with a high value added requirement (for example 50% – 60%) can become an impossible condition, as a product incorporates imported inputs from many sources and may cross the border several times as it undergoes outward processing.

C. While the parties to a bilateral FTA each negotiate a liberalization schedule, the number of schedules or bilateral preferential relationships has the potential to increase dramatically with the number of FTA partners. For example, a plurilateral membership of 11 (as in ASEAN + 1) could conceptually give rise to 55 bilateral schemes ($n * n - 1$, divide by 2 where “ n ” is the number of countries in the FTA).

D. ROOs have different criteria of ascertaining the value added percentages, different basis for computation (ex factory cost or fob), and different applications of cumulation, de minimis, build-up/build-down, different products subject to product process criterion and different certification methods. The various plurilateral

and bilateral FTAs in East Asia give rise to the “*spaghetti bowl effect*” of a complex and inconsistent web of ROOs, product standards, and conformance requirements and diverse tariff liberalisation schedules. This reduces the benefits of economies of scale because of market segmentation and increased business transaction costs.

There is no ROO consistency among the various ASEAN + 1 agreements. Hence a harmonisation of ROOs under a region-wide FTA would increase the utilisation rate of the preferential tariffs and reduce business and transaction costs. The consolidation of existing FTAs into a region-wide FTA would not displace existing arrangements. These would continue to exist, but their provisions would prevail only to the extent that the rights and obligations under these agreements are not covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of the region-wide FTA.

5. An ASEAN +3 or ASEAN +6 Configuration?

There is no consensus on what criteria should be used to define the East Asia region, whether geography, history, economics or politics. What might emerge is a pragmatic “coalition of the willing.” There are currently two contending proposals for the region-wide FTA, one comprising ASEAN + 3 countries first mooted by South Korea and strongly supported by China, and the other comprising ASEAN +6 countries mooted by Japan and strongly supported by India, Australia and New Zealand.

(1) Economic and Political Arguments

The proposal for an ASEAN + 3 (comprising ASEAN10, China, Japan and South Korea) took shape in 2001 when the East Asia Vision Group recommended formation of an East Asia FTA (EAFTA) in its report *Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress*. This was followed by the 2002 officials’ report of the *East Asia Study Group* that proposed the ASEAN + 3 EAFTA as a mid- to long-term measure. Following the decision of the ASEAN + 3 Economic Ministers Meeting in 2004, the Joint Expert Group for Feasibility Study

on EAFTA was created and submitted its report *Towards an East Asia FTA: Modality and Road Map* in July 2006, recommending the ASEAN +3 framework to launch negotiations.

In early 2006 Japan proposed an alternative ASEAN + 6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPEA) comprising the ASEAN10, China, Japan, South Korea as well as India, Australia and New Zealand. At the time, these are also the 16 countries that participated in the East Asia Summit in December 2005.

The choice of an ASEAN +3 or ASEAN +6 configuration appears to depend crucially on the choice by ASEAN. However, ASEAN's response appears ambivalent. It argues that its priorities are on strengthening its own integration and realization of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and completing the various ASEAN +1 negotiations already underway before serious consideration can be given to the ASEAN +3 and ASEAN +6 proposals.

The inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in an East Asia FTA (CEPEA) has its critics and advocates.

A. Critics argue that these 3 countries are not part of East Asia as traditionally understood and are themselves members of other regional groupings. Their inclusion would add to the economic, political and social complexity of negotiating an FTA. Although Australia and New Zealand have extensive links with East Asia, they belong to Oceania and are members of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (ANZCERTA) and are perceived by some to be more closely aligned with the U. S. and Europe. And India has weak economic links with Southeast Asia, and is more inward-looking and protectionist than the East Asian economies so that it would be difficult to achieve trade liberalisation on a wide front with its inclusion. Further, India is part of South Asia and the South Asia FTA (SAFTA), and the Indian Prime Minister is advocating a pan-Asia FTA, a proposal that would greatly widen the geographical scope and membership of the region-wide FTA.

B. Proponents for the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India argue that these countries are already involved in FTAs with East Asia through the ASEAN-

CER (Australia and New Zealand) and ASEAN-India FTAs as well as various bilateral agreements with individual East Asian countries. These 3 countries are also members of the East Asia Summit. Australia and New Zealand have substantial trade and investment relations with East Asia and are also involved in long-standing security arrangements with some ASEAN countries. India is an emerging dynamic economic power and its economic relations with East Asian economies are growing rapidly.

(2) Modelling Results

CGE modelling results show that broadening the FTA membership from ASEAN + 3 to ASEAN + 6 increases the economic gains for participating members. Further, extending the FTA scope to include liberalisation of trade in goods and services, trade facilitation measures, and liberalisation and facilitation of foreign investment results in larger gains than just free trade in goods alone.

6. Possible Scope-Coverage and Roadmap of an East Asia FTA

(1) Scope and Coverage

A region-wide FTA will have to be a comprehensive economic partnership (CEP) or "new-age FTA", conforming to the various ASEAN + 1 agreements and maximising the benefits.

A. Liberalisation of trade in goods should cover substantially all sectors and minimise the exclusion lists of individual countries. A contentious issue in the negotiations will be key agricultural products of most countries.

B. Liberalisation of trade in services could follow the more restrictive negative list approach of the WTO and of ASEAN, or the more liberal positive list approach. However, as several East Asian countries are very sensitive to the protection of their "key" services, a negative approach looks more feasible.

C. The major benefits from the region-wide FTA are likely to be from the dynamic benefits that arise from trade facilitation measures, investment liberalisation and facilitation, and other behind-the-border measures. These have MFN characteristics, reduce business and trade costs, and improve an economy's international competitiveness.

(2) Possible Roadmaps

The region-wide FTA need not displace the existing numerous plurilateral and bilateral FTAs in East Asia. These would continue to exist, but their provisions would prevail only to the extent that the rights and obligations under these agreements are not covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of the East Asia FTA.

A number of options exist to realize the region-wide East Asia FTA. They suggest negotiating an ASEAN + 3 FTA first, and subsequently expanding into ASEAN + 6.

A. Expand and deepen the existing ASEAN + 3 framework; Current ASEAN + 3 cooperation exists only in the form of monetary and financial cooperation that includes regional surveillance, swap agreements between regional central banks, and the Asian bond market. The 2006 Report of the Joint Expert Group for Feasibility Study on EAFTA recommended launching of negotiations on an FTA in 2009, completion of negotiations by 2011, and completion of the FTA by 2016 (with 2020 for CLMV countries). This roadmap for the ASEAN + 3 option and the suggested dates take into consideration the relevant deadlines to achieve the APEC free trade and investment by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for developing countries, the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, and the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea and ASEAN-Japan free trade areas.

B. Consolidate the ASEAN Plus One FTAs: This roadmap works with either the ASEAN + 3 or ASEAN + 6 options. ASEAN has negotiated or are negotiating FTAs with China, Japan and South Korea (partners in ASEAN + 3) as well as with Australia, New Zealand and India (partners in ASEAN + 6). Hence these

ASEAN + 1 agreements could serve as the basic framework for either the ASEAN + 3 FTA or ASEAN + 6 FTA. The various ASEAN + 1 agreements are currently at various stages of implementation and negotiation. Completion dates of the FTAs are 2009 for ASEAN-Korea, 2010 for ASEAN-China and 2012 for ASEAN-Japan, with the CLMV countries given an extra 5 years to complete their commitments. On the plus side, these ASEAN + 1 agreements would already have agreed areas of liberalisation and cooperation, thus reducing the possible areas of disagreement and dispute. On the minus side, since these agreements are being negotiated without a common template, the resultant "spaghetti bowl" would be difficult to unravel, making harmonisation and convergence problematic.

C. Merge the Southeast Asian agreement with a Northeast Asian agreement; This roadmap also envisages only the ASEAN + 3 option. Southeast Asia already has ongoing ASEAN's AFTA, AFAS, AIA and an agreement to implement the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015.

There is no parallel among the Northeast Asian economies although a number of bilateral agreements are under negotiation or at the joint-study stage. A merger of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia would shift the gravity towards the Northeast since it has an economic weight of 90 percent and ASEAN has only 10 percent.

7. Conclusion

Regionalism in East Asia should lead to competitive trade and investment liberalization, spur and pressure domestic structural and policy reforms, provide the learning experience for East Asian producers and suppliers to meet the challenges of rapid globalisation as well as the rise of China and India.

However, it is essential to ensure that FTAs in East Asia, including the region-wide FTA, incorporate best practices that maximize benefits and minimize costs to its members as well as to the global trading system. These would include consistency with WTO agreements and principles. The WTO-plus features of FTAs also need to be emphasized. To the extent that these border and behind-the-border

measures are dealt with in the FTAs in East Asia, they become building blocks to global trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation.

Economic benefits are larger with a region-wide East Asia FTA than the multiple plurilateral and bilateral FTAs that exist today. However, issues of membership, scope and coverage, and modality have to be resolved. There is a trade off between breadth of membership and depth of scope and coverage. To try to achieve both, a more flexible modality will have to be adopted. Instead of a single package deal, a staggered approach might be more pragmatic. While all members sign onto a core group of FTA sectors and issues, for the more contentious issues, members could be given the option of when they are ready to sign on.

A region-wide East Asia FTA can only be realized in the medium term. Although the modelling results were clearly in favour of the ASEAN + 6 option, other factors have to be considered. Currently, ASEAN + 3 has stronger economic and non-economic linkages than ASEAN + 6. The ASEAN + 3 framework has been operating since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 1998. It would be more realistic for the region-wide FTA to begin with ASEAN + 3 and subsequently expand into an ASEAN + 6.

ASEAN Economic Regionalism in Response to Globalization and the Rise of China

Chia Siow Yue*

1. Introduction

Forming free trade areas (FTAs) has become the fashion in East Asia since the late 1990s. However, in so doing, East Asia is only catching up with the rest of the world. The WTO has reported that by end 2005 there were some 300 regional trading arrangements in operation, under negotiation or being planned. In East Asia, until the flurry of FTAs in recent years, ASEAN's free trade area was the only FTA in East Asia.

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1967 under the Bangkok Declaration. Brunei joined in the 1980s while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV - 4) joined in 1995 - 1999 after the end of the Cold War.

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ASEAN was formed to promote regional peace and security. In so doing, it provided the underpinning for each nation state to pursue its economic development objectives. Regional economic “integration” was never mentioned as an objective by ASEAN’s founding fathers.

2. Developments in ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Integration

ASEAN’s efforts to integrate its 10 economies usually responded to external threats and challenges rather than internal conviction of the benefits of economic integration. Economic cooperation schemes followed on the First ASEAN Summit in 1976 in Bali after the end of the Vietnam War. It was only at the ASEAN Summit in January 1992 that the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was born. Over the years, but more particularly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 – 1998, there was growing criticism of the slow progress in economic integration, as the many schemes and initiatives were not followed by effective implementation, particularly of the commitments on intra-regional liberalisation of trade in goods, trade in services and investment flows. Taking stock of the less than satisfactory record, ASEAN leaders agreed in October 2003 to ensure more effective implementation as well as take ASEAN economic integration further by agreeing to establish the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020.

The ASEAN10 is a grouping of countries diverse in size, resource endowment, level of economic development, technological capability, as well as political, social and cultural institutions and practices. Over the years, ASEAN’s economic diversity has widened and deepened with the differential rates of economic growth and structural change and with membership expansion. Differences in development level and economic structures have slowed the pace and form of economic liberalization and integration, as the less competitive economies are concerned over the impact of market opening on their domestic producers and service suppliers. Yet ASEAN diversity gives rise to opportunity for a regional

division of labour and regional production networks which leverage on each country's comparative advantage and cost structure. Multinational corporations (MNCs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been instrumental in establishing production networks and relocating labour intensive segments of production and assembly from countries with rising wages and costs to low wage countries in the region and forming a growing web of intra-regional trade.

The ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) was introduced in 1977 to promote regional trade but failed to live up to expectations. There were also some industrial cooperation schemes in the 1970s and 1980s. Then in 1992 ASEAN agreed to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area in response to a number of internal and external developments and pressures.

First, political, strategic and diplomatic issues had pre-occupied ASEAN leaders during the Cold War era, and they were able to focus more on economic issues after it ended. In particular, ASEAN was concerned over the emerging 1992 European Single Market and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as these trade blocs would discriminate against ASEAN exports and would make ASEAN less attractive to FDI. There was also concern over the rise of China and its competitiveness in global markets. Individual ASEAN economies were too small and lack economies of scale.

Second, the ASEAN economies, particularly Indonesia, had been unilaterally de-emphasising import substitution strategies since the mid-1980s and adopting more open trade and investment regimes and hence have become more receptive to the idea of regional free trade.

Responding to criticisms of the slow progress of ASEAN economic integration and competitive pressures posed by economic integration trends in Latin America and Eastern Europe and the economic rise of China and India, the tariff reduction schedule of AFTA (trade in goods) was accelerated with the end-date for 0 – 5% tariff level eventually forwarded to 2002 for ASEAN6 and 2006 – 2010 for the CLMV countries. The zero tariff level would be reached in 2010 for ASEAN6 and 2015 for CLMV. Services and investment liberalization are separately covered

under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) in 1995 and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Agreement in 1998.

AFTA is small compared to other regional blocs in North America and Europe. Intra-ASEAN trade accounts for less than 25% of the region's total trade, much lower than that of NAFTA or the EU. The region's trade is still dominantly conducted with non-ASEAN trading partners from the developed world, reflecting the ASEAN economies' global integration.

In response to calls that ASEAN needs to quicken, widen and deepen its economic integration to meet the challenges of globalization, regionalism in the Americas and Europe, and the rise of China, the ASEAN Summit in October 2003 agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020. The AEC will create a single market and production area with free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and freer flow of capital. AEC will turn ASEAN diversity into opportunities for economic complementation to make the ASEAN region a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain, and improve ASEAN economic competitiveness and attract investments.

The plan of action to realise the AEC has four components.

First, it will build on existing economic cooperation initiatives. ASEAN will have a work programme with clear timelines to remove all non-tariff barriers, including harmonisation of product standards and technical regulations, with 5 MRAs completed.

Second, new initiatives and measures include "fast track" vertical integration in 11 priority sectors, identified to be wood-based products, automotives, rubber based products, textiles and apparels, agro based products, fisheries, electronics, e-Asean, healthcare, air travel and tourism. Roadmaps are being developed for implementation in 2004, with active involvement of the private sector.

Third, to strengthen institutions and streamline decision-making process and ensure effective implementation of all ASEAN initiatives, measures include establishing a legal unit within the ASEAN Secretariat to provide legal advice on trade disputes; ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues; a

ASEAN Compliance Body; and an enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

Finally, the ASEAN - 6 will continue to help the CLMV - 4 in capacity building and narrow the development gap through technical and development cooperation.

3. Economic Integration Beyond ASEAN

ASEAN, although a grouping of over 500 million people in Southeast Asia, is small when compared to other major economic blocs (EU, NAFTA) and single economies (for example, U. S. , Japan, China, India) and hence needs to widen and deepen its economic networking to improve market access and trade and investment competitiveness. ASEAN is currently engaged in studies and negotiations on economic cooperation agreements with China, Japan, Australia-New Zealand CER, U. S. , India, Korea and EU.

Chronologically, proposals started with China, followed by Japan, Korea, India, U. S. , CER and EU. It reflects the grouping's political, strategic and economic importance. While U. S. , Japan, and China have larger economies than the collective ASEAN - 10, the economies of India, South Korea and CER are smaller. Per capita income of ASEAN - 10 is lower than U. S. , Japan, EU, CER, and Japan, but higher than India and China. Economic partnerships with more advanced groupings and countries are expected to be more beneficial for ASEAN as they facilitate access to not only markets but also technology and investment resources. However, partnerships with economic powers (U. S. , EU, Japan, China, India) also carry the danger of dominance and unequal bargaining leverage.

The various ASEAN + 1 economic partnership initiatives have been dubbed as FTA-plus and WTO-plus, as the scope extends beyond the FTA and beyond what is covered in the WTO. The very broad agenda extends beyond trade liberalization to encompass trade and investment facilitation; technical assistance, capacity building; and human resource development; cooperation in the development of agriculture,

industry, fishery, forestry, energy, infrastructure, small and medium enterprises, science and technology, information and communications technology; and protection of intellectual property rights and the environment.

These various economic partnership initiatives have both political and economic motivations.

A. In the ASEAN-China partnership, China seeks a friendly and cooperative Southeast Asia on its southern flank and counter the more established influences of Japan and U. S. . On the economic front, China is eyeing the ASEAN region both for its market and its raw materials, energy and mineral resources. In turn, ASEAN governments recognise China as an emerging economic power and a rapidly growing market for ASEAN products and for ASEAN services (particularly tourism). China's WTO accession also means the economic relations will be underpinned by WTO rules and disciplines. ASEAN also hopes to attract FDI to produce for the China market and to attract Chinese FDI as well. At the same time, ASEAN countries are concerned over China's competitive strengths and advantages, particularly competition in labour intensive products in domestic and global markets, and competition for global FDI and need to restructure their economies and develop economic complementarities with China.

B. Japan proposed an economic partnership agreement with ASEAN in January 2002, soon after the China initiative. Japan is increasingly concerned over the economic ascendancy of China and its growing influence in Southeast Asia and does not wish to be upstaged. Also, a closer economic partnership with ASEAN will enable Japanese businesses not to put all their investment eggs in the China basket. In turn, ASEAN recognises Japan as the most powerful economy in East Asia. Japan is a major trading partner, a major investor and a major donor of development and technical assistance for ASEAN's less developed economies.

C. India's overture to ASEAN is part of its continuing "look East" policy and economic reform and opening up to foreign trade and investment. India wants to be part of the FTA community emerging in East Asia. India has also proposed a broader pan-Asia Community, comprising ASEAN + 10, China, Japan, South

Korea and India. For ASEAN - 10, India is another emerging economic power in Asia that ASEAN would like to develop closer economic relations. India is also an Indian Ocean strategic power.

D. Australia and New Zealand have long and close ties with many East Asian economies and have aspirations to be part of East Asia. Politics led to an earlier overture by the CER for an FTA being rebuffed by ASEAN but changes in political leadership have led to a warming of economic relations.

E. Two factors appear to be driving the U. S. initiative. The first is American geo-strategic interest in moderate Muslim Southeast Asia following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U. S. The second is the rapidly emerging regionalism within East Asia and China's growing regional influence. The American initiative seeks to create a network of bilateral FTAs with different implementation schedules.

F. South Korea is the third largest industrial power in East Asia, after Japan and China, and does not want to be left out of FTA arrangements in East Asia.

G. The EU is the most successful economic bloc in the world with an expanding membership into central and eastern Europe and an active Neighbourhood Policy. With the U. S., Japan, China and India entering into formal economic agreements, it does not want to be left out of Asia.

In addition to negotiating various ASEAN + 1 agreements, individual ASEAN countries have also been active in negotiating bilateral FTAs. Singapore is in the forefront with a growing number of bilateral FTAs all over the world and many of them fore-runners of ASEAN + 1 agreements. Singapore's FTA initiatives have had a domino effect pressuring other ASEAN countries into similar agreements. However, while Singapore's negotiations have proceeded fairly smoothly because of its open trade and investment regimes and a high level of national cohesion, for some ASEAN countries FTA negotiations have met with strong resistance from different sections of society which perceive their countries and themselves as losers in the globalization and FTA race.

This mix of ASEAN-wide and bilateral agreements raises a number of issues.

First is the relationship between the ASEAN-wide agreement and the bilateral agreements. As many negotiations are still ongoing, it is unclear whether the ASEAN-wide agreement will form the framework under which bilateral agreements are negotiated, or whether the ASEAN-wide agreement will be an amalgam of bilateral agreements.

Second is ASEAN's apparent inability to negotiate as a united group. Bilateral agreements are justified on the grounds that the ASEAN economies are so diverse that it would be impractical and undesirable to negotiate on the basis of "one size fits all." Bilaterals allow for flexibility with respect to treatment of sensitive sectors and time frames. However, a divided ASEAN engaging in bilaterals will lose the hub advantage and each ASEAN country becomes a spoke of China, Japan, South Korea, CER, India, U. S. and EU. Bilaterals also allow ASEAN's FTA partners to "cherry pick."

A third key question is what to do with the "spaghetti bowl" effect of multiple and possibly conflicting rules of origin and technical and product standards created by overlapping FTAs. ASEAN governments, the business communities and the research communities need to pay more attention to these issues as ASEAN governments rush headlong into more FTAs.

Fourth, with this proliferation of ASEAN-wide and bilateral FTAs, a key question is whether the ASEAN countries, particularly the smaller and less developed, have the necessary human resources, particularly the technical and legal expertise, to engage in negotiations on so many fronts. This has serious implications also on the resources ASEAN countries have for the Doha Round negotiations. Another key question is whether pre-occupation with the ASEAN-wide and bilateral negotiations will undermine ASEAN itself - both in terms of diversion of negotiating resources as well as undermining the core importance of economic relations among Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, while busily engaged in ASEAN-wide and bilateral FTAs, ASEAN collectively and individually cannot afford to lose sight of the WTO and the Doha Development Round. Multilateralism is still the first best option and regionalism

and bilateralism are second best options. As most ASEAN economies are small and economically not advanced, they have limited bargaining leverage or recourse to dispute settlement and need the WTO to protect their interests.

4. Towards an East Asian FTA

The 1997 – 1998 Asian financial crisis clearly demonstrated the need for regional cooperation in East Asia. This has led to the ASEAN + 3 initiative (encompassing ASEAN10, Japan, South Korea and China) with the following dimensions:

A. Surveillance process: ASEAN finance ministers established the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in 1998 to monitor exchange rates, macroeconomic aggregates and sectoral and social policies. This was later extended to China, Japan and Korea under the ASEAN + 3 Surveillance Process.

B. Swap arrangement: The ASEAN Swap Arrangement was first established in 1977 among ASEAN central banks, to provide short-term swap facilities for member countries with temporary liquidity problems. ASEAN + 3 finance ministers met in May 2000 and adopted the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) involving an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement with a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN + 3 countries.

C. Asian bond market: There is great interest in developing the region's capital market to avoid the double mismatch that largely underpinned the Crisis and to exploit the huge savings available in the region. In addition to the ASEAN + 3's Asian Bond Market Initiative, there are several Asian bond market initiatives under implementation and discussion.

D. Other proposals: Various fora in the region have also mooted ideas of pooling of foreign reserves to form an Asian Monetary Fund and a common currency or monetary union. These proposals are only feasible in the longer term.

In November 1998 Korea proposed an *East Asia Vision Group (EAVG)* to present a vision for East Asian cooperation. This led to various reports and studies

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

in subsequent years on the objective, modality and membership of East Asian economic integration.

E. Objective and scope: The hierarchy of economic integration ranges from sectoral integration to free trade areas, customs unions, and finally common market and economic community. Given East Asia's diversity as well as sensitivity on national sovereignty, forming an economic community along the model of the European Union, with the creation of supranational institutions and significant surrender of national sovereignty, would be difficult to achieve in the near term. Even ASEAN, which has been in existence for 40 years will find it difficult to adopt the EU model. An East Asia FTA is the most likely objective, but even that would be difficult to achieve in the near term.

F. Modality: The current proliferation of regional, sub-regional and bilateral FTAs could serve as building blocs for an East Asia FTA, although overcoming the spaghetti bowl effect would be challenging. A starting point could be to deepen the current ASEAN + 3 cooperative arrangements to encompass liberalization of trade in goods and services and investment; trade and investment facilitation; competition policy; intellectual property rights; government procurement; and technical and development cooperation. With the experience of ASEAN and various ASEAN + 1 and bilateral FTA negotiations, finding common ground in the negotiations to achieve a successful outcome would be difficult.

G. Membership: There are currently two proposals being considered, one involving ASEAN + 3 economies (ASEAN 10, Japan, Korea, China) and the other ASEAN + 6 economies (ASEAN + 3, Australia, New Zealand and India). Others argue that an East Asian grouping should be confined to East Asia, thus excluding non-East Asian economies of Australia, New Zealand and India. It would be a difficult political decision.

The Rationale for East Asia Community Building: The Economic Dimension of Regional and Global Governance Issues

Jesus P. Estanislao, Ph. D. *

1. Introduction^①

The Asian financial crisis, which affected large swathes of the East Asian economic region slightly more than a decade ago, is remembered in a typically Asian manner. The enormous cost of the crisis is properly acknowledged. At the same time, the tapping of the opportunities that has enabled the region to recover from the crisis is quietly celebrated.

The cost has been counted not only in terms of values lost and resources spent in economic and financial restructuring. It has also been reckoned in terms of the destabilization that inevitably spread from the economic and financial spheres into

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① The basic reference used in writing this paper is: Gill, Indermit and Kharas, Homi; "An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth", 2006, Washington D. C.

the political and social spheres as well. In some economies of the region, changes in government were unexpectedly speeded up as millions of their citizens were swept back below the poverty line.

There can be no under-estimating the cost of the Asian financial crisis. But there can be no closing of the eyes either to the opportunities for recovery that virtually all economies in the region seized. With the hindsight that a decade now affords, it appears that the lights switched on by opportunities smartly seized look brighter than the shadows cast in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.

Indeed, there is hardly any talk in the region of a decade lost. Rather, much of the reference is to the remarkable recovery that the region has been able to stage. Looking at the region as a whole, real GDP has grown at an annual average rate of 9%. Export growth has been even much higher, such that the region now accounts for one-fifth of the global export volume. Complemented by significant inflows of FDI into the region, these export surpluses have enabled virtually all economies in the region to boost their foreign exchange reserves significantly.

Moreover, in light of the immediate aftermath of the crisis, two positive developments need to be highlighted.

First, in the decade since the onset of the Asian financial crisis, it is estimated that on a net basis, some 300 million people in the region have crossed over the poverty line, offsetting the millions that were thrown back below it at the start of the crisis. And second, the region is no longer a set of individual economies gasping for financial support from economies and multilateral institutions outside the region. It has become much more integrated so that there is now much more substance to referring to East Asia as one economic region. After all, intra-regional trade in East Asia now accounts for 54% of its total trade. This is admittedly still a shade below the 60% that the EU claims. But it is already above the corresponding 45% of NAFTA.

Much of what has been achieved in the region can be traced to the remarkable economic performance of China. Its economy has been growing, generally at double digit rates, or at rates very close to double digit. China's ability to sell in

export markets and to attract significant amounts of FDI has enabled it to build its exchange reserves to unparalleled heights. Looking up to those heights, other economies, particularly the U. S. and those in the EU as well, have been pressing China to allow its exchange rate to move accordingly. Indeed, in the decade after the Asian financial crisis, China has loomed very large, not only in affecting the recovery of the entire East Asian region, but also in shaping economic perceptions in global financial markets.

China's dramatic economic performance during the past decade has been phenomenal indeed. No other economy, in the region or anywhere else, comes anywhere close. But China has not been alone in growing its GDP and its export volume. Neither has it been alone in attracting FDIs and in building foreign exchange reserves. Virtually all other economies in the region have been following suit, in part being pulled up by China's economic dynamism.

All the other economies in the East Asian region have been playing a part in driving the region forward. Through mainly "market-driven" policies, they have been able to achieve higher levels of GDP growth. And as a "natural by-product" of higher rates of GDP growth and of relatively more open trade regimes, they have been able to raise their export growth rates even more significantly. In the process, they too have been able to contribute to the much higher degree of "regionalization" in East Asia.

Japan, in particular, has been notable for its contribution to a higher degree of "regionalization". Despite the much slower growth of the Japanese economy during the period, still Japanese multinationals have been able to play a very significant role towards making East Asia a more cohesive economic region in the decade since the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Japanese multinationals have been sending as much as 80% of their exports from their East Asian affiliates to other countries in the region. And these Japanese multinationals have been sourcing as much as 95% of their imports from their affiliate plants located in other East Asian economies.

East Asia, then, seems to have emerged within the decade since the start of the Asian financial crisis as a much more integrated region to a point where referring to

an East Asian economic region has almost as much substance as referring to the EU as one European economic region and, even more so, to NAFTA as one North American economic region. The higher level of regionalization in East Asia has been achieved mainly through intra-regional trade, which has been facilitated by higher real economic growth, greater reliance on market-driven policies and more open trade regimes.

In this light, the dream of eventually building an East Asian community within the region, initially through more free and open trade, has been gradually realized in the past decade. The tentative arrangements for more free and open trade in the region that were almost gingerly put in place, starting with ASEAN and lately also extending ASEAN to include other East Asian economies, may have survived the skepticism generally heaped upon them. These arrangements may yet provide a useful framework and one of several venues for efforts at bringing the level of regionalization in East Asia to an even much higher level.

2. A Framework for Further Regionalization in East Asia

Once brought to a fork by the Asian financial crisis, the economies in the region could have chosen to go down the road of putting up barriers and closing themselves up from the cross-currents of more open economic interaction with each other and with the rest of the world. To their credit, they chose instead to move up the road towards more free and open trade. The choice may not have been easy for a few economies in the region. But it was helped by the much greater reliance on markets that key economies in the region decided upon, e. g. China and Japan, and by the generally favorable environment for exports into key markets, particularly the U. S. and other developed economies as well.

It is sometimes easy to turn a blind eye on the positive boost that more free and open markets can give to economies. The debate on further market opening never stops. And negotiations for further moving up the scale towards more free and open trade arrangements on a global scale can be tortuous and stretched. The Doha

Round keeps missing deadlines and would, at the time of writing, need heroic efforts to bring it back to life. Nonetheless, it is difficult to close our eyes to the positive developments in East Asia that have been facilitated by more open trading regimes in the past decade.

More open trade regimes bring up trade volumes not only on the basis of factor endowments, but also increasingly on the basis of scale economies. Through tight supply chain management that new technology now makes possible, East Asia has made significant strides in intra-industry trade. Trade in parts and components has boosted intra-regional trade, with various plants located in different countries being able to work in close sync with one another, in order to more effectively and efficiently serve final consumer markets, particularly in more developed markets such as the U. S. and the EU. Under supply chain arrangements, specialized firms are being continuously pressed to innovate, go for higher quality, and cut costs as they try to take advantage of the increased size of the market they jointly serve. The combination of specialized focus and much bigger volumes gives much greater impetus towards even further innovation.

Innovation used to be a near monopoly of the West. And East Asia had been getting the reputation of being merely good copyists, cheap imitators, and technology-pirates. In the past decade, however, as the relationship between production sites and final markets has become much closer and as supply chains have become more efficient, R&D networks have been strengthened and multiplied. Ideas have traveled more quickly and freely, and more innovation has been done much closer to production sites in East Asia. The number of patents taken out by North East Asia — particularly Japan, China, and South Korea — has gone up dramatically in more recent years. The more open transmission of skills and exchange of ideas and scientific insights have also been facilitated by easier and more frequent travel and longer stay abroad on the part of research personnel from East Asia.

Where trade and technology lead, there finance follows. As real economic growth picked up and as trade volumes from the region rose even more

impressively, investment opportunities in the region became more attractive. China, in particular, and to a lesser extent the other economies in East Asia, also became the destination of foreign direct investment flows. Every East Asian economy did in fact take advantage of higher FDI inflows and higher trade surpluses to build up their foreign exchange reserves. They also started to engage in initial conversations to set up at least limited arrangements by which to jointly mitigate risks that could lead to a repetition of the financial crisis of the previous decade. Economies in the region decided to set up a limited pool of exchange reserves as a first step towards ensuring against the return of the financial crisis of the 1990s. They also began discussion about an Asian bond market. All these are just slightly more than straws in the wind for now. But they point to the direction where winds would be blowing in the future, and that is towards greater regional financial cooperation.

Trade, technology, and finance have thus reinforced each other in a manner that has more broadly integrated East Asian economies with the global economy. In the process of such integration, they have also gotten to be much more closely integrated with each other such that substantively speaking an East Asian economic region has emerged. The main pillars of such an economic region are the big economies in the region, Japan and China. Both have maintained largely open trade regimes. They also have relied more on the dynamics of market forces to drive the economic reforms they were undertaking and particularly in the case of China to rev up its economic and export engines. The smaller economies in the region pursued similar market orientation and more open trade regimes. They too have contributed dynamically to the increasing integration of East Asia to the global economy as well as to the emergence of the East Asian economic region.

As the economies in the East Asian region got increasingly integrated with the global economy mainly through greater reliance on market processes, they were however increasingly faced with challenges to their domestic, internal integration. The scale economies that trade, technology and finance were making possible also brought with them social and other consequences which put increasing pressure upon

the domestic cohesion of several East Asian societies.

Perhaps, the most noticeable of such consequences is the increasing concentration of people and economic activity in cities. Increased economic activity tends to be location-specific; and it tends to be concentrated in a few centers. Indeed, economies of scale call for concentration and even further agglomeration of economic activity and of people. People migrate, generally from the less developed countryside with much fewer economic opportunities to the centers of industrial production, trade, and export activity.

All this tends to widen inequality of economic opportunity and income levels. A gap grows between the urban and rural divide as well as between segments of a nation's geography (south and north, east and west, interior and coastal areas, etc.). Furthermore, the pressure of immigration into a few industrial urban centers brings spatial challenges such as congestion, garbage and sewage disposal, pollution, snarled traffic, and where city governments are relatively weak also slums and squatter colonies. Where all these challenges are not properly and adequately met, crime surges and the sense of security in a few urban areas considerably falls.

The burden of having to meet these challenges falls upon city governments that have been required to make adjustments in governance paradigms and improvements in technical capacity at a pace generally faster than could normally be expected. As challenges to them grow, so do opportunities open up as newer and higher level of resources flood into their areas. Together with these opportunities come greater temptations for graft and corruption involving enormous amounts. For several ordinary city government officials, these temptations are often too great to resist such that corruption rockets up to the top priority as a public concern.

East Asia, in the past decade, has had to face these consequences which challenge the internal, domestic cohesion of their societies. Concentration of economic opportunities in a few urban centers, congestion, and corruption have become increasingly serious concerns that keep crying louder for attention and purposeful action. Failure to meet these challenges has often given a bad face to

closer integration with the rest of the world, i. e. to “globalization.” Even in the societies of East Asia that have been benefiting from closer integration with the global economy, and therefore from “globalization,” the word “globalization” — often attracts demonstrators sufficiently incensed by the triple “C”s that have come in the wake of scale economies; concentration, congestion, and corruption.

Moving forward, with East Asia having become increasingly one economic region, the key issue, then, that has to be resolved is: how to continue to take advantage of the positive consequences of scale economies while confronting effectively their negative consequences on societies in the region. In other words, how can East Asia continue to interconnect with the rest of the world and with each other, i. e. continue with global integration, while resolving the difficult problems from concentration, congestion and corruption that are putting enormous pressure on the domestic integration of many societies in the region?

It is in having to face up to this issue that many avenues have opened up for East Asia moving forward, beyond being merely one economic region and becoming one economic-plus region as well (if it is deemed premature to aim at becoming one community) in the decade ahead.

3. The Road Ahead for East Asia

If East Asia has been able to post a remarkable recovery from the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago with heavy reliance on market-driven forces and more open trade regimes, then moving forward should draw impetus from the region's commitment to continue to allow markets to work. It would be foolhardy for the economies in the region to scale down on such a commitment, which can continue to provide headwinds to their economic sails.

Either individually or increasingly through regional arrangements such as ASEAN-plus or more fittingly under the newer and broader auspices of the East Asian Summit, the economies in the region should continue to exploit scale economies by facilitating the further growth and development of networks engaged

in the parts and components trade. Indeed, there is wide scope for further expanding the regional production networks by broadening as well as further tightening the logistical supply-chain systems that are already working across several economies in the region. Inter-governmental initiatives could aim at simplifying, making consistent, and eventually unifying the wide variety of rules, such as those related to rules of origin, and more broadly the special economic partnership arrangements or bilateral trade agreements that have been and are in process of being forged within East Asia.

As innovation centers gain further ground and achieve more success within the region, more open mechanisms should be set up to ensure and enhance "regional knowledge and technology spillovers." The flow should be expanded from the vertical channels running from more developed economies from outside the region, such as the U. S. and the EU, to the economies in Northeast Asia. This should now be increasingly complemented by horizontal channels established between several economies in the region. To begin setting up these alternative horizontal channels and to systematically develop them, encouragement and facilitation of cooperation between research centers, scientific laboratories, and graduate institutes, including eventually between universities in the region should be provided. Regional cooperation should therefore include among its top priorities in the next few decades greater coordination and support for upgrading tertiary education and more meaningful exchange programs as well as scientific and technical inter-action between research institutes and graduate centers in various economies.

Regional financial cooperation also needs to be pushed further. Now that the symbolic agreements to pool limited amounts of exchange reserves have been forged, the next more substantive steps should be taken. These may include the wider spread of improved risk management systems and the possible sharing of best practices in risk management at both the micro-economic and macro-economic levels. Corporate bond markets need to be given further impetus so financial markets can be further developed and strengthened in various economies. The initial efforts towards linking the region's capital markets more closely and more inter-

actively together should never be allowed to flag. They should in fact be encouraged by the stark imbalances, and the problems those imbalances create, in the financial relations between the individual economies in the region (e. g. China) with the more developed financial markets, particularly the U. S. financial market.

The market trinity marked out by trade, innovation, and finance, therefore, does provide a rich and fertile ground for the economies in the region from which to further push their economic growth, moving forward. As they continue to work on such a favorable ground, they need to consider undertaking further initiatives, such as those indicated in very broad terms above, either individually or preferably in solidarity with many other market-minded economies in the region. As they attempt to do so, they will find that they would continue to rely mainly upon governmental leadership and inter-governmental cooperation within the region. But the role of governments, i. e. the role of the state, needs to be increasingly complemented by the role of business enterprises, i. e. corporations, and of tertiary educational institutions, such as universities and graduate research centers. Corporations and universities need to be drawn much more pro-actively into the challenges — there are always newer and more of these challenges — that market-oriented economies face. Moreover, these challenges arise from the dynamics of more open and robust competition within markets. And it is corporations, with tertiary educational institutions playing a positive and supportive role to them, that need to meet the challenges of market competition. Beyond a point, after the “rules of the game” have been set and the framework for competition policy has been provided by governments and inter-governmental agreements, it is corporations — which stand or fall on the basis of their competitiveness and their general ability to play effectively with market forces — that should carry the ball. At that point and much more so beyond it, states should become less and less; and corporations should take on more and more strategic and operational responsibility, on their own, within the economy. East Asia may well be reaching this point within the decade ahead.

If in the next stage that East Asia is entering in the next decade of continuing commitment to markets, business corporations are to play a much greater role, on

their own, with much lesser dependence upon the state and state-managed arrangements, then the manner in which corporations are governed becomes a critical concern. The corporate governance of business corporations that compete in increasingly free and open markets needs to be subject to clear "rules of the game" and a publicly acceptable framework. Markets are increasingly demanding that these rules and this framework should be in line with professional and ethical standards as well as the demands of social responsibility. Governments should insist on setting these rules and standards and on ensuring that the demands of social responsibility are met. But compliance remains the responsibility of the corporations themselves, which should increasingly hold themselves more transparently accountable to free and open markets. In living up to professional, technical, ethical, and social-responsibility standards, corporations should be able to bank upon the active and dynamic support of independent tertiary educational institutions with their different graduate research centers and technical institutes.

Business corporations and tertiary educational institutions operate at the micro-economic level within the macro-economic "rules of the game" and market competition framework that governments provide. In the next few decades, the economies in East Asia would continue to rely upon their governments to further improve the rules of the game and enter into inter-governmental regional arrangements further refining and operationalizing the market competition framework for the region. More macro-economic work needs to be undertaken and accomplished. But even more work at the micro-economic level needs to be accomplished so as to complement and give further substance to the work of governments and between governments in the region. Institution-building in the business corporate sector as well as at level of specialized tertiary educational and research institutes becomes even more compelling and important as a complement to continued nation-building. The success in East Asia with regard to the former (institution-building) as a major complement to the latter (further nation-building) can help secure further progress of East Asia as an economic-plus region. Even more, it would have taken decisive steps towards the higher and more ambitious

dream of becoming an East Asian community.

These steps, to be taken within the rich ground marked out by the market trinity of trade, innovation, and finance, need to be complemented by steps addressing the triple challenges that have come along with economic growth and high export volumes in the past decade. The major challenges are from congestion, cohesion, and corruption. These need to be faced decisively and effectively; otherwise, the failure to address them properly could slow and eventually stall the economic and export engines of the region.

Mega-cities have developed. Metropolitan centers have spread in the region. Fortunately, the development and spread of these mega-cities and metropolitan centers have come along with the growth of many more mid-sized and small cities. The problems of congestions have thus far become acute in the former, i. e. the mega-cities and metropolitan centers. Some of them can be alleviated by providing more efficient interconnection between the former with the latter, i. e. several of the emerging mid-sized and even smaller cities. Fortunately, resources are increasingly available — in part as a consequence of higher economic growth — from within the economies of East Asia for constructing the interconnection infrastructure such as road and railway networks as well as airports and harbors. Moreover, standards of public governance, even for the latter are being raised. And greater efforts should be directed, in the next decade, towards sharing best practices in the public governance of cities and of component cities and municipalities of metropolitan centers. More attention should be paid to the closer coordination between the governance initiatives — and between the public works and infrastructure projects embedded in those initiatives — of various local governments so that economies of scale can be positively tapped from the greater interconnection between them. The “external economies” from more efficient interconnection between cities and surrounding municipalities should be tapped to help address urban congestion and towards making cities more livable as well as more economically competitive.

The challenge to cohesion from the rising inequality brought in part by high economic and export growth in a few industrial centers needs to be met by providing

wider access to skills training, continuing education, and to other social services such as basic health care and community organization. In varying degrees, this access is already being provided through various programs that governments and civil society organizations are undertaking. Governments are however finding that there are limits to their effectiveness, particularly their cost-effectiveness, in providing such access to a much wider range of the population that such programs need to cover. Civil society organizations, on their part, are also finding that they too are subject to deficits particularly in accountability and transparency. Moreover, the limited resources for, and the even more limited coordination between, their social outreach programs generally limit their over-all effectiveness. Clearly, within economies as well as between economies in the region, greater exchange of best practices should be placed as a priority item in the regional cooperation agenda of East Asia. In particular, the exchange of best practices in providing access to various social services, particularly access to skills formation and continuing education for those segments of the population unable to go to tertiary education, should be facilitated between the various economies in the region.

The challenge from corruption cannot be fully met by simple decentralization of governmental power. Decentralization has to be accompanied by positive efforts at helping local governments, starting with those made responsible for mid-sized and smaller cities, to raise the standards of their public governance practices. These standards call for more effective mechanisms ensuring greater transparency and public accountability. These mechanisms need to be systemic, involving the participation of the socially responsible sectors in the city. Often, a multi-sectoral coalition, made up of business, academe, media, civil society organizations, professional organizations, can be encouraged to work positively and constructively with local officials of the city so as to pursue a common road map for the community. The public governance paradigm would call for their participation and contribution towards the accomplishment of various projects and targets embedded in the city road map. Thus, responsible citizens and public officials have a joint stake in promoting the development of their city in a more transparent environment

with shared accountability and zero tolerance for corruption.

Indeed, throughout the region, political power is becoming more contestable. In many economies of the region, a transition is well in process, from the rule of man to the rule of law. As this transition gathers momentum, public governance initiatives aimed at raising transparency and accountability as well as the standards of professionalism and social responsibility can be more openly shared. The emerging best practices, which have already been tested in a number of cities and local government units across the region, should be more freely exchanged and more broadly spread.

The triple challenges from congestion, rising inequality straining internal, domestic cohesion, and corruption can be met in the next decade across the region with the heavy involvement of governments. Not only national governments, however, need to be involved. Increasingly, also local governments have to be given a greater share of the responsibility; and at the local level, there is greater imperative as well as greater opportunity for the involvement and participation of sectors and various citizens' groups. Provided they are steeped in the discipline of responsibility citizenship, these groups can and should be brought into the public governance process as positive and meaningful contributors to good governance and community development.

The threats to internal, domestic integration in various economies in the region can be more effectively countered, therefore, if efforts of governments at the national level are complemented by efforts of more genuinely empowered local governments, starting with those of cities and the municipalities immediately surrounding them. These local governments, however, need to have their capacity for public governance built and brought up to higher levels of transparency, accountability, and professionalism. To effectively assist them in this regard are sectoral groups and other associations, particularly those promoting the interests of families within the community, which also have to step up the plate of social responsibility as constructive partners of their local public officials. Sharing of best practices in public governance, particularly at the local level, also provide a rich

field for regional cooperation in East Asia.

4. Prospects for Greater Solidarity in the Region

The agenda laid out for initiatives within economies in East Asia as well as initiatives for greater regional cooperation in the region, moving forward, is broad and wide-ranging. It spans the wide range from building on the strengths already achieved through commitment to greater reliance on open and competitive markets to addressing the weaknesses that have put heavy pressure on domestic integration and that have come largely in the wake of greater integration with global markets.

Indeed, there is a rich field for positive initiatives called for by the continued and even deeper commitment to market competition on the part of economies in East Asia. These initiatives are called for the market trinity of trade, innovation and finance. All these would require the continued involvement of national governments dealing with macro-economic issues. But even greater involvement would be necessary on the part of business corporations supported by research and educational institutions at the tertiary level. Their involvement, necessarily at the more micro-economic level, would have to be guided by the principles and best practices of corporate and institutional governance in line with professional and ethical standards that markets have increasingly been demanding.

There is an equally rich field for initiatives called for by the imperative of meeting the pressures exerted upon domestic integration arising in part from higher economic and export growth in many parts of the region. Indeed, the pressures from congestion, rising inequality, and corruption would have to be mitigated by positive initiatives on the part of national governments in the region. However, governments at the national level, in many economies, are finding it necessary, even increasingly essential, to count upon the greater and more socially responsible involvement of local governments and intermediate social groups, starting with associations of families and other sectors in local communities. But at this sub-

national, local level, the standards of public governance practices need to be significantly raised. Transparency and accountability as well as higher professional and technical competence need to be added to social responsibility in the public governance practice of local governments that must bank on the participation and sustained involvement of intermediate groups in the community.

All these initiatives are open to, and in some instances ripe for, greater and more intense cooperation between economies in the region.

The agenda for regional cooperation in East Asia, moving forward, extends to concerns that go beyond the narrow fields traditionally reserved for macro-economics and finance. It includes related fields carved out by more open market competition between business corporations at the micro-economic level as well as more substantive cooperation and mutual support between research and graduate institutions. Issues related to economic geography such as the rise of middle-sized cities becoming more inter-connected with each other and particularly with the bigger metropolitan centers, also get into the agenda. The priority list of the agenda would also include issues from welfare economics such as access to skills training, continuing education and other vital social services, especially for the more marginalized segments of the population. Looming up as umbrella issues are those directly connected with corporate, institutional and public governance. The expansion of the agenda comes from the wider and deeper realization that East Asia has recovered from the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago; and that it has done so by following a framework relying heavily upon scale economies and the imperative of maintaining domestic cohesion through higher standards of public governance practice.

By taking on such a broader agenda, the economies of East Asia could find many concrete steps they can take individually and increasingly also together as a regional group. These steps could add many more pluses to the economic region they have already built in the decade after the Asian financial crisis. Should they succeed in adding those many pluses, it is possible that a realistic ground can be laid for the East Asian economic region to begin moving more decisively towards

building the components, which in time can be put together for an East Asian community. The impact from those pluses could also add force to the winds behind the sails to further economic growth, let alone to even much higher levels of integration within the region.

中国的和平发展与亚洲区域主义

A New Silk Road? China in the Global Marketplace

Gary Wihl*

We are at a point in history where China is fully re-engaged in global trade, investment, and wealth accumulation to a level not seen since the era of the Silk Road. At the same time, globalization in China has foreign connotations of modernization and westernization through the adoption of open market principles and competitive models of production. Globalization creates new historical problems for China through the homogenization of products and methods of production. Following the insights of the economist Amartya Sen, this paper offers a concept of globalization that is beneficial for East and West by focusing on the ways that trade and growth build human capability. Sen defines capability as the production and exchange of knowledge as well as goods and distribution of greater wealth. For educators and university leaders, his focus on the production and exchange of knowledge across borders modifies narrowly Western definitions of globalization. A capabilities approach to the issues of globalization promotes the need for greater exchange of knowledge across national borders in order to achieve scientific and aesthetic innovation. Innovation across borders counters the tendency toward

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homogeneous products and consumption associated with globalization. Through greater exchange of scientific and aesthetic knowledge, China may contribute to a new globalization based on the principle of building human capability.

My presentation will be in three parts. First, I will give an historical example of innovation and trade from the Silk Road. This example will demonstrate the lasting benefits of greater capability through the creation of precious artifacts of lasting value. Second, as a point of contrast, I will discuss some of the modern difficulties associated with globalization in China as described by Yu Keping. Last, I will attempt to answer those difficulties with reference to the writings of the economist Amartya Sen.

1. An Historical Example of Innovation and Trade

The term "Silk Road" is not of Chinese origin. It is a term invented in the 19th century by the German explorer Baron Ferdinand von Richtofen to define the vast trading network that stretched from China to the Mediterranean Sea, encompassing five thousand miles of travel and commerce across Tajikistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria to Greece, and all the way to the south of India. Principal Chinese cities on the Silk Road include Beijing, Xi'an, Lanzhou and Ganzhou. Over a period of 1,300 years, vast numbers of people occupied new territory, developed new technologies, and introduced new military techniques, including the horse mounted warrior, and developed new manufacturing techniques and new forms of music. Today, the Silk Road inspires efforts in the West to gain a better understanding of Chinese history and culture through many exhibitions of artefacts, textiles, and musical instruments. In 2006, the Art Institute of Chicago launched the Silk Road project to demonstrate the beauty and complexity of China's engagement with the Muslim and Western civilizations for many centuries. Currently, in New York City, there is a major exhibitions on the theme of the Silk Road at the American Museum of Natural History. James Cuno, the Director of the Art Institute of Chicago, has written, "beautiful things" help us understand the past; they are

enduring expressions of the human spirit that outlast many difficult conditions that may have been part of their origin, such as economic hardship, military violence, or the challenges of disease. Cuno gives us an interesting example of lasting beauty, a Ming dynasty Jar, from the reign of Xuande (1426 – 1435), made of porcelain with a blue glaze. The beauty of this blue glazed vessel also tells us an important story about the transmission of knowledge and provides an excellent example of human capability.

The discovery of blue glaze occurred in Iraq, through the use of the chemical cobalt in the firing process. The process spread to China where it was perfected to the level of a fine decoration of blue glazed porcelain, which then became a desired commodity in the West and led to the establishment of new industries for making fine “China” ware in Holland, where it continues today in the famous Delft brand.

Similarly, the much admired “Celadon” glaze, or green glaze, associated with the finest Korean ceramics, originated in China, when Chinese artists discovered the application of iron oxide mixed with very high heat on the surface of a clay vessel. The perfection of green hues, like the perfection of blue glaze, become an expression of highest artistic quality, particularly in Korea, where the Chinese invention was copied and modified according to local tastes, for example the delicate mixing of red accents in the green that defined the Goryeo celadon.

The discovery, transmission, adoption, and circulation of delicate, artistic forms of glazing is an example of capability building across cultures. What does the elegant vase, its simple perfection, standing for one thousand years, tell us? It is the product of many cultures, each building upon one facet of another culture, in shape, in color, in manufacturing technique, and then in the establishment of a distinctive taste. Let us keep this example in mind when we examine the definition of capability in the work of Amartya Sen. First, however, let us contrast the story of the blue and the green glaze with the problematic definition of globalization as it is applied to modern trade and manufacture.

2. Yu Keping on Globalization versus Westernization

The Chinese intellectual Yu Keping has written many essays on the problem of globalization, westernization, and modernization because these terms, which always overlap and mingle in meaning, have been part of China's struggle for reform according to its own historical trajectory. Externally, China has modernized and to a degree westernized because it has joined the international market for goods, resources, and capital investment. Internally, Chinese intellectuals like Yu Keping focus on the cultural and social impact of much greater contact with the industrialized democracies of America and Western Europe. Our world cannot be compared to the world of the Silk Road because modern production and consumption moves toward the mass production of high quality goods at the lowest possible cost. The competition is not for beauty and capability but for mass production and consumption. Even scientific and aesthetic innovation has become intertwined with laws of property and private ownership under a new legal regime of incentives. In the debates that focus on cultural assimilation, the definition of citizenship and rights, and how to achieve national wealth, there is a struggle between openness and protection, advancement and loss of historical identity. Many Chinese intellectuals want to embrace elements of reform external to China that lead to success, competitiveness, and wealth but they do not advocate imitation of western society, where they also see many problems of disruptive economic cycles, complicated tensions between rich and poor, wasteful use of resources and wasteful food production. In the complicated world of modernity, the exchange of knowledge, skills, and goods also involves new patterns of activity that could affect social structures and social stability.

Yu Keping sees a response to the contradictions of globalization in the new discourse of Chinese intellectuals called "cultural self-consciousness." Building upon the work of the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong, self consciousness rejects reform as an effort to replace the old with the new. It means "weeding through the

old to bring forth the new as well as learning about the new by returning to a study of the old for insight." In effect, Yu Keping and Fei Xiaotong help us narrow the focus from very abstract debates about globalization, industrialization, modernization, where the question of what is good or bad cannot be answered clearly. Cultural self consciousness means examining what endures in the culture over time and has the strength to be exported to other countries. We know that management models from the west, methods of scientific inquiry, models of university education have indeed produced great success in the west. But they do not define the entire function of western societies. They are the elements of western society that have the strength to shape practices in developing societies. Cultural self consciousness avoids a focus on the appeal of "showmanship" — foreign cultural elements that do not really transfer capacity or strength. The Chinese definition of "self-consciousness" turns our attention to specific cultural elements that may be integrated and joined with other cultures. This emphasis, set in the context of the homogenizing forces of globalization, offers new opportunities for economic exchange and growth through the transfer of specific strengths. In order to reinforce and develop this point, I would like to conclude my presentation by connecting "self-consciousness" with the work of Amartya Sen on human capability.

3. Answer Those Difficulties about the Writings of the economist Amartya Sen

The Nobel Prize economist Amartya Sen has put the topic of globalization at the center of his most recent writings. His newest book, *Identity and Violence*, discusses the negative forces of globalization when nation states look at each other in simple terms, as predominantly Christian or Muslim, or Anglo Saxon, or African, or Western. These categories, according to Sen, are the product of historical metanarratives that do not do justice to the true complexity, history, and development of cultures and populations. As an economist, Sen is primarily

concerned with bringing the abstract principles of the market down to the description of how to build human capacity to deal with the problems of massive poverty, disease, nutrition, and beneficial productivity. “Business” is one thing; the complicated interactions that have shaped scientific progress, medical discovery, modern architecture is another thing.

As a native of India, Sen has also taken a particular interest in the role of India and China in the new global economy, where we now look for new wave of growth that will drive further expansion and trade with the Western economies. India must overcome certain colonial legacies that present a false image of India's historical achievements and relationships with other nations. Many so called Western innovations, including the compass and the use of magnetism as a tool of navigation, trigonometry and algebra, advances in metalworking and agriculture were developed in China, in some cases through scholars travelling along the Silk Road to and from India and Arabia. Sen wants to deconstruct the image of India and China as part of the development of a global sugar and textile economy in the 17th and 18th centuries. Not only does a simple view of history distort the benefits of shared discoveries and transmission of knowledge, it narrows the view of what can actually be accomplished through greater cooperation between modern nation states. For example, in our century pharmaceuticals, diagnostic medical technologies (genetic testing as well as new forms of radiology), new forms of arts like film, offer the same possibilities of lasting social and economic value as the sharing of techniques for the creation of new objects of beauty and value during the time of the Silk Road. When we look at the creation of new knowledge and application, we must focus attention on what the Chinese call “strength” or what Sen calls “capability” — a higher level of shared skills in the workforce, which will raise standards of living and improve human welfare. For this potential to be realized, governments and business leaders can learn much from the work of historians and economists and sociologists with a philosophical perspective like Sen or Yu Keping. In the coming years, it will be exciting to observe the emergence of new ideas and ways of thinking coming from the East and as much as from the West.

The 2008 – 2009 Global Economic Crisis and the China Phenomenon: The Asian Development Model Revisited

Xiaoming Huang *

The global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 has prompted scholars and commentators to look back and compare it to the Great Depression in the 1930s. The underlying message appears to be that the scale and nature of the economic crisis is comparable to the Great Depression and therefore a new Roosevelt-type New Deal might be justified in response. Indeed, rescue packages in 2008 and 2009 by governments in countries from the United States to China, from Japan, Korea to the European Union, have built a sense of *déjà vu* among attentive observers over the classic debate on state-market relations in a modern economy.

Along with this almost end-of-world cry over the economic crisis, there was a celebration of China's 30 years of rapid economic growth in 2008. Much of the attention has been focused on the unique path of China's economic reform and social development, and how the emergent economic institutions and the enduring

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political structure worked together as an emergent system of political economy that no one can fully describe, using existing theories and concepts.

Ironically though, in both cases, the Asian financial crisis 14 years ago and more broadly the East Asian model of rapid economic growth since World War II have not featured well in the debate. There have been whispers within some circles that the responses to the economic crisis by governments around the world jibe with what the East Asian model is known for: government intervention to govern the market (Johnson 1982, Wade 1990). But overall, economists, political economists and politicians seem to be quiet about the striking resemblance between the rescue/relief packages of today in the free market economies, and government intervention and guidance in the not so free East Asian economies in their rapid growth period.

There are strong reasons to believe that the model of China's rapid economic growth of the past 30 years shared many important features of the model of rapid economic growth in East Asian economies. But the distinct background of the socialist system prior to its current growth cycle and the fact that its "Asian model" growth started much later than its fellow East Asian economies defy attempts from the very beginning to see China's growth as part of the East Asian model.^① For many, because of China's levels of economic development and the complexity of its political and economic system, the Chinese economy and other East Asian economies are simply incomparable. More specifically, China's corporate governance and bank-firm relations are different, and the labour market is more flexible and competitiveness in the domestic market is much higher.^②

As such, we do not learn much about the pattern of the rise and fall of the growth model in these East Asian economies. We learn how and why the East Asian economies rose, but not much of why and how they fell. At the end of the 30 years of rapid economic growth in China, for example, we are more concerned

① Indeed, China was very careful not to be seen as following its East Asian neighbors' successful growth model in its early years of opening and reform in the 1980s.

② Lee, Hahn and Lin 2001; see also opposing views, White 1996, Baek 2005.

about how the current downturn and the future direction of the Chinese economy would be determined by the external, global dynamics as well as predominant interests and demands currently within China itself. We have not learnt much about the lessons the historical experiences of rapid economic growth in East Asia have offered and the internal logic of this growth model itself. We insist that rapid growth above 8 percent should still be the sole target of the national economy. But we seem to have not paid enough attention to the fact that all the other East Asian economies experienced their rapid economic growth for about 30 years, and then fell below the 8 percent annual growth rate ever since.

In this chapter I shall first demonstrate the historical patterns of rapid economic growth in the East Asian economies,¹ and explain the underlying logic that has shaped such a recurrent pattern in these economies. I will then compare China's growth model and that of East Asian economies in general and see where they converge and where they depart. In the final part, I will discuss the different "modes" of exit out of the East Asian model and explore how the Chinese exit would feature. I will conclude by arguing that there are many factors that complicate the case of China being seen as an instance of the East Asian model. In the second half of its 30 year rapid growth in particular, China has experienced a fading away or removal of some of the key features of the East Asian model to the extent it can no longer be comfortably described as an East Asian model economy.

1. Historical Patterns of Rapid Economic Growth in East Asia

In my research in the early 2000s on the patterns of rapid economic growth in East Asia (Huang 2005), I found a recurrent pattern in the waves of rapid economic growth during the 50 year period from 1950 to 2000, first in Japan from

¹ The East Asian economies here refer to Japan, South Korea, China's Taiwan Province, Singapore and China's mainland.

the early 1950s to the early 1970s, then in South Korea, China's Taiwan Province and Singapore from the early/mid 1960s to the early/mid 1990s, and finally in China's mainland from the early 1980s to 2000 when my research period ended. I defined *rapid growth* as having consecutive annual growth rates above the average of the growth rates among the five economies over the 50 year period which was 7.93%. For Japan, this was the period from 1953 to 1973 with an average growth rate at 11.93%. Korea had an average growth rate of 8.52% over the 30 year period from 1963 to 1992; China's Taiwan, 9.17% over the same period; and Singapore, 8.88% over the period from 1968 to 1997. China's mainland only had close to 20 years of rapid growth by 2000 with the average growth rate at 9.98%.

As shown in the graphics below (Figures 1-5, Source: Huang 2008: 7-9) where the black data line was the 5-year moving average of the GDP annual percentage of change over the previous year (constant in national currency). The grey data line is the same data of the United States as a benchmark. The grey box is the rapid growth period of each of the economies as defined here. I summarized the recurrent pattern as follows:




Figure 1 Japan's rapid growth pattern



Figure 2 Korea's rapid growth pattern




Figure 3 China's Taiwan's rapid growth pattern




Figure 4 Singapore's rapid growth pattern




Figure 5 China's mainland's rapid growth pattern

- a. Each economy had a rapid growth period with an average growth rate generally above 8% (there is the magic number!);
- b. The rapid growth period ran for about 30 years;
- c. The 20 year period of Japan and China are explained with their unique circumstances;
- d. Their rapid growth period started at a different historical point and there was an end point for the rapid economic growth.

One of the circumstances for China was the fact the 50-year period only allowed a 20 year observation time for China. It was the expectation from the observed pattern that China would have another 10–12 years from 2000 to continue to have rapid economic growth. 8 years have passed since then. We now have more evidence to test the model on China. I plotted the latest data from 2001 to 2008 to the original graphic as seen in Figure 6.



Figure 6 China's rapid growth pattern updated

As we can see here, the general pattern of 30 year rapid growth stands well. The claim is particularly strong with the feared scenario that China's growth rate

will move below the 8% line in the next few years.^① The question here is whether China can have its rapid growth beyond 30 years and why. To answer this question, the underlying dynamics behind the 30 year pattern of rapid growth and how China fits into this needs to be understood.

2. Chinese and East Asia models Compared

The 30-year pattern of rapid growth, in my view, is not accidental. Research has identified, for example, that initial low-income levels may be responsible for speedy growth during a catch up period (Solow 1956, Abramovitz 1986, 1989). Indeed, all these five economies started their rapid growth period at very low levels of economic development except Japan, which was afflicted by war devastation. This in part might have contributed to its shorter period of rapid growth. However, the catch up theory may explain the historical span and timing of rapid growth, but not why rapid growth took place in the first place. Many countries and regions were and perhaps still remain at a very low level of economic development.

The 30-year pattern of rapid growth in East Asia has more to do, in my view, with the underlying logic of the growth system itself. In my early work (Huang 2005 and 2008), I suggested that there were four shared features of the historically dynamic model of rapid growth in East Asia:

First, the initial conditions required national coordinated efforts in manufacturing exports. These conditions included the challenge of national survival with the economy collapsing, political chaos and security threats; inflows of foreign capital and their repayment in hard currency; limited domestic purchasing power and resources, and international demands for national products.

Second, export concentration did not come naturally. It required (1) the separation of the domestic market from the international market, (2) reorganization

^① The World Bank in its latest China Quarterly Update on 17 March 2009 put China's growth rate in 2009 at 6.5%.

of national production to provide competitiveness in international markets, and (3) redirecting of domestic economic forces, resources and growth activities to export industries.

Third, reorganization and redirection happened at three levels. The government implemented policy and deployed “rents” under the general category of industrial policy to promote and direct growth activities and control distributional demands. Corporations, particularly small and medium sized businesses, managed themselves following the model featuring strong influence of the family structure and relations, giant corporate groups of institutionally rather than legally connected firms, and close access to and interaction with the government to ensure trust, efficiency and cost control. Individuals were integrated into the national campaign for growth and development, and developed with more compatible attitudes and values regarding money, profit and competition.

Fourth, all these added to the competitiveness of the national economy as a collaborative whole in the international market, not so much through conventional sources of competitiveness such as more capital, better technology and scientific management, but rather through institutional arrangements that developed from the reorganization and redirection. The emergent institutions for rapid growth therefore included a three-tier structure of state management that involved:

(1) The political leadership (a single dominant political party in most cases); a delegated and insulated bureaucracy; and intermediate industrial associations that bridged the government and the business community.

(2) Various arrangements and mechanisms that internalized costs of production; extended families that performed economic functions; Conglomerates that neutralized effects of business cycles within single companies; state-brokered management-labour relations that kept labour costs under control.

(3) A generally centripetal society where the boundaries between state and society/individual are blurring at the best.

(4) Finally, a separation of the domestic and international market either through internal control and/or because of external barriers. This is where the

government promotion for exports became possible. For all these, competitiveness of the East Asian economies was essentially institutional.

Fifth, the provision of institutions incurred costs. Government subsidies, corporation bail outs, and labour subordination only temporarily brought costs down. But these costs were either delayed, shared or accumulated somewhere else in the system. Over a longer period, these costs would eventually erode the capacity of the institutions to continue to function effectively. Moreover, effects of institutions can be isolated and monopolized by growth participants and their intended effects will gradually lose over time. This is where corruption and rent seeking activity became rampant. In the end, the overall institutional setting can no longer effectively direct or even generate growth activities.

Above are the essential properties of the growth model underlying the 30-year pattern of rapid growth. In each East Asian economy, this rapid growth has come to an end one after another, not necessarily because of the rights or wrongs of the model, but because of the internal logic and hence the life cycle of the growth system itself. China, for much of its rapid growth, fitted roughly into this model. One can find all these five defining features in China's rapid growth. However, there have been some significant developments since the mid 1990s that have effectively allowed China to grow out of the model (rephrasing Barry Naughton's "growing out of the plan," Naughton 1995). The most profound of these developments has been the gradual integration of the domestic and international market.

The landmark development in that direction has been China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, along with substantive presence and continual expansion of multinational corporate interests and operations in the Chinese economy. The goal underlying the new relationship is that there should be no boundary between the Chinese economy and the world economy. This effectively challenges one of the key foundations of the East Asian model: the separation of domestic and international markets. Without such a separation, or with the weakening of such a separation, there is no effective institutional support for

government's efforts to promote a manufacturing export-led economy. The concept of "national" economy thus became problematic. Corporate identities and interests are ambiguous in relation to national and government interests with the growing extent of the mixture of multinational corporations in the national economy. Government's "industrial policy" faces a problem of "country of origin" in reserve.

Not only have the separation of domestic and international markets become problematic. There has also been the issue of the capacity of government in "governing" the market. Public Sector reforms in China have been profoundly influenced by the New Public Management movement of the 1990s and the larger ideological environment of Neoliberalism at the time. Decentralization, service delegation, transparency, accountability, and local autonomy have been the dominant themes for institutional reforms. The government is not exactly bureaucracy-centred, politically protected, and insulated with an unchallenged, exclusive command of national resources, as seen in the typical East Asian model. The early phase of China's rapid growth under the East Asian model benefited significantly from its socialist system of central planning, public ownership, and government's control of national economic activity, as well as the complete separation of its economy from the rest of the world. In the process of the reform over the years, these features have gradually weakened and yielded to market forces, local government, corporate and other distributional interests, and a more open, transparent and competitive economic decision making process. Consequently, government's ability to govern the market is much more constrained than in the typical East Asian model.

Finally, the model of manufacturing exports as a primary source of growth has been increasingly challenged with intensifying competitiveness, uncertainty and fluctuations in the international market; as well as the global movement of capital uniquely towards China, and the growing potential of the domestic market in China itself as an alternative source of growth. The "Internal Demand Drive" appears to be not just temporary relief of the export congestion, but a significantly different model of growth from the typical East Asian model. The key to whether China can

more effectively move away from the East Asian model than its fellow East Asian model economies is the potential of its domestic market.

In summary, China's growth model over the past 30 years has exhibited the essential features of the East Asian growth model. However, because of China's unique background of the socialist system and subsequent pro-market reforms, and the changing conditions in the world economic system, China has effectively been growing out of the model in the later period of its 30-year rapid growth. What is unclear here is the direction of China's future growth, which will inevitably continue to be affected by these conditions.

3. Exit Out of the Model and Future Chinese Growth

There have been very different or even contrasting "modes" of exit out of the East Asian growth model among the East Asian economies. I use here the word, "mode," to suggest that the ending of the rapid growth among the East Asian economies was neither intended as part of a strategic plan, nor happened randomly. Unlike many East Asian model advocates, I do see the ending of East Asian growth as the logical consequence of the maturing of the model. The difference here is the form and timing the East Asian growth ended in each of these economies. The ending in Japan in the early 1970s was largely the influence of global economic dynamics; the oil crisis in the 1970s, changes in global trade and financial regimes in response to the rise of the Japanese economy, as well as U. S. pressures for structural changes in Japan. Moreover, Japan's pre-war levels of industrial development were much higher than those of its fellow East Asian countries. This made it relatively quicker for Japan to go through the rapid growth period. Overall, the ending in Japan was smooth and over a longer period.^①

① Features of the East Asian model lingered on in Japan until the early 1990s: a single dominant political party, corporation-government relations, and bank-corporation grouping (see Pempel 1999 for discussion for regime shifts in Japan).

China's Taiwan, Singapore and Korea experienced, in my view, a standard ending of the 30 year East Asian growth — standard in the sense that their rapid growth all spanned around 30 years and ended as the logical maturing of the East Asian growth model. However, the ways they ended were different due very much to the extent the emergent global dynamics could have an effect on their system and due to some of the unique conditions of each system. China's Taiwan and Singapore were on the smooth side. While rapid growth was no longer by the mid 1990s, their growth systems however were less exposed to the global swings of forces. As for South Korea, neoliberal reforms were introduced much earlier and its corporate operations and financing were much more internationalized. The Korean economy collapsed under the forces of the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, which constituted a “hard” ending of the model.

China has already been inching out of the East Asian model over the years and at the same time has been able to maintain rapid growth. The 2008 – 2009 global economic crisis has very similar effects on national economies. China in this sense is more in the category of China's Taiwan and Singapore a decade ago; it has reached the maturing point of East Asian Growth model and the global economic crisis is finally forcing China out of this model. But two unique conditions in China make it a challenge to argue whether rapid growth above 8% will end this year or next year and how China will look 5 years from now. First, as discussed earlier, China has been reforming not only its socialist system for the past 30 years, but more subtly its East Asian growth system in the past decade or so. If a substantive part of its East Asian growth system has been transformed and its rapid growth in the past decade has been achieved under the emergent system, it is possible that China can continue to produce this above-8% -growth rate under this new, evolving system. Second, the domestic market drive can provide new sources of growth in place of manufacturing exports. While the domestic market campaign looks more like a fiscal policy solution, over time it can generate structural changes and movements that can sustain rapid growth for a considerable time.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the East Asian economies experienced a rapid growth period of roughly 30 years in duration under a similar growth system. This growth system featured a separation of the domestic and international market; organization of national economic growth by government in partnership with corporations and other grow participants; a concentration on manufacturing exports and competitiveness of its strategic products; an efficient reorganization of national production; and political and social support for the working of such a growth system.

China's rapid growth of the past 30 years has been largely the function of a similar growth model, though this growth model rose and functioned in China under some very different historical and institutional conditions. The mode and timing of the ending of its East Asian growth therefore will be determined not only by the internal logic of the East Asian growth model itself but also by the enabling conditions in the organization and operation of the Chinese economy.

The campaign to secure 8% growth rate this year is therefore slightly off the mark. Not only is this unnecessary, but it might also be counterproductive — particularly when this is done mainly through deficit based fiscal policy. We should allow the growth rate to be determined by economic fundamentals, rather than the other way around. Ironically, this is very much a key lesson of the East Asian growth model.

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Sino-Indian Relations: Quest for Strategic Partnership

Shen Dingli*

The rise of China and India has invited questions as to how their bilateral relations will evolve and how this will impact America and the world. This paper addresses the burgeoning strategic relations between the two Asian giants. It argues that Beijing and New Delhi are discovering a wide range of issues to consolidate their strategic tie, but such a bond won't fully establish before they can peacefully settle their border disputes. It points out that the U. S. is re-balancing the powers given the new reality. Eventually, these countries will interact with a pattern of cooperating plus hedging, each playing respective largely constructive rather than destabilizing roles.

By any measure, the Sino-Indian relations are steadily improving.^① This has

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① For some good review papers on Sino-Indian relations, see Richard Weixing Hu, "India's Nuclear Bomb and Future Sino-Indian Relations", *East Asia*, Vol 17, No 1, Spring 1999, pp. 40-68, and Sun Shuhai, "Sino-Indian Relations toward the 21st Century", in *Asia Report 2000*, Changchun Press, 2001 (in Chinese).

been manifested by a number of factors.

In the political area, both China and India are accommodating each other to their respective "rise". India has been unwavering in committing to "One China" position, and China seems to be supportive to India's bidding for a permanent seat in a reformed U. N. Security Council (UNSC).^① The two countries have basically overcome their difficulty arisen from India's nuclear weapons testing when China was implicitly pointed out by the Indian side to justify its tests. In the economic field, Sino-Indian two-way trade is rapidly expanding and their mutual investment is no longer a new phenomenon. In nuclear and security sphere, China joined in 2004 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that more or less relieves India's concern over China-Pakistan nexus of sensitive technology transfer. Given the U. S. -India deal of cooperation on civilian use of nuclear energy, China and India agreed in 2006 that the two countries will follow suit.^② The two countries have also carried out joint military exercises and India has even spent its defense asset to aid China's combat of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome).^③

While Beijing and New Delhi are yet to resolve their border disputes, they have strengthened their military confidence building measures (CBMs), and the two sides have designated Special Representatives to engage in well-authorized talks on the border question. India has stated unequivocally to the effect that Tibet is a

① *Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India*, April 11, 2005. Article 16 stated, "[China] understands and supports India to play active role in the U. N. and international affairs."

② *Joint Declaration between China and India*, New Delhi, November 21, 2006. Article 17 reads, "Considering that for both India and China, expansion of civilian nuclear energy program is an essential and important component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security, the two sides agree to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with their respective international commitments." This entails revision of NSG, as its current shape doesn't allow even for peaceful purpose nuclear energy cooperation between NSG members and any non-members of NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons).

③ Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visited China in spring 2003 despite the SARS that Beijing was suffering from. He announced that India will provide China with Indian military medicine.

part of China while China has virtually admitted India's annexation of Sikkim. The two Asian giants have even officially declared to forge their "strategic partnership".

Sino-Indian relations certainly have a component of America. China used to work with the U. S. in denouncing India's nuclear weapons testing but now has to observe how the U. S. moves forward to accommodate India's nuclear status. Actually, the past few years have witnessed the growing U. S. -India political and military rapprochement. While maintaining its interest in thinking through this development, China has shown no hesitance in adjusting its own India policy.

In the India-U. S. -China trilateral context, the picture is mixed so far. On the one hand, it is noted that India has received the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) that Israel initially built for China but was later disallowed to deliver by Washington for political reason. It is also noteworthy that India has shifted its official view toward the U. S. missile defense, quite a strategic move repositioning New Delhi in the world system.^① On the other hand, India has condemned the U. S. -led NATO's bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and China has been impartial in covering the Kargil conflict in its press, at least not tilting to Pakistan, to India's respect.

The dazzling shifting of China-India relations over the last two decades won't occur were not for the transformation of world political landscape as well as China's and India's respective "rise", plus the pragmatic rather than rigid approaches of their leadership. This essay will analyze various dimensions of Sino-Indian relations that have become increasingly strategically defined, as well as the factors that have led to the arrival of such a new relationship.

1. Political Relations

China and India have worked out their first document regarding the principles

^① Shen Dingli, "India's Intention Suspect" (Cover Story), *Outlook* (The Weekly Magazine), India, May 21, 2001, p. 52.

of border settlement. The two leaderships are committed to searching for mutually acceptable solution to the border question. If this issue is truly resolved, this part of Asia may find its long-term peace and tranquility. Even prior to that arrival, China and India have agreed to build strategic partnership, cooperating in India's UNSC bidding at present.

(1) India's UNSC bidding

China has enjoyed, for decades, its privilege as the sole Asian representative in the permanent chamber of the U. N. Security Council. This has been augmented by China's unprecedented economic development since late 1970's that has empowered it as a new competitor in the world economy. In parallel, for much of the late 20th century, Japan has been rehabilitating and reconstructing itself enormously successfully, and has long established itself as a lieutenant economic superpower in the world. By today, Tokyo may have concluded that it has qualified a permanent membership of the UNSC, and is pushing forcefully for such a position.

Thus far, India is neither a strong international economic power nor in the forefront of world political stage. Nevertheless, India has longed for this and been enjoying an impressive economic growth. It has been keeping some 6% - 8% of GDP (grand domestic production) development for nearly a decade.^① That brings India, in PPP (purchasing power parity) term, to be a new respectable player in Asia's economy. Like Tokyo, New Delhi currently also deems the time mature to bid the UNSC permanent seat.

The challenge is thus for both the United States and China. One would gather that as the current permanent members enjoying veto power, none of the P5 (permanent five members of the UNSC) would be truly interested in seeing their power be further shared significantly and their freedom of action be more complicated. Beijing and Washington may welcome a limited expansion of the

① By 2006, India has attained 1 trillion GDP a year.

Security Council at no cost of their veto privilege. However, the two capitals have a big divide in viewing who would qualify the new permanent slots. In 2005, Washington allowed only two seats including its close ally in the Far East, Japan, while having rejected India's bid. In contrast, Beijing may be more flexible in expecting an even enlarged permanent chamber, but is conservative concerning Japan's bid.

Beijing's concern over Japan is rooted in the latter's refusal, especially by its latest leaders including Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, of East Asia's call for respecting the history, in particular, of Japan's war-time atrocity during WW II and subsequent need to assume its responsibility. With 14 A-class war criminals resting in Yasukuni Shrine, the yearly official visit to it by Japanese Prime Minister and cabinet members simply demeans that country and keeps most Chinese, as well as many other East Asians don't think Japan politically suits a permanent seat at UNSC. Obviously, the U. S.-Japan security alliance that helps deter China's freedom of action on the question of China's Taiwan would have contributed to China's cool attitude toward Japan.

Beijing's theory of reforming the UNSC is that the new permanent members shall have a fair regional representation, and developing countries shall merit adequate consideration. Given these criteria, India seems better qualified, as it represents 1 billion people in Asia's developing world whose economy is being lifted, and as it maintains a fairly independent foreign policy. Comparing the popularity of India and Japan in their neighborhood in the context of bidding the UNSC seat, India seems to be only opposed by Pakistan in the entire South Asia, while Japan is disapproved by almost all its Northeast Asian neighbors: China, DPRK and ROK.

Therefore, China seems to have chosen India and is preparing for its *strategic* consequence — getting ready to share Asia's leadership and responsibility at the Security Council with New Delhi. Their political baggage of Pokran nuclear tests seems to be left behind. Over years, India has withstood international pressures despite the “illegitimacy” of its development and possession of nuclear weapons, as

viewed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India's nuclear status has been gradually accepted as *fact accompli*, and China has to show its realism in this regard. For its own part, India has more officially distanced itself from viewing China as a "threat", though such arguments surface from time to time especially when the border dispute still remains.

(2) Settling border dispute

The perennial headache of Sino-Indian border dispute has presented a seemingly insurmountable barrier of complete normalization of their relations. Indeed, there exist certain military confidence building measures among both armed forces along the line of actual control (LAC).^① However, without total settlement of the border dispute, it is hard to dispel distrust completely between the two countries.

Given the recent strong commitment from the tops to shaping a new relationship in the new century, China and India have each designated Dai Bingguo, Vice Foreign Minister of China, and Misra^②, National Security Advisor, to start their first round of talk on the border question from October 23, 2003. Their talks have reached the climax of "*Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question*" of April 11, 2005.

This Agreement indicated in its Preamble that "an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interests of the two countries and should therefore be pursued as a *strategic objective*". It is also noted that "[T]he differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall

① Two previous documents signed by Chinese and Indian governments have played pivotal role in stabilizing their relations. First, *Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas*, September 7, 1993. Second, *Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border*, November 29, 1996.

② Special Representative Misra was later succeeded by former President Narayanan.

development of bilateral relations.”^① It is worth mentioning that the Agreement made it clear that “[T]he two sides will take into account, *inter alia*, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas.”^② With the ongoing progress in affirming the current LAC, it is reasonable to expect that the *status quo* LAC will turn to be the legal base of future negotiation leading to eventual border settlement.

On the territorial question, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee declared in June 2003 when he visited China that “Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of territory of the People’s Republic of China”.^③ Though India may consider that it has been of this position for over half a century, this statement *per se* has been viewed widely as India’s first unambiguous assertion of this sort. Consequently, Beijing made a *quid-pro-quo* action by withdrawing Sikkim as a sovereign state from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website, hence reverting a long-held PRC principle that had denied India’s sovereignty over the formal Himalayan kingdom. Contrary to its Japan policy, Chinese idealistic foreign policy yields more to realism in the case of India. With Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Delhi in 2005, the two sides furthered their exchange through the Joint Statement of April 11: India repeated its rhetoric on Tibet made two years ago,^④ and the Chinese used the term “the Sikkim state of India”^⑤.

(3) Moving toward “strategic partnership”

China and India are the two most populous nations in the world. Given their

① See Article I of the Agreement.

② See Article V of the Agreement.

③ Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between China and India, June 23, 2003.

④ Article 12, Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, April 11, 2005.

⑤ Article 13, Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, April 11, 2005.

size of territory and population, and given their level and potential of economic development, the relationship of these two *de facto* nuclear weapons states cannot be trivial. Both leaderships would accord their bilateral relations with global and strategic significance. In 2005, the two countries eventually culminated their "strategic partnership".

A Sino-Indian cooperative partnership could be nurtured decades earlier, as at least Zhou En-lai and Jawaharlal Nehru initiated, as early as in 1954, the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" that also laid their own foundation of relations. However, due to the problematic handling of the border dispute and the twist of the Cold War, China and India missed their opportunity to build a partnership throughout much of the Cold War period.

Then, the forging of a Sino-Indian cooperative partnership at contemporary time has taken two steps since late 1990's. The first step followed Jiang Zemin's visit to Delhi in November 1996. In this first visit by a Chinese head of state, the two countries agreed to establish their "constructive cooperative partnership toward the 21st century", signaling China's strategic shift to a balanced foreign policy toward South Asia in the post-Cold War time. Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in June 2003, following his Defense Minister Fernandes's visit in April despite of SARS, consolidated this newly created partnership. His talk in Beijing has elevated Sino-Indian relations to a new height; his visit first set the tone of mutual recognition of Tibet and Sikkim, and set up the mechanism of Special Representative to decide the principle of future border negotiation.^①

The second step is an outcome of Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005. For the entire history of PRC and Republic of India, the two countries have for the first time agreed to establish "a strategic cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity". This visit had led to the signing and publishing of 12 bilateral

① The two Special Representatives have held ten rounds of talks so far: October 2003, January 2004, July 2004, November 2004, April 2005, September 2005, March 2006, June 2006, January 2007 and April 2007.

documents, including the *Protocol of Implementing Military CBMs in the Border Areas along China-India LAC* and *Five-Year Plan of Sino-Indian Comprehensive Economic and Trade Cooperation*.

To be honest, China-India rapprochement has their world view to do with a fair world order and multi-polarity in the international system. This has reduced though not necessarily removed their mutual apprehension. Both sides recognize the need to tap the opportunities their economic development and interaction have provided them in an inter-connected world. Interestingly enough, this trend has been expanded to a Sino-Indian-Russo framework. In June 2005, the three Foreign Ministers met in Vladivostok affirming the need of democratization in international relations and fair world order.^① It remains to be seen as to how far this trilateral relationship can be advanced.

2. Economic Relations

China-India trade relations started from a very low point. In the aftermath of PM R. Ghandi's visit to Beijing, China-India trade was only U. S. \$200 millions. The border trade was resumed from 1992, primarily with barter standing at a level of 5 million Chinese yuans per annum.

However, over a decade Sino-Indian trade relations have experienced fast development. In accordance with the statistics from China's General Administration of Customs the total trade column between China and India reached U. S. \$4.9 billion in 2002, up 37% from 2001; U. S. \$7.6 billion in 2003, up 54% from 2002; U. S. \$13.6 billions in 2004, up 79% from 2003; U. S. \$18.7 billions in 2005, up 38% from 2004; and U. S. \$24.9 billions in 2006, up 33% from 2005.^②

^① See, *The Joint Communiqué of the Informal Meeting between the Foreign Ministers of People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of India*, June 3, 2005.

^② China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjlb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/1328/default.htm>, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjlb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2711/>. China has registered trade surplus at U. S. \$0.3 B (2002), U. S. \$1.2 B (2003), U. S. \$1.7 B (2004), and U. S. \$4.3 B (2006).

Reportedly, Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 concurred with Chinese that in 3 years the two countries shall double their trade from U. S. \$5 (2003) to U. S \$10 (2006). Apparently, this ambition has been met in less than 2 years. Then, the April 2005 *Joint Statement* targeted U. S. \$20B and U. S. \$30B for 2008 and 2010, respectively. In fact, the target of U. S. \$20B was met by 2006. Given the actual average annual increasing level of trade of 32% over the decade from 1995 – 2005, one could even linearly protract Sino-Indian trade volume to attain U. S. \$43 B by 2008.

Realistically speaking, a yearly U. S. \$43B trade by 2008 is not impossible to attain, given the current level of U. S. \$24.9B at 2006, and given the potential of trade between the two countries (they traded U. S. \$8.2B in the first quarter in 2007, up 58.5% than the same period a year ago). It is almost certain that Sino-Indian trade will flourish significantly in the future, given their geographic vicinity and vast scale of their economies. Chinese and Indian governments have decided to launch their feasibility study of bilateral free trade zone. This further bodes well for the future of their trade relationship.

Clearly, while China and India have managed to stabilize their nuclear relationship, they are blessed by their thriving economic relations through rapid expansion of trade. There is no doubt that the Sino-Indian "strategic relations" will be strengthened and further stabilized by their economic and trade dimension. The two governments are encouraging the expansion of trade area and reduction of trade barrier. They are also expected to strengthen cooperation in high-tech area and mutual investment. Cooperation in infrastructure construction could possibly open one more layer of near-term collaboration.

3. Security Relations

Putting border issue aside, China and India are leaving the liability of India's nuclear weapons testing behind. They cannot talk officially on their nuclear relationship, but have been watching the nuclear policy of the other side, as that

will shape their response to some extent. China and India still have much to do in assuring each other.

(1) Nuclear relationship

India and China are two promising economic powerhouses in the world, and their economic relations are easier to manage than their nuclear relationship. As an acknowledged nuclear weapons state, it is subtle for China to accept India as a *de jure* nuclear weapons state. As a member of the NPT, China is not in a position to accord India with an official recognition, in order to maintain the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. India won't be encouraged to see this but both countries have agreed that nothing shall forestall their relations from moving forward. In fact, India doesn't care much if its nuclear weapons status is recognized or not.

Despite the fact that China cannot accept India's nuclear weapons status, it is clear that Beijing will not ignore the fact when making its strategic calculation. As both are nuclear weapons neighbors whose border disputes are yet to be resolved, China and India will find that they have to develop a multi-faceted nuclear relationship.

A. Understanding respective nuclear doctrine.

Allegedly, both countries have embraced No-First-Use (NFU) strategy. China is believed by most western strategists as employing a minimum nuclear deterrence, while India seems to pursue a similar course. Understanding and ascertaining respective nuclear doctrine concerning their strategic requirement, use and basing, and ramification of such development on regional and global disarmament and nonproliferation, remain their long-term strategic objectives.

B. Avoiding nuclear misunderstanding.

India may have acquired adequate amount of fissile materials to build a nuclear arsenal at level of few hundreds of weapon, while its civilian reactors are accumulating even more plutonium in spent fuels (though less militarily useable due

to higher isotopes of plutonium are mixed).^① The potential to expand their nuclear arsenals exist, so it is important that China and India won't have misunderstanding and miscalculation in their strategic planning.

C. Employing a responsible nonproliferation system.

As nuclear weapons states, it is of utmost importance to carry out nuclear nonproliferation policy and set up a national system of nonproliferation export control. China has had relatively richer experience in this regard and it is productive for them to engage in such cooperation. Meanwhile, it is imperative that the two countries develop enough physical protection for their nuclear assets, assuring their weapons' safety and security and minimizing the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism.

(2) Pakistan's factor

As an "all-weather strategic partner", Pakistan has rendered comprehensive support to China over decades. Likewise, China has delivered strategic support to Pakistan whenever it has a need. However, Beijing-Islamabad relations were developed during the Cold War time, when security alignment was the key consideration in foreign policy making. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation was embodied in South Asia as Pak-India confrontation and China's strategic relations with Pakistan have much to do with India's territorial conflicts with both China and Pakistan.

Allegedly, in much of the 1980's and early 1990's, China's nuclear-related exports, particularly to Pakistan, were of "major international nonproliferation concern" that clouded China-U.S. and China-India bilateral relations.^② However,

^① Nongovernmental estimates of India's fissile-material stockpiles are summarized in *Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies*, by David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker (Oxford University Press, 1997). See also updates at http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/tableofcontents.html.

^② For western description, see Chapter 7: China, in Joseph Crinione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenal: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005, 2nd ed. revised and expanded), pp. 163 - 188.

China made notable strides in 1990's by joining formal arms control and nonproliferation regimes, and in 2000's in joining informal nonproliferation export regimes. In the wake of the ring magnet issue, Chinese government announced on May 10, 1996 that "it will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded facilities".^① In May 2004, China joined NSG committing fully to full-scope safeguards (FSS), i. e., not to provide any nuclear assistance to any countries that refuse to accept FSS. By taking this measurement, China has committed not to cooperate with India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK as they remain outside of the NPT.^②

India and Pakistan remain confrontational though their political relationship is improving. In the post-Cold War era, maintaining strategic partnership with Pakistan while limiting Sino-Indian relations undercut China's important interests. Beijing might come to re-define its strategic interests and build simultaneous partnership with both Islamabad and New Delhi. Its strategic partnership with Pakistan could be re-defined to include wider range of substances but to limit transfer of sensitive technologies. China's effort to adjust its nonproliferation stance and apply FSS upon itself helps clear India's fundamental concern. This in turn offers trust and confidence between China and India that promote their strategic trust building.

(3) Anti-terrorism

While the "9/11" attack has transformed the world political landscape, the anti-terror issue has been increasingly a part of Sino-Indian new security

① According to press reports, the Clinton Administration determined in August 1995 that China had sold 5,000 ring magnets valued at U. S. \$ 70,000 to Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta between December 1994 and mid-1995. This unsafeguarded gas-centrifuge facility can produce weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium. *Reuters and UPI* reports, February 8, 1996

② The DPRK quit NPT on January 10, 2003. In the wake of U. S. -India agreement of peaceful use of nuclear energy of March 2006, China agreed also, in 2006, to cooperate with both India and Pakistan on peaceful use of nuclear energy. This can only be possible if and when China can re-arrange its commit of FSS toward NSG.

relationship. Both China and India have noticed the terrorism threat in their bilateral, regional and global context. They worked together in supporting the anti-terror military action in Afghanistan. They share disagreement of the “unilateral” military action in Iraq under the pretext of counter-WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation or anti-terror. The two countries launched anti-terror dialogue in April 2002 (second round in June 2003, newer round in late 2005) , and China has supported India’s accession to Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer in mid-2005. It is understood that Indian government has enhanced security protection of Chinese diplomatic compounds as they may be under threat of “Eastern Turkish Independence Movement (ETIM)” , a U. N. -listed international terrorist group.

The Sino-Indian mil-to-mil contact with anti-terror in the background is emerging. In November 2003, China and India carried out joint search-and-rescue naval exercise, in East China Sea near Shanghai. In August 2004 Indian soldiers joined Chinese for a joint mountain-hiking training. In December 2005, Chinese navy conducted joint exercise with India in northern Indian Ocean for search-and-rescue purpose. Reportedly, India has intended to invite Chinese ground force for a multi-nation anti-terror military exercise inside India. Such activities indicate the trend that the two countries are ridding traditional mindset. The strengthening of China-India military relationship shall place China in a better position with normal relations with countries in South Asia.

4. The Driving Forces and Implications

The aforementioned positive developments of China-India relations have been inspiring. They are derived from a number of factors; the parallel rise of China and India that renders them more confident and mature in dealing with each other; the post-“9/11” era that re-prioritizes threat perception and national interests. The U. S. -China and U. S. -India relations obviously have affected Sino-Indian relations, inducing often a positive change regardless of the initial American intention.

It shall be pointed out that the Sino-Indian relations still needs time to nurture. This relationship is not fragile as it enjoys wide support from both countries, but it is not unshakable before border dispute is resolved. As the border talks involve national feel and are hence highly sensitive, one wouldn't expect this dispute to be settled anytime soon. Nevertheless, given the new maturity of the two states, there is good chance that they will be able to control potential disruption and the current positive trend of their relations will sustain.

(1) Rise of China and India

The contemporary republics of China and India have only enjoyed a history of some half a century. For the part of China, it was only able to discover a flourishing path to success less than 30 years ago. For India, its democratic institution might have not delivered substantial economic goods for many years, and many resources have been diverted to non-civilian purposes. The two "newly" independent states so treasured their hard-won sovereignty that they collided militarily in 1962 over their "border" that has never officially decided.

Nuclear weapons provide both China and India with security and pride. Presently they are still learning how to peacefully co-exist given their nuclear weapons assets. India's tacit accusation, in 1998, against China when India tested nuclear weapons, was viewed as a proof of its then "immature" foreign policy. However, India's possession of nuclear weapons has subsequently led it to handle relations with China and Pakistan more cautiously. India refrained itself in early 2000's vis-à-vis Pakistan, after a terrorist attack outside its Parliament.

Following nuclear weapons tests of India and Pakistan, both China and India have taken forward-looking approach to dealing with each other. The "China threat" rhetoric in India has been downplayed as Indian leaders and mainstream strategists are less viewing China as such. China has taken a more realistic view toward India, as it could not afford to leave relations cool for excessively long time. One has to admit that both India and China are more confident and realistic nowadays, driving their relationship positively forward.

(2) World strategic landscape

The contemporary anti-terror “warfare” is inductive to Sino-Indian relations. Such a global landscape has allowed states to downplay their inter-state competition and rivalry, but presents ever unfolding cooperative opportunities.

In the case of Sino-Indian relations, the previous section has already suggested that the anti-terror campaign furnishes the two countries with a common security objective, in South Asia and Central Asia as well. Comparing Indian with Pakistani positions on the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not impossible to infer that the Beijing-New Delhi policy coordination on anti-terror probably has transcended that between Beijing and Islamabad.

China would not allow the improvement of Sino-Indian relations to sour its relations with Pakistan. But China is facing more challenges due to terrorist attack on Chinese people in Pakistan. In 2004 and 2007, Chinese engineers and workers were targeted in abduction and on one occasion the kidnapping had led to death of a Chinese citizen. More recently, Chinese government has requested cooperation of Pakistani government in arresting and repatriating 22 chief members of ETIM staying in the tribal area of Pakistan.^① In this context, it is likely that China will need to expand its anti-terror cooperation with both India and Pakistan.

(3) The American effect

The U. S. role on China-India relations is unavoidable and its effect so far has been mixed. To elaborate this, one needs to distinguish between intention, perception and outcome.

First, the American intention, both professed and real ones. The published policy is readily available, while the “real” one keeps others speculating. Then, how China will perceive American policy? Typically, one would perceive it from

^① *Elite Reference*, June 26, 2007, http://qnc.k.cyoil.com/content/2007_06/26/content1805952.htm

the negative end, as the two countries still lack trust. Finally the outcome: China and India develop their bilateral relations under some external circumstances, say, how the U. S. deals with each of them.

For the respective two terms of the Clinton and Bush administrations, the U. S. has been reforming its relations with India: building up bilateral defense relations, accommodating India's political standing (short of agreeing with India's bidding for UNSC permanent seat), extending civilian nuclear energy cooperation, etc. China may be uninterested in seeing such development. However, no matter how the U. S. has pushed for anti-terror or WMD nonproliferation, eventually China and India have improved their relationship, regardless how the U. S. has intended or how China would have deciphered it.

For the whole 1990's, China and the U. S. have only worked briefly to be critical of India's and Pak's nuclear weapons testing. But the U. S. lifted its sanctions on India quite quickly and started to accept India's minimum deterrence. The U. S. realism could only invite Chinese suspicion and as a result, China presented its own realism: when Indian President Shri Kocheril Raman Narayanan visited Beijing in 1999, the nuclear issue didn't surface.

As mentioned above, the recent U. S. -India nuclear move merits China pondering. One July 18, 2005, President Bush agreed with the visiting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the cooperation of peaceful use of nuclear energy. This marked a major departure of U. S. pre-condition of full-scope safeguards in regard to civilian nuclear cooperation with any foreign countries.

As a new member of NSG, China is obliged to such full-scope safeguards requirement. Prior to joining NSG, China had supplied low-enriched uranium to India, and light water reactors to Pakistan, with both exported materials and facility under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards but not full-scope safeguards, a prerequisite that neither India nor Pakistan would accept. With China's joining NSG in 2004, China shall have relinquished its future rights to engage in nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes with non-NPT states. But given the U. S. policy change now, China must speculate the U. S. intention, and shall

review its current FSS requirement under NSG obligation. In fact, China has sought the same departure vis-à-vis India, or expand FSS exception to Pakistan unilaterally as well. Apparently, American policy toward India drives Chinese one when Beijing envisions its relations with New Delhi.

5. Conclusion

The rise of China and India has become the major phenomenon of the contemporary world. Despite their deep difficulties concern border settlement etc. , China and India have embarked on a course of dialogue and cooperation while leaving the unsettled border issue basically quite.

And China and India have been talking about their strategic partnership. Forging such a tie between Beijing and New Delhi, possibly still premature before it is substantiated over the next decades, shall improve their bilateral relations and world order, but also affects American interest in the region in a complicated way.

The logic is that Sino-Indian relations will benefit more than two billions of people living in these two states, under whichever external circumstances. The U. S. could foresee some uncertainties due to China's and India's rise, and will play the statecraft of balance of power amongst China, India and itself. However, given the tradition of Chinese and Indian independent foreign policy, they will find their way to adjust their contour of development to their best interest. One can reasonably predict that none of them will form any bilateral alliance against the third party. The China-India strategic relations will be unlikely to be directed against American interests, just as US-India ever closing relations shall not be developed to target against China as well.

China-Central Asia Cooperation and the Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Pan Guang*

1. Overview

China established close contact with Central Asia through the Silk Road as early as 2,000 years ago. The disintegration of the Soviet Union caused Central Asia to open its door to the outside world again. 17 years ago, in January of 1992, only one month after the founding of new Central Asian countries, a Chinese delegation visited five Central Asian states and signed a series of agreements to establish diplomatic relations with all of them.

In the past 17 years, the political relations and security cooperation between China and Central Asia have fully developed. All Central Asian leaders have come to Beijing and China's counterparts have in turn visited Central Asian countries. In April 1996 and April 1997, two agreements for security and disarmament along

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borders, which marked the beginning of "Shanghai Five" — SCO process, were signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, indicating that the stable security cooperation between China and her Central Asian neighbors has been built up. In the framework of these two agreements, all the disputes regarding the western section of the formally Sino-Soviet border of more than 3,000 kilometers, that had bred instability and conflicts for centuries, were completely solved in 6 years, which is a rare case in the history of international relations. At the same time, "Shanghai Five" — SCO process provides a good structure for China and Central Asia to cooperate closely in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism and various other cross-border criminal forces. The Treaty on Long-term Good-neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation, signed in August 2007 in Bishkek, promotes the improvement of socioeconomic conditions and deepening of integration processes in the SCO space.

Economic and trade relations between China and Central Asian countries have also developed very rapidly. Compared with U. S. \$500 million in 1992, China's trade with five Central Asian countries reached U. S. \$19.61 billion in 2007.^① As to the bilateral trade between China and Central Asian countries, China-Kazakhstan trade is the largest one, reaching U. S. \$13.876 billion in 2007.^②

2. Energy and Culture

After several years of constructions, the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China (Aterlao — Kenjiyaker — Atasu — Ala Shankou) finally started its work in 2006. The designed handling capacity of the pipeline is 20 million tons per year, which will be a big jump over the annual amount of 500 thousand tons currently handled on railways. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization plays a coordinating role so that the China-Kazakhstan pipeline that competes with the Russia-

①. Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC.

②. Ibid

Kazakhstan pipeline can also be used by Russia. On the one hand, Russia can transport oil to China through the China-Kazakhstan pipeline. On the other hand, China, Kazakhstan and Russia can also exchange oil supply through the two pipelines, thus achieving mutually beneficial and win-win objective. In November 2007, Russian Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko announced that Russian would for the first time transport oil, 5 million tons a year, to China via the territory of Kazakhstan. Gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China will also be constructed. The pipelines, with an annual handling capacity of 25 - 40 billion cubic meters, will help to increase the low percentage of gas in China's current energy structure. If connected with the Xinjiang - Shanghai Gas Pipeline, the lines will also help the implementation of China's West Development Strategy and Energy Eastward Transportation Program. Japan and South Korea, which can also take part in this project, will be entitled to part of the gas transported by the lines. This will open a new chapter in energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, and even between East Asia and Central Asia. It should be pointed out Central Asia — Siberia, different from Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, is a source of energy supply that demands no protection from any ocean navy. As China is still unable in the near future to build up an ocean navy strong enough to protect its long oil shipping lines, this sole alternative to maritime lane that China enjoys is of crucial strategic significance for China's energy security and overall development. Likewise, for the first time in the history, Central Asian countries obtained an eastward energy pipeline, which is not going through Russia and Caucasus — Turkey — Europe, but crossing China, and finally reaching Pacific. Obviously, this pipeline is strategically important for the future development of Central Asia.

Central Asia is an area where the Confucian, Islamic, Slavic, and Indian civilizations encounter. From ancient times to this date, religious and cultural differences have often underlain the ethnic, religious and sectarian conflicts. The historic tragedy of destroying the Bamiyan Statue — the symbol of Buddhist culture in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime is still fresh in our mind. Terrorist and

extremist forces have also used these religious and cultural differences to incite disunity and manufacture turmoil. It seems of particular significance against this background that cultural and humanistic cooperation is to be stepped up between China and Central Asian countries. In the short run, the focus of such cooperation is to highlight the spirit of the Silk Road by enhancing the mutual communication and understanding among different civilizations and nations in the region, so as to strengthen the emotional ties between Chinese and Central Asians, and also to pave the way for the unfolding comprehensive Sino-Central Asia cooperation. China has played a pivotal role in the cooperation. The SCO Cultural and Art Festivals held in the past 4 years have shown themselves as specific achievements in this field.

3. Prospect

In looking into the future, it is necessary to highlight that China-Central Asia relations still face several major issues that deserve urgent attention.

Firstly, there should be a prompt achievement of essential breakthrough in the China-Central Asia economic cooperation. Several points are extremely important to realize this aim. The first point is to be pragmatic in designing cooperation goals and in implementing the cooperation measures. Empty talks and a lack of specific goals and effective measures will never make it, more so when it comes to economic issues. The second point is to persist in following market rules like the level playing field, equality and reciprocity, mutual opening, and a combination of both bilateral and multilateral approaches. Only caring about one's own interests will not do, and dissolving cooperation from the market base is even more fallible. Additionally, bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation can be mutually enhancing, a case in point being the oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China, which is now also giving rise to the triangular energy cooperation involving Central Asian countries as well. The third point is to get ahead with coordination and priorities for each stage. Front-up investment is certainly necessary, yet caution is needed against excessive expansion and repetitive construction. The fourth point is

to allow the banking consortium to play effectively its role and encourage the cooperation with international financial institutions. As quite a few cooperative programs are simply held up by the lack of funds, the effective operations of the banking consortium together with its foundations could provide badly needed financial facilitation to the planned projects. In this regard, China is now playing a driving role. The fulfillment of China's promise for the USD 900 million of buyer's credit promoted the China - Central Asia economic cooperation. At the same time, the SCO Mechanism of Inter-bank Cooperation — the first step to the SCO Development Bank to be formally inaugurated in June 2006 is expected to provide a financing platform for the major projects in Central Asia and facilitate greater economic cooperation between China and Central Asian countries ^①.

The spread of the global financial crisis has put into standstill quite a few projects in Central Asia. With enterprises closing down, large numbers of employees are laid off, while local currencies there depreciate sharply. However, the major projects of cooperation between China and Central Asia are running as usual, as shown by the recent official launch of Central Asia - China Gas Pipeline jointly invested by China and three Central Asian states. ^②

Secondly, there is an obvious need to deepen the security cooperation. A joint advantage of the China - Central Asia cooperation in the near future will still be in the security area. Yet, there must be a deepening of the cooperation in this aspect if both sides are to make headway on the basis of the past achievements. Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of "election-related turmoil" or so-called "Color Revolution" in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist forces fishing in the troubled waters. Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda in the wake of a new wave of terrorist attacks following Iraq War. More severely, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation) and other extreme groups

① Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, June 15, 2006.

② *Xinhua News Agency*, February 7, 2009.

are fast winning support in Central Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Fergana countryside, bespeaking a remerging grim security situation in the region that poses new challenges to both Central Asian countries and China. Facing such serious situation, several practical things seem necessary to take up. For one thing, the SCO Regional Anti-terrorism Structure should be quickly consolidated to work efficiency, and specific cooperation be stepped up in drafting SCO name list of those wanted terrorists and terrorist groups, and in regularizing the joint anti-terror exercises. For another, the proposed Central Asian Nuclear Free-Zone (CANFZ) program should be furthered, so that the region can avoid suffering nuclear arms race and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For still another, further campaigns should be launched to crack down on drug-trafficking, weapon-smuggling, illegal immigration and other cross-border crimes. In this regard, China and Central Asian countries should specifically step up participation in the international efforts on the formation of anti-narcotic belts around Afghanistan, in formulation and realization of special programs, providing assistance for Afghanistan in order to stabilize its social, economic and humanitarian situation. Only until these several practical things are finished can China - Central Asia cooperation play an indispensable role in maintaining security in the whole Central Asian region.

Thirdly, cultural cooperation should be pushed forward steadily. The existing bilateral cultural cooperation could be expanded into multilateral cultural cooperation, which certainly calls for organizational coordination, financial support, and professional programming. In the near future, the cooperation will specifically unfold on these fronts: exchanging mutual visits by cultural, artistic and sports groups, hosting joint art festivals and exhibitions, dispatching and accepting more exchange students, promoting visits by high-level experts and scholars, mutually assisting in training talents in various fields, increasing cultural exchanges among young people, facilitating culture-oriented tourism along the Silk Road, and so on.

With the Obama administration taking office and showing a ready inclination

for dialogue and multilateralism, it is believed that China and America can coordinate and cooperate more effectively in Central Asia for addressing a series of common challenges.

4. Conclusion

In reviewing the successful journey that China – Central Asia relations have covered and looking into the future development of the relations, the following several points merit and should be paid special attention to. Firstly, regional cooperation must be steadily institutionalized, and be guaranteed by relevant international or regional laws and regulations. At the same time, the discrepancy in rules and regulations between the domestic and the regional should be sorted out in a careful manner. Secondly, regional security cooperation must be based on “comprehensive security”, and particularly, the handling of conventional security threats should be combined closely with the handling of non-conventional security threats. Thirdly, the maintenance of regional security and stability is a precondition and a guarantee to the facilitation of regional economic and cultural cooperation, and economic and cultural cooperation can in turn constitute a solid basis for political and security cooperation.

金融危机与中国模式

郑永年*

一、金融危机与中国模式

金融危机发生以来,各国政府纷纷推出各种应对措施以缓解危机或者努力争取尽早走出危机。到目前为止,尽管整个世界还是处于深刻的危机之中,但很多人已经开始争论世界各国经济模式的问题。其中,中国俨然已经被很多人视为是有别于美国和西方的经济模式。在有些人眼里,中国和美国所代表的两个经济模式已经处于竞争之中。笔者前不久参加了在法国巴黎郊区由瑞典的Glasshouse Forum 组织的中国西方知识峰会,讨论的就是中国发展模式的前途问题,会议上大家最关心的是中国发展模式是否会成为西方发展模式的另一种选择^①。

对中国经济模式的关注主要在三个层面。

第一是中国模式对金融危机的防御能力。毫无疑问,这次金融危机对各国经济体的影响程度不同。中国经济体尽管也深受影响,但和西方各经济体相比

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① 关于2008年Glasshouse Forum的文字和影像资料,可参见:http://www.glasshouseforum.org/news_film_chinamodel_complete.html。

较,甚至和亚洲的日本和“四小龙”相比较,中国显现出了相当高的抵御能力。而中国的抵御能力显然和中国改革开放以来的不同经济发展模式有关。这里人们提出来的问题就是:中国的经济模式和其他经济模式有何不同?这种不同如何增强了中国的危机抵御能力?

第二是中国应付金融危机的方法和手段。和其他国家一样,中国政府在应付金融危机过程中使用了一系列的手段和方法。尽管从表面上看,和其他国家没有实质性的区别,但到目前为止,中国政府所使用的方法和手段要比西方政府的来得有效。当西方各国走入负增长,有迹象已经显示了中国经济复苏的方向。在当今世界上,很少有像中国那样的国家可以对自己的经济持乐观的态度。一些人已经开始预测经济什么时候回弹了。信心非常重要。前不久,中国总理温家宝到欧洲各国访问,把其旅行称之为“信心之旅”。没有了信心,经济活动就很难恢复正常。举个简单的例子说,如果没有信心,人们就不会去投资,不会去消费。从这个角度来说,政府有责任激励社会的信心。

应当指出的是,中国的这种乐观情绪和信心有其客观的依据。在应付危机过程中,美国和西方政府只有金融杠杆,而无经济杠杆。但中国政府两者都有,除了金融杠杆之外,中国的经济杠杆可以通过巨大的国有部门得到发挥。再者,美国和大多数西方政府都是赤字政府,而中国政府的财政状况良好。^①可以说,中国政府是世界上少数几个比较有钱的政府。

第三是中国在未来新的国际金融秩序中的角色问题。那么深刻的危机发生了,表明现存世界经济和金融秩序出了很大的毛病。如同从前的重大危机一样,这次危机也必然导致经济和金融体制的重建。在过去,西方世界是体制的建构者,其他国家则是被动的接受者。但是在今后的经济和金融秩序重建过程中,西方不可能垄断一切了。包括中国、印度、巴西和俄罗斯等国家在内的新兴经济体必然参与重建过程。没有这些新兴经济体的参与,就不会有新秩序的出现。或者说,如果把这些国家排除在外,那么西方所建立的秩序不能称之为世界的秩序。要确立秩序,西方和非西方国家之间就要进行一次“大谈判”(grand bargaining)。因为中国经济的规模,决定其必然要扮演一个非常重要的角色。

^① 经济学家通常用政府负债和GDP的比值来测量一个国家财政政策的空间。中国在危机前这一比例大致是18%,而美国是61%,日本是170%,欧洲国家多在60%—100%之间

在这方面,人们迫切想知道中国对未来秩序的认知和中国对本身在未来体制中地位的期望。

金融危机以来,有人赞扬中国,认为中国正在承担一个大国应当承担的责任;也有人批评中国,认为中国应当对金融危机的发生负责。但无论是批评者还是赞扬者,都反映了一个共同的心态,就是对中国的高度期待。对中国本身来说,金融危机则成了对本身所确立的经济制度的一次大检验。前不久,中国总理温家宝在英国剑桥大学演讲时,强调中国是一个“学习国家”。^①我想,这里的“学习”至少有两方面的意义。一方面,它指的是中国向世界各国学习。改革开放以来,中国虚心学习国际经验,不管是像美国那样的大国还是像新加坡那样的小国,中国都好好学习。可以说,中国是当今世界最好学的国家。尽管很多国家尤其是西方经常对中国持批评态度,但这并没有影响中国向这些国家学习。另一方面,“学习”也指中国向自己的经验学习。中国向各国学习,这里有积极的经验,也有负面的教训。中国的经济体制并非十全十美。这次金融危机一方面体现出了中国体制的优势,但同时也显现出其所存在的问题。分析中国模式的优势和指出其弊端同样重要。中国模式是一种发展中的模式,是世界经验和中国本身经验的累积。中国模式的进步对中国和世界同样重要。通过金融危机来检验中国模式是有理论和现实意义的。

二、中国的复合经济模式

无论是中国抵御金融危机的能力,还是其应付危机的方式都和中国改革开放之后建立起来的中国经济模式有紧密的关联。问题是中国模式是什么。这是一个非常复杂的问题。越来越多的人对中国模式表现出了越来越强烈的兴趣。很多发展中国家想向中国学习,而发达国家则担心中国模式是否会取代西方发展模式。^②但对中国模式是什么,人们并不清楚。所以总结中国模式很重要。中国模式反映在政治、经济和社会各个方面。从经济上看,我觉得可以把中

^① 温家宝 2009 年在剑桥演讲的全文参看: http://www.gov.cn/jdhd/2009_02/03/content_1220032.htm。

^② 关于中国模式的详细探讨,参看郑永年:《中国模式:经验与困局》,浙江人民出版社 2010 年版。

国模式称之为复合型或者混合型经济模式。我在这里使用“混合”这个概念和人们平常所说的不太相同。一般说来,混合经济指的是中国经济的混合所有制模式。我使用这个概念的范围要比所有权广,包括很多方面。所有权当然很重要,所谓的混合就是说各种所有权之间的平衡。在所有权之外,混合模式也应当包括对外开放和内部需求之间的平衡,政府和市场两者在经济领域的作用的平衡等。

从哲学上说,混合经济是中国人“中庸”哲学在实践上的反映。在中庸哲学下,中国人努力避免走极端路线。在改革开放的三十年里,中国基本上从制度层面确立了混合经济模式。改革开放之前,因为各种历史原因,中国走了极端社会主义路线,或者“贫穷社会主义”路线。改革开放后实行邓小平的“实事求是”路线。在开放路线下,西方的各种“主义”进入中国,对中国的各个政策层面产生影响。但很难说,哪一种“主义”占据主导地位。就是说,中国基本上保持了各种“主义”对政策影响的平衡。今天,在中国的学术界仍然不乏各种基本教义派,包括新自由主义经济学和传统社会主义思想。这两种思潮构成今天中国经济思想界的两个极端。新自由主义强调一个极端即市场和私有化,而传统社会主义则占据另外一个极端即政府和公有制。不过,无论是新自由主义还是传统社会主义都不能主导中国的经济实践。在实践层面,中国是混合型经济。

(一) 混合所有权制度

在应付金融危机过程中,国有化已经成为西方各国政府所采用的一种手段,至少对金融银行部门是这样。欧洲的国有化有根深蒂固的传统。实际上,国有化是欧洲社会主义的主要内容。二战后,很多国家的国有经济部门曾经变得非常大,导致了经济效率和效益低下。这就导致了反向运动,即私有化。^①英国政府在撒切尔任首相期间曾经试图发动大规模的私有化运动,并对欧洲各国产生影响。但是即使是撒切尔的私有化运动也极其有限,限于几个实体经济部门。在涉及到公共利益,就是说那些提供公共服务或者福利的部门,私有化运动遇到了来自民主政治的很大的阻力。这主要表现在教育、社会保障和医疗卫生方面。

^① 对私有化思想和政策的一个很好的历史性阐释,参见 Harvey David, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2005。

因为这些部门涉及到全体人民的利益,人们用选票否决和抵制了私有化运动。现在欧洲面临危机,各国政府又开始诉诸于国有化,对此欧洲社会并没有出现反对声音。

有意思的是美国也开始出现国有化运动。美国是私人资本主义的典型代表和大本营。在很长时间里,美国是抵御公有化尤其是社会主义运动的主要力量。在学术方面,以私有化为核心的新自由主义就在美国生长并拥有了向外的扩张力。在政治上,新自由主义最典型的表现就是里根经济学。但是,今天像前美国联储主席格林斯潘那样的可以称之为原教旨主义式新自由主义人物也开始认为并提倡国有化可以成为应付危机的有效方式。

在发展混合型所有权方面,中国比较典型。在改革开放前,中国从经济管理方式来说是典型的计划经济,但从所有权来说已经呈现多种形式,有国家所有制和集体所有制,在农村还有少量的私有性经济活动,主要表现在农民的自留地上。在国家所有制内部也存在着不同层面的所有权,即实体经济或者企业由各级政府分别所有和管理。

改革开放后,中国开始引入和鼓励其他多种形式的所有制形式,包括民营、合资、外资等等。在俄罗斯和东欧原来的共产主义国家,因为深受新自由主义的影响,进行了以私有化为核心的急风暴雨式的经济改革。但中国并没有这样做。中国一方面鼓励其他所有制的产生和发展,另一方面通过改革原先僵硬的公有制来适应新的环境。国家所有原来占据绝对的主导地位,并在宪法和法律方面得到保障。在市场经济的早期,国家所有制为主,其他所有制为辅,仅仅作为补充。但后来各种所有制得到了平等的法律地位。这里尤其要提及上世纪90年代中期之后的“抓大放小”的经济改革。这是一个具有战略意义的改革方案。通过“抓大”,中国重组了大型国有企业;而“放小”则是通过民营化给中小企业的发展提供动力机制。^①

中国的混合型或者复合型所有制已经形成,并且得到宪法和法律的保护。这种所有制结构应当不会容易改变。各种所有制之间也已经形成了互相竞争的机制,通过互相竞争来提高各自的生产力。尤其显著的是这种混合型经济在应

^① 笔者曾经详细探讨过“抓大放小”这个改革思路的逻辑和原则,见郑永年:《朱镕基新政:中国改革的新模式》,八方文化企业公司1999年版。

付金融危机过程中显示出了其优势。国有部门已经成了中国政府强有力的用来实施其为应付危机所推出的政策的工具。如上面所提到的,西方多数国家政府只有金融工具而无经济杠杆,而中国政府两者皆有。

这次金融危机也为中国那些一直在鼓吹私有化的人一个反思的机会。私有化或者民营化当然有其优势,这也就是为什么改革开放以来中国政府在不断发展民营经济。但一些人尤其是新自由主义经济学家则走向了极端,把私有化神圣化,以为私有化是解决一切经济问题的唯一手段和工具。但事实上显然不是这样。极端的私有化和极端的公有化一样会导致无穷的经济问题。为了公有化而公有化,为了私有化而私有化,都不是理性的方式。重要的是要在不同所有权之间找到一个合理的平衡,通过它们之间的竞争而达到资源的合理配置、经济效益的最大化和社会公正的实现。

(二) 出口导向和内部需求

金融危机发生之后,一些西方学者和政治人物把责任推给中国。在一些人看来,金融危机的主要原因在于中国的增长模式。改革开放以来,中国的发展模式和早先的日本和后来的“四小龙”有很大的类似之处,都是出口导向的。外向型经济增长依赖于出口,依赖于西方市场。同时,中国的金融体系也是为这个外向型经济体系服务的。出口导向型经济创造了大量的外汇,再用外汇购买西方的诸多金融产品。在过去的三十年里已经形成了中国生产、西方消费的模式。这个模式被视为是导致这次金融危机的主要原因。尽管这些指责并没有多少道理,但却值得中国思考。这次危机告诉人们,无论是要解决危机还是要长期的发展,都不能依赖于西方市场,依赖于西方消费者。中国的发展还必须主要靠自己,就是说要建设一个内需型经济体。一个内需型经济体并不是说不要外贸和出口了。但一个高度依赖于外贸而内需不足的经济体,其增长是不可持续的。在全球化环境下,内需和外贸是两个最为重要的经济支柱。对中国这样大的经济体来说,内需无疑要比外贸重要得多。

但同时中国这次之所以能够抵御源于西方的危机,表明中国的经济形态和日本与“四小龙”的不同。无疑,这次金融危机表明中国的出口导向型经济出现了问题。因为西方没有了需求,依赖于西方市场的实体经济必然出现问题。人们已经看到在珠江三角洲有大量的工厂倒闭和大量的工人尤其是农民工失业。

珠江三角洲的经济正在面临很大的困难。出口导向型经济要转型,这是很显然的。然而,转型并不是说要否定出口导向。在中国内部,出口导向型经济也表现为不同类型。比较一下珠江三角洲和长江三角洲就可以看到这一点。^① 珠江三角洲的出口导向型可以说是一种典型的“自由放任”型经济。自20世纪80年代开始,地方有关部门对本身的产业发展没有长远的政策,只要是外资就欢迎。因此,低技术、劳动密集、高能源消耗、高污染等成了珠江三角洲经济的特色。这种经济增长方式随着时间的推移也显出其不可持续的特点。例如,它不能承受劳动关系的变化。前些年,中国出台新的劳动法,珠江三角洲的资本方就出来反对。这种方式也不能承受土地方面的变化。当土地的供应不能持续时,这种发展模式也会遇到很大的麻烦。正是这种情况促使广东地方政府在近年来开始努力调整产业政策。实际上,在这次金融危机发生之前,广东地方政府已经开始作产业的升级调整。广东的一些企业在金融危机之前就开始关闭或者倒闭。广东称这一步是“腾笼换鸟”。这种做法受到一些方面的质疑,尤其是新自由主义经济学者。但是,无论从产业升级还是劳工权利或者可持续发展来说,这一步必须走。所不幸的是,这种产业调整遇到了现在的金融危机。不管怎样,很多国家的产业调整和升级都经历过一个痛苦和漫长的过程。中国也不会例外。

和珠江三角洲相比,长江三角洲的出口导向型经济情况就有很大的不同。在大规模吸收外资方面,长江三角洲可说是后来者。或许接受了珠江三角洲的教训,长江三角洲在规划发展过程中,政府一直起了非常大的作用。长江三角洲从一开始就拒绝低技术和高污染的产业。从各个经济指标来看,长江三角洲的发展要比珠江三角洲更具有优势。尽管这次金融危机也影响到长江三角洲,但受影响的程度显然远远低于珠江三角洲。

更为重要的是,除了出口导向型经济体,中国也有很多地方发展出了以内部需求为导向的经济体。前年,我到浙江考察,写了一篇题为“浙江模式值得深思”的文章^②,专门讨论浙江内生型民营经济的特点。首先,它是一种内生型发展,就是说,发展的动力来自内部。在中国沿海从珠江三角洲到长江三角洲再到

① Yu Hong and Huang Yanjie, "Impact of The Global Economic Crisis on The Pearl River and Yangtze River Delta Regions", *EAI Background Brief No. 477*.

② 参见《联合早报》2006年7月4日。

京津塘和渤海湾地区的很多地方,经济发展的主动力来自外来资本。浙江则没有这样的情况。尽管外资也得到鼓励,但发展的主动力主要来自民族资本。在过去的二十多年间,民族工业得到长足的发展,足以和外来资本相抗衡。发展的资本来自内部,发展也是以满足内部市场为主。浙江的产品都是以先抢占内部市场为主,出口为辅。这与很多沿海地区高度依赖于出口导向的经济形成鲜明的对照。浙江是以开拓内部市场闻名的。在全国的各个角落,现在没有一个地方是没有浙江商人的。这种满足内部市场为主体的发展模式对整个国家的发展是非常有利的,同时这种模式要比出口导向型更稳定和更具有可持续性,因为它更能承受外部国际市场的冲击。

浙江经济基于民营资本之上,其技术创新能力也比其他地区要高出很多。在20世纪80年代,浙江的一些地区尤其是温州地区以生产假货闻名,但是现在这种情况完全改观。在吸取了以往的经验之后,浙江民营企业非常重视技术创新的重要性。因为是民营资本,浙江企业的技术创新更具有自主性。现在的浙江商人不仅走遍全国,也走遍全世界。很多产品在国际市场上具有相当的竞争能力。近年来浙江产品在发达国家经常遭受地方贸易保护主义的“反击”,这从一个侧面反映了浙江产品的国际竞争能力。但同样重要的是浙江健康发展的国有企业。在中国的其他地区,国有企业的发展一直存在着很大的问题,但浙江的国有企业发展势头相当好。这与民营企业的发展是密切相关的。民营企业的发展为国有企业营造了一个有利的环境,国有企业和民营企业两者相互补充又相互竞争,起到了共同发展的效果。

更值得注意的是,浙江的劳工状况远较其他地区好。^① 在一些地区,尤其是台资、港资和外资(如韩资)等密集的地区,劳工状况存在着太多的问题,劳工的权益往往得不到保障。但在浙江,侵犯劳工权益的情况并不多见。造成这种情况的因素有多种,但这与浙江重视本土资本有关。外来资本主要动机来自对地方廉价劳动力的利用,企业的社会责任感很难产生。而本土资本则因为受地方归属感等因素的影响,往往较能注意企业的社会责任的培养和发展。劳资关系也因此显得比较和谐。

浙江当然不是唯一的以内部需求为导向的地方经济体。中国的很多地方也

^① 参见中国社科院《浙江经验与中国发展》课题报告,2007年1月。

是这样。山东是另外一个例子,出口经济在总体经济中的比例很低。最近这些年出现的“重庆模式”也是通过扩展内部需求得到高速发展的。

外贸在过去给中国的经济发展提供了莫大的动力机制。金融危机显现了外向型经济的弱势之所在,内需变得重要起来。金融危机以来,中国还在继续推动外贸。实际上,中国已经成了世界贸易自由化的主要动力。这背后就是中国强大的出口经济。但同时也要意识到,内需经济是经济可持续发展的关键。如上所说,中国各地以内需为导向的经济成分也在发展,并且有些成功的经验,但是关键在于内需经济政策要像出口导向经济政策那样被提升到国家层面。内需和外贸是持续经济发展的两条腿。只有到了两条腿走路的时候,中国才会成为一个真正的经济强国。

(三) 政府和市场

政府和市场的关系既关乎一个经济体是否会导致经济或者金融危机,也关乎这个经济体是否有能力应付危机和预防危机。金融危机发生之后,政府和市场的关系再次成为各国政府和学术界的讨论议题。

不管这次金融危机有怎样复杂的原因在背后,就政府来说,最主要的是政府对金融系统监管不严。新自由主义者把亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”,即市场,推到了至高无上的程度,他们相信这只手会解决一切经济问题。在新自由主义那里没有政府的经济功能。如果说有,那么就是要保证这只看不见的手能毫无障碍地运作。但这次金融危机表明这种信仰存在问题。

中国在改革开放前是计划经济,把政府的经济作用极端化,而市场被视为是属于资本主义制度的,从而其功能也被否定。改革开放后,中国对市场有了不同的看法。邓小平认为资本主义可以使用市场机制,社会主义也可以使用市场机制。这就把市场中立化了。同时政府大力推进市场建设。上面所说的各种所有制经济都是在同一个市场平台上互动竞争的。

重要的是,中国在强调市场功能的同时没有走向市场万能主义。崇拜市场的新自由主义在学术界有很大的影响,但在政策面,不同领域有不同的影响。在西方,新自由主义的根基可以说在实体经济领域,即在企业界。但在中国则不同。新自由主义进入中国之后,在实体经济领域遇到强大的阻力,尤其在大型国有企业领域。如上所说,中国政府重组了大型国有企业,民营化并没有发生在大

型国企。但新自由主义对中小企业的影响相当大。一方面是因为“放小”的战略。尽管这个战略设想得很好,但在实施过程中出现了很大的问题,主要是恶性私有化和国有资产的流失,导致了社会的不正义。新自由主义对社会制度领域的影响更大,主要表现在医疗卫生、社会保障和教育领域。在西方,因为民主制度的存在,新自由主义在这些领域遇到了强大的阻力,即被人民所否决。但在中国则相反。在国有企业领域,因为有国家的力量存在,新自由主义不能发生作用。在社会制度领域,新自由主义如鱼得水。原因很简单,因为社会制度的存在主要是为了弱势社会群体。弱势社会群体很难抵制新自由主义的侵入。在这些社会制度领域,改革开放前中国取得了很大的成就。在新自由主义进入这些领域以后,原来的社会体制包括学校、医疗卫生和社会保障制度全面衰落甚至解体,尤其是在农村地区。尽管近年来政府尽了很大的努力,但到今天这些社会制度还没有建立起来。^①

在新自由主义影响深刻的领域,政府的作用很成问题。因为政府全面撤退,市场恶性竞争变得不可避免。中国企业间的恶性竞争是这些年企业界丑闻不断的一个主要原因。恶性竞争表明市场还是缺乏规则。市场如何规则化?这很难靠市场本身。从中外历史的经验来看,政府还必须扮演一个主要角色。就是说市场这只看不见的手的发生、发展和健康运作离不开政府这只看得见的手。^②

可以感到欣慰的是,在金融银行领域,中国规制国家初步成形。温家宝最近在和网友对话时指出,中国的金融经过十多年的改革,已经具备应对危机的良好基础。在金融和银行领域,中国规制国家的建设得益于1997年发生的亚洲金融危机。亚洲金融危机的产生源于亚洲一些国家金融监管不严。中国从亚洲金融危机开始致力于金融银行系统的改革,取得了很大的成绩。这就是这次中国的金融和银行系统没有发生像西方那样的深刻危机的主要原因。西方各国在亚洲发生金融危机的时候,批评亚洲国家,给亚洲国家带来很大的压力。这种压力也

^① 笔者曾在《联合早报》上大量撰文,论及中国社会解体、道德失范、教育和医疗改革失败以及基层无政府化等问题。参见: http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/forum_zp.shtml。

^② 当前一直被奉为世界经济发展经典模式的美国模式,从19世纪末以来就经历一个国家主导的经济制度建构过程。从州际商贸委员会、美联储、劳工部、房贷局,直到各种国家监督机构,没有哪一个主要的国家层面的市场不受特定机构的严格规制并受到法律的严格约束。

是促使中国改革的一个因素。但是,西方国家本身则忽视了改革,最终造成今天的危机。尽管西方国家可以强调一些外在的因素(如中国的高存款率),但推卸不了内部监管不严的责任。很显然,不管外部因素如何,危机是通过内部因素发生作用而爆发的。

三、社会改革和中国模式的改进

上面强调过,这次金融危机中,中国社会主义市场经济模式既显现了其优势,但也表现出一些弱势。不管怎样,中国模式仍然处于发展过程之中。如果能够从这次金融危机中学到足够的教训,那么非常有利于这个模式的发展。

海内外学者在讨论这次金融危机是否能够促成中国经济增长模式转型的问题。我个人认为,中国模式的改进的关键在于通过社会改革而确立社会制度,从而保障中国经济的可持续发展。这些年来,中国的社会改革往往是雷声大、雨点小。医疗卫生改革已经争论了很多年,但还是没有一个让各方都能普遍接受的好方案。社会保障制度有了一些进展,但远离社会的客观需求。教育改革还是很糟糕。环境则恶化到了不可忍受的程度。尽管国家税收能力大大提到,但收入分配和社会分化继续恶化。另一方面,社会群体事件的频繁发生,加上国际经济环境的恶化,表明社会的不稳定因素还会遽然增加。无论从哪个方面来看,社会改革和社会制度的建设已经刻不容缓。但是,各方面一直在这些问题上争论不休。在很多领域,一会儿集权,一会儿分权。尽管谁都说改革很重要,但就是解决不了谁来改革的问题。这背后无非是既得利益在抵制改革。

社会改革的重要性是不言而喻的。

首先,社会改革是为了应付和解决经济改革所带来的负面结果。在前三十年,经济主义可以说是中国发展的主题,经济发展就是一切。中国在短短的时间里,创造了世界经济史奇迹。此前,没有任何国家能够在这样短的时间里能够帮助数以亿计的人民脱离贫困状态,能够帮助这样大规模的社会群体提高生活水平。但经济主义在促进经济繁荣的同时也带来了一系列问题。各级政府 GDP 主义盛行,非经济方面的发展大多被大大忽视,导致环境恶化,资源大量浪费,贫富差异扩大和社会分化严重。这些由经济发展导致的后果,加上一些党政官员的深度腐败,反映到社会层面就是政府在人民眼中的合法性问题,群体事件越来

越频繁,多数表现在各级政府和社会的对立。很显然,对经济主义的不良后果不加以纠正,经济发展就不可持续。这一点毋需再多说。这些年来中国政府确定的“科学发展观”和“和谐社会”就是对这种单向发展反思的产物。

其次,社会改革要为未来经济增长奠定新的制度基础。前面三十年的经济增长总体上来说来源于经济制度的改革和创新。但迄今,经济改革的很多方面已经很难深入下去,说明过去的增长模式已经达到了顶点。进行社会改革和建设社会制度的目标是推动中国从一个非消费型社会向消费型社会的转型。消费型社会是中国未来长期经济增长的最主要来源。很简单,经济增长有两大来源,即投资和消费,而投资的最终目的也是消费。中国在过去三十年里建立了一个外向型经济。增长来自投资,但投资是为外部市场服务,主要是西方市场。如上所说,随着全球经济危机的发生,来自西方的需求遽然下降,中国这种发展模式的局限性一下子就显现出来了。中国要向消费社会转型,就必须建立一整套有助于消费社会发展的基本社会制度,例如医疗保险、社会保障、教育和环保等等。没有这样一套制度,没有可能出现消费社会。^①

再次,更为重要的是社会改革要为中国未来的政治改革作制度准备。中国的改革进程大致可以分为经济改革—社会改革—政治改革三个阶段。从改革开放开始到本世纪初,一直是以经济改革为主。本世纪初以来也就是中共十六大以来,社会改革提到议事日程上来。从历史的角度看,中国的政治发展进程应当是基本国家制度建设在先,民主化随后。民主制度的有效运作不仅需要社会经济发展到一定的水平,更需要诸多基本国家制度成为其基础结构。从世界范围来看,凡是基本国家制度建设得好的国家,民主化过程比较和平,新建立的民主制度能够有效运作。反之,在缺乏基本国家制度的情况下,如果发生民主化,就会出现无政府状态、社会不稳定和政治的恶斗。现在,亚洲很多国家所经历的民主危机就说明了这个问题。在过去三十年中,中国已经建立了一套基本的国家经济制度。但社会制度则远远没有建立。如果在基本国家制度中缺失了社会制

① 中国一般家庭在住房(房贷)、医疗和教育方面的支出,其占总收入份额不仅大大超出发达国家标准,而且负担非常不均衡。2009年房价暴涨,更导致一线城市85%家庭购房无望(社科院经济蓝皮书,2010)。中国所谓“中产阶级”也有就此消失的危险,其生活和消费水平更是普遍下降。参见《中国新闻周刊》,2010年第3期。

度这一块的情况下进行政治民主化,那么必定出现动乱频繁发生的政治局面。[†]

应对金融危机的确是个进行社会改革和建立社会制度的好机会。但现在看来,中国政府现在所采取的应付危机的模式基本上承续了处理“九七亚洲金融危机”的模式,即以公共投资为主体,附带拉动内需。很显然,1997年之后,政府在前一方面非常成功,但在打造内部消费市场方面并没有很大的成绩。当时,因为西方市场没有危机,中国的出口不久就恢复了。这次金融危机之后所推出的各种拯救经济的举措,其重点还是在原来意义上的经济增长模式上。例如外贸,还是想通过各种途径来促进外贸。但谁都知道,这种方式已经无效。大量的资金因为背后存在着庞大的既得利益而流向基础设施的投资。中央政府尽管也强调了民生经济,但因为其背后没有“既得利益”,资金很难流向民生经济。尽管这次中国也在努力扩大社会制度建设方面的投入,但很显然大多数投入还是流向基础设施、产业升级等方面,而非社会制度建设。

中国迫切需要在危机中继续寻求新的模式。努力的方向和重中之重应当是扩大内需,建立消费型社会。在任何国家,社会改革和建立社会制度都是一场攻坚战。在当今发达国家,社会制度的建立往往和持久的充满暴力的工人阶级运动,甚至革命联系在一起。不难看到,从原始市场经济或者资本主义转型到现代福利型资本主义并非一个自然的过程,而是社会改革的结果。一些国家的政治精英能够实行“铁血”政策,超越既得利益,进行自觉的改革,但另一些国家的政治精英则受制于既得利益,没有能力进行改革,让暴力式社会运动和革命发生。有一点很明确,到现在为止,所有实行市场经济的国家中,一套良好的基本社会制度都是保障其市场运行和社会稳定的制度基础。中国在这些方面还需要很大的努力。

[†] 亚洲和拉美许多“民主国家”政权堕落成精英/民粹之间的暴力争夺即是前车之鉴。例如泰国、菲律宾和巴西。没有坚实中产阶级作基础的民主即使制度完善,也容易走向极权政体,例如魏玛德国。

另辟蹊径：重思东亚政治发展道路

张维为*

不少东亚国家和地区都采用了西方多元民主制度，这些国家和地区又大致可以分为两类，一类是在经济比较落后的情况下就采用了西方的政治制度，如泰国、菲律宾、蒙古等，另一类是在经济起飞之后转而采用西方政治制度的，如韩国、中国台湾等。但从过去 20 年的情况来看，这些民主政体的品质普遍不佳，它们几乎都遇到了非西方社会采用西方政治制度后出现的一系列典型问题。本文旨在探讨这些民主政体面临的问题及其成因，并提出非西方社会的民主建设需要摆脱西方僵化政治话语的束缚，另辟蹊径，探索体制创新之路。过去 30 年中国发展模式的相对成功及其背后的一些理念，对重新思考东亚政治发展的道路也有启发。

一、东亚民主政体面临四大问题

第一，社会分裂。采用西方民主政体后的东亚国家和地区几乎都面临了社会严重分裂的问题。这些社会原来由于种种原因而形成的社会矛盾和分歧，在采用了西方多元民主制度之后，不是缩小了，而是放大了、强化了，导致了严重的社会分裂，甚至对抗。泰国近三年来围绕着他信总理下台的抗争很能说明这个

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问题：泰国“黄衫军”与“红衫军”对峙的背后，是泰国城乡贫富差距的严峻现实，泰国是世界上贫富差距最大的国家之一，国家总人口中最富的20%拥有国民收入的60%以上，最穷的20%只拥有国民收入的5%。他信的支持者主要是泰国农民和城市穷人，而其反对者主要是城市中产阶级和社会上流人士。2006年9月，泰国军人发动政变，推翻了民选的他信政府，某种意义上，这个政变顺应了城里中产阶级的民意主流，但遭到了农民的激烈反对。泰国农村人口占了总人口的约70%，所以就不断地出现所谓“农民选出总理，城里人赶他下台”的局面^①。

如果泰国的政治局面可以被大致概括为“城乡分裂”，那么中国台湾的情况则可以被大致归纳为“南北分裂”，这种分裂的背后是“族群分裂”：这些年来，台湾民主的特征是政党恶斗。陈水扁2000年上台后，没有带来他所说的“全民政府，清流共治”。恰恰相反，为了选票，陈水扁故意挑起族群矛盾（所谓“本省人”，“外省人”，“台湾人”，“中国人”等），“南部”与“北部”成了一种政治切割工具，即所谓“爱台”的南部对抗“卖台”的北部。台湾南北差异固然有其历史上形成的“重北轻南”因素，但采用西方政治制度后，政客出于争夺选票的目的，竞相争打“族群牌”，大大加剧了社会分裂，也使政府对社会的整合能力锐减。虽然主张族群和谐的马英九先生已上台，但如何修复台湾社会的深深裂痕绝非易事。

社会分裂的现象也出现在其他东亚国家，如韩国的“地域分裂”，其特点是政客为了争权夺利，操动原来已经存在的地域矛盾来争夺选票，使本来就存在的如岭南人（庆尚地区，包括大丘市、釜山市和庆尚南北道的人）和湖南人（又称全罗地区，包括光州市、全罗北道和全罗南道的人）之间的“道籍矛盾”更为尖锐，朝野政党为了选票争打“地域牌”和“道籍牌”，使韩国的经济发展也出现了更大的区域不平衡^②。

值得注意的是社会分裂总是与政治动荡联系在一起。这些国家和地区都经历了较大规模的震荡，泰国的动乱已持续三年，从封锁机场，冲击总理府，到取消

^① Stanley A. Weiss, "Thailand's lessons in populism", *the International Herald Tribune*, 15 Jan. 2009.

^② 林震：《驾驭“第二波”：中国台湾和韩国民主化比较研究》，www.tecn.cn/data。

东盟 10 + 3 高峰会,反对党领袖遇刺,社会震荡不止;蒙古不久前出现了暴乱,导致政府被迫实施戒严令;菲律宾更是经历了无数次军事政变;中国台湾则出现了“两颗子弹”抗争和百万民众走上街头的“红衫军”;韩国的各种不同规模的政治冲突也几乎从未间断。

第二,贪腐增加。西方政治学理论一般假设采用了西方民主制度,贪污腐败就会减少,但从东亚这些国家和地区实施西方政治制度的实际情况来看,贪污腐败往往有增无减。从“透明国际”发表的 2004 年与 2008 年的腐败指数来看,中国台湾、泰国、蒙古、菲律宾的腐败情况在过去 4 年中都更为严重了(见表 1):

表 1 腐败指数

	中国台湾	泰 国	蒙 古	菲 律 宾	印 尼
2004	35	64	85	102	133
2008	39	80	102	141	126

资料来源:《透明国际》网站。

印度尼西亚情况似乎略有好转,但最新的亚洲政经风险顾问公司仍把印度尼西亚排为亚洲腐败最严重的国家,把中国台湾的腐败也排在中国大陆之前^①。有些人不服这个排名,但台湾民主化后,黑道和金钱大规模介入政治,台湾民主制度迅速市场化等,都是不争的事实。台湾的民主体制演变成钱主,特别是前领导人陈水扁 8 年“总统”拼命敛财之贪婪,令人吃惊。韩国的财阀势力自民主化以来也更为膨胀,政企之间互相勾结和利用,财阀向党提供大量政治资金是韩国屡禁不止的问题;菲律宾很多人形容自己国家换一届领导人,就是新一轮的腐败开始^②。

第三,经济滑坡。泰国自 2006 年军事政变造成动乱以来,经济整体下滑;菲律宾实行了近一个世纪的民主制度,但三分之一的民众今天还生活在赤贫之中,十分之一的人口在国外打工,最近的粮食危机和金融危机又使菲律宾经济雪上加霜;蒙古骚乱背后的主要原因也是经济的持续衰退,蒙古的经济结构单一,过去 20 年鲜有发展,人口的三分之一处于赤贫之中。韩国自 20 世纪 80 年代中期

① 《台湾比大陆更腐败,马英九痛心疾首》,凤凰网新闻报道,2009 年 4 月 10 日。

② 张维为:《中国触动全球》,新华出版社 2008 年版,第 19 页。

民主化以来,虽然展现过经济发展的巨大活力,但由于宏观监管严重失误等原因,韩国不幸地成为1997年亚洲金融危机和当前这场金融海啸的重灾区。中国台湾的民进党执政八年,台湾经济的整体实力滑坡,中国台湾已成了“四小龙”之尾。政府债务急剧上升,失业率居高不下,外国投资锐减。本该拼经济,拼民生,拼竞争力,但当局却意识形态挂帅,拼“修宪”,拼“正名”,拼“公投”。陈水扁八年执政,换了六位“行政院长”,各项政策摇摆不定。从2007年瑞士洛桑国际管理学院公布的排名来看,台湾的竞争力也开始落后于中国大陆^①。

第四,不满上升。由于上述问题,这些国家和地区的民众对自己政体的满意度明显走低。根据Asian Barometer Project 2008年的报告,韩国、蒙古、中国台湾、泰国、菲律宾的多数民众都认为这些年来的民主转型未能改善他们的生活^②。过去曾积极推动泰国民主化的泰国PAD的领导人林明达也公开说:泰国的民主非常腐败,买票行为普遍,农村选民愚昧无知,所以选举已没有什么意义,他甚至主张废除议员的选举,改为任命。林明达本人曾是1998年泰国民主运动的主要推动者,10年之后其对泰国民主发出了这样的感叹,不能不使人唏嘘^③。泰国从1932年开始实行君主立宪制,迄今为止已经历了24次军事政变,有意思的是泰国历次政变后产生的非民选看守政府往往政绩比较好,如20世纪90年代初的阿南政府。印度尼西亚民主制度也存有诸多不确定因素,基本上还是一种人脉政治,军队和政客家族的影响力巨大,而公民的参与和利益表述仍然受到很多限制,再加上严重的政府腐败问题,前途不容乐观。依我实地访问观察,如果万幸,印尼也许可以逐步演变成一种类似印度的低品质民主国家;如果不幸,印尼则可能陷入长期党争,甚至四分五裂。

实际上,对西方民主制度失望的情绪不局限在上述的国家和地区,整个亚洲都是如此,孟加拉经历了两年的军人政权,最近选出了一个新政府,但又遇上了兵变;巴基斯坦和东帝汶已被不少人看作是接近“失败的国家”;印度孟买一场恐怖主义袭击也暴露出自己体制太多的问题,使得很多印度人反思印度政治制度的问题,特别是消除贫困乏力,腐败愈演愈烈,政府效率低下。日本早在19世

① 张维为:《台湾民主的困境及其对两岸关系的影响》,载《中国评论月刊》,2007年第11期。

② Hannah Beech, "Why Democracy is struggling in Asia," *Time*, 12 January 2009, p. 30

③ 同上。

纪末就完成了自己的工业革命，二次大战后又建立了西方民主制度，但也面临诸多体制问题，比较突出的问题是走马灯一样地换首相，裙带关系的政治，必要的改革难以推动等，连美国《新闻周刊》2009年3月也刊载长文质疑：“日本的政客为什么都那么差劲？”这些国家虽然不属本文讨论的范围，但其民主发展道路上遇到的问题亦值得我们深思^①。

二、民主品质不佳的原因

从西方主流民主理论的角度来看，东亚民主品质不佳主要由两个原因造成。第一是缺乏司法独立和法治精神。西方民主理论认为：一个理想的民主社会，应该建立在司法独立和法治精神的基础之上。没有一个具有高度公信力的独立的司法系统，民主的质量很难保证。既然选择了西方民主框架，那么各方就应该遵守同样的游戏规则来进行博弈，这首先就需要有一个独立的具有公信力的法律体系，但很多亚洲社会都未能做到这一点。

此外，这种体系的真正落实又需要深入人心的法治精神和法治文化，正如著名法学家哈罗德·伯尔曼（Harold J. Berman）所说：“法律必须被信仰，否则等于形同虚设。”但是东亚社会普遍缺少西方意义上的法治传统。例如，曼谷市民对于2006年的军事政变均普遍表示欢迎，西方社会就很难理解民众怎么能支持军队推翻一个通过选举而产生的合法政府呢。泰国法庭后来又以选举作弊为由，以速战速决的方式裁决泰国人民权力党及与其联合执政的政党为“非法”，西方主流媒体称这种做法为“司法政变”^②。

法治不足也体现在普通公民对法律制度的信任感不高，以法治程度相对比较发达的韩国为例，韩国民调显示韩国人民对自己国家的法律制度信任度也不强，多数人认为自己国家的法律制度无法保证法律面前人人平等^③。中国台湾在司法独立方面虽然取得了不少进步，但这个体系仍不具备一个健全民主制度发展所需要的公信力。2004年人们不满高等法院对两颗子弹带来的陈水扁当

① Christian Caryl, “Headless in Tokyo”, *Newsweek*, 9 March 2009, p. 28

② Hannah Beech, “Why Democracy is struggling in Asia”. *Time*, 12 January 2009, p. 32.

③ Ditto.

选的裁定,2007年红衫军数百万人走上街头抗争等情况,都反映出人民对在现有司法体制内解决问题持强烈的怀疑态度。

第二是“公民文化”严重不足。“公民文化”本来是一种特定的习俗与态度,其最大的特点是理性与宽容,任何时候都尊重对手,尊重少数。由于“公民文化”缺位,政客很容易愚弄百姓,政客口中的人民实际上不是西方经典民主理论中所设想的能够理性参政的公民,而是自上而下通过炒作政治议题动员而来的民众。曾经竞选总统的菲律宾女政治家M·D·圣地亚哥说:“菲律宾人从来不把选举当一码事。菲律宾人似乎不是亚洲人,他们似乎更接近于夏威夷的波利尼西亚人。菲律宾人在竞选期间唱歌跳舞,把政治集会当作一种娱乐方式,候选人也为选民提供各种娱乐活动,包括邀请艺人影星前来唱歌跳舞吸引选民,他们不谈论严肃的政治议题。菲律宾的选举事实上是一种比知名度大小的选美比赛,而不是比能力高低的智力比赛。”当一些政客对阿罗约总统不满时,他们便可出钱到大街上收买成千上万的无业游民去游行,美其名曰表达民意^①。

美国政治学家亨廷顿也曾表述过民主建设容易遇到的难题:“在许多情境下,政治领袖赢得选票的最简便方法,就是诉诸于部落、族群、种族以及宗教的支持者,从而导致社群及族群间冲突加剧。”^②中国台湾就是一个例子,公民文化严重缺位产生了“非自由民主”(illiberal democracy),政客为了选票故意挑起族群矛盾,造成族群分裂,还对对手进行“抹黑”、“抹红”、“抹黄”,直至置于死地而后快。韩国国会也是不断地演出暴力冲突。韩国民主化已经20多年了,但民主化水平仍停留在强制性的制度约束层面上,没有从观念上深入到自律的层面。在韩国政治中,各个政党都赞同“少数服从多数”的原则,但一旦自己的政党沦为议会中的少数时,就不愿服从这个原则,而议会中的多数政党又倾向于滥用多数的权力来独家经营^③。

^① 引自曹云华:《菲律宾人民需要什么样的民主》,http://www.gx.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-11/06/content_11595000.htm。

^② 萨缪尔·亨廷顿:《民主的千秋大业》,见朱云汉等主编:《巩固第三波民主》,台北业强出版社1997年版,第52页。

^③ 《韩国民主主义还有很长的路要走》,见《朝鲜日报》中文网,2008年12月24日。

三、另辟蹊径：走民主创新之路

（一）历史没有终结

如果说上述原因可以大致解释东亚许多民主试验不甚成功的原因，那么开出的药方自然是加强司法独立的建设，培养法治精神和公民文化，这种努力当然可以也应该继续下去，但我们也有必要提出一些与此相关的更深层次上的问题。比方说，这些社会的司法独立和法治精神为什么这么难确立？这些社会的公民文化为什么这么难培养？这些社会改进司法和公民文化的努力最终一定能成功吗？这种努力的机会成本有多人？这些社会能够承受这种机会成本吗？要是像菲律宾这样试验了西方民主近一个世纪，或者像泰国这样试验了70多年，还是不成功又该怎么办？

我们还可以进一步提问：既然西方民主制度自身已暴露出这么多问题，既然这种制度在非西方国家的实践几乎没有真正成功的例子，难道我们还一定要前赴后继，甚至赴汤蹈火去照搬西方的体制吗？还一定要以西方民主模式为马首是瞻吗？面对这么多失败的经验，我们难道还不应该考虑在民主建设上另辟蹊径吗？我个人认为对于东亚国家，乃至整个非西方世界，只有汲取别国民主建设的经验和教训，结合自己的文化传统来进行制度创新，才是唯一可行的办法。

历史并没有像福山所说的那样终结于西方民主制度，人类对最佳政治制度的内容和形式探索还在进行，也不会终结。世界根本不存在其他文化必须一致照搬的唯一的民主模式，世界各国都应该自己去探索适合自己国情的民主模式，也就是说民主模式是多元化的，而不是单元化的，世界的政治发展也不可能是一种单线的西方民主模式。

中国国画大师齐白石曾说过一句名言：“仿我者死，学我者生” 这个理念对我们思考民主问题也有启发，他的意思是：机械地模仿别人最后只能是死路一条，学习别人的长处，才是生路。我这里还想加上一句：“超我者达”，也就是说，要想达到理想的境界，就要考虑如何知己知彼，最终争取比别人做得更好。

中国经济改革的相对成功走的就是这么一条路，从总体上看，我们没有机械

地模仿西方市场经济,而是学习了它的长处,了解了它的短处,并结合了自身的条件进行了大规模的体制创新。现在中国的社会主义市场经济,包括一整套宏观调控的思路、方法、措施的“组合拳”,显出了强大的生命力,它不仅创造了人类历史上为数不多的持续三十年的高速发展,而且在这次应对全球金融海啸的过程中,展现了自己模式的独特力量。

中国还有一句古训:“取法乎上,得乎其中”,如果你的标准就是美国这个有诸多缺陷的政治制度,那你最后得到的恐怕连它的一半都没有。其实,美国人自己对自己的政治经济制度的信心严重不足。美国芝加哥大学最新的“普遍社会调查”(General Social Survey)表明:美国对体制“很有信心”者在美国总人口中的比例一路走低(见表2)。

表2 美国“普遍社会调查”的结果(2000年与2008年的比较)

	2000年	2008年
1. 对政府行政主管部门“很有信心”者:	14%	11%
2. 对国会“很有信心”者:	13%	11%
3. 对银行“很有信心”者:	30%	19%
4. 对大公司“很有信心”者:	30%	16%

资料来源:《经济学人》,2009年3月28日,第48页。

依我之见,这种对自己体制的信任度低于中国公众对自己体制的信任度。从这个角度看,美国体制改革的任务恐怕不比中国轻。有些人把美国的制度吹得大花乱坠,还要其他国家效仿和照搬,就这么一种低水准的公众信任度,何以服人?难怪头脑比较清醒的奥巴马一上台,就决定不再在世界上用武力强行推销美国模式了。奥巴马总统似乎还懂得什么叫与时俱进,但我们的一些极右人士还是整天想着用美国模式来改造中国,此路是走不通的。

美国颇有影响力的皮尤研究中心多年来一直在世界主要国家进行民意测验,了解公众对自己国家现状的满意程度,2005年对17个国家的国民进行的调查,发现西方国家的民众对自己国家的状况不满意的比例很大,倒是72%的中国人对自己国家的现状表示满意,在被调查的17个国家中拔了头筹(见表3)。

表 3 您对自己国家的现状是否满意? (%)

	满 意	不满意
中 国	72	19
约 旦	69	30
巴基斯坦	57	39
西班牙	51	44
荷 兰	49	50
英 国	44	51
加拿大	45	52
土耳其	41	55
印 度	41	57
美 国	39	57
黎巴嫩	40	58
印度尼西亚	35	64
法 国	28	71
俄罗斯	23	71
德 国	25	73
波 兰	13	82

资料来源: PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2005。

这个调查不能说明与政治制度有关的所有问题,但至少可以说明一点:中国现有的体制一定有其长处,西方的体制一定有其短处,否则不会是这样的结果。过去 30 年的一个举世瞩目的事件就是中国的迅速崛起,这种崛起的方式是西方所没有预料到的,其崛起背后的理念也与西方主流政治观点大相径庭,这些理念对于我们进行民主创新富有启迪。

使中国改革开放获得相对成功的最重要理念就是“实事求是”,其核心内容是不相信任何教条,而是通过对事实本身的检验来确定事物的是非曲直。西方这么多年在全世界推动所谓“民主化”,但“民主化”的口号虽然动听,一看事实就会发现很多问题。前面已经综述了东亚民主政体遇到的诸多问题,实际上在整个世界范围内情况也是如此:为什么南斯拉夫一推行西方的“民主化”就崩溃了,为什么苏联这样做也解体了?为什么戈尔巴乔夫在西方那么

受宠,但在本国的支持率连1%都不到?为什么东欧“民主化”已20年了,但根据欧盟权威研究机构的评估,其民主品质普遍还不如陈水扁主政时的中国台湾?它们的经济命脉也完全被西方公司控制了。为什么整个第三世界都找不到一个通过西方民主化而解决了腐败问题并实现了现代化的例子?随着伊拉克战争的演变和“颜色革命”的接连失败,世界上相信西方“历史终结论”者越来越少。发展中国家照搬西方模式也几乎是照搬一个,失败一个。西方自己政治体制改革也任重道远,否则怎么会有今天冰岛的破产,怎么会有法国最近数百万人上街抗议,怎么会有美国堪称世界第一的金融腐败和如此严重的经济危机?

基于这种对事实的判断,我认为东亚国家,乃至所有的非西方社会在民主建设上都要考虑另辟蹊径,如果不是这样做,而是继续沿着西方民主模式走下去,可能是一条代价巨大甚至完全走不通的路。这里还要指出中国台湾和韩国的情况:他们是在基本实现了现代化之后转而采用西方政治制度的(东欧大部分国家也是在中等工业化国家的基础上转而采用西方政治模式的),但他们的民主品质无法令人恭维,这就使我们不得不质疑整个西方民主模式及其话语对于非西方社会的适合性,也许美国《新闻周刊》主编扎卡里的“文化传统决定论”更有道理,他认为非西方文化传统国家采用西方民主模式的结果往往是“非自由的民主”,即西方民主的形式都在,但有形无神,真正的民主品质却大打折扣,甚至荡然无存。^①

(二) 尊重传统的重要性

东亚社会有着与西方社会迥然不同的文化传统,如果说西方传统的最大特点是以个人为基础而形成的一整套风俗、习惯和制度,那么东亚国家传统则更多是以家庭及其衍生出来的人与人的关系而形成的一整套风俗、习惯和制度。我们可以从 East Asian Barometer 进行的调查中看到,东亚国家和社会,虽然发展程度不同,但大都保留着这种与西方不同的文化传统(见表4)。

^① Fareed Zakaria, *the Future of Freedom*, WW Norton & Company, New York & London, 2003

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

表4 东亚社会传统价值观的影响(%)

	中国 香港	中国 台湾	菲律宾	日本	韩国	中国 大陆	泰国	蒙古	平均
家庭利益高于 个人利益	90.2	86.1	72.7	79.0	69.9	91.0	88.1	73.6	81.3
请长者来帮助 解决争端	36.9	68.9	66.2	75.8	44.2	72.4	76.7	70.9	64.0
与邻居发生争 议,我可以让步	67.1	46.1	75.4	45.8	71.4	71.9	50.7	82.3	63.8
如果同事都反 对,我也不坚持	53.4	63.0	61.4	57.0	61.4	51.6	62.3	66.7	59.6

资料来源:2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys。

美国学者 David Hitchcock 也曾对中国、日本、韩国、泰国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、菲律宾等七国和美国的国民进行了民意调查^①,他发现东亚民众的社会价值观与美国人的社会价值观存有巨大的差别:美国人强调个人权利,而东亚民众更强调人与人的关系所形成的秩序。东亚和美国民众社会价值认同中的优先顺序为:

东亚:(1) 社会秩序;(2) 和谐;(3) 政府问责制;(4) 接受新思想;(5) 言论自由;(6) 尊重权威;

美国:(1) 言论自由;(2) 个人权利;(3) 个人自由;(4) 公开辩论;(5) 生存;(6) 政府问责制。

实际上这些调查只是再次确认了东亚国家多数人基于常识判断可以得出的结论。鉴于这种文化传统的巨大差异,建设民主的最佳途径就不应该是一味改造自己的文化以适应西方文化及其西方文化影响下产生的政治制度。西方那种以个人权利为基础的法治传统,在非西方社会很难复制,少数地方可以复制,多数地方很难复制。比方说,中国乃至东亚的文化特点是讲“合情合理”,而西方文化一般只讲“合理”,不讲“合情”,彻底改造这种东亚文化的成功概率不高,正

^① David Hitchcock, "Asia values and the United States: How much conflict?", Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.

确的做法应该是了解双方文化的长处和短处,并在此基础上,取长补短,进行体制创新。

再比方说,中国以家庭及其延伸关系为特点的文化具有“一方有难、八方支援”的传统(这个关系从家庭成员延伸到亲戚、朋友、同事之间,延伸到地方与地方之间),这种传统帮助中国人克服了很多在西方人看来似乎不可思议的困难:从上学、治病、养老、购房,到帮助下岗工人,到抗震救灾都是这样。你一定要把中国家庭成员的弹性的亲密关系都改造成美国一样的刚性的契约关系,并认为这才是唯一正确的道路,这在中国,乃至在整个东亚社会都行不通,正确的态度应该是把两者之长结合起来,进行创新,也就是我讲的所谓“超我者达”。

民主的核心是体现人民的意志,在这一点上,东亚和西方可以取得共识。西方自己认为他们已经从数百年的实践中,从自己的文化传统中,创造出了能够体现人民意志的民主制度,也就是多党竞选制度。尽管也有不少人,包括我在内,认为这种制度无法真正体现人民的意志,大概只是体现了西方选民在投票那一瞬间的意志。当然,如果美国多数人真的认为小布什被选上了总统,包括他八年的治理无能,体现出来的都是全体美国人民的意志,那我无话可说,只能说是美国人自作自受吧。实际上西方太故步自封了,他们的制度非好好改革不可,否则怎么能真正体现人民的意志,美国民众在布什当政的八年中无法改变其错误的政策就是一例。在东亚情况也类似,学习了美国民主模式的中国台湾,选出了一个得票不到40%的陈水扁,算不算代表了台湾人民的意志?如果是,那么他八年的贪腐无能,也代表了台湾人民的意志?我始终认为美国制度之所以弊端众多还能维持下来,主要原因不是它这个制度的力量,而是因为它占有多于发展中国家30多倍的人均资源,去掉资源占有的差距,哪怕一半,它那个制度都难以继。

其实,东亚社会,乃至整个非西方社会,都应该努力从自己的实际出发,从传统与现代的互动中来不断地探索自己的发展道路,探索新型的民主制度,只有这样形成的政治制度才会有生命力的,代价比较小的,效果更加好的。把强调个人权利的西方“斗争文化”照搬到强调权利与义务平衡的“和谐文化”社会中,总会遇到水土不服的问题,搞得不好,还会引起社会的激烈对抗和分裂。

这里还可以用台湾作为例子来说明这个观点:台湾社会本质上是中国传统文化影响下形成的社会,过去六十多年中也没有中断中国传统的儒家教育,经济

起飞后又形成了较为庞大的中产阶级,台湾的社会本来应该是一个比较和谐的社会。我自己曾多次访问过台湾,特别是台北地区,可以感受到台湾社会受“温良恭俭让”儒家文化的长期熏陶,存有一种令人温馨的文化底蕴,许多方面的经验真是值得大陆借鉴。我一直认为台湾社会完全可以在这种和谐文化的基础上发展出一种理性协商和对话的民主制度。但不幸的是,台湾完全照搬了美国式“对抗民主”,全盘接受了僵化的美国民主话语,特别是把程序民主等同于实质民主,把民主等同于几年一次的领导人选举,把选举等同于竞选,把竞选等同于营销,于是大家开始拼金钱、拼资源、拼谋略、拼公关、拼形象。这种民主的简约化、市场化、庸俗化是台湾民主品质走低的主要原因,这种美式民主,在美国内部,在欧洲都广受批评。亏得台湾在“民主化”之前已经积累了相当的财富,形成了比较大的中产阶级群体,还有大陆出于善意“留给”它的大量外汇盈余,所以台湾还经得起这样的折腾,如果换到一个不甚富裕的社会,这样折腾的话,整个社会是要崩盘的。即使台湾也得当心,如果再不提高民主的品质,台湾社会还会继续下滑和沉沦。

(三) 摆脱西方话语的束缚

为了建立真正体现人民意志的民主体制,必须首先摆脱西方僵化的政治话语的束缚,特别是所谓“民主与专制”话语的束缚。亚洲不少人也喜欢用“民主与专制”这个概念来解释为什么必须选择西方民主道路,甚至不假思索地全盘接受西方政治话语。“民主与专制”这个概念在今天还有多少诠释能力?这个概念已沦为一种意识形态的工具,它把千差万异的世界政治形态过分简约化了;这个世界只剩下民主与专制的对立,不是民主就是专制,而民主是好的,专制是坏的,专制就是法西斯,就是希特勒。

如果世界真可以这么简单分类,那么民主制度选出了仇视人类的希特勒该怎么解释?西方认为非常不民主的那个新加坡,其国家治理水平明显高于中国台湾和韩国,更不要说第三世界的大批所谓民主国家了,这该怎么解释?萨达姆时期的伊拉克是专制社会,美国入侵后的伊拉克是民主社会,但迄今大部分伊拉克人还是认为,今天的民主还不如过去的专制,这又该怎么解释?

把这个概念套到中国也面临窘境。西方把蒋介石时代叫专制,把毛泽东时代叫专制,把邓小平开创的新时代也叫专制,而经历过这些时代的人都知道这些

时代间的巨大差别。这一事实本身就表明了民主与专制概念的局限性。其实,只要有点“实事求是”的精神,就可以点破这种西方话语的盲点。“民主与专制”的二元对立确实已经无法解释当今这个复杂的世界了,想用所谓世界民主国家联盟的方法来处理当今的世界事务更是愚不可及。既然“民主与专制”概念无法解释上述这些简单的事实,那么有没有比民主与专制对立这种观念更具有阐释力、更客观中性的概念呢?有。世界政治如果需要简约地分为两大类的话,我认为那就应该是良政(good governance)与恶政(bad governance)两大类。^①

(四) 良政才是关键

现在国际社会还没有对 good governance 形成普遍接受的定义,一些国家想垄断这个概念的定义,但很难做到。我个人以为,中国人的“以人为本”、“励精图治”两个观念,就是对“良政”的一个很好的界定。这样的界定,中国老百姓都懂,外国人理解也不困难,其基本含义就是要想尽一切办法,作出一切努力,为了人民的利益把国家治理好。

2008年12月,笔者去印度尼赫鲁大学讲学,谈了中国发展模式,中国模式在消除贫困和实现现代化方面的效果远远好于其他模式,一位在场的印度学者问笔者“您是不是想证明‘专制’比‘民主’更有效率”,笔者回答:“您错了,不是‘专制’比‘民主’更有效率,而是‘良政’比‘恶政’更有效率。中国模式的相对成功表明:不管什么政治制度,最后一定要落实到‘良政’才行,落实到中国人讲的‘以人为本’、‘励精图治’才行。‘良政’可以是西方政治制度,如瑞士的政治体制,也可以是非西方的政治制度,如新加坡、中国香港特区的政制,中国在这方面虽有不足,但远比绝大多数发展中国家做得好;‘恶政’可以是西方政治制度,如海地、伊拉克、菲律宾、刚果、格鲁吉亚的政制,也可以是非西方政治制度,如缅甸的政制。”

中国改革开放的一条重要经验就是从“内容”和“结果”来判断一项政策、一种政治制度的质量,邓小平在1992年南巡讲话中把社会主义界定为三个“有利于”:有利于发展社会生产力,有利于增强综合国力,有利于提高人民的生活水

^① 张维为:《中国触动全球》,新华出版社2008年版,第229—335页。

平^①。这个思路对我们讨论民主建设也有启发,因为邓小平把判断社会主义的重点放在“内容”和“结果”上,而不是放在“形式”和“程序”上,这样做的最大好处就是为社会主义的“形式”和“程序”创新留下了无穷的空间。实际上,即使从西方民主理论本身来看,今天西方主要国家把民主简化为“程序民主”,其实也是对民主理念的“严重异化”,并因此而带来了大量的问题,使这个世界充斥了大量劣质民主,也使西方社会无法解决自己大量的社会问题,更不要说进行全球治理了。我们现在看来确实需要从“内容”和“结果”出发,从实现“良政”出发来探索新型的民主制度的“形式”。

这个观点对于只强调“程序正确”的西方“民主与专制”话语是一种颠覆,是一种范式变化(paradigm shift),这个变化也更符合我们这个世界的现实。换言之,无论是什么政治制度,最终都必须体现在是否能够实现良政上,体现在自己人民的满意和认同之上,这才能体现实质的民主。西方主流观点认为“形式正义”会自动产生“实质正义”,“形式民主”会自动产生“实质民主”,这是站不住脚的,也是经不起实践检验的。

(五) 探索新型民主制度

基于以上的论述,我认为东亚社会,乃至整个非西方社会都应该大胆地探索如何结合自己文化传统来建立新型的民主制度。也许具体操作上可以遵循这么一个思路:如果说西方民主现在被简约为程序民主,我们可以尝试反过来做,即从内容出发来探索民主的形式。

我不久前曾和一位西方学者就这个问题辩论过一次,我说中国要大胆探索建立新型的民主制度,她说美国政治学家罗伯特·达尔认为民主制度一定要有六个要素(选举产生官员;自由定期选举;言论自由;多种信息来源;独立社团;公民参与),否则就不算是民主国家,至少西方不会承认。我说:您这叫民主教条主义,南斯拉夫这样搞,国家就解体了;苏联这样搞,国家也解体了;第三世界这样搞,一个比一个糟糕,为什么会这样?主要原因有两个:一是害人不浅的福山的“历史终结论”,即认为西方民主模式已经穷尽了人类政治制度探索的历史,这是缺少政治常识的傲慢,这种傲慢以小布什“大中东民主计划”的失败而

^① 《邓小平文选》第三卷,第372页。

大致告终；第二是西方把民主这个概念本末倒置了，民主的内容比形式更重要，现在在西方则变成了形式比内容更重要，罗伯特·达尔对民主的定义也没有摆脱这种思路，这样搞民主，在非西方社会中成功率极低，在西方社会中也产生了越来越多的问题。

我对这位西方学者说：中国民主建设会参考西方的经验，包括这六个要素，但也一定会发掘自己的政治资源。我个人认为中国民主政治的道路是从“内容”和“结果”出发，努力确立“三个一流”，即确立一流的人才选拔机制、一流的民主监督机制、一流的社会协商机制，最终落实到人民的“优良的生活”。在努力实现这些民主社会的目标过程中，我们会大胆探索各种新的民主形式，直至成功。至于西方是否承认，我们不是很在乎，就跟中国经济改革成功一样，西方到现在还不承认中国是市场经济，我问她，是不是要等到中国成了世界最大经济体的时候再来承认？其实，在十三亿人口的中国试验成功的东西就是真理，民主进程也是这样，到时候还不知道谁来承认谁呢。历史上，西方自己的民主模式也是这样一路走来，并最终成为强势模式的，例如英国创立了君主立宪制，但很长时间内，别人还是把它看作“贵族国家”，而非民主国家。

在探索新型民主的过程中，中国改革开放中的三条经验十分重要。

一是走渐进改革的经验主义道路，从现实出发，而不是从一个完美的理想设计出发，循序渐进，不断试验，发挥人民的首创精神，不要给自己设定过多的框框，摸着石头过河，最终总会到达彼岸，并逐步形成自己比较完整的新体制框架。

二是内需驱动，从中国的实实在在的内需出发，从有效的内需出发，因为只有有效内需驱动的改革才会比较稳健。什么叫有效的内需？有效的内需就是一个国家的思想、文化、民情等方面产生的真正的内需，这才是政治改革最大的内在动力。就中国目前阶段，最强的内需大概是反腐机制建设、党内民主机制建设、服务型政府的建设和法治社会的建设。非西方国家采用西方政治体制而不断失败的一个重要原因就是这些国家不是从自己国内的内需出发，而是跟着西方的指挥棒起舞，结果成了从西方国家的要求出发，严重脱离本国人民的真实需求，例如老百姓要求创造就业，减少犯罪，议会却天天争论修宪、废除死刑之类的事情，这样的做法能不失败吗？

三是民生为大，也就是说不仅国家的主要任务是改善民生，而且民主建设也要着眼于在更高、更广的层次上全面提升人民生活的品质，落实到政府为百姓提

全球化、亚洲区域主义与中国的和平发展

供更为优质的服务上,落实到让人民过上更安全、更自由、更幸福、更有尊严的生活上。第三世界民主试验之所以频频失败的一个主要原因就是西方大力推动的“为民主而民主”,结果是国家政治机器空转,导致无穷的内耗,多数老百姓的生活不是变得更好了,而是更糟了,这样的民主自然难以为继。

有了这三条,非西方社会应该可以逐步摸索出符合自己国情的民主道路和形式,甚至在民主的品质上超过西方。

最后,我想用两个联想来结束这篇文章。

第一,民主建设就像开门一样,门可以推开,也可以拉开。西方文化习惯了推,强调不同利益的差异和对抗,喜欢斗争哲学;而东亚和中国文化更习惯拉,强调不同利益的共生和融合,主张和谐哲学,最后就是看解决问题的实际效果。西方民主模式在非西方文化国家的成功率极低,那一套斗争哲学把多少国家搞得四分五裂,现在东亚国家,包括中国在内都可以探索用拉的方法来打开民主之门,探索建立一种源于自己文化,同时又汲取百家之长、在品质和实效上都超越西方水准的新型民主制度。

第二,中国2008年取得奥运会金牌总数第一,这对于民主建设也有启迪:如果你只认可西方一种体育发展模式,那么一个发展中国家的体育水平大概只能落得个印度今天的水平。印度从上世纪20年代加入奥运会到今天,共拿过2块金牌,但当你像中国那样,把东西方的优势结合起来,进行体制创新,就出现了中国体育事业的迅速崛起和奥运会的辉煌战绩。我们的体育发展模式虽然还有不少问题,可以进一步完善,但总体效果已经远远好于照搬西方体育模式的发展中国家。民主建设也应该走东西方长处相结合的体制创新之路。中国奥运会辉煌战绩的重要启迪就是跟在西方模式后面爬行是毫无希望的,而大胆走东西方的优势互补和体制创新之路,则前景充满希望。